

URBANIZATION IN MALAWI
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
NEW CAPITAL CITY OF LILONGWE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the process of urbanization in Malawi, with special reference to the new capital city, Lilongwe.

At independence Malawi inherited an extremely underdeveloped urban system. It is argued that colonial Nyasaland's involvement in the migrant labour system and its reluctant membership of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were contributory factors, both of which related to Nyasaland's economically and politically subordinate position in Southern Africa. Analysis of the static and dynamic nature of independent Malawi's urban system shows it to be very simplistic. It is emphasized that the growth of the truly 'urban' population in most of the small centres in the urban hierarchy has been slow, and that institutional hindrances and government perceptions of the urban process may dissipate the impact of policies designed to promote their development.

The major aspect of urban policy since 1964 has been the development of Lilongwe, which the government emphasized had two objectives: to create a new capital replacing the colonial creation of Zomba, and to develop a growth centre to promote greater regional equality and act as a counter-attraction to the commercial 'capital' of Blantyre. President Banda's key role in the instigation of this project is emphasized, and it is suggested that the second objective was rhetorically promoted as a justificatory expedient. The results of original research on urban policy implementation and private sector investment in Blantyre and Lilongwe support the contention that government commitment to Lilongwe as a growth centre is weak, and also draws attention to problems inherent in applying such strategies in small, underdeveloped economies such as Malawi's.

Lilongwe's economic development has not been in theoretical accordance with that of a growth centre. Nevertheless although it is proposed that a new capital programme per se cannot be used as a surrogate for a regional development policy, major infrastructural developments in Lilongwe have allowed it to provide a degree of economic competition to Blantyre. These are argued to be mainly associated with government commitment to its development as the capital city rather than its weakly developed growth centre role.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADMARC	Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
ADD	Agricultural Development Division
CCDC	Capital City Development Corporation
DCDP	District Centres Development Programme
DD	Development Division
EPA	Extension Planning Area
IDP	Industrial Development Programme
LCC	Lilongwe City Council
LLDP	Lilongwe Land Development Programme
LUSP	Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan
MDC	Malawi Development Corporation
MHC	Malawi Housing Corporation
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
NRDP	National Rural Development Programme
NSO	National Statistical Office
OPC	Office of the President and Cabinet
RGCP	Rural Growth Centres Programme
SAL	Structural Adjustment Loan
SEDOM	Small Enterprises Development Organization of Malawi
TCPD	Town and Country Planning Department
THA	Traditional Housing Area
TPA	Town Planning Area
TPD	Town Planning Department
UTM	United Transport (Malawi)

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Some Theoretical Issues and Outline

1.1 Introduction

The forces that are shaping the future of Third World countries (1) are many and disparate and urbanization represents one of the most active forces for change. The exact economic, social and political changes wrought by rapid urbanization or particular urban structures are matters for some disagreement amongst urban researchers but rarely is its significance as an important factor in development questioned. The Third World is, and has been especially since the Second World War, experiencing rapid urban growth, and for part of this time the growth rates have not only been high but increasing. Only in the 1970s was there some indication that growth rates were levelling off, although at a very high level.

This phenomenon of a gradual levelling off of urban growth rates is true of Africa also, where in the recent past population growth rates for some individual cities reached extremely high levels. Whilst urban data for many Tropical African countries are scarce and also sometimes of dubious accuracy the following examples give some indication of the order of magnitude of growth experienced by some of the larger cities. It has been estimated that between 1960 and 1970 metropolitan Lagos grew at an average annual rate of 11.5%, Nairobi at 9.6%, Kinshasa at 11.8% (Fair and Davies, 1976), Kampala at 9.2% and Dar es Salaam at 9% (Davis, 1972). In the more urbanized African countries, though the absolute growth of the urban population is still very high, as cities get larger their annual growth rates inevitably slow: for instance in Zambia where 36% of the population was urbanized by 1975, Lusaka's officially reported average annual growth rate was 13.4% from 1963-69, whilst from 1969-74 it was 8.5% (Zambia, Central Statistical Office, 1974).

In Malawi, which is the focus of this study, reasonably comprehensive

data on urban growth are only available for the post-independence period. The first census held in 1966 showed Malawi's level of urbanization to be one of the lowest in Africa, at around 5%. Over the next 11 years up until the next census in 1977, official statistics suggested that Lilongwe, which became the country's new capital city during that period, experienced a fantastically high annual average growth rate of about 16%. Blantyre however, which was (and still remains) Malawi's largest urban centre, had a lower growth rate of 6.4%, and thus its rate of expansion, although very rapid, did not quite rise to the levels that had been experienced in some of the other African cities cited above. It is considered that since Blantyre was by far the largest city in Malawi at independence (its population of approximately 100,000 represented about one half of the total urban population), but was also relative to many other 'primate' African cities still fairly small, it may have been expected that its growth rate in the early years of independence would have been rather higher, if Malawi had been experiencing the same phenomenon in its urbanization process which occurred elsewhere on the continent. Whilst Lilongwe's growth must have affected Blantyre's, Lilongwe's growth must be viewed within the context of its very low initial base population of about 20,000 in 1966 (reaching about 100,000 by 1977). In fact a variety of factors have meant that Lilongwe's official growth rate in the intercensal period was an overestimate, and it is estimated in this study that a (still very high) growth rate of around 12-13% per year is more accurate (see Chapter 6). Furthermore Malawi's census data also recorded a very high total urban growth rate of over 8% per year from 1966-77, with several small centres growing at well over 10% per year, suggesting that overall Malawi was experiencing one of the highest rates of urbanization in Africa. Uncritical acceptance of these figures led some Malawian analysts to emphasize the problem that Malawi was facing during the 1970s and into the 1980s in the sphere of

urbanization (e.g. Mlia, 1978; Town and Country Planning Department, 1979). However these official data for small centres presented a misleading picture of urbanization at the lower end of the urban system because the effects of very significant boundary changes were not taken into account (see Chapter 4). Overall therefore the process of urbanization had not been as widespread nor quite as rapid as it seemed, although Lilongwe's growth was outstanding. Given the low initial base population in urban centres, both nationally and for individual centres (including Blantyre), the potential for Malawi to have experienced urban growth rates after independence comparable to those in other African countries during the 1950s and 1960s was very high, but it is arguable that this situation was not fully realized. It is possible therefore that Malawi may be experiencing accelerating rates of urbanization during the 1980s, therefore lagging temporally behind other African countries where growth rates have now levelled off.

Africa today remains the world's least urbanized region, yet its urbanization rate is the world's highest. It averaged over 5% in the 1970s, and is projected to remain above that level for the remainder of the 1980s. At these levels the continent's urban population will increase from around 140 million in 1980 to 360 million by 2000, which would represent an urbanization level of around 40% (Ramachandra, 1986, p.3). This combination of the lowest levels and the highest growth rates of urbanization make Africa of particular interest in that the urban scene is not yet "set", and thus the effect of the urban process can be studied in action from an early stage. This view is summed up by O'Connor's (1983, p.16) opinion that "Tropical Africa provides almost unparalleled opportunities for the outside observer to see 'cities in the making'." Malawi is especially interesting from this respect if it is correct to view its stage of urbanization as 'incipient'. It also shares the tradition of many other African countries (particularly in the East and

South) of a basically rural pattern of settlement on which a colonial power imposed a low level of urban settlement represented by a particular type of urban system suited to colonial priorities, and then a much swifter rate of urbanization after World War Two and particularly after independence during which it has become apparent that different urban policies and priorities need to emerge. Thus the experience of other African countries will often be applicable to Malawi, and a study of its own urban processes and progress may help to form a better understanding of the phenomenon of urbanization in Africa as a whole, although it must be remembered that the diversity of urban characteristics displayed dictates that international comparisons must be carefully conducted.

Whilst the study of 'cities in the making' may be of academic interest, the justification for the study of an emerging urban system may lie more in the consideration of the impact of that system on the social, economic and political structures of a country as a whole. In this thesis the general characteristics of Malawi's urban system as it has developed from the end of the nineteenth century, and particularly during the past two decades since independence, are described and analysed. Certain aspects of the relationship between that urban system, and general developmental issues in Malawi today, and during the colonial period are also considered (2). Government urban policies are also critically reviewed. The major aspect of government urban policy since independence has been the creation of a new capital city at Lilongwe in the Central Region, replacing the colonial capital of Zomba in the Southern Region. Critical analysis of the development of Lilongwe forms a major part of this thesis including not only examination of processes of decision-making and planning, finance for the new capital, and its internal growth and development, but also its national role. Several countries in Africa have transferred their capital since independence. There are variations in the motives for this policy, and in the internal

characteristics of the new capitals developed (e.g. see Potts, 1985a,b attached herewith), but some governments have included a definite economic role for their new capitals in terms of regional development planning. This is true of Lilongwe but there are a number of important questions about this policy which are addressed in this thesis, which are also relevant to new capital policies in other countries, and to some extent to the implementation of growth centre policies generally in Africa. These include the question of whether the intended growth centre role of Lilongwe was ever more than a merely justificatory political expedient in terms of the original decision-making and motivation for the new capital project, and therefore in relation to this point whether government policies have really addressed the issue of facilitating a growth centre role for Lilongwe. In the context of these discussions some wider issues also emerge. One of these is whether the designation of new capitals as growth centres in the particular context of a poor, underdeveloped economy with little industrial potential actually has much validity, and also, viewing the question to some extent from a reverse position, whether new capitals do in fact have the potential to instigate a certain economic restructuring of the urban system, even if this is not according to the tenets of growth centre theory.

In order to provide a context and background for the present study, certain theoretical issues relating to the role of urbanization in development, and of growth centres in regional planning need to be reviewed, and these are considered in the next section.

1.2 Theoretical Issues

1.2.1 Development Planning and Regional Development Theory

There has been a certain degree of shift in development planning in the Third World over the past thirty years or so from a national, sectoral approach centering on increasing the country's Gross National Product,

towards a more spatially aware approach where the importance of planning for regional equality is recognized. In the former it was hoped that high levels and growth rates of GNP would bring about the sorts of improvement in living standards and economic viability implied in the word "development"; however, by the end of the first Development Decade of the 1960s it began to be realized that this unilineal view of development, which often borrowed heavily from First World economic theory, was inappropriate for the developing countries. Despite some successes in generating high GNP growth rates-often with the help of international aid-the empirical evidence was that the poor remained, on the whole, no better off and "take-off" as postulated by Rostow (1956) had not been reached. Part of the problem lay in the word "development" - not enough thought had been given to what exactly the word actually did imply and planning for some nebulous abstract was likely to have unforeseen consequences. Attempts to define what "development" meant and who it was meant to benefit (e.g. Haq, 1976; Donaldson, 1973; Myrdal, 1972; Seers, 1971; Brookfield, 1973; Smith, 1973) were complementary to increased interest in regional planning as a developmental tool in the Third World (3) (e.g. Gilbert, 1974, 1976; Friedmann, 1966; Friedmann and Weaver, 1979; El Shakhs and Obuhdo, 1974; Stöhr and Taylor, 1981; Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983), since one of the main criteria for adopting this approach is that "a spatial approach to planning decisions might offer a more reliable route to equitable and balanced development" (Gilbert, 1974, p.294).

It is because the problems that characterize the Third World have an explicit spatial component that regional planning has so much to offer. Development does not occur evenly in space and the recognition of this fact and the school of economic theory that has developed from it is the cornerstone of regional development planning. The growth of theory relating to the spatial occurrence of development and its tendency to manifest itself inequitably in socio-economic space has been succinctly

described by Brookfield (1975) and to repeat it here would be wasteful duplication. Suffice it to say that the contributions of such writers as Perroux, through Myrdal and Hirschmann, culminating in John Friedmann's general theory of polarized development have established some of the causal mechanisms that lead to spatial imbalances and form a necessary framework for regional planning policies to work within. However although a theoretical base is necessary, it is not yet sufficient and "we are as yet a very long way from any true general theory" (Brookfield, 1975, p.123). In part this accounts for the problem facing regional planners today - although very often they are all seeking to attain the same goals, without a complete and integrated body of theory about the exact role of factors like urbanization, migration, industrialization, entrepreneurial decisions, and authority-dependency relationships in generating imbalanced development, it is difficult for them to know exactly which elements of the system to manipulate, when and how, in order to achieve their aims.

The role of urbanization is a case in point. That urbanization is an important feature in the Third World has already been established and its role in the causation of regional imbalances is implicit in much of the theory, but the precise mechanisms at work are not explicit. Consequently although it is widely felt that the urban process, the speed of urbanization and the type of urban system a country exhibits have important implications for that country's development both nationally and regionally, exactly what these implications are in a planning context is a matter of some disagreement and discussion to which many writers have contributed (e.g. Gilbert and Gugler, 1982; Soja and Weaver, 1976; Southall, 1979). This obviously leaves urban planners with major problems and, in the context of this study of Malawian urbanization, it is worth quoting the view of a Malawian academic, Mlia (1974, p.81), whose work has embraced the twin themes of urbanization and regional planning in that country:

"granted that the process of urbanization can be both a liability and an asset in terms of national development, there is a vacuum as far as policies for guiding urbanization are concerned. There exists a torrent of interesting ideas on the subject, yet a direction or, much less an agreement, is yet to emerge."

1.2.2 The Role of Urbanization in Regional and National Development

It is felt by many students of urbanization that urbanization is a necessary concomitant of development, especially inasmuch as it is seen by them to be correlated with industrialization. Up to the 1950s this role was hardly questioned. Statements such as "it would appear that significant industrialization is not possible without some accompanying urbanization" and "economic development without industrialization is unthinkable" (Higgins, 1967, p.134 and p.123) sum up this general attitude - obviously during the "growth" decade of the 1960s this sort of analysis was likely to be prevalent. Others also feel that urbanization is generally an asset, but do not tend to hold this view unconditionally and various other factors like location of urban investment within the urban hierarchy are considered. For instance Mabogunje (e.g. 1965; 1968; 1978) has argued that urbanization is likely to promote economic development by the mechanisms of forward and backward linkages of certain propulsive industries only if government investment is guided by the criterion of concentrating in 'growth poles' which have good development potential. Other pro-urban analyses have stemmed from considerations of the urban role in social development, in terms of its ability to generate, adopt and diffuse innovations (Friedmann, 1968; Horowitz, 1967).

Hoselitz' (1955) analysis of 'generative' and 'parasitic' cities was an early attempt to draw attention to the fact that urbanization did not constitute an unmixed blessing in terms of regional development (4). Although his initial assumption is that urbanization is a necessary precondition for economic development, drawing on Redfield and Singer's (1954) model of orthogenetic and heterogenetic cities, he proposed that certain types of cities, particularly those characteristic of the Third

World, are likely to be economically parasitic on their surrounding regions. His analysis is more complex than a simple orthogenetic/parasitic, heterogenetic/generative model, since cities can exhibit a combination of features from Redfield and Singer's city types, and it is their interaction which determines the city's regional impact. For instance he suggested that many Third World cities are economically and culturally dominant in their national context, but subordinate to world metropolises, and this combination tends to produce a city which is parasitic. Parasitism may also stem from incongruities between a city's economic features which are modern (e.g. specific, universalistic) and its cultural/political life which may be particularistic and diffuse. His analysis is essentially spatial as the terms refer to the city's effect on the region within which it is located and is dynamic in that it allows for change over time as certain features change or become predominant.

Hoselitz' ideas have been examined in some detail because it is felt that they constitute a useful starting point for examining other views on urbanization which may acknowledge its potential for stimulating "development" (variously defined), but at the same time also may feel that certain factors are preventing urban processes from fulfilling their potential. These include considerations of rapid urban growth rates, skewed hierarchical development or urban investment bias vis a vis rural investment, or the nature of the authority/dependency relationships between core and periphery.

One of the main characteristics of Third World urbanization which caused this more critical attitude towards its role in development is that much of the urban growth being experienced is not in direct response to the stimulus of industrialization as was the case in the developed countries. This tends to undermine the assumptions concerning urbanization proposed by unilineal developmentalists of the correlation

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a large proportion of the urban population lives in one metropolitan centre" (Gilbert, 1974, p. 92).

Implicit in these ideas is the feeling that there is some optimal form of urban system for each country related to its stage of development, and often that the pattern of urban development at present exhibited in less developed countries does not correspond to this optimum. The reasons for this non-correspondence are often traced to the legacy of an imposed colonial settlement pattern, and to the influence of dependency relationships which link the less developed countries into a network of international capitalism.

1.2.3 Urban Systems and Their Relation to Development

Theories relating to city size and the inter-urban disposition of urban activities and populations owe much to the concepts introduced by Christaller's theory of central places. This is not the place to describe the theory in detail (see Christaller, 1966) which posits that in an ideal spatio-economic framework of competitive equilibrium centres will emerge providing functions for discrete areas in an interlocking lattice which forms a spatial hexagonal system. The hierarchical nature of these settlements has attracted much attention from those studying urbanization as being an element imperfectly exhibited by many Third World urban systems.

Some of the main concepts that have been used in the study of Third World urbanization: rank-size distribution, primacy and, obviously, the need for settlement hierarchies — can be related to Christaller's theoretical study. These concepts and their recommendations for improving the potential of urban systems to generate "development" are often complementary, although paradoxically their policy implication may be discordant (e.g. the policy of deconcentrating urban growth to counteract primacy versus the policy of "decentralized concentration" (Rodwin, 1970)

of the growth centre approach). It is not intended to consider here theoretical and policy issues related to the rank-size rule and primacy, partly because they have been covered extensively elsewhere (e.g. Zipf, 1949; Berry and Garrison, 1958; Berry, 1964, 1973; Linsky, 1965; El Shakhs, 1972; Gilbert, 1974, 1972; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982). Furthermore these concepts are not considered critical to this study of urbanization in Malawi, nor have Malawian policy makers tended to evaluate urban policy needs there in relation to them, although acknowledgement of Blantyre's 'primacy' at independence is contained in policy statements. As O'Connor (1983, p.46) has pointed out, even within the context of increasing primacy in Tropical Africa:

"since this [primacy] is a phenomenon shared with most countries in Latin America, many in South-East Asia and the Middle East, and several in Europe, it should not be regarded as an aberration needing specific explanation. Probably the rank-size rule is best forgotten."

However the literature relating to the spatial expression of urbanization and its hierarchical nature is specifically relevant to this thesis, since such considerations are crucial to the examination of Lilongwe's development as a growth centre, and also to Malawian policies towards the smaller settlements in its urban system.

1.2.4 Urban Planning Strategies for Regional Development

It is possible to identify two strands of planning recommendations emanating from reservations about the spatial form urbanization has taken in the Third World. The first is represented by the body of literature on 'growth centres' representing the policy of 'concentrated decentralization'; the second is related to this approach but is more concerned with the creation of an hierarchical urban structure and is associated with the analysis of service centres and the promotion of smaller urban centres.

1.2.4.1 'Growth Centres'

In 1955 Perroux identified the concept of growth poles: areas in

economic space which have particularly high potential for generating high growth rates. This potential was derived from an initial innovation and the existence of certain types of industries which have high propulsive properties because of their forward and backward linkages. Since this concept was first introduced, it has been used extensively in economic analyses and the definition of the term has become increasingly nebulous (see Moseley, 1973; Gilbert, 1975). The types of towns which have been proposed as performing the function of a growth pole/growth centre (the two terms having become almost interchangeable) are very variable, from settlements over 15,000 to ones with populations of 50,000-500,000 (Carol, 1955; Misra, 1972 cited in Moseley, op cit), and including centres whose characteristics adhere to a more strict interpretation of Perroux's term with the presence of particularly economically favourable industries being necessary (Hermansen, 1972). Some feel that this has rendered the concept almost worthless to a regional development planner (Moseley, op cit), but nevertheless it is often recommended as a policy that balances a skewed urban system if this is seen as undesirable. It is also a basic assumption of the growth centre approach that the new or stimulated centre will be a positive economic element creating new growth and adding to the gross national product, often exploiting economic opportunities previously ignored when the primate city constituted the country's only 'core' area. John Friedmann was particularly associated with this approach as an antidote to the exigencies of the core-periphery process. His analysis and description of the processes which tend to cause the polarization of a country's economic space into a growing core and stagnant or declining periphery, relating this process to the stage of development and the urban system, draws heavily on the disequilibrium theories of Myrdal (1957) and Hirschmann (1958) and has been applied empirically to the case of Venezuela (Friedmann, 1966). In the Venezuelan case Friedmann was involved in the setting up of a growth centre in the region of Guayana

which utilized unexploited resources and which it was hoped would provide self-sustaining economic growth, benefit the region by increasing incomes and stimulating new avenues of production by the industrial linkages effect, and assuage regional sentiments by offsetting the Caracas region. Opinions vary as to the success such policies have had in fulfilling all these hopes, particularly in the field of stimulating the surrounding rural areas (Gilbert, 1974; Appalraju and Safier, 1976). Many however favour this approach because they see it as providing the answer to the opposing goals of regional planning: efficiency and equity. They feel it combines the need to concentrate limited investment resources in order to achieve the increases in national income necessary to improve standards of living, with the acknowledged need to make some effort to balance regional development so that alternative economic potential is not overlooked by the tendency to polarize, and political and social consideration are not ignored (e.g. see Mabogunje, 1978; Mlia, 1975b; Pioro, 1972). Particularly from the 1970s on, these sorts of considerations have made growth centres a recognized element in Third World national development plans when regional equity is recognized as a desirable goal (e.g. Tanzanian 2nd Five Year Development Plan, 1969-74; Iran 5th Development Plan, 1974-78; Malawi Statement of Development Policies, 1971-80; Kenya 2nd Development Plan 1970-74 and 3rd Development Plan 1974-78; also see Appalraju and Safier, 1976). Mabogunje (1965), for example, criticized Nigeria's Six Year National Development Plan of 1962-68 for not recognizing the importance of growth centres and for spreading their investment of social overhead capital too widely over the country's urban centres, instead of directing investment allocation by identifying the centres which would utilize investment most efficiently to generate economic growth.

However although there are many aspects of the growth centre approach to recommend it to the regional and urban planner, there are also reasons

to have reservations about it. For instance, if it is accepted that there are problems associated with concentrated growth and large cities, to counteract them with more concentrated growth in other large urban areas may accentuate the problem if the presumed growth centre spread effects do not work. The setting up of a new centre may also be extremely costly (this has been one of the major reservations given by detractors of Malawi's new capital), and if this expense is met by transferring resources from other centres or sectors of the economy, or by massive borrowing likely to cause severe debt repayment problems in the future, it may be that the overall benefits of the new centre are negligible or even negative. The question of spread effects is absolutely crucial - Perroux's initial concept assumed economic spread in terms of backward and forward linkages, and urban centres are often seen as being centres of social and political change. If the mechanisms of spread are integrated into growth centres, it might be felt that the more growth centres the merrier. Geographers have identified urban areas as important factors in the spread of modernization (Soja, 1968; Riddell, 1970; Rodwin, 1970) although this must be set against McGee's (1971, p.31) view that "in the context of Third World countries, it seems that a theoretical framework which regards the city as the prime catalyst of change must be discarded". However if the city's role as a 'modernizer' is accepted, this still leaves aside the problem of what sorts of innovations are being spread for, as Adams (1970) pointed out, many aspects of modernization are very undesirable.

Even should the less desirable aspects of 'modernization' be controlled, (e.g. prostitution, cultural breakdown), and the mechanisms, theoretically and empirically described (Hagerstrand, 1972; Pedersen, 1970), are acknowledged, are the characteristics of Third World urbanization such that beneficial forces for change are likely to be generated within them without some basic changes in the structural causes

of their undesirable characteristics? In a country oriented towards export production for an alien metropole, and in a position of political and economic dependence vis à vis the world metropolis (Frank, 1966), the centrifugal forces attributed to urban areas by dependency analysts may outweigh the centripetal forces attributed to them by some economists. To some extent the strict definition of a growth centre's properties should prevent this but as discussed, in practice, the growth centre concept has become much more diffuse. In fact empirical evidence exists that questions the operation of beneficial spread effects outwards from growth centres in to their respective regions. Gilbert's (1975) study of development indicators in the vicinity of Medellin in the department of Antioquia in Colombia found that the low levels of development in the surrounding rural areas reflected the failure of the 'trickle-down' process and were rather "a consequence of the nature of their relationship with the growth centre" (ibid, p.331). He concludes therefore that "social services and infrastructural improvements do not diffuse from growth centres beyond a certain limited area....and regions beyond the immediate vicinity of the growth centres receive little in the way of positive benefits". Gilbert's study is considered of particular relevance to Lilongwe's potential as a growth centre and further reference is made to it in Chapter Five. The implications of the study for less developed countries are that if a growth centre strategy is adopted in the expressed hope that it will induce rural and regional development, it is unlikely to be successful unless existing rural-urban relationships are modified, since it is these which, in part, caused many of the conditions the growth centres are meant to change. This point is reiterated by Mabogunje (1977, p.16) who stated:

"a growth centre is not regarded as bringing about development simply because it achieved growth in itself but only to extent that it induced it in the surrounding rural area....Only to the extent that....new and appropriate rural structures are created as a necessary complement to industrial investments in urban centres, or old wineskins are replaced by new ones, can urban-rural

relationships in less developed countries come to engender the kind of cumulative development process with which advanced countries have become familiar."

1.2.4.2 Service Centres and Urban Hierarchies

From the viewpoint of redressing the basic imbalances between the rural and urban areas, and between different regions, some feel that the growth centre approach has less to offer than promoting the development of a network of urban centres, arranged in a hierarchical sequence (although the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive). The main spatial impact of a growth centre is limited to the region in which it is located, and few Third World countries can afford to develop a regional network of such centres.

The type of hierarchical pattern of urban settlement identified by Christaller is felt by some to represent the most efficient system for distributing the central functions of urban areas. Elements of an urban hierarchy have been identified in Third World settlement patterns (e.g. Abiodun, 1968; Grove and Huszar, 1964; Funnell, 1976), but it is widely felt that this characteristic is not sufficiently developed in Third World urban systems. The advantages of a hierarchical system are presented as being both economic and social as evident from the following statement:

"The advantages of a rational distribution of service centres cannot easily be measured in terms of monetary costs; but there is no doubt that considerable financial savings are possible....A proper distribution of service centres can create a new sense of social and political unity in the country's various regions, preventing the drift of the most energetic and ambitious people to the big cities, and making maximum use of resources. The establishment of a new centre or the upgrading of an old one can provide a powerful stimulus to the general development of an area....This is especially true if basic economic activities, particularly manufacturing industry, are located in the same places as central services." (Grove and Huszar, op cit, pp. 10-11)

The reservations, discussed above, about the mechanisms and nature of spread effects are obviously applicable to this approach too, and although an hierarchical settlement pattern is said to aid diffusion (Pedersen, 1970), an empirical study of diffusion mechanisms in India came to much the same conclusions about the nature of hierarchical and neighbourhood

diffusion as Gilbert did for growth centre spread in Colombia (Blaikie, 1976). However the distribution and provision of services is often stressed as an important element of a hierarchical network of settlements, more than in the growth centre approach, and even if the area affected by a settlement is very limited, a whole system of settlements will have more impact than one growth centre. In terms of counteracting over-concentration in one or a few large cities, the generation of an urban hierarchy implies both decentralization and deconcentration as opposed to the decentralized concentration needed for growth centres. Johnson (1970) felt that the creation of an extensive hierarchical urban network was vital for the developmental prospects of the Third World, and that access to fairly small market towns for all the population would prevent the emergence of backward sloping rural supply curves by providing demand for increased production as well as a supply outlet for rural demand. In his analysis he rejects as a 'myth' the possibility of a major development impetus arising from the wisdom supposedly embodied in rural villages, and also rejects the strategy of concentrating industry in a few centres, despite possible monetary economies that might be achieved.

Although the settlement pattern identified by Christaller has been likened to the rank-size rule (Berry and Garrison, 1958), those who feel that the existence of a system of different sized urban settlements is likely to improve development potential in the Third World do not necessarily subscribe to the supposed advantages of that rule. Spengler (1967) said that it should be avoided in fact since it is likely to involve the existence of some very large cities. He suggested that the optimum size for cities in Africa was about 100,000 but that some sort of urban hierarchy with an upper tier of a system of cities of this size should be encouraged.

Others have also identified particular levels of the urban hierarchy which they feel deserve particular consideration. For instance Taylor

(1974) singled out small urban centres of 800-5,000 people as being especially able, in his opinion, to implement developmental aims in the Kenyan context - possibly more so than "the deliberate artificial creation of a 4-fold urban hierarchy" (ibid, p. 157), as proposed in Kenyan urban policy. With special reference to Africa, Funnell (1976) directed his attention to the role of small service centres ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 people. He admitted that it was not really appropriate to term some of the settlements 'urban', but nor did he feel that they are merely hamlets or villages. His analysis of the relationships between these centres and the rural population in terms of their roles as providers of social services, suppliers of goods and services, and centres for agricultural production and generators of growth impulses involves a consideration of both the benefits as identified by writers such as Johnson, and the costs as identified by Frank and others. He concluded that the centres provide important social, commercial and administrative functions but for only a limited proportion of the rural population, and that the problem of identifying an efficient spatial pattern of service facilities, and using service centres to disseminate new ideas had not yet been solved, although the application of network analysis could be very useful for helping to channel services and innovations through the most beneficial locations.

More recently some researchers have reached more negative conclusions about the role of small urban centres in development in Africa (e.g. Southall et al, 1979). The implications of these views are considered in greater detail in Chapter 4, in the context of a discussion of Malawi's policies towards its small centres.

The problem of population thresholds necessary for the emergence of particular services has been identified in theory and was one of the guiding principles behind attempts to group dispersed rural populations into more concentrated settlements in Tanzania. There it was felt that

rural development was a most important goal and that improvements in the rural population's standards of living could not be achieved without providing access to basic services, which could not be done unless rural people were grouped into some sort of network of rural villages, hence the operation of the villagization programme. Although these villages are not urban, their creation is indicative of the interest in manipulating settlement patterns to achieve developmental goals, and the generation of various hierarchical patterns suited to different types of functional regions, with the village as an integral component, has been proposed in the Tanzanian context. In this analysis areas with the highest industrial potential would require a more complex and developed hierarchical settlement pattern to create optimal conditions for socio-economic progress than areas of low agricultural potential, for example (Pioro, 1972). The idea of adapting settlement hierarchies to suit particular local conditions has much to recommend it, and policy recommendations of "filling the gaps" to resemble more closely the characteristics of a Christaller-type system, as advocated by Grove and Huszar (op cit) for Ghana, have been criticized for making "unwarranted assumptions" about the appropriateness of existing hierarchies for fulfilling their supposed role (Funnell, op cit). Obviously the conditions found in most African countries are vastly different from those displayed in the developed countries which served as a basis for Christaller's model, and modifications are therefore necessary if it is to be used as a regional planning tool. The definition of areas that qualify as urban by virtue of their provision of some sorts of urban functions is likely to need adapting to local conditions; often this is set at a threshold far below those used in developed countries. In Sierra Leone, for example, this has been set as low as 1,000 and 2 or more central place functions (Harvey, 1966, cited in Mitchell, 1972) although Mitchell revised this to 2,000 and 5-8 central place functions for a more strict 'urban' definition.

Several empirical studies of the existing settlement patterns in African countries have been conducted, which often utilize central place functions to identify hierarchical levels (e.g. Abiodun, 1968, 1971; Davies, 1967; Mitchell, op cit). A more sophisticated attempt to analyze the Tanzanian urban system through principal components analysis concluded that functional specialization was almost negligible, and that no integrated hierarchical system of towns existed (Hirst, 1973). The poor integration of the urban system was exhibited by an analysis of urban-urban phone calls which showed that the empirical pattern did not conform with the 'ideal' pattern of centres having primary links with the nearest next level centre. A similar analysis of the Malawian urban system is conducted in this study, and the results lead to very similar conclusions (see Chapter 4). Later Hirst (1975) used complex telephone transaction analysis to study East African urban hierarchies and indicated that national inter-urban linkages were relatively weak, and that development planners could use this technique to identify weaknesses in urban hierarchies which would help to combat regional inequality.

Network analysis of transport routes has been used in Sierra Leone to identify hierarchical levels of transport 'nodes' which were then clustered to form functional development regions. It was felt that the nested regional landscape has many advantages for development planning:

"Because the nodes are ordered hierarchically, it may be feasible to structure development through higher order nodes to lower order nodes centres....This approach to regional planning will, in the main, cause the development of medium-sized towns that are presently absent from the urban hierarchy of many developing countries." (Harvey, 1972, p. 236).

By analysing the resources available in each node and region and comparing them with the expected number for the population, it was felt that problems which might hinder the transmission of growth impulses down through the nested regions and from nodes to periphery could be identified and removed. Harvey concluded that disparities between regions and especially between primary and secondary nodes were striking and if this

was not rectified the nodes could become what Friedmann termed "major points of strangulation within the fabric of their development".

Empirical studies using interaction analysis for identifying spatial settlement structures in Kenya and Nigeria have also been performed, and have emphasized the importance of this approach for guiding the allocation of development funds to create

urban systems which will play a positive role in regional development (Mckim, 1978; Ajoku Nwala, 1972). The oversimplicity or underdevelopment of African urban network integration has also been emphasized by McNulty (1972).

It is apparent that African urban systems suffer from major imbalances in terms of their functional characteristics and inter-urban linkages, which many feel are preventing the urban network from embodying and directing the processes of welfare distribution, innovation diffusion, migration, investment and political decision-making in a beneficial way for the achievement of regional development and greater equality.

1.2.5 The Colonial Influence on the Urban System

The presence of maladaptive forms of urbanization can be traced back, in part, to the urban foundations which evolved during the colonial period. Historical analyses of the pattern of urbanization in most African countries demonstrate the influence colonial priorities had on the type of system that emerged (e.g. Mckim, 1978; McNulty, 1976; Soja and Weaver, 1976; Mlia, 1975a,b). These priorities were basically trade and administration and the consequent urban settlements tended to be located in accordance with the need to channel resources out of the country, and therefore to be on direct transport links to the coast, and to administer the colonized area. Health and racial segregation were also factors, and often settlements would be deliberately located so as to avoid existing African settlements. Another factor was the location of missionary

settlements which were less influenced by these forces and tended towards separate sites (Soja and Weaver, 1976). In West Africa an indigenous urban tradition already existed, but even here underlying similarities in the urban system stem from the colonial process, which McNulty (op cit) has identified as characterized mainly by coastal orientation, peripheral location, simplistic structures and polarization. In East Africa, where such a tradition was much less evident, the imprint of the colonial spatial structure was even more important in influencing the urban system which was inherited at independence. Since it has been recognized that the spatial and structural characteristics of an urban system can affect a country's developmental prospects, it has been felt that a system organized to facilitate the objectives of a colonial power is unlikely to fulfil the needs of an independent country, and will probably hinder them. Primacy, the lack of development of medium-sized towns, alignment of urban settlements with simplistic externally oriented transport routes, and concentration of infrastructural services have all been identified as products of colonialism. For the case of East Africa, though the argument is applicable to much of the Third World, Soja and Weaver (op cit, p.249) have written:

"whether the drainage [of resources] was large or small is not as important as the fact that the social and spatial structures which evolved were designed to distribute scarce resources in such a way as to promote an exploitative emphasis in economic relations, to facilitate control and domination by a non-indigenous colonial elite, and to solidify a condition of dependency within the international market system....This process of underdevelopment brought with it many beneficial side effects, such as improved health and nutrition, modern educational facilities, better farming techniques, and easier transport and communications. But the distribution of these benefits served primarily the interest of British and other colonial powers rather than indigenously expressed demand and local development potential....Whatever the benefits of underdevelopment might have been, it has engrained a framework of social and spatial relations and an associated pattern of urbanization which is inherently antithetical to an autonomously controlled and socially just process of development."

Therefore a transformation of such patterns by direct governmental intervention is necessary: but urban growth since independence has been

felt to be an elaboration of the colonial structures rather than a transformation (McNulty, op cit). The forces set in motion by the colonial process are difficult to counteract and evolved spatial structures tend to crystallize so that the pattern tends to maintain itself.

The problem of transforming Third World urban systems must be tackled by regional and national development planners but the task is difficult. The political will to bring it about may be lacking if decision-making power rests mainly with elites who benefit from the continuance of the status quo. Also with the lack of agreement on the exact role of urbanization and how best to manipulate the system to achieve policy objectives, planners have to choose between the alternatives with no guarantee that desired results will occur, and the limited resources that many Third World countries can allocate to regional and urban planning means that their planning alternatives are anyway restricted. These factors relating to colonial urban structures are especially relevant to the present study of Malawi, where a specific attempt has been made to restructure colonial patterns by developing a new capital city.

The final sections of this chapter present a brief outline of Malawi and the structure of this study.

1.3 Outline of Malawi

This thesis on Malawian urbanization and the new capital city of Lilongwe necessarily contains within the following chapters discussion of many aspects of Malawi's geography, and in particular the spatial expression of economic development and urbanization. Certain aspects of the nature of politics in Malawi, especially the key role of President Banda, are also covered. It is therefore not intended to cover these issues here, but only to supply a very brief contextual description of points that do not naturally emerge in later discussion.

Malawi is a landlocked African country south of the equator between latitudes $9^{\circ}45'$ and $17^{\circ}16'$ south, and longitudes 33° and 36° east, about 560 miles long, varying in width from 50-100 miles and covering an area of 45,747 square miles. It is bordered to the north and north-east by Tanzania, to the east, south and south-west by Mozambique, and to the west by Zambia (see Map 2.4 in Chapter 2). Its geographical location allows it to be discussed within the context of Eastern Africa and/or Central Africa, but it is here considered to be essentially part of the Southern African regional sub-system because of the orientation of its transport routes, and historical ties.

An outstanding feature of Malawi is its lake which extends roughly two-thirds of the country's length from the north along its eastern side. It is Africa's third largest lake, and lies about 1500 feet above sea-level, occupying the greater portion of the southern extension of the East African rift valley which cuts through Malawi from north to south. It is both an important transport route and source of protein for the country's peoples, as well as being an important potential tourist attraction because of its beauty and relative freedom from bilharzia.

To the west of the lake the country's plateaux rise to a general height of 3,000-4,000 feet (see Map 2.2 in Chapter 2). Rising above these are even higher plateaux like those of Viphya, Dedza and Nyika, which in places reach 5,000-8,000 feet. In the south are the Shire highlands, which attained great economic importance during the colonial ^{an importance} period, which is still maintained to a large extent to this day. These are dominated by Zomba Plateau, ^{(7,000 feet),} again a location of extreme physical beauty, which rises above the old colonial capital of Zomba. Further south is Central Africa's highest peak, Mulanje Mountain (10,000 feet).

The climate is essentially tropical continental, although maritime air sometimes induces a light drizzle in the dry season, which is known as the chiperoni (blankets) in the Shire highlands. Obviously variations in

altitude exert local influences on temperatures - maximum temperatures of over 100°F may thus be experienced in the Lower Shire valley, although generally mean maximum temperatures do not rise above 85°F even during the hottest months of October and November. The rainy season usually occurs between November and April. Annual rainfall averages between 25" and 120" across the country according to altitude and aspect. For example the Lower Shire valley receives particularly low and unreliable rainfall due to rain-shadow effects.

with
 Malawi has certain advantages in terms of its general agricultural potential in comparison many other African countries. It is usually considered that all parts of the country have sufficient rain for dry-land farming. The range of ecological conditions allow both tropical and sub-tropical crops to be grown, such as maize, groundnuts, tobacco, tea, cotton, and sugar. Although the soils are typical of the tropics, often being deficient in certain nutrients, particularly nitrogen, fertilizers are now widely applied, and in combination with the rainfall regime Malawi is usually considered to be a relatively agriculturally stable and fertile part of Tropical Africa. This view is supported by the historical concentration of African peoples there and its success since independence in usually maintaining self-sufficiency in staple food production. It is recognized that other factors contributed to both these points, but it is considered that the natural resource base definitely played a part.

The country is divided into three main administrative regions: the Northern, Central and Southern Regions with the respective regional capitals of Mzuzu, Lilongwe and Blantyre. The population of about 6.5 million people is unevenly distributed partly reflecting physical factors, and partly the spatial impact of economic developments during the colonial period and the years since independence in 1964. The Southern Region is most densely populated with over 220 people per square mile in 1977, compared to 154 in the Central Region and 62 in the Northern. About 90%

of the population remain rural, with the vast majority of people occupied mainly in agriculture, although this ranges from those employed on estates to those engaged in some combination of subsistence agriculture and production of food and cash crops for the market. However there is a great degree of mobility between these sectors. The emphasis of Malawi's development strategies is on the agricultural sector. There ~~is~~ a range of agricultural development projects in specific areas, directed to smallholder production, which have been initiated since independence (e.g. the Kasungu Flue-Cured Tobacco Project, the Lilongwe Land Development Programme, the Lakeshore Rural Development Project), mostly supported by external aid, and more recently a broader National Rural Development Programme was designed to extend coverage to the many peasants not covered by these. However, much emphasis and local financial resources, and political commitment have also been given to the privately owned estate sector, which has grown rapidly since independence, with a massive expansion in the number of Malawian-owned estates.

1.4 Outline of Thesis

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The next two chapters provide the historical geogrpahy of urbanization in Malawi, before independence in Chapter 2, and after independence in Chapter 3, which gives the factual background for analytical discussion. A brief background to the colonial choice of Zomba as capital city is included, as this is crucial to an understanding of the later focus on Lilongwe as the new capital. This descriptive material forms the base in both chapters for exploration of other issues. The very low level of urbanization in Nyasaland (even when compared with other African colonies) is emphasized in Chapter 2, with specific comparisons drawn with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. From this point the rest of the chapter focusses on factors considered to have been influential in holding down the process of urbanization. These include Nyasaland's geographical location (i.e. its

landlockedness), general poverty, and lack of economic development during colonial times, as well as a number of forces which encouraged the decentralization of urban functions at the lower end of the urban hierarchy. The latter factor was common to Eastern and Central African colonial urbanization, but two further major elements are emphasized: Nyasaland's heavy involvement in the Southern African migrant labour system (a factor which was partly both cause and effect of its colonial neglect and underdevelopment), and the deepening of Nyasaland's political and economic dependence by the existence of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953-63. One of the aims of this chapter is therefore to explain why Nyasaland's urban development was so limited, and to show how important external relationships and forces can be in determining the degree of urbanization experienced within a country.

The description of the urban system as it developed after independence, in Chapter 3, includes a major discussion of a problem mentioned earlier - which relates to the official data base on the urban population. The aim of this discussion is to show that most of the small urban centres which make up the majority of Malawi's urban system have in fact not experienced the rates of urban growth suggested by official figures, because of the effect of very significant boundary changes. Various other factors, including the very restricted nature of the 1966 census boundaries, and the possible out-migration of some people from the newly designated 'urban' areas, combined with a lack of suitable alternative data, make it impossible to come to any firm conclusions about the real rate of growth of these smaller centres. However a very approximate estimate has been made by a German consultancy team whose work is drawn upon in the latter part of the chapter. The other two major themes of this chapter are a description and analysis of both the static and dynamic attributes of the urban system, and a critique of urban policies in Malawi (excluding the new capital programme which is

considered in detail in later chapters). The methodology for analysing the urban system includes the use of central place values for the smaller centres (the 'gap' between them and Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zomba being so large that it would overshadow any differentials identified between the smaller centres). The dynamics of the urban system are analysed through the medium of telephone data, and, despite some data problems, this section presents a clear picture of an extremely simplistic urban hierarchy. The results of the analysis of Malawi's urban hierarchy helps to provide a prescriptive input into the final part of Chapter 3, in relation to government policies which are directed at manipulating and developing the lower end of the urban hierarchy.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focus entirely on the development and growth of Lilongwe as Malawi's new capital city. Chapter 5 concentrates on the motivation and decision-making processes which led to the initiation of the new capital programme and the choice of Lilongwe to serve as the new administrative focus. As for other new capitals, a variety of motivations and processes of decision-making appear, on the surface, to have influenced this issue. An important aspect of this chapter therefore is to attempt to disentangle these points, with the intention of showing how paramount political and personal motivations were, hinging on the unique personality and power of Malawi's president. This in turn helps to focus attention on a major theme of this study: the stated growth centre role of Lilongwe and the implications of the real motivations for the true importance and commitment of the government to this aspect of the new capital programme.

Financial and planning aspects of the new capital are considered in Chapter 6. The role and influence of South Africa in both these issues is shown, and again Banda's role is emphasized. Also the nature and capability of the major authority involved in Lilongwe's development, the Capital City Development Corporation, is analysed. The impact of Lilongwe

and its associated infrastructural developments on national development expenditure is emphasized. This chapter provides the background for Chapter 7 which describes the physical development of Lilongwe since the capital city programme began, and shows how the nature of the source of finance and planning can affect a city's internal spatial development in this case particularly in terms of the zoning and shortage of low income housing, and deficiencies in transport.

Chapter 8 turns specifically to the question, already raised in Chapter 5, of Lilongwe's growth centre role. Two hypotheses are examined which are essentially that Lilongwe's development has not contained the features expected of a growth centre, and secondly that the government has not shown a true commitment to promoting this aspect of the new capital's role. The methodology for examining these issues is an examination of appropriate published data which allows comparison between Blantyre and Lilongwe in a number of economic spheres, since Blantyre is the commercial capital to which Lilongwe was essentially meant to provide a counterattraction. Secondly the results of research conducted by the author in 1980 and 1982 are presented. In 1980 a postal questionnaire was sent to a sample of business concerns in Lilongwe which aimed to establish the nature of the city's economy and its relations with its hinterland. In 1982 a series of relatively unstructured interviews with managers of new industrial concerns in both Blantyre and Lilongwe were conducted, focussing in particular on the implementation of stated government policies on promoting Lilongwe's growth centre role, and managerial perceptions of the industrial potential and performance of both cities. The aim is to show how far the government has initiated/maintained a policy commitment to Lilongwe as a growth centre, and how far Lilongwe has succeeded, because or despite of the government, to develop internal economic characteristics and external links with its regional hinterland and the national economy, which might

be expected of a growth centre.

Major conclusions and an evaluation of Lilongwe's development in relation to other new capitals in Africa are presented in the final chapter. Certain common themes as well as contrasts in these programmes are thus identified. The continued low level of urbanization in Malawi and its potential for future accelerated growth is emphasized. The fact that Lilongwe has achieved a degree of economic success, and has provided a modest alternative national urban focus to Blantyre, is also discussed. Perhaps unexpectedly, this is shown to be due in many ways to infrastructural and other economic developments which accompanied its designation as a new capital (though not its capital status per se), which may not have accompanied its development as a growth centre alone, rather than government efforts to promote its growth centre role, as opposed to its national administrative role.

Notes for Chapter One

1. Throughout this work the term "the Third World" is used as a descriptive term to mean those countries in the world where poverty and inequality are major factors and whose development is to some extent dependent on the activities and policies of the industrialized nations. It does not necessarily imply that it is accepted that the world consists of separate entities which are not interdependent and do not comprise a whole.
2. Before independence in 1964 Malawi was known as Nyasaland. Throughout this thesis the country is referred to by the name appropriate to the time period being considered.
3. This is not to suggest that regional planning was a relatively new concept universally. Gilbert (1976) describes how in many developed countries it was an early planning component and sometimes emerged (e.g. in Great Britain) before national planning.
4. Others had much earlier established that urbanization had undesirable economic and social results, reflected in the generation of class conflicts and the inequalities between town and countryside (for instance see Chapters 1-4 in Abu-Lughod (ed) (1977)).

CHAPTER TWO

Urbanization in Nyasaland before Independence

2.1 Settlement Patterns before 1859 and Early British Settlement

Prior to the arrival of Livingstone and the beginning of British interest in the territory that was to become Nyasaland, there was no settlement which could be called 'urban', although by the nineteenth century the population density was relatively high and there existed a network of both local and main trade routes, the latter covering hundreds of miles for trade between the coast and the interior. The impact of the Arab slave trade involved the growth of certain settlements which acted as centres for the movement of slaves to the coast - for instance Nkhota-kota from which there were operating two Arab dhows across the lake when Livingstone visited it in 1859. According to Malawian guide-books, this was the largest indigenous African settlement in Central Africa at the time. Another Arab base was at Karonga at the North end of the lake (Macmillan, 1972) and in the 1880s this also became the northern headquarters of the African Lakes Company.

British interest in the area began with Livingstone's expedition to the Zambezi, Shire and Nyasa region in 1859. This led to the establishment of missions and the beginning of European commercial activity in Nyasaland. The Church of Scotland Mission set up in 1876 at Blantyre, a site chosen by Henry Henderson who "in turning aside praise for having found such a suitable spot for the mission, often talked of it as being a matter of chance" (Ross, 1973, p.159). This decision was to have far-reaching consequences for the eventual pattern of urbanization in Nyasaland. Blantyre's advantages were that it was "comparatively accessible to the lower Shire and the outside world; to the Shire highlands and to the upper Shire and the lake" (Cole-King, 1972).

In 1878 the African Lakes Company started to establish a train of trading stations in the country. Planters concentrated in the Shire

highlands especially round Blantyre, Zomba and Mulanje (Baker, 1971). The main European trade and passenger route from the Shire highlands to the sea was overland to the river ports of either Chiromo on the confluence of the rivers Ruo and Shire, or Chikwawa (also known as Chibisa's in contemporary records) or Katunga's, 10 miles below the Murchison cataracts (Pachai, 1973; 1978), and thence down the Shire to the Zambezi.

2.2 Colonial settlement patterns

Part of Southern Nyasaland was declared a protectorate in 1889, and in 1891 the whole of the 'Nyasaland districts' became a British protectorate under the administration of Henry Johnston as Commissioner and Consul-General. Captain Foot, Britain's Consul and Slave Trade Commissioner to the area in 1883, had used Blantyre as his headquarters. However, in 1886 Foot's successor, Hawes, decided to make Zomba, 43 miles north of Blantyre, the headquarters for Nyasaland's administration. Yet Blantyre, with its cool climate and nearness to the commercial tea and tobacco estates at Mulanje and Thyolo and the export route via the Shire to the Indian Ocean, remained the focus of European settlement and commerce: the core of the urban system had already emerged.

The colonial juggling which ended with Nyasaland as a British protectorate created a country of unusual shape, being 530 miles long and never more than 100 miles wide with the lake taking up roughly a quarter of its total area. Strategic rivalry with the Portuguese to the east over access to the Shire and the lake partly determined Nyasaland's borders. It was therefore a result of European politics and geographical reality that the Southern region and the Shire highlands in particular received the most attention from the colonial power, and that it was here that Malawi's largest town was established. In comparison with other African colonies the location of the main European settlements and agricultural estates in the highlands is unremarkable, the Kenyan "White Highlands" being an obvious parallel. It is also not surprising that commercial

interest remained concentrated in this area throughout the colonial period. Both economic theory in the form of Hirschmann's polarization effects and Myrdal's cumulative causation, and the very geography of Malawi whereby the Central and Northern regions were relatively remote from the original area of British contact and had no direct access to the sea for exports except via the Shire, would lead one to expect such a concentration in the early stages of development.

Blantyre remains to this day Malawi's largest urban centre, and its commercial dominance is still in evidence, despite never being the country's capital city. Zomba, with its beautiful location at the foot of the Zomba Plateau was the Protectorate's capital throughout the colonial period. ^{There has been} Much speculation [^] about the choice of Zomba as Nyasaland's capital, and there seems little doubt that the decision was somewhat arbitrary.

When Captain Hawes chose Zomba as his headquarters in 1886 one reason given was that it was near to the great slave route running from the south end of Lake Nyasa to the Portuguese coast South of Ibo. However there were at least two other such routes further north, and it has been proposed that the sheer beauty of the location was another factor at work. Personal animosities may have been influential as well, as illustrated by a commentary by R.S. Hynde in the Nyasaland Times, 10th August 1923:


"The average person thinks that there must be some deepseated reason why the Government was located at Zomba and not near Blantyre. This unfortunately is not the case. The history of the move is instructive. Consul Hawes, before the British Government took Nyasaland under its protection, located his Consulate at Zomba for personal reasons. He and Mr. John Buchanan did not hit it off with the Europeans settled in and around Blantyre, and as Mr. Buchanan, who was the most prominent landowner, had his place in Zomba, the Consulate was built there. When Sir Harry Johnston came here and took over the country he also found difficulties with the Europeans and missions, and probably influenced by similar reasons to that of Consul Hawes, he adopted Zomba as his capital. Observe that there was no picking out of Zomba for strategic reasons, or for health reasons, or because it was nearer the line of communications. It was purely a matter of personal idiosyncrasy." (quoted in Pachai, 1971, p.36).

Johnston himself admitted the attraction of the "superb scenery" and also

that the selection of Zomba was the cause of "a sense of hostility, emanating from Blantyre", whose residents felt that it was a more logical choice. Objections raised against Zomba were that it was unhealthy, on a cyclone belt, uneconomic because of its distance from the main commercial centre, and later that it was off the railway line.

The railway argument was suspect since the first Foreign Office surveyor's report in 1896 proposed a route from Chiromo to Zomba and thence to the lake, with only a five mile branch line to Blantyre, and this caused considerable outrage amongst Blantyre residents. When the Shire Highlands Railway Company contracted to build the railway the route was Chiromo to Blantyre, but it is impossible to know whether the Blantyre faction had any influence on this choice. In the end the lowering of river levels on the Shire necessitated that this railway started at Port Herald, south of Chiromo; known as the Shire Highlands railway, it was completed in 1908. Undoubtedly the choice of Blantyre as the railway terminus had a most important impact on the future development of that town. The actual location of the terminus was at Limbe, 5 miles from Blantyre, and officially the two remained separate settlements until 1956, but both benefited enormously from their status as the railway head and most of the small industrial and commercial concerns which were established were located here. Their position was enhanced when the railway was extended first to the Zambezi in 1915, and later to Beira in 1922.

A later northern extension of the railway to the lake caused more controversy as an eastern route to Fort Johnston was suggested passing near to Zomba, as well as a more central route to Domira Bay. Eventually in the 1930s the central route was completed to Salima, Domira Bay having been flooded (Pachai, 1971; Stubbs, 1972) (see Map 2.1). Zomba's isolation may well have prevented it assuming anything other than an administrative function.



Map 2.1

**EARLY RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT IN NYASALAND :
PROPOSED AND COMPLETED ROUTES**

Much of Malawi's urban system today is a legacy of colonial administration, which involved the division of the country into districts and location of 'bomas' or government stations which formed the basis of local government. These stations were located according to British administrative and economic needs, and there is no evidence that the indigenous settlement system and concentrations of population were taken into account.

Only a few of the settlements originally established in the 1890s have an urban function today as over the years many original bomas were closed and new ones established in other locations. However those that did grow or were located at already established settlements in the 1890s (e.g. Blantyre, Karonga, Kota-Kota) now form a major part of the urban system. The location of those government settlements established from 1891-96 is shown in Map 2.2, which also indicates those which still retain an urban role today.

Gradually the British consolidated their administrative network and more government stations were opened in the central and northern interior. By the 1920s a settlement pattern was emerging which bore a resemblance to that of today (see Map 2.3). Five townships had been gazetted by this time: Blantyre, Limbe, Zomba, Fort Johnston and Port Herald, and these performed the most sophisticated central place functions in Nyasaland during the early twentieth century.

Most of the rest of Nyasaland's centres performed little other than an administrative function in the early twentieth century, to which was gradually added the role of retail centres. Further transport development added some new centres to this system. Up until 1922 the terminus of the Central African Railway from Port Herald was Chindio in Portuguese East Africa, which was then connected via the Zambezi to Chinde on the coast, which acted as Nyasaland's sea port. However the railway connecting Chindio to the port of Beira was completed in 1922 (see Map




Map 2.3-NYASALAND'S SETTLEMENT PATTERN 1912

Source: Van der Horst, 1912

2.4), and Chinde, which had been administered by the Nyasaland government, gradually diminished in importance (Murray, 1922; Central African Archives, 1951). The completion of the northern extension of the railway to Salima by 1935 meant that new centres to serve the railway appeared, such as Balaka and Sharpevale. Also in this year the Zambezi bridge providing a rail link across the river between the Zambezi railway to Beira and the Central African Railway was completed. Previously a ferry had linked the two and the improved access must have increased the commercial and agricultural advantages enjoyed by those towns and areas on or near the line of rail.

Nyasaland's main settlements as recognized by the 1938 Colonial Report are shown in Map 2.5. Comparison with the 1922 settlement system shows that the new centres established by 1938 came under two categories: new administrative stations such as Neno in the Central Shire district, and a string of small centres which had grown up along the railway. Although the northwards extension of the railway had lessened Blantyre and Limbe's advantage as the railway head, they had enjoyed that position for 27 years and obviously their attractiveness as a location for investment was already established.


No significant changes in the pattern of settlements occurred during and after the war, although the availability of more funds after 1945 (mainly due to the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act) did allow for some improvements in the provision of urban services throughout the system. This period also saw considerable growth of the African urban population in Blantyre/Limbe, Zomba and Lilongwe, although census coverage of urban populations (particularly African urban dwellers) was poor in Nyasaland. The last census (1961), before independence for example, did not enumerate Africans at all.



- — — Shire highlands railway 1908
- - - Trans-Zambezia railway 1922
(Zambezi bridge not opened until 1935)
- Central Africa railway 1915

Note: Chindio on this map depicting the situation in 1922 is not the same as contemporary Chindio which is further south.

Map 2.4 NYASALAND'S TRANSPORT TO THE COAST 1922



Source : After Nyasaland Colonial Report, 1938

2.2.1 Nyasaland's Urban System at Independence

The early evolution of Nyasaland's urban system reflected almost wholly processes operating during the colonial period only. Pre-colonial settlement patterns and economic forces had very little impact. Thus by independence the main features of the Nyasaland system were:

- 1) An administrative capital, Zomba, which, unlike most other African countries had not achieved a primate position in the urban hierarchy. The nature of Zomba's location, and its economic inferiority to Blantyre was a controversial matter throughout the colonial period. The capital was in fact nearly transferred to Blantyre after a cyclone hit Zomba in 1946 (Nyasaland, 1947b), but financial constraints and the then current issue of Federation meant the issue was pushed aside.
- 2) A commercial capital at Blantyre/Limbe which was the country's primate city and had most of its industry and commerce. In comparison to other African countries' primate cities at independence however, Blantyre/Limbe was still fairly small. They had originated as separate settlements but were finally amalgamated as Blantyre in 1956. The population of Blantyre/Limbe then was about 40,500 (Nyasaland, 1956); the later 1961 census recorded 8,500 non-Africans for the township but did not enumerate the African population (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1961).
- 3) A system of administrative stations which had gradually emerged over the years of colonial administration. Not all places chosen as administrative stations during the colonial period kept their status, as many lost their administrative function (which usually meant that the settlement closed altogether), whilst new ones were opened. Those that remained by independence made up nearly all the remaining 'urban' places in the system. These were located entirely according to the administrative principles of the government with no regard for previous settlement patterns. Only at Kota-Kota (later Nkhota-kota) was there an administrative station which coincided with an indigenous town, which in

this case had previously been a centre for the slave trade. Lilongwe was the most developed of these centres, the rest being mainly involved in administration and some trading. In some cases missionary activities were also located at these station; a few missions pre-dated the location of the station itself, as for instance at Blantyre, Kasungu and Domasi.

4) A very limited number of transport and trading centres. Asians and Africans had established thousands of retail outlets all over the country by this time, but very few centres had gained enough status to be recognized as trading centres. Asians tended to concentrate in the administrative stations. However a few centres emerged along the lake steamer route and the railway which were important enough to be mentioned in some contemporary reports as small centres, and also sometimes to attract some investment in public services e.g. Monkey Bay, Chipoka, Balaka, Luchenza, Ntakataka, Mbawa.

5) A small number of missionary stations which unlike the majority of those established in Nyasaland had attracted a fairly large concentration of population. These stations had established relatively high order educational and health facilities and all belonged to the Universities Mission to Central Africa e.g. Livingstonia, Ekwendeni, Loudon.

The main factors affecting the location of these settlements were similar to those operating in other colonies. One factor was the administrative needs of the colonial power. In the early stages the slave trade routes and areas of local rebellion affected the location of administrative stations which were often military establishments. When these stations had achieved their purpose many of the remoter ones were closed; those which remained became part of the administrative network which gradually developed to cover most areas of the territory. Factors affecting the location of other centres were the route of the railway and the lake steamer service; and in the case of the missionary stations, a relatively healthy environment and a suitably receptive population, as

well as a desire to compete with and preferably pre-empt the impact of other brands of Christianity, let alone other faiths (Murray, 1932).

Overall the impact of the process of urbanization in Nyasaland was small, and the urban system inherited at independence was both very limited and unbalanced. The following statement from Fetter (1982, p.93) actually refers to the urban system of 1945, but it very concisely picks out a number of salient factors about Nyasaland's colonial experience which the following sections will develop:

"The most remarkable quality of the colony's urbanization is the absence of it. In 1945 only Blantyre with its satellite town of Limbe constituted a city of over 10,000. To be more precise there were two other towns containing over 10,000 Malawians, but they were outside the colony - Johannesburg and Salisbury! The absence of colonial cities was undoubtedly a result of Nyasaland's poverty."

2.3 Why was Nyasaland's Urban Development so Limited ?

2.3.1 Comparison of Nyasaland's urban development with that of other African colonial territories

Before attempting to identify which historical processes in Nyasaland could be seen as hindrances to its urban development, it is necessary to demonstrate that Nyasaland's urban system really was less developed than those in other countries which had had a fairly similar colonial background. Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda are obvious candidates for comparison, more so in some ways than the two Rhodesias, despite their greater geographical proximity, as certain important characteristics of these territories set them apart from Nyasaland: their mineral wealth with its strong influence on urban development, the relatively very large white settler population in Southern Rhodesia, and the unusual political status enjoyed by Southern Rhodesia as a self-governing colony. The East African territories on the other hand all had agriculturally based economies with no major mining areas, and although Tanganyika's early colonial settlement pattern evolved under German rule, the major colonial influence, as in Nyasaland, was British. Also there are some parallels to be drawn between white settlement in Kenya's 'White Highlands' and white settlement in the

Shire highlands in Nyasaland. In both cases the group holding most of the political and economic power in the territory, and with the greatest ability to influence decisions made in Whitehall, concentrated in one area. This made that area a natural location for the country's largest city where normally both political and economic decision-making power were centred; and where European demand stimulated the development of relatively high economic, infrastructural and urban functions. In Nyasaland's case this pattern was modified inasmuch as most administrative decisions were made in Zomba and not Blantyre, although this was still situated in the Shire highlands. Tanganyika did not have a concentrated white farming population in the same way, although Dar es Salaam's dominance was even more marked than that of Nairobi and Blantyre.

Uganda is an even closer parallel to Nyasaland, the country's economy being primarily based on two export crops, coffee and cotton, as Nyasaland's was based on tea and tobacco. Also here the administrative capital, Entebbe, was geographically separate from the commercial capital and largest urban centre, Kampala. In addition, like Nyasaland, Uganda is landlocked and therefore necessarily had very strong links with Kenya as its export trade went via that country to Mombasa. Although Nyasaland was equally dependent on its export outlets via Mozambique, it did not develop a similar type of relationship with this Portuguese territory, but it did become very dependent on Southern Rhodesia during the colonial period. Uganda however retained a greater degree of independence in its relationships with Kenya than did Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia. If an East African Federation had been formed similar to that of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, perhaps Uganda's urban system and growth would have been affected in the same way that it is here proposed Nyasaland's was.

Table 2.1 illustrates how, in comparison to Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, the development of medium-sized towns in Nyasaland during the

TABLE 2.1

Towns over 5,000: a Comparison between Nyasaland
and Late Colonial Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda

NYASALAND 1956		MALAWI 1966		UGANDA 1959		KENYA 1962		TANGANYIKA 1957	
Town	Popn.	Town	Popn.	Town	Popn.	Town	Popn.	Town	Popn.
Blantyre/Limbe	40,498	B/Limbe	109,461	Kampala	46,735	Nairobi	266,794	Dar es Salaam	128,742
Zomba	9,331	Zomba	19,666	Jinja	29,741	Mombasa	179,575	Tanga	38,853
		Lilongwe	19,425	Mbale	13,569	Nakuru	38,200	Mwanza	19,877
		Mzuzu	8,490	Entebbe	10,941	Kisumu	23,536	Tabora	15,361
				Kabale	10,919	Eldoret	19,605	Morogoro	14,507
				Fort Portal	8,317	Thika	13,952	Moshi	13,726
				Soroti	6,645	Nanyuki	10,448	Dodoma	13,435
				Tororo	6,365	Kitale	9,327	Ujiji	12,011
						Nyeri	7,857	Mtwara	10,459
						Kericho	7,692	Lindi	10,315
						Gilgil	6,452	Arusha	10,038
						Lamu	5,828	Iringa	9,587
						Malindi	5,818	Mbeya	6,932
						Athi R.	5,510		
						Isiolo	5,445		
						F. Hall	5,389		
						Thomson's			
						Falls	5,316		
						Embu	5,213		

Note: 1. This officially recorded figure for Kampala refers to the municipal area only, and a more realistic figure (including all the urban area of Kampala and Mengo) would be about 100,000-120,000 at this time (O'Connor, personal communication).

Sources: Nyasaland, Census 1956
Malawi, Census 1966
Uganda, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1962
Kenya, Population Census 1962
Tanganyika Statistics Division, 1960

colonial period was almost non-existent. According to the 1956 census Nyasaland only had two towns with populations over 5000. Although no other figures are available for the years before independence in 1964, by that time Lilongwe should also be added to this category since it was approaching 5000 in 1956. However even by 1966 when the next census was held, Malawi (as Nyasaland had been renamed) still had only four towns over this size. It is impossible to obtain town population estimates for the same base year for all the countries, as none were made in the inter-censal years and the censuses were made in different years. However it is evident that the other territories, despite the similarities in their historical background, economic base and population size to Nyasaland, had developed some sort of network of intermediate urban places by the end of the colonial period. Kenya had 15 centres with populations of over 5000 apart from Nairobi and Mombasa, and Tanganyika had 13 in addition to Dar es Salaam. In Uganda besides Kampala and Entebbe (which had a population comparable to Zomba in Malawi at this time) 6 other small towns of over 5000 people also existed, including the 'industrial' town of Jinja.

A number of factors can be identified which help to explain the lack of such centres in Nyasaland's urban system. For instance both Kenya and Tanganyika had seen the development of ports along their eastern coastlines both prior to and during the colonial period, whilst the stimulus which Nyasaland's export trade could give to such urban development occurred in Portuguese East Africa to some extent. Pre-colonial ports such as Mombasa, Lamu and Malindi in Kenya, or Bagamoyo and Lindi in Tanganyika, had no counterpart in Nyasaland. Colonial port development involved a major expansion of those ports most suited to colonial needs, particularly Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mombasa, whilst others suffered a decline. The latter however are still numbered among the intermediate centres which these territories had developed by

independence. Also the impact of early Arab and Swahili trading routes stimulated some urban development, for instance at Tabora and Ujiji (Soja and Weaver, 1976, p.236); although some sort of parallel can perhaps be drawn with Nyasaland's settlement of Kota-Kota, which although still relatively small at independence, had initially developed because of the Arab slave trade and managed to retain some of its importance during the colonial period.

Both Kenya and Tanganyika had a much larger land area than Nyasaland, and all three East African territories had larger populations. This may have encouraged the development of a greater number of urban centres to administer and serve adequately the larger areas and populations. On the other hand this does not explain why the towns developed were larger than those developed in Nyasaland. Also Uganda is a roughly similar size and yet developed more urban centres than Nyasaland.

Nyasaland was one of the poorest of the British African possessions, which hindered all aspects of 'modernization' including the development of urban infrastructure, and therefore the growth of industrial and commercial functions. Its recurrent revenue in 1958/59 was only £5.3 million, the majority of which came from the African poll tax, its 6% share of federal income tax, and the 20% territorial surcharge on income tax collected in Nyasaland. The latter two items relate to Nyasaland's partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953, when all income tax, export and import duties became federal revenue. From the start of the Federation Nyasaland had a deficit on its recurrent expenditure account and "it had practically no scope for increasing its revenues by its policies" (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959). Prior to Federation most of Nyasaland's public development expenditure was financed from recurrent revenue and U.K. government grants, and investment was generally small, averaging about £1.5 million per year from 1948-52.

During the federal years investment in the public sector increased and the greater proportion was financed by loans. However money available for development projects in Nyasaland was still limited, averaging for example, about £3 million annually from 1953-59, of which the Nyasaland government's share averaged just under £2 million per year from 1954-59. However Tanzania was in a comparable economic position: in 1956 its per capita gross domestic product was estimated at £15.8, compared to £17 for Nyasaland, when Kenya and Uganda's per capita net domestic product were £25.9 and £20.9 respectively (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959, p.51).

Several historical studies of urbanization in various African countries have been completed, which both describe and attempt to analyze the major processes involved (e.g. for Africa as a whole: Hanna and Hanna, 1971; Hance, 1970; for Kenya: Morgan, 1969; Obuhdo, 1974; for Tanzania: Slater, 1975; for Nigeria, Mabogunje, 1968; for West Africa: McNulty, 1976; for East Africa: Soja and Weaver, 1976; and a number of papers in Obuhdo and El Shakhs, 1979). To some extent both the nature of the processes identified, as well as their relative importance are similar in all the studies despite differences in the analytical frameworks adopted. The pre-colonial settlement pattern is felt throughout Africa to have had an influence on present urban patterns, but in most cases it is agreed that these structures have largely been destroyed or superseded by the creation of the colonial settlement network. For instance McNulty says that the colonial phase of urbanization in West Africa "was characterized by a growing economic dependence on Europe and the creation of a system of cities to serve colonial ends. Those towns, even important indigenous centres such as Oyo in Nigeria, which did not fit into the colonial spatial scheme suffered serious economic and political decline" (McNulty, op cit, p.217)(1). Slater (1975, p.153) makes a similar point in his study of Tanzania's spatial structure which he analyzed within the framework of dependency theory:

"commercial agriculture had existed in Tanzania before the German invasion, especially along the coast, where crops like rice, sugar and copra were produced for export to Zanzibar and other parts of the Indian Ocean market, both by Arab-owned slave plantations and by Swahili-speaking peasants. One of the results of German penetration was to destroy this complicated coastal economy and to ruin many small ports....In 1907 a German governor remarked with much relevance that:

one finds only one place that has progressed under German control, viz. Dar es Salaam Comparatively large places like Pangani, Sangani and Bagamoyo have retrogressed A whole list of medium-sized places ... have practically lost all importance. Such places are Mkwaja, Winde, Mbweni, Mbwamaji, Kisiju, Kiumangao, Nyamsate, Msindaji, and others....."

There is no doubt that the colonial power in Nyasaland also neglected to consider the existing spatial structures when imposing its own settlement network. However there is no evidence that an indigenous system of central places was in existence, as in the above examples. There were established trading routes, operating for both local and long distance trade, but there is no mention in historical studies of the existence of any sort of network of periodic markets, as existed in West Africa, and to a lesser extent in East Africa. The most detailed study of Malawian settlement patterns describes the evolution of various types of rural village networks which resulted from the interaction of factors like migration flows, invasions and the emergence (usually temporary) of strong local chiefdoms (Pike and Rimmington, 1965: Chapter 8). However the overwhelmingly rural and subsistence nature of the early Nyasa economy leads to the conclusion that "true urbanization was unknown in Malawi before the entry of Europeans and Asians into the country....Urban development is entirely a result of the growth of administration, commerce, and industry during the period of British protection" (ibid: p.167). Kota-Kota and Karonga differed from the usual indigenous pattern because of the influence of the Arab slave trade on them. Karonga was only a fortress and depot really, and apart from Kota-Kota no permanent, nucleated, multi-functional centres existed and even here agriculture remained the most important means of livelihood (ibid). Although other

large nucleated villages often had larger populations than colonial administrative centres, and were foci for the operation of local authority as exercised by their chiefs, they could not be classified as 'urban'. One such was Mponda at the exit of the Shire from the lake, which was the centre of a strong Yao chiefdom with a population of over 1,000 before Johnston's arrival (ibid, p.167).

Some writers have in fact generalized that the whole of East Africa had no indigenous urban tradition in the interior. For instance, Morgan says that before the colonial penetration of Kenya, there were no interior settlements in Kenya which could be classified as towns, as there was no economic base to build them on (Morgan, op cit; also see Obuhdo, 1974). Others have shown this to be an oversimplification (e.g. see Mckim, 1978, Chapter 2), although undoubtedly the major characteristic of East African settlement patterns in the interior was its dispersed nature. Soja and Weaver describe two main types of pre-colonial urbanization in East Africa: the Arab and Swahili trade route towns like Tabora, Mwapwa and Ujiji; and the "significant settlement concentrations" of the royal capitals of large, centralized states like Buganda and Ankole (Soja and Weaver, op cit: 236). There are certainly no parallels to be drawn for Nyasaland with the latter type of centre, and as it had no coast it had no opportunity to develop the ports which constituted the major pre-colonial urbanization experienced by Tanganyika and Kenya.

Processes identified in various studies of Africa's colonial urban experience can nearly all be seen to have operated in Nyasaland also. One very important exception is that the location of ports is usually seen to be a very important factor in the re-orientation of a colony's spatial economy. Nyasaland's land-locked position meant that one major influence which encouraged the formation of relatively large urban places in other territories was lacking in Nyasaland. In the early colonial years the river ports acted to some extent in the same way as the major seaports did

in other colonies. Soja and Weaver (1976, p.237) state:

"The major seaports of East Africa emerged as the basing points for colonial penetration and as the centers for the export of commercial products from the interior."

Ports like Port Herald and Chikwawa can be seen as having been involved in both these processes - but both were really only staging points for functions that were really performed in Chinde, Quelimane, and later Beira in Portuguese East Africa. Even this intermediary function was lost as river levels dropped and the railway was built. Thus part of Nyasaland's 'urbanization' process was occurring on the coast of Portuguese East Africa.

The other key urban focus of the newly imposed spatial system in most colonial territories was the administrative capital whose location, along with those of the ports, directly reflected the central strategic and exploitative objectives of the colonial powers. In West Africa the two foci (port and administrative capital) often coincided, thus combining two of the major characteristics identified by McNulty as being typical of West African colonial city systems: coastal orientation, and peripheral location. This is seen to be a reflection of the colonial power's need to organize efficiently the export-orientated and metropole-dependent economic system which had been imposed. Thus the most important urban places were the major linkage points between the railways which channelled exports from the interior and the shipping routes which linked the colony back to the metropole (McNulty, 1974). In British colonies in Eastern and Southern Africa it is not so easy to generalize; although the objectives were the same, the location and nature of resources were more varied, and several colonies were landlocked: i.e. Nyasaland, Uganda, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia. The influence of the coast was therefore far less persuasive. Even Kenya's capital was in the interior thus providing the country with two urban foci: the port of Mombasa and the administrative capital of Nairobi. The influences of the railway route to

Uganda and of white settlement in the "White Highlands" were both factors in Nairobi's location; no such influences were operative in British-controlled West Africa as there were no British possessions inland from the coastal colonies, nor was there white settlement on a similar scale. Both the influences of a trade route and white settlement could be argued to have affected the growth of Blantyre as Nyasaland's main town; although the railway post-dated Blantyre's early growth, it did have relatively good access to the Shire, by which early links with the metropole were maintained. Location ^{itself} on the Shire was prevented by an oppressive climate.

Apart from the urban centres acting as river ports and the administrative and commercial capitals, Nyasaland's only other 'urban' settlements created during the colonial period were those which emerged at the administrative stations, and the small trading centres which emerged on the railway. Also there were the mission sites providing education and health services. This pattern and the processes involved are almost identical to those identified for the East African territories by Soja and Weaver. They recognize the administration as being:

"probably the most powerful generator of town growth in East Africa. Strategic and health factors tended to dominate the location of administrative centres, the first leading to accessible points near the centre of major ethnic groups, the second to areas of high ground and good drainage, most commonly some distance away from both local African markets and the Asian dukas (shops) of the trading centres" (Soja and Weaver, 1976, p.239).

This statement could be applied quite accurately to Nyasaland, except that here the 'strategic' interests seemed to have been less concerned with the location of local centres of power, and more with ending the slave trade and establishing British authority in areas of local rebellion. The lake was also important for the siting of early administrative stations: its configuration, running two-thirds of the way down one side of a very narrow country, meant that it formed a most convenient transport route in Northern and Central Nyasaland. The position of the lakes of East Africa

meant they were not nearly so important for internal transport. Stations like Karonga, Chinteché, Nkhata Bay, Nkhota-Kota and Fort Johnston all reflected Nyasaland's early dependence on the lake as a central part of Nyasaland's communications network. The establishment of later stations in the twentieth century such as Lilongwe, Neno, Kasungu and Mzuzu represented more an attempt to fill in gaps in the administrative network. Their exact location within the area chosen was a matter of convenience to some extent. Lilongwe for instance was requested by a local chief. Neno replaced the less centrally situated boma Matobe as the headquarters of the Central Shire district. Kasungu was situated at an established missionary centre and Mzuzu at an abandoned tung station.

Trading centres are also recognized by Soja and Weaver as forming another major layer of centres. The railways are seen as being the most decisive factor influencing their location as in Nyasaland. The growth of nucleated trading settlements at pre-existing marketing points did not seem to occur there however as it did occasionally in East Africa (ibid). Sometimes Asian traders would however establish shops at periodic market sites. These latter must have been important nodes for the African rural population as they had always been, and their impact on day-to-day life may have been greater than the more remote influence of the more artificially created 'bomas' - yet they were very small and receive little comment in contemporary records.

The separation of missionary sites from other town-building functions in Nyasaland was repeated throughout East Africa. The numbers of mission stations and schools was always fairly fluid as new ones opened and others closed, but for 1932 a rough estimation can be made from information contained in the Handbook of Nyasaland. At this time there were approximately 55-60 major stations of which about one third coincided with administrative stations; most of the rest were completely dissociated from other nucleated 'urban' settlements. In addition about 3000

out-schools were operated by the missions, apart from those actually at the stations, and the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) also had 229 'out-stations' not included in the above mission station estimates (Murray, 1932). This dispersal of potential town-building functions is one factor that helps explain the limited degree of urbanization experienced by East Africa and Nyasaland. If administrative, trading and missionary service functions had located together, the population attracted to permanent urban settlement would probably have been larger than the combined populations of the dispersed settlements since there would have been the additional attraction of the convenience of having all the functions combined in one location. The likelihood of a settlement being recognized as a town for the purpose of enumerating 'urban' populations would also have been enhanced, changing the picture of urban statistics in these countries. However the result of the processes of the colonial period in Nyasaland as outlined above was, as in East Africa:

"a pattern of small, polynucleated towns, consisting of a few thousand people spread out around several nodal centres, and a rural landscape dotted with isolated services, a school here, a market center there, and administrative stations elsewhere" (Soja and Weaver, op cit, p.239).

For Soja and Weaver this helps to explain why by independence only Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Kampala and Mombasa had populations over 40,000, and nearly every town over 20,000 was an administrative station established before 1910, reflecting the major importance of colonial administrative needs as a town-building force.

The theory appears to be applicable to Nyasaland, yet urban development was limited here to an even greater degree. Presumably therefore other factors were at work.

The degree of polarization displayed by Nyasaland's urban system by independence, centring on Blantyre, is again typical of colonial urban systems. In West Africa this has been seen to be one of the major

characteristics of the urban legacy of colonialism (McNulty, op cit), and the pattern is similarly repeated in East Africa (Soja and Weaver, op cit; Slater, op cit). However, specialized secondary centres grew in all three East African territories: Mombasa in Kenya; Jinja in Uganda, and Tanga in Tanganyika. Nothing like this occurred in Nyasaland; and although McNulty feels that in West Africa, below the level of the primate cities, "urban centres, if indeed they can be so classified, are practically devoid of employment opportunities, services and other urban facilities" (McNulty, op cit, p.272), this was truer for Nyasaland than for several of the countries that he was considering.

Hanna and Hanna (1971) attach much importance to colonial industrial and mining requirements for the creation of colonial towns, "treating administration, education and entertainment as secondary factors. This view is also taken by Magubane (1979, p.44) who says: "the trajectory of urban development in Africa was based on extractive capitalism which created urban complexes exemplified in the Katanga region of the Congo; the Copperbelt of Zambia; and the Witwatersrand of the Transvaal in South Africa." This may have some truth for selected countries (like South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia), but it is more usually felt that industrialization was neglected by the colonial powers, and that the colonies' urban development and economies suffered as a result. There appears to be a positive correlation between industrialization and urbanization, and industrial development in Nyasaland was negligible: even more so than the very limited progress made in this sector in colonial Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika.

Thus whilst processes involved in the evolution of Nyasaland's urban system up until 1964 are often comparable to those felt to be typical for colonial African urbanization as a whole, in many cases those forces identified as limiting factors on urbanization were more strongly present in that country (e.g. general lack of capital; disparate location of

urban functions). In addition, many of the elements identified as likely to encourage urban growth were absent or only present in a very weak form (e.g. access to the sea; existence of mineral resources; indigenous pre-colonial forms of urbanization or a centralized state). Inasmuch as many of the processes discussed above did also operate in Nyasaland, a similar urban system to those which evolved in these other territories may be expected. However as already demonstrated, Nyasaland's urban system was even less developed than those which evolved in other British possessions in East Africa, and also some important processes were at work in Nyasaland which cannot be seen in these other studies. After 1953 Nyasaland's links to Southern Rhodesia were stronger than those between, for instance, Uganda and Kenya; also Nyasaland was part of a migratory labour system operating in Southern Africa which drained it of an appreciable proportion of its male labour force. The ways in which these factors influenced Nyasaland's urban system are discussed next, as they appear to be the major processes which differentiate the evolution of Nyasaland's pre-independence urban system from the process in other similar African territories.

2.3.2 Nyasaland's Primate City: Salisbury or Blantyre? (2)

There is much evidence to show that Nyasaland's urban system did become merely part of the federal urban hierarchy during the years 1953-63. It is also arguable that, throughout the entire period in which it was a protectorate, its urban system was so strongly linked to Southern Rhodesia and particularly to Salisbury that to regard it as an autonomous system with Blantyre as its core is invalid. The model of the world's urban system proposed by Frank (1966) incorporates this concept: less developed countries having a core region including the country's main metropolis to which the rest of the country is peripheral, and the core region in turn being linked to, and subordinate to the metropolis of the

developed world. In Nyasaland's case however the model can be extended for here existed an urban system which, if superficially viewed within the territorial unit, appeared to follow the familiar pattern of one large primate city which stood at the apex of a system of much smaller urban centres with a paucity of intermediate towns; however when the links between Blantyre and Salisbury are examined it appears that the true 'core' of Nyasaland's system was Salisbury. Salisbury was then linked strongly to the developed world via London, and ultimately it was here that key decisions affecting much of the political, economic and social development of the two possessions would be made. Thus Blantyre was not simply a secondary satellite relative to the world system, but was a tertiary outpost through which central control was channelled. In this sense it was almost comparable to, for instance, Tanga or Moshi in Tanzania, Kisumu or Mombasa in Kenya, or Kumasi in Ghana. This analysis seems to go some way to explaining the extreme underdevelopment of Nyasaland's urban system at the time of Independence.


Even prior to Federation Salisbury performed many functions with respect to Nyasaland which placed it at the head of many of the country's spheres of activity, although central administrative power was located in Zomba with the Protectorate's Governor and was thence linked to London. Through Zomba the ultimate authority of central decision-makers in the United Kingdom was channelled as were those policies and decisions which Nyasaland's legislative body was able to make. Central decisions relating to major issues were made by the Colonial Office in London; for instance, the crucial issue of the route of the first section of Nyasaland's railway had to be referred to the Foreign Office in 1896 by Sir Harry Johnston, as was the question of the removal of the capital when this arose (Pachai, 1971). In the political sphere therefore Nyasaland at this stage was no different from other British colonies and Protectorates, with the capital acting as the immediate 'core' for the territory. However Zomba remained

very small when compared to, for instance, Nairobi or Dar es Salaam, which were both not only their countries' administrative centres, but also their main commercial and service centres. In Nyasaland the highest order commercial and service functions were found in Blantyre. Both Nairobi and Dar acted as the foci through which links to and from the rest of the world and particularly London were channelled, yet in many instances Nyasaland's external linkages had to go through Salisbury.


For instance, almost all external communication links (except for road and railway transport) for Nyasaland operated through Salisbury during most of the colonial period. Obviously when the sea route was the only external transport link, Southern Rhodesia had no part to play in passenger and trade traffic. Air transport changed this pattern with regard to passenger traffic in particular. Salisbury also came to play an increasingly important role in the general sphere of communications over the years. The earliest form of communication was postal, and the network of postal agencies operating from administrative stations was linked by various means to Zomba or Blantyre. At first the postal links between Nyasaland and the rest of the world operated by river transport via Chinde on the Portuguese East African coast. As early as 1909-10 a direct exchange of mails between Chinde and Blantyre was begun (British Central African Protectorate, 1911). However when airmail was introduced all Nyasaland's airmail had to go to Salisbury by train before being forwarded by air to its destination (Nyasaland, 1931). The airmail link between Blantyre and Salisbury was inaugurated in 1934 (Nyasaland, 1934). Early telegraph linkages were to Tanzania, south from Blantyre to Chindio on the River Zambezi via a line owned by the Central African Railways, and from Chiromo on the River Shire to Chinde on the coast via a Portuguese line. However as telecommunications improved Salisbury became Nyasaland's main centre for this service also. A radiotelephone link between Zomba and Salisbury was established in 1950 (Nyasaland, 1950), and when a

telephone link between Nyasaland and London became possible in 1953 this also was routed through Salisbury (Nyasaland, 1953).

Chileka aerodrome at Blantyre was not even begun until 1932 and the air link to London and most other external destinations was then via Salisbury. A direct link between Nyasaland and London operated for only one year, in 1949, when B.O.A.C. flying boats from London landed at Cape Maclear on the Southern lake-shore (Nyasaland, 1949). The basis of Nyasaland's early air services was the Central African Airways Corporation (CAAC) established in 1946, and most international flights originated in Salisbury. Prior to this Nyasaland had gradually developed an internal air service linking many of its main administrative centres but the only regular external links were to Salisbury and Fort Jameson in Northern Rhodesia. The air route maps for 1946 and 1960 illustrate how Salisbury rather than Blantyre was the main link between local and international air traffic (Maps 2.6 and 2.7). For a while Nairobi was also an important centre as it offered a connection to London via a South African flight, and the CAAC flight from Salisbury to Nairobi actually went via Blantyre (Nyasaland, 1946). By 1948 a daily air service from Blantyre to Salisbury was operating, strengthening the links between the two (Nyasaland, 1948) and by 1952 the CAAC had added some new routes. These included a twice weekly service from Blantyre to Dar es Salaam and then Nairobi, and links from Salisbury to Livingstone, Bulawayo and Lourenco Marques, as well as those to Beira and Johannesburg. Connections to Europe, India and Australia could be made from East African destinations. Thus Salisbury was acting as Nyasaland's major link to Southern and Central Africa. It also regained its position in terms of the crucial air link to London as by 1960 the flight via Blantyre to Nairobi was lost and the only direct link Nyasaland had to a destination beyond the Federation was to Dar es Salaam - all other external links operated via Salisbury (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960a, p.31).



Map 2.6 INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS PER WEEK FROM FEDERATION 1946
Source: Nyasaland ; Report for 1946



Map 2.7 INTERNATIONAL AIR ROUTES: FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASASALAND 1960

Source: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960

Salisbury also stood at the apex of another vital aspect of Nyasaland's urban functions: that of European secondary education. This was available in most other colonies providing another central place function for many towns, especially the capital although the schools were not necessarily urban based. However, to save money Britain decided that it was not necessary to provide such a service in Nyasaland and all European secondary pupils had to go to Southern Rhodesia and usually Salisbury, for this purpose. In 1935 a conference for Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was held to create a common educational policy for all three territories with the result that Southern Rhodesia was regarded as the main centre for European education (Nyasaland, 1935). This meant that the people who might well have eventually become important in Nyasaland's economic, social and political life were educated in Salisbury and knew it fairly well and were maybe likely to view it as 'the metropole' to which Blantyre was a pale comparison. It is arguable that this would be to the detriment of Blantyre's and Nyasaland's urban development as those who became private investors or public decision-makers would have a psychological tendency to look to Southern Rhodesia and Salisbury for profit-making opportunities and/or political guidance.

Thus the links between the two countries were already strongly established before 1953 and the consolidation of the Nyasaland/Southern Rhodesia link through Federation, and in almost every case the picture was one in which Nyasaland/Blantyre stood in a subordinate position to the central services provided by Southern Rhodesia/Salisbury. The advent of Federation obviously strengthened this situation because now central administrative authority over much of Nyasaland's economy and public expenditure was vested in Salisbury as the Federal capital.

2.3.3 The effect of Federation on Nyasaland's urban system

In 1953 Nyasaland became part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland along with Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Exactly how this affected Nyasaland's evolving urban system is difficult to analyse. Opinions on whether the Federal period was beneficial to economic and social development as a whole in Nyasaland are conflicting: some felt the amalgamation was most undesirable (for instance, see Clutton-Brock, 1959) and represented a betrayal of Nyasaland's Protectorate status by the British Government, whilst others stressed the economic benefits to be gained by a small, poor and densely populated country from association with the more diverse and labour-hungry economies of the two Rhodesias. This latter argument is most forcibly argued by all publications issuing from Southern Rhodesia before 1953, and from the Federation as a whole after 1953, which dealt with this question (e.g. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960b). Most relatively objective authors admitted that there was no simple answer to the question, as there were both advantages and disadvantages for Nyasaland, some more easily measured than others, and it could only be speculated as to how Nyasaland would have fared if it had not become part of the Federation. One very valid fear was that Federation represented an attempt by relatively powerful Southern Rhodesia to create a territory which could later receive Dominion status, thereby allowing the introduction of racist policies, as in South Africa, under an autonomous white Government. Events in Rhodesia after Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia had received their independence certainly proved this fear to be well-founded, and the break up of the Federation in 1963 was indispensable to their national integrity.

However, socio-political considerations aside, the weight of opinion is generally that Nyasaland probably benefited to some degree from the Federation, in purely economic terms. This did not necessarily mean, of course, that the economic benefits were of a nature that enhanced the

long-term development of urban-based activities in Nyasaland, which is the real issue in question here. Nevertheless, the 'Jack Report', a federal economic survey of Nyasaland in 1958/59, for instance, pointed out that association with the other two more credit-worthy territories meant that commercial loans for capital expenditure in Nyasaland were more easily obtained. This view was generally shared by those analysing the effects of Federation for Nyasaland, although Hazlewood and Henderson (1960) felt the case was overstated. Prior to Federation Nyasaland had only raised one loan for general development (on the London market), but by 1959 it had raised another on the New York market and had received shares of three Federal loans raised on the London market, plus four issues of Federal local stock. Obviously this allowed for considerable development expenditure which almost definitely could not have been funded by alternative means, such as the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, had Nyasaland remained outside the Federation. Repayment of loans obviously represented a burden for Nyasaland which before Federation had had only very modest support from Britain, and had achieved a small surplus in the years immediately before Federation (Creighton, 1960), but suffered an increasing shortfall in its recurrent account throughout the Federal period.

Nyasaland lost control of its principal sources of revenue to the Federal Government, as import, excise and export duties and income tax became Federal responsibilities and accrued to Federal revenues. This left Nyasaland with control over the proceeds of the African poll tax, licence sales and motor-spirit tax only. The major source of revenue for the Nyasaland Government became the 6% share of income from Federal taxes, supplemented by a 20% territorial surcharge on basic income tax collected within Nyasaland. Most authors (e.g. Creighton, 1960; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959; Franklin, 1963; Hazlewood and Henderson, 1960) agree that the total revenues thus available to Nyasaland exceeded

those it would have received if it had not joined the Federation as it benefitted from the copper boom in Northern Rhodesia, although its loss of control over its sources of revenue was felt to be "less satisfactory" (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, op cit) from the view-point of budget planning. Uncertainty over yearly territorial income cannot have helped long-term development planning and in 1958/59 for instance a fall in copper prices caused a 22% fall in Nyasaland's share of Federal income tax (which had previously increased year by year) from £2.46 million in 1957/58 to £1.95 million.

Recurrent Government revenue is a fairly useful index of a country's prosperity, and the degree to which Nyasaland's recurrent revenues benefited was significant but not spectacular. Of course it is possible that some of the growth would have occurred without Federation although this is speculation. General development in Nyasaland up to 1952, although slow, had allowed the Government's revenues to grow, and from 1950-52 they increased from £2,950,000 to £3,378,000 (an average annual growth rate of 4.6%). In 1958/59 £5,332,000 was received implying an average annual growth rate from 1952 of 7.9% (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959).

The most cautious analyses of the economic benefits of Federation to Nyasaland (Hazlewood and Henderson, 1960; Woodruff and Thompson, 1954), discounted many of the general benefits presumed to operate, such as the stimulus to industry of a wider, unified market and free labour movement, pointing out that to a large extent these conditions had operated prior to Federation. Nyasaland, in fact, because it was part of the Congo Basin Treaty, could not previously operate discriminatory tariffs although its own exports to the other two territories were treated at the most preferential tariff rates applied to the United Kingdom and Colonies. When the discriminatory tariffs of the Federation were applied to Nyasaland in 1956, in the opinion of Hazlewood and Henderson, the changes

were not beneficial and prices for some basic commodities like hoes, shirts and enamelware rose as increased tariffs were imposed on goods from cheap sources like India and Hong Kong. Also protectionist policies covering a customs union are often not beneficial to the whole area especially "where the economic growth stimulated by the tariff is highly localized geographically" (Hazlewood and Henderson, 1960, p. 76), and the opening of Nyasaland to Southern Rhodesian industry in particular probably meant that "industrial development within Nyasaland will be made more difficult" (ibid, p.76). This argument will be further discussed later, as the development of industry has major repercussions on urban development. The most direct benefits therefore were felt to be the increase in current revenues available to Nyasaland, and possibly a higher level of public capital expenditure and the safeguard of Federal citizenship preventing Southern Rhodesia's post-1958 foreign labour restrictions affecting the large migrant labour force from Nyasaland.

For an analysis of the impact of Federation on Nyasaland's urban system it is important to establish how Nyasaland's prospects for overall development expenditure were affected. As can be seen, on balance these were improved, and inasmuch as the urban centres of the Protectorate benefitted from this expenditure (e.g. in the expansion of building programmes, and provision of various amenities and facilities) the impact was beneficial.

Another indirect consequence of Federation that could have had an impact on urban development did not occur. The spectre of the establishment of 'apartheid' type policies within the Federal territories which would have severely affected the growth and urban morphology of Nyasaland's towns was not realized. Racial segregation was a component of Nyasaland's urban residential patterns but this was largely due to economic factors rather than a deliberate policy measure.

2.3.3.1 Direct Effects of Federation

It is impossible to be clear about how much of Nyasaland's development within urban areas from 1953-63 was a result of the Federal links and how much would have occurred anyway. This is made even more difficult because different sources voice differing opinions about how various sectors of Nyasaland's economy were affected by Federation, and none address themselves specifically to urban development. However the location of industrial and commercial development and the siting of the Federal capital are two factors affecting the urban system which received some attention in ^{the} contemporary literature.

a) Industry and commerce

Most contemporary analysts viewed Nyasaland's industrial prospects in a negative light. They either felt that development was very restricted and the potential for expansion very limited, or that federation with the more attractive investment areas of Northern and Southern Rhodesia would mean that new industries would locate there to an even greater extent than if Nyasaland was a separate unit. Industrialization in Nyasaland suffered from the disadvantage of lack of power sources and although these were being expanded, particularly in Blantyre, the Jack Report pointed out that "assured and abundant power in the larger centres of the rest of the Federation as a result of the Kariba scheme might divert to the Rhodesias some of the industrial expansion which might have otherwise occurred in Nyasaland" (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959, p.17). To add insult to injury the Kariba project absorbed a massive proportion of Federal development funds to which Nyasaland was a contributor. In the 1959-63 Federal development plan the Kariba project accounted for an average annual expenditure of £6.3 million, or 34% of total development expenditure (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1962). Had special efforts been made to prevent Nyasaland falling even further behind in the power stakes, and therefore in its ability to attract urban-based

power-dependent investment, its financial loss on the Kariba project from which it benefited not at all would have been less important. After all it did receive more funds on the whole from the Federation than it put in because of the redistribution of the Northern Rhodesian copper revenues. However as no such efforts were made, in this case Nyasaland appears to have lost out all round.

Transportation between Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a hindrance to some extent to the former's relatively advanced industries having complete access to Nyasaland's market. The planned Salisbury-Blantyre all-weather road via Tete in Mozambique was never completed during the federal years. Had it been, it would have made Nyasaland even more vulnerable to penetration by outside producers and correspondingly harmed its own industrial development (Hazlewood and Henderson, 1960).

In absolute terms the growth of manufacturing output occurred overwhelmingly in Southern Rhodesia during the federal years. Between 1955/56 and 1957/58 net output of manufacturing industry expanded by £12.8 million there, compared to £2.1 million in Northern Rhodesia and only £0.9 million in Nyasaland. However Nyasaland's share of total Federal industrial production remained virtually constant during that period at 2%, whilst Southern Rhodesia's share increased from 40% to 47%. It could be argued therefore that Nyasaland neither gained nor lost in terms of industrial investment and its corollary of urban population, and functional, growth. On the other hand it is also true that countries with a very small industrial base often experience industrial growth rates which exceed that of more industrialized territories, during the early stage of development. Therefore Nyasaland's share of Federal industrial output should perhaps have increased, even if only by one or two per cent, simply because there were so many gaps to be filled. That this did not occur may have been because industries chose to locate elsewhere in the

Federation due to the more favourable infrastructural and commercial facilities to be found there.

Nyasaland's population was almost equal to that of Southern Rhodesia's in 1956 (2.61 million compared to 2.91 million). Northern Rhodesia's was smaller at 2.2 million so there was little disadvantage for prospective industrialists in terms of Nyasaland's labour force and labour costs were lowest here, although the very low average incomes of the African population there would have depressed its comparative market potential. Southern Rhodesia's European population was also 25 times that of Nyasaland's so manufactures geared to a European market would obviously be attracted there.

One way of estimating the impact of the Federation on Nyasaland's industrial development is to analyse investors' guides and Federal industrial policy, to see whether Nyasaland received equal treatment in relation to its resources and industrial needs. There was no attempt made by the Federal government's Ministry of Commerce and Industry to guide industrial development into particular areas, and therefore private decision-making was the major factor involved in industrial location. The 1962-65 Federal development plan stated that "generally, the provision of capital for industry is a function of the private sector aided by the various policy measures of the Government, including the provision of services, aimed at the creation of a favourable climate for industrial expansion" (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1962, p.31). Inasmuch as the Kariba dam development was a government policy measure which provided a more attractive climate for industrialization in the two Rhodesias compared to Nyasaland (therefore) Nyasaland's ability to attract industry was damaged by government policy.

Each territory had its own industrial finance body sponsored by the territorial government. However the federal Industrial Promotion Corporation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, financed by the Central Bank, was a

purely commercial concern and thus unlikely to show preference to Nyasaland as an area which had the greatest need for industrial development.

Investment guides for the Federation also may not have helped Nyasaland, as it was bound to be seen in an unfavourable light when compared to the other, more economically developed territories. Separate guides for Nyasaland alone would have prevented it suffering by comparison. The Federation produced its own investor's guide in 1960, and both the text and the maps which described the geographical location of infrastructural facilities served to accentuate the relative underdevelopment of Nyasaland in those respects. From a purely perceptual viewpoint federal maps in general made Nyasaland look remote and peripheral to the main economy, which an emphasis on population numbers might have helped to diminish. The section on markets emphasized the importance of Southern Rhodesia because of its large European population. European consumption expenditure in the Federation was estimated to be double that of the African population. The three main market areas listed therefore were Salisbury, Bulawayo and the Copperbelt, and it was pointed out that African incomes also tended to be higher in these areas. The only potential market mentioned for Nyasaland was Blantyre/Limbe.

The guide also listed the headquarters of commercial enterprises by location, and again Nyasaland was noticeable only by its absence. All five U.K. banks operating in the Federation had their local H.Qs in Salisbury, as did the other three banking groups including the Merchant Bank of Central Africa and the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The latter did not even have a branch in Nyasaland until one opened in Blantyre in 1962, a year before the Federation ended (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1963). Eleven finance and trust companies also had their H.Qs in Salisbury and only one was based in Nyasaland (in

Limbe). None of the Federation's fifteen discount houses were based in Nyasaland either, and eight of them had their headquarters in Salisbury, as did the three federally based producers' and employers' organisations (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960a). The location of commercial services and governmental offices is known to be a factor influencing the location of commercial and industrial development, and potential industrial investors would obviously have been attracted to Salisbury by these factors. Nyasaland's towns on the other hand were at a complete disadvantage in these terms.

Other surveys and guides presented much the same picture. A Barclays Bank survey of the Federation devoted more space and information to Southern Rhodesia than to either of the other two territories. At the time there were 77 Barclays Bank branches in Southern Rhodesia (20 in Salisbury alone), 25 in Northern Rhodesia, and only 5 in Nyasaland (Barclays Bank, DCO, 1961). Southern Rhodesia and Salisbury were again pre-eminent in a U.S.A. Department of Commerce guide to investment in the Federation. An appendix listing the Federation's towns gave only Blantyre/Limbe for Nyasaland, with a brief mention of Zomba (U.S.A. Department of Commerce, 1956). Another American sponsored report on the Federation's economy stated that "Nyasaland is of little economic consequence at present" and virtually dismissed it from further discussion (Enke, 1959).

This sort of information may have been quite important for investment from external sources where the decision-makers had little or no prior knowledge of the three territories. Additional information could have come from the Federal Information Department, which yet again had its headquarters in Salisbury. Private decision-makers are not guided purely by strict analysis of the factors which affect the return to capital; however, to the extent that they are, these factors may be ones on which they are imperfectly informed, especially if their sources of information

are not (fully) objective. In the examples discussed above, Nyasaland's treatment is to some extent subjective because detail is lost for the sake of the generalization made necessary by the size of the unit to be surveyed. Every characteristic is presented in relation to the whole Federation and therefore usually as a relative lack of that factor, rather than a mere report of its presence. This probably unintentional and unavoidable slant given to Nyasaland through its relationships with the other more resource-rich federal territories cannot have helped its 'investment image'.

Investors' decisions are also distorted, from a purely profit-making view, by their perceptions of other, perhaps social advantages of a particular location. This has been termed "psychic income" by Richardson (1969). They may also overestimate the agglomeration economies to be gained by location in the main metropolis and/or capital because its obvious size and stage of commercial and administrative development relative to smaller centres distracts their attention from unrealized potential in other locations. This is one of the factors recognized by Friedmann (1966) as hindering the process of 'trickle-down' or 'spread effects' in an urban hierarchy.

b) Choice of Salisbury as Federal Capital

That Salisbury became the Federal capital was almost inevitable, although the decision was not made without some controversy. The arguments against Salisbury at the time were mainly political. First, siting the capital in one of the other territories would have been a strategic move that would have illustrated a spirit of federal partnership rather than the domination which both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia feared. Second, Salisbury was racist and this obviously caused an enormous amount of ill-feeling, especially for those Africans from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia who had to visit the federal capital only to find many amenities were denied to them. A Select Committee on the

question, appointed in 1954, prepared a report which, nevertheless, led to the choice of Salisbury as the federal capital. This report had covered alternative sites in the other territories with what was felt to be suspicious speed, especially since Sir Roy Welensky (the Federal Prime Minister) had stated in 1952 that none of the three territorial capitals would become the federal capital. Certainly there was evidence that the result had been a foregone conclusion, demonstrating the power wielded by the Southern Rhodesians in the supposedly democratic process of federal decision-making (Franklin, 1963).

The economic issues relating to the siting of the capital at the Federation's most populous and economically developed city appear to have received less recognition at the time. Salisbury had not only the economic advantages of having the Federation's most advanced infrastructural and industrial base, but also, as the seat of the federal government, was now an even more obvious choice for the headquarters of enterprises operating in all three territories and for new industrial, commercial and trading establishments. If the federal capital had been sited at any other town, particularly one outside Southern Rhodesia, it is probable that a more equal spread of urban-based development would have been achieved. If Nyasaland had been chosen to house the federal capital, for instance at Blantyre (this not being a territorial capital), the gains to that particular town would have been obvious, and it is arguable that the whole territory would have benefited. Not only would direct gains have occurred due to necessary investment in the new capital, but the territory as a whole would probably have received more official attention merely because those in authority would have been more familiar with it by virtue of their residence there, and also because they would have been more accessible to the views and opinions of the inhabitants of Nyasaland. Had Northern Rhodesia housed the federal capital the detracting from Salisbury's position may have prevented the

degree of concentration of urban investment there which occurred, although whether this competition would have aided Nyasaland's urban centres is impossible to tell. However it would have lessened the extent to which Nyasaland was operating as a satellite of Salisbury with all that this entailed for the status of Blantyre and Zomba.

The general theme of these arguments about Salisbury were in fact recognized as the federal period progressed, as is illustrated by this statement taken from the Monckton Commission which was set up to review the Federation's constitution:

"The siting of the Federal capital in Salisbury has undoubtedly caused dissatisfaction and suspicion in the Northern Territories. We were told this by both Africans and Europeans. The latter maintain that the capital should have been placed in one or other of the less developed Northern Territories, thus stimulating development there, and that its location in Salisbury has led to a greater concentration of economic activity in Southern Rhodesia than is equitable. The African objections are partly psychological, because it is felt that the Federal Government by being in Salisbury comes too much under the influence of the Southern Rhodesian Government, and partly due to the racial discrimination which still exists in Salisbury....There is therefore a strong case for moving the Federal capital from Southern Rhodesia altogether." (Report of the Advisory Commission, 1960, p.90)

The financial cost of relocation however was felt to outweigh the benefits to be gained, although it was also felt that if Salisbury did not improve its attitudes to racial discrimination, a move might eventually become unavoidable. However the general findings of the Commission had "passed the death sentence on the Federation" (Pike, 1968, p.157). In 1961 Nyasaland held a general election for representatives on its territorial Legislative Council and in 1962 adopted a new constitution providing for a two-stage move towards full internal self-government. The Federation finally came to an end on December 31st, 1963.

2.3.4 Migration and Urbanization in Nyasaland

Labour was one of Nyasaland's main exports in the colonial period and the effects of this on social and economic life in Nyasaland were all-

pervasive. Much authoritative empirical and theoretical work has been done on the causes and effects of the migrant labour system in Southern Africa and it is not intended here to tackle these topics in detail (e.g. see Palmer and Parsons, 1977; Schapera, 1947; Boeder, 1973; Murray, 1981). The perspective here is to emphasize that the degree to which Nyasaland was involved was another factor which would have depressed urban development there because at any one time a significant proportion of the male labour force was away, and by deduction therefore a number of potential urban dwellers were absent.

Table 2.2 gives estimates of the number of male Nyasas working abroad between the years 1927-62. This and the following table (2.3) show that both the absolute numbers and the proportion of the male labour force absent from Nyasaland increased over this period. Women also migrated but their numbers were relatively insignificant. Despite some reservations about the accuracy of the figures (see Appendix 2.1) it is possible that up until about 1930 the proportion who went abroad was relatively small and thereafter a rapid upward trend emerged, with between 20-30% of adult males away up until the end of the war (which in itself proved a drain on Nyasaland's male labour force), and after the war over a third being absent. The numbers applying for identity certificates to go abroad (Table 2.4) also increased over the years; in the ten years up until 1962 the average number applying was about 70,000 per year (Nyasaland, 1962). The numbers varied slightly from year to year according to conditions in the destination countries.

The reason for this enormous movement was the attraction of much higher wages in the main territories to which the migrants moved. Lack of any employment opportunities in certain areas of Nyasaland also played a part, but the wage differential was certainly the most important factor. The emigration was in fact viewed with much misgiving by certain sectors of the white population in Nyasaland as sometimes it became difficult to

TABLE 2.2
Estimated numbers of Male Nyasas Working Abroad by Territory 1927-62

	1927	1929	1930	1937	1938	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Estimated no. of men abroad	30	30-60	30	90	114	123 ¹	123	150	140	146	143	148	150	159	150	160	142	140	169	164	160
Estimated nos. in:																					
Southern Rhodesia	-	-	-	-	72-75	-	82	84	82	87	87	90	95	100	100	100	100	100	123	115	113
South Africa	-	-	-	-	27	-	35	50	48	43	40	42	42	42	42	42	30	26	26	29	28
Northern Rhodesia	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	-	7	10	10	11	13	19	18	17
Other territories	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	3-4	3-4	-	10	8	8	1	1	1	1.5	1.5

Source: data from Nyasaland, Reports for the years 1927-62

TABLE 2.3Estimated Nyasa Male Labour Force and Percentage Absent 1930-56

	1930	1937	1938	1945	1948	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Estimated labour force (male)	300,000	443,000	424,000	513,000	na	413,000	423,600	435,000	435,000	430,625
Percentage absent	>10%	20%	27%	24%	33%	36%	38%	37%	37%	33%

Notes: 1. no data available for 1931-36, 1939-44,
1946-47, 1949-51
2. see Appendix 2.1 for explanation of
variations in defining 'male labour force'.

Source: data from Nyasaland, Reports for the
years 1930-62

TABLE 2.4Annual Issue of Identity Certificates to Migrant Workers 1946-61

Country of Destination	Average 1946-50	Average 1951-55	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Southern Rhodesia	22,853	40,662	50,760	49,248	44,863	40,252	36,424	28,947
Northern Rhodesia	1,389	4,145	5,638	6,671	3,961	5,155	7,448	8,537
South Africa	9,925	10,089	15,516	18,015	19,615	22,022	28,656	34,405
Other Territories	395	619	390	382	506	865	1,022	663
TOTAL :	33,852	55,545	72,304	74,346	68,945	68,924	73,550	72,552

Source: data from Nyasaland, Reports for the years 1946-62

recruit sufficient workers to fulfil their needs. This is first mentioned in the 1947 Colonial Report when a labour shortage, particularly in the south where the majority of the European plantations were, is discussed in relation to the problem of migrant workers. Also local African chiefs and the white missionaries often complained about the system because of its disruptive effects on family life and the exercise of traditional local authority. However the unequal distribution of cash-earning opportunities, whether in self-employment or as an employee, did mean that in the Central and Southern Regions men were less likely to be actively forced to migrate in order to pay their taxes. In the Northern Region however the almost complete lack of wage-earning opportunities combined with a lack of infrastructure which prevented the development of African cash crop agriculture (as it developed in the Central Region) meant that in 1945 22% of the entire male population was abroad (excluding those on military service). The corresponding percentages for the Central and Southern Regions were 11% and 5% (Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1952). The conditions under which the migration occurred varied according to the destination, but nearly all of it was circular, most men returning within three years, if only for a holiday (Nyasaland, 1947).

By far the largest proportion of the migrants went to Southern Rhodesia, yet another important link between the two countries. The average wages paid here were considerably higher than the average wages operating in Nyasaland, as illustrated in Table 2.5. For convenience average wages in Northern Rhodesia are also given for comparison. In 1959, when the largest number of male Nyasas is estimated to have been in Southern Rhodesia (see Table 2.2), probably about one quarter of Nyasaland's male labour force was at work there. Federation does not appear to have affected the numbers attracted to work there: the upward trend registered before 1953 simply continued. A certain proportion of those who went to Southern Rhodesia went under contract but

TABLE 2.5

Average African Wages in the Federation

	£ PER ANNUM			
TERRITORY	1954	1960	1961	1962
Southern Rhodesia	63	91	99	101
Northern Rhodesia	77	133	142	146
Nyasaland	36	57	60	65

source: adapted from Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963, p.18.

Note: wages in Northern Rhodesia are skewed by the very high wages on the mines, where in 1959 the lowest paid surface worker earned £10/12/6 for a 30 day ticket (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1958/59, p.77). Wages for other jobs were generally higher in Southern Rhodesia: the urban minimum weekly wage here was 30/- compared to a minimum daily wage of 2/1d to 2/6d in townships in Nyasaland (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963).

TABLE 2.6

WENELA Recruitment in Nyasaland 1947-62

YEAR	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Quota	12,750	10,000	10,000	8,000	8,000	7,000	10,000	10,000
no. recruited	9,800	9,540	8,022	7,889	7,828	6,501	6,974	9,844
YEAR	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Quota	12,600	14,000	16,000	18,000	20,000	(1)	-	-
no. recruited	12,600	14,000	16,000	18,000	20,000	25,960	31,830	20,645

Source: data from Nyasaland, Reports for 1947-62

1. Quota abolished in this year (see Appendix 2.2).

the majority simply left Nyasaland and found a job there when they arrived. As Southern Rhodesia was overwhelmingly dominant as a destination for migrants it must have been most influential in determining the effect that the migratory system had on the country of origin, both in terms of the absenteeism itself and in terms of the impact returning migrants had on their country of birth.

The factors affecting migration to Northern Rhodesia were very similar to those in Southern Rhodesia. Again the proximity of the two territories meant that the link was established early and Federation appears to have had little effect. Most migrant workers to Northern Rhodesia went to work on the Copper Belt.

There were several important differences in the system of migration to South Africa however. First, all the workers who went there were contract workers: all African Nyasas were prohibited immigrants unless recruited for the gold mines (Nyasaland, 1954). The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) was the only body allowed to conduct this recruitment. The numbers involved from 1947-62 are shown in Table 2.6. Wages again were high on the Rand compared to those offered in Nyasaland, and the Union attracted the greatest number of migrants after Southern Rhodesia although never seriously rivalling its position. ^{In fact} South Africa's proportion of Nyasaland's total migrant labour force fell over the years under consideration (see Appendix 2.2 for a more detailed discussion of the levels of Nyasa migrant labour during the colonial period, and of the conditions under which it occurred).

Migration to other territories besides these three was negligible. It is the impact of these major links, particularly the Southern Rhodesian flow, to which any possible effects on Nyasaland's urban development must be attributed. Obviously the situation described above, with such a large proportion of the African adult male population absent, had devastating effects on most spheres of life in Nyasaland: political, economic and

social. The concern of the missionaries mostly reflected the social problems experienced in the villages which sometimes lost one half of their men in this way. (However) it is also true that it is often the youngest, fittest, best educated and most aware members of a society who migrate: they are the ones most likely to respond to, and seek out, opportunities to earn higher (or any) wages, and want to experience new things. It is this group who, in countries where migration abroad does not form a major part of everyday life, would have migrated within the country to urban places. Thus it is not just the scale of Nyasaland's migration helped to limit its urban development, but also the probability that it selected the very elements who might have contributed to the internal urban population. Nyasas were often regarded as being particularly skilled workers in the countries to which they migrated, which was probably partly a legacy of the importance and success of missionary education in the country. Had this labour remained in Nyasaland and its potential ^{been} recognized, it might have attracted the industrial and commercial investment which needed such labour, and which would have been mainly urban-based. Even had no such employment opportunities been forthcoming in the towns, some of the absentees would probably have gone to the towns anyway and maybe set up small enterprises of a formal or informal nature. .

The argument is not without flaws however. The system of migration undoubtedly allowed many individuals to remit considerable amounts of money. In 1952 it was estimated that approximately £85,000 was remitted, excluding amounts in excess of the sums obligatory under the various inter-territorial agreements, and money brought back personally by returning migrants. £539,000 was cashed in postal and money orders in local Post Offices in the same year. The 1952 Colonial Report (Nyasaland, 1952) felt this could well be representative of the additional monies which migrants were bringing or sending to the country. It is estimated

that Nyasaland benefited by £0.75 million in total in 1953 and 1954, and by £1.75 million in 1959 (Nyasaland, 1954, 1959). Undoubtedly this allowed for a higher standard of living in Nyasaland than would otherwise have been possible (Wilson, 1976). Money saved by the time of a migrant's return could perhaps have been an incentive to start up small enterprises rather than return to farming, and some of these might have been in the towns. The money generated by the migrant labour system could therefore be seen as a possible generator of urbanization in Nyasaland. On the other hand there is no evidence in contemporary records that returning migrants did use their money in this way, nor indeed of how they used it at all, although the basic needs of their dependents was one major outgoing from money remitted during their absence.

Also all the migrants experienced new ways of life, which may have made them dissatisfied with rural village life when they returned and encouraged further migration to Nyasaland's towns. This would be particularly likely for those who had experienced urban life in other countries. There is no data on how many of Nyasaland's African urban workforce had previously been migrant labourers, but should such dissatisfaction have occurred, the higher wage rates and possibly more cosmopolitan atmosphere in foreign towns may have meant that many migrants went abroad again.

Taking the overall picture however there does seem to be some merit in the argument that Nyasaland's involvement in the Southern African migratory labour system meant that some of the urbanization which might have occurred within her boundaries in the absence of this involvement, in fact occurred in, for instance, Salisbury and Bulawayo, on the Rand in South Africa, and in the Copperbelt towns of Northern Rhodesia. It seems a fair proposition that the loss of that section of a population which in most countries is the most innovative and non-traditional, both being characteristics often associated with urban centres, is likely to

have some retarding effect on those aspects of a country's development where those characteristics are most influential. In the same way it might be proposed that the urban centres of Southern Mozambique, or of Lesotho, have been underdeveloped as they too have been enmeshed in systems which link them strongly to other countries through the operation of the migrant labour system.

2.4 Conclusion

At the time of independence Nyasaland had an urban system which was characterized not only by features which reflected particular aspects of its pre-colonial and colonial experience (e.g. the administrative/commercial capital split), but also by a general lack of development on all urban indices. The urban population was small, both absolutely and as a proportion of the total population, the number of centres was very limited, and urban functions and infrastructural development were negligible outside Blantyre, Zomba and possibly Lilongwe. This chapter has argued that since Nyasaland's urban development was in many ways similar to that experienced in some other British colonies, and yet was even more limited in extent by independence, some other factors unique to Nyasaland must be considered to explain the discrepancy. The factors identified here as likely to have had a retarding effect on Nyasaland's urban development are its close ties to neighbouring countries to the south. Aspects of Nyasaland's relationship with Southern Rhodesia, and particularly with Salisbury, appear to have operated as limitations on general urban development, especially in functional terms. The specific ties of dependency which resulted from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland served to strengthen the satellite status of Nyasaland's urban centres vis à vis Salisbury, which was already in operation in many spheres of economic and social activity. Also the drain on Nyasaland's population from migrant labour going to South Africa and

the two Rhodesias can be seen as a system in which part of Nyasaland's potential urban development was displaced and occurred outside the country.

Notes for Chapter 2

1. Whilst this analysis is applicable in many cases in West Africa, it should also be recognized that in Nigeria many pre-colonial urban centres (e.g. Ibadan, Kano) remain very important in today's urban system, as they were throughout the colonial period.
2. The concept of primacy is used here not only in its simplest form whereby it denotes that the largest city has more than twice the population of the second largest but also in a broader sense. Thus a city's primacy within any urban system is also reflected in its capacity to formulate most of the central decisions which affect the rest of the urban system and in its dominant share of all urban infrastructure, industrial and commercial development, and wage employment.

CHAPTER THREE

Urban Development in Malawi after Independence

Nyasaland gained her independence in 1964, one year after the Federation had been abolished. In 1966 the first full population census was taken in the country, which had been renamed Malawi. For the first time it was possible to gauge the degree of urbanization, and to analyse the relative size of the centres in the urban system. The level of urbanization was extremely low at this time: just over 200,000 people were living in urban centres, which was a mere 5% of the population of 4 million. Most of the urban population was concentrated in a few centres: Blantyre itself accounted for 54% of urban dwellers and it was one of only 4 towns (Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and Mzuzu) with populations of over 5,000. These 4 accounted for over three-quarters (78%) of Malawi's entire urban population as recorded in the census.

The only other full census was taken in 1977 and recorded an urban population of about 471,000, 8.4% of the national population of 5.5 million. This implied an extremely rapid increase in ^{the} urban ^{population} in the intervening 11 years at a rate of 8% per year, and suggested that Malawi was one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries on the continent, although the level of urbanization was still low. Blantyre still accounted for almost a half (46.5%) of the total, and the four main centres maintained their overall importance with 76% of the urban population living in them.

3.1 Rapid Urban Growth in Malawi: True or False?

3.1.1 The definition of 'urban' centres

One problem associated with international comparison of urbanization levels and growth rates is the lack of consistency in the definition of which centres are defined as 'urban'. As alluded to above, Malawian official figures include many centres which would not be included in urban statistics in most other countries (i.e. centres with populations under

5,000). This makes direct comparisons of Malawian urbanization with the process of urbanization as experienced elsewhere difficult. In fact the majority of the places designated as 'urban' in the 1966 census had populations of under 1,000 and most of the rest were under 2,000. Even by 1977 two-thirds of the officially designated urban centres had populations of less than 5,000.

In addition to these problems, the way in which census officials selected centres as being urban rather than rural settlements is not very well defined, and the criteria changed between the two census dates. Thus whilst 51 places were assigned urban status in 1966, a somewhat tighter set of criteria led to only 32 being so defined in 1977. In 1966 urban areas were defined as all townships (1) and district centres as well as those centres "having installations such as a Police Post, a Works Camp or a Post Office, in addition to trading stores and market" (Malawi Statistical Yearbook, 1977, p.7). Although this would go some way to exclude essentially rural settlements (many villages have much larger populations than the smaller urban centres) it is clearly not a strict definition, and would easily allow settlements with populations almost entirely engaged in agricultural occupations to be included as 'urban'. If a population minimum is not used to select urban centres, a functional approach can be a more useful tool especially in the context of countries like Malawi.


To some extent the 1977 census also used functional characteristics to select urban centres but the definition was narrower and excluded many very small settlements (Town and Country Planning Department, personal communication, January 1983). The 32 centres fell into three categories: gazetted cities and towns, all district administrative centres not included in the first category, and four other small centres. The first category essentially covers those settlements which have acquired sufficient status to be locally administered by a Town Council, rather

than their District Council. The second category covers the remaining majority of district administrative headquarters. The four towns in the last category were also designated urban in 1966 and all have sub-district centre status (ibid). Several other sub-district centres also exist but were not included, many of them much larger than Phalombe with a population of only 1207. However Phalombe is a well established sub-district centre with a resident Assistant District Commissioner and empirical observation combined with the evidence of official studies (TCPD, 1979; TCPD, 1980a) supports the assumption that these four centres were selected on the basis of their other urban functions besides the merely administrative.

Any analysis of Malawi's urban system must try to account for any definitional inaccuracies. A consultancy firm involved in the preparation of a project to develop Malawi's district centres still stated in 1980 that "There is no clear definition of "urban population " in Malawi. To consider a town as such is rather a matter of custom " (TCPD, 1980b, Annex 3, p.3). However it is considered here that an analysis of Malawi's urban system should take as a basis only the 32 centres selected in the 1977 census which are shown in Map 3.1. Generally these centres are the main service centres for their area and contain a wider range and higher level of facilities than other local settlements. Settlements which might appear to be unimportant according to their population size may in fact perform very important functions in less developed countries such as Malawi, where the majority of the population is engaged in agricultural occupations which are the mainstay of the economy. Also policies directly affecting urban development tend to concentrate on these centres and the scarce comparative urban statistics which exist pertain to them.

3.1.2 Urban Growth Rates 1966-77: the Problem of Boundary Changes

"Malawi is essentially an agricultural country with less than 10% of its population employed and residing in urban areas of any



Map 3.1 URBAN CENTRES IN MALAWI ACCORDING TO 1977 CENSUS

description. But the situation is not static. A number of urban areas are growing rapidly at rates in excess of 6% with....Lilongwe, the new capital, [registering] a growth rate of....16%." (Mlia, 1978, p.8 emphasis added).

The initial impression gained from a straight comparison between the populations enumerated in Malawi's urban centres in 1966 and 1977 (see Table 3.1) would tend to support the opinion expressed in this statement, and implies that Malawi has failed in its intention of preventing disruptive rural emigration (Economic Planning Division, 1971).

A stricter analysis of the situation however not only calls into question the rapidity of urbanization in Malawi, but also raises the issue of whether rural-urban migration is, in fact, making a significant contribution to growth rates in the majority of the designated urban centres. These apparent contradictions arise mainly because of extensive boundary changes. These have significantly affected the area within which people are enumerated as 'urban' for nearly every centre. The massive boundary changes which accompanied Lilongwe's development as the new national capital are one aspect of this problem (2). The average annual growth rate of around 16% quoted in the above statement thus gives a false impression of Lilongwe's true growth and, inter alia, means that the 8.4% national urban growth rate was an overestimate (3). This distortion is amplified by the fact that in 1966 the 'urban' population of all but the four largest urban centres was only considered to be that population which resided within the boundaries of the so-called 'boma' area, a very restricted area centred on the old colonial administrative offices. Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and Mzuzu's boundaries covered much more extensive areas which were designated and occasionally expanded under the auspices of the Local Government (Urban Areas) Act. Although other townships were gazetted in March 1966 they had not had their boundaries defined in time for the census (Malawi Notices, GN 48, 1966). Even Salima which had new boundaries gazetted in July 1966 (a month before the census) (Malawi Notices, GN 162, 1966) was enumerated in accordance with its

TABLE 3.1
Urban Centres in Malawi: 1966 and 1977

Urban Centre	Population 1977 Census	Population 1966 Census	Rank in 1966	AAGR ¹ %	Urban Area (km ²)		Popn. Density /km ²
					1966	1977	
Blantyre	219,011	109,461	1	6.4	202	220	996
Lilongwe	98,718	19,425	3	15.8	23	218	453
Zomba	24,234	19,666	2	2.0	21	21	1,154
Mzuzu	16,108	8,490	4	6.0	23	23	700
Karonga	12,051	1,128	21	24.0	-	26	464
Nkhota-kota	10,316	1,117	23	22.4	-	10	1,032
Kasungu	6,488	1,628	10	13.4	-	36	180
Nsanje	6,400	1,373	15	15.0	-	16	400
Balaka	5,632	1,647	9	11.8	-	10	363
Dedza	5,578	2,318	6	8.3	-	18	310
Mzimba	5,396	4,156	5	2.4	-	10	540
Ngabu	4,848	614	26	20.7	-	34	143
Salima	4,712	2,307	7	6.7	-	5	942
Monkey Bay	4,048	1,188	20	11.8	-	10	405
Rumphi	4,003	1,916	8	6.9	-	21	191
Thyolo	3,856	1,394	14	9.7	-	5	676
Liwonde	3,738	-	-	-	-	34	110
Luchenza	3,381	827	29	13.7	-	13	297
Mponela	3,359	1,310	16	8.9	-	8	420
Monkey Bay	3,207	1,300	17	8.6	-	10	371
Ntcheu	3,115	1,118	22	9.8	-	16	195
Chitipa	3,110	1,429	13	7.3	-	8	389
Chikwawa	3,036	902	24	11.7	-	10	304
Mulanje	3,001	1,225	18	8.5	-	13	231
Mangochi	2,792	1,467	12	6.0	-	10	279
Mwanza	2,354	692	25	11.8	-	5	471
Dowa	1,962	1,552	11	2.2	-	13	151
Mchinji	1,957	831	28	8.1	-	10	196
Ntchisi	1,654	1,218	19	2.8	-	5	331
Phalombe	1,207	203	31	17.6	-	3	402
Machinga	697	203	30	5.1	2	8	87
Chiradzulu	689	609	-	1.1	-	3	230
Total Urban	470,658	192,913		8.4			

Sources: Malawi Population Census 1977
Malawi Population Census 1966

- Notes: 1. AAGRs taken from 1977 census, Table 1, or own calculations.
 2. Area covered by boma boundaries in 1966 not available, except for Machinga.
 - : not applicable

'boma' population only (Malawi, N.S.O., 1968, Table 2).

By 1977 the population of urban centres was enumerated in two different ways according to their status. The gazetted towns of Salima, Dedza, Mangochi, Balaka, Liwonde and Ngabu were now treated like the major centres had been in 1966, and their populations were enumerated within their gazetted boundaries (excluding Town Planning Areas). The remainder of the designated urban centres were assigned the population residing within their entire Town Planning Areas (4). In both cases the area designated as urban was larger than that used in 1966.

Boundary changes, per se, need not lead to the overestimation of urban growth rates. As the urban population grows it is likely to spread out beyond the original town area and new borders must be defined which include it. However the nature of the boundary changes described above has led to a significant distortion of the meaning of 'urbanization' at the lower end of the urban hierarchy. Before this assertion can be analyzed the term 'urbanization' must be defined.

Urbanization can be perceived as a spatial and/or behavioural process. The definition of whether an environment and its population should be classified as 'urban' can be problematical. Factors such as minimum population thresholds, minimum levels of population density, and the area of the urban labour market are often used in developed countries (Simmons and Bourne, 1978). These are variables which can be measured spatially to determine which areas are urban. However none of them address the question of a functional difference between urban and rural areas. This often involves the consideration of occupational structures as well as the provision of certain types of services. It is often asserted that an urban population should be primarily engaged in non-agricultural activities in order to distinguish it from the rural population of large, densely settled centres where agriculture remains the primary activity. This implies that there is a qualitative difference between the mode of

existence of urban and rural dwellers. This criterion of employment structure is a useful tool because it does begin to tackle the behavioural aspects of urbanization. However it should not perhaps be used in isolation since agricultural employment and 'urban' categorization are not always mutually exclusive as illustrated in the following statement:

"the most traditionally urban of all African peoples were the Yoruba....Nigeria's last reliable population census, that of 1952, found that fully 47% of the population in the Yoruba region lived in settlements of 5000 or more people. However, it is significant that most of the inhabitants of these towns earned their livelihood on farms to which they commuted for several days at a time. These were clearly pre-industrial as well as pre-colonial towns." (Sandbrook, 1982, p.39)

The classification of these Yoruba settlements as urban does not rest merely on their size. They also exhibit societal and institutional characteristics which differentiate them from rural communities (Mabogunje, 1962; LLoyd, 1973).

In most cases urban centres are characterized by a combination of these various factors. Thus Friedmann (1973) has defined urbanization as two inter-related processes: the geographical concentration of population and non-agricultural activities in urban environments, and the geographic diffusion of urban values, behaviour, organizations and institutions. The urban environment must therefore be dictated by not only the density and concentration of settlements but also by the usual modes of production and interaction assumed by the resident population. The corollary of this premise is that the urban population is that which is specifically and directly involved in the urban milieu: in general this would mean that the population's occupational structure would usually exclude widespread agricultural activities, and that the people's behaviour was governed to some extent by the influence of urban values and institutions. In fact there is disagreement over whether urbanization can be characterized by the adoption of a new orientation to life which involves a move from traditional to modern cultural values (Sandbrook, 1982, p.184). However

the perception of oneself as urban need not imply the denial or loss of traditional values (which in themselves need not be equated with rural values). Instead it could involve a high degree of dependence on urban-based facilities for everyday needs (e.g. food, cooking utensils) or a certain level of interaction with urban services (e.g. schools, hospitals). In addition a switch to involvement with urban institutions such as voting for Town Councillors, or dealing with licencing officers could lead to a more 'urban' perception than dealing with village headmen (who are still influential administrative authorities in Malawi).

When such a definition of the urban population is applied to the Malawian situation, it becomes clear that the growth rates registered for many urban centres have little to do with a true increase in the population that is genuinely urban. The redefinition of the small centres' boundaries to include Town Planning Areas (TPAs) was not designed to include only new areas of the urban environment which had spread from the original nucleus. The assignment of TPAs by the TCPD was a logical step in urban planning to provide areas within which the long-term growth and development of centres could be organized. The new boundaries define the potential urban space and include 'undeveloped' or 'unurbanized' areas and their residents.

The case of Karonga on the Northern lake-shore is illustrative. The 'raw' average annual population growth rate of the population is an astonishing 24% per year. Yet a significant proportion of the new population are not people who have decisively altered their lifestyle to become part of the urban population whether by immigration or absorption. Many are village residents who have been included in the urban population of 1977 by a cartographical procedure. Thus an official study recommending measures for Karonga's development states:

"the settlement pattern for the planning area is essentially rural...In 1981 the TPA is estimated to house 12,350 inhabitants of which approximately one third live in Karonga Town, whereas the remaining two-thirds are scattered in villages or live in an urban

settlement cluster around Karonga Airport and Bwiba."
(TCPD, 1981, ps. 2,3)

Although a rural settlement structure and residence in villages is not incompatible with urbanization inasmuch as outlying villages on urban boundaries can be absorbed into an urban environment by a gradual (and virtually organic) process, it is indisputable that a significant proportion of Malawi's official 'urban' growth is false. Much of the 1977 'urban' population remained rural in its characteristics and lifestyle and could not be part of the true urban population.

One method by which boundary changes can be taken into account is to estimate the population living within the 1977 boundaries at the time of the 1966 census. Published statistics are insufficiently detailed for such an analysis, and unpublished data proved to be inaccessible to the individual researcher. However the TCPD did have data for two towns which exhibited extreme growth rates (TCPD, personal communication, January, 1982). The growth rates thus calculated are indicative of the massive distortions produced by boundary changes (see Table 3.2). However this system produces its own distortions as it suggests that Karonga's growth was well below the rate of natural increase. The explanation partly lies in the fact that there has been out-migration of the 'village population' of the TPA due to flooding of agricultural land

(TCPD, 1981). The TCPD also feels that the conversion of fertile agricultural land to urban land use also drove 'peasant' families out of the TPA: thus for some people absorption into an urban environment was rejected. In some ways this could be seen as an increased 'ruralization' of part of the TPA population. The definition by the TCPD of a proportion of Karonga's population as either 'village' or 'peasant' (ibid, Annex 1, p. 6, and Table A1-3) shows that there is a tacit acceptance that large numbers of the so-called urban population within the TPA are essentially rural. The numbers of 'peasants' in 1977 is given as 8900: 74% of the TPA's population.

TABLE 3.2
Adjusted Average Annual Growth Rates 1966-77
for two small urban centres

Town	1966 Census Pop.	1966 Pop. adjusted to 1977 Boundaries	1977 Census Pop.	Adjusted AAGR 1966-77	'Raw' AAGR
Nkhota- kota	1117	6425	10316	4.4%	24%
Karonga	1128	11240	12051	0.63%	22.4%

Source: TCPD, personal communication,
January 1982.

If this proportion was assumed to be applicable to the situation in the 28 other small urban centres, calculations shows that there was no 'urban' growth at all in these centres. In fact a decrease in 'urban' population would be registered, from 35,871 in 1966 to 29,272 in 1977. This is an untenable conclusion: unfortunately the picture is much more complex and other detailed analyses, such as that for Karonga, were unavailable. Yet it is possible to draw some inferential conclusion from available information.

For instance Karonga's 'urban' population (i.e. the non-village population) is estimated as 3151 in 1977 (ibid) giving a 9.8% AAGR in the intercensal period: a viable but still very rapid rate of increase. Yet there has been no attempt to define the 'urban' population according to the type of methodology outlined earlier; it is merely the population living in the specifically 'urban' environment. However about 6,250 inhabitants of the TPA were dependent on "urban job-type opportunities" in the town that year (ibid, Annex 1, p. 6) (5). Clearly residence in the village environment has not prevented some people obtaining urban employment, as roughly half the number employed and those dependent upon them must be living outside the strictly urban area. Consequently the definition of the village population as 'peasant' must be inaccurate to some degree as up to a third of them are part of the urban labour market. No employment statistics for small urban areas were gathered in the past, but it seems a fair assumption that a similar situation pertained in 1966, and that some proportion of the urban population (defined by the urban labour market) were resident outside the delineated 'boma' area at that time. It is possible that some so-called 'peasants' should also have been perceived as 'urban' then, as well as in 1977, by the imposition of a broader definition which includes some consideration of the level and nature of interaction with the urban milieu. This can be assumed to be a minority as it is clearly significant that over 1000 peasants chose to

leave the TPA suggesting that maintenance of agricultural production was their major priority, thus excluding them from classification as 'urban'. This was due to the loss of only 140 has. of agricultural land whereas the TPA covers a total of 2600 has. Thus a loss of only 5% of the TPA was sufficient to displace roughly 10% of the village population (6). By analogy it appears that generally the village population of Karonga is not committed to urban life despite proximity to the urban environment and it is therefore assumed that only those forming part of the urban labour market should be regarded as part of the urban population.

The conclusion of this analysis is that whilst the 1966 census significantly underestimated Karonga's true urban population, the 1977 census overestimated it. Controlling for boundary changes is not particularly helpful in Karonga's case because of urban-rural migration in the inter-censal period and the very large area covered by the TPA. Adjusting Nkhota-kota's growth rate by this method may be more satisfactory because the boundary extension was more limited and the TPA only covers 1000 has. Also Nkhota-kota is an extensive, indigenous settlement and its TPA was the most densely settled in the country after Blantyre and Zomba. Therefore its TPA may well have covered an area where few truly 'rural' people resided even in 1966.

For Karonga the urban labour market appears to offer the most useful method for interpreting urban growth there, yet lack of data makes exact analysis of past trends impossible. However a complete study of Karonga's urban job opportunities found 2060 jobs in 1981, a 4.2% AAGR since 1977 (TCPD, 1981, Annex 1). This rate is regarded as low and expected to increase to 5-6% "as a result of urban development promotion, because the latter will certainly result in accelerated expansion of future employment" (ibid, p.9). As Karonga received no special promotion up until 1981 when the report was prepared, it seems safe to assume that the 4.2% growth rate in employment opportunities was a reasonable

approximation to the real situation in Karonga from 1966-77. Assuming a roughly similar level of dependents per worker over the period (7) the employment growth rate becomes a surrogate for the urban population growth rate, and this leads to the conclusion that Karonga's urban growth between 1966-77 occurred at a rate of roughly 4-5%.

Despite the imperfections of such a method which rests on the acceptance of several unverifiable assumptions, there are reasons to believe that it does present a fair picture of the real process of urbanization in this case. If the general points made in respect of this centre's growth are accepted, particularly in relation to the underestimation in 1966 and overestimation in 1977 of the urban population, some further inferences can be drawn for other small centres. For instance it can be deduced from available figures that the expansion of the urban labour market has been rather slow in the smaller urban centres. Detailed statistics by occupation are available for two urban categories only: Blantyre and Lilongwe combined, and all other urban centres. An overall picture for small urban centres can therefore be gained from the latter category. Of all occupations enumerated, 17,739 people (37%) people were agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers, fishermen and hunters (Malawi, NSO, 1980b, Vol. 11, Table 4.3). If these people and their dependents (calculated on the basis of average activity rates for this urban category) are excluded from the enumerated urban population, the number of 'urban' workers, unemployed and their dependents is 96,237. Assuming that the narrowly delineated 1966 urban areas would have included few people involved in non-urban jobs, this analysis implies an inter-censal AAGR of only 3.7% per year in the urban labour market (excluding Blantyre and Lilongwe). The 1977 census data give a natural increase rate for all urban centres of 3.5%. If this can be used as an indication of the situation in the category of urban centres being considered, it appears that the increase in urban job

opportunities from 1966-77 would have done little more than absorb the natural increase in the urban labour supply. Whilst the data base is admittedly imperfect, this evidence definitely shows that the huge in-migration rate implied by the AAGR of 11% for small urban centres recorded in the 1977 census must be misleading.

Further evidence of a significant 'rural' component in the smaller urban centres is available. Economic activity statistics classifying people as employers, employees, self-employed, family business workers or 'mlimi' (peasant farmers) are given in the 1977 census. These are disaggregated by district for rural and urban areas; hence occupational data is available for individual towns when there is only one urban centre in a district, or for a group of towns where there are more than one (Table 3.3). Whilst the large urban centres had only a small minority of mlimi, in many centres they made up an even larger proportion of the economically active population than in Karonga. However this is not a perfect indicator of the rural element in the population. First, particularly in the smaller, more densely settled centres, it is possible that a broad definition would regard some mlimi as part of the urban population because their degree of accessibility to the urban environment allowed a sufficiently high level of interaction with urban services and institutions to produce a greater degree of urban commitment than was the case in Karonga. Secondly, in some cases the number of agricultural workers will actually be higher than the recorded mlimi, as those working for large estates or for small farmers are registered only as employees and many of these would be essentially rural (8). Therefore more useful conclusions can be drawn if this evidence is combined with an analysis of the size of TPAs and their population density.

Those urban centres which have been designated fairly limited TPAs in 1977 might be expected to present a truer picture of urban growth rates in Malawi. This is because a restricted TPA is less likely to cover large

TABLE 3.3

'Mlimi' (peasant farmers) as a proportion of the economically active population in Malawi's urban centres, by district, 1977

District	Urban Centres	Total Economically Active	'Mlimi'	Mlimi as % ec. active
Chitipa	Chitipa	812	329	41
Karonga	Karonga	3373	1488	44
Nkhata Bay	Nkhata Bay	1204	237	17 ¹
Rumphi	Rumphi	1295	479	37
Mzimba	Mzimba, Mzuzu	5335	579	11
Kasungu	Kasungu	1938	345	18 ²
Nkhotakota	Nkhotakota	2133	1005	47
Ntchisi	Ntchisi	611	229	37
Dowa	Dowa, Mponela	1711	685	40
Salima	Salima	1941	425	22
Lilongwe	Lilongwe	30769	1599	5
Mchinji	Mchinji	790	367	46
Dedza	Dedza	2030	899	44
Ntcheu	Ntcheu	1235	675	55
Mangochi	Mangochi, Monkey Bay	2026	428	21
Machinga	Machinga, Liwonde, Balaka	3734	1334	36
Zomba	Zomba	6379	822	13
Chiradzulu	Chiradzulu	278	107	38
Blantyre	Blantyre	76146	5111	7
Mwanza	Mwanza	1030	423	41
Thyolo	Thyolo, Luchenza	2392	365	15 ²
Mulanje	Mulanje, Phalombe	1359	354	26 ²
Chikwawa	Chikwawa, Ngabu	3313	1606	48
Nsanje	Nsanje	2941	2099	72

Source: Malawi Population Census 1977,
Vol. II, Table 4.2

1. This figure will overestimate 'urban' employment rates. A proportion of those designated 'employees' are probably primarily engaged in fishing as Nkhata Bay is an important fisheries centre. It also had an extremely high unemployment rate of 33% of economically active (no other centres approached this rate; but Nkhata Bay had the highest out-migration rate to other countries of all districts from 1966-77 and is experiencing relative stagnation).

2. Excludes agricultural workers in tea and tobacco estates.

areas of cultivated land and therefore include a corresponding scattered rural population, with relatively limited access to the urban centre. Thus the recorded 1977 population is probably a fair approximation of the true urban population then. It is significant that it is generally these centres which registered the lowest 'raw' growth rates (see Table 3.1). Some are actually recorded as stagnating; Chiradzulu, for example, with an area of only 300 has. experienced an AAGR of only 1.1%, significantly lower than its district growth rate (2%) or even natural increase. This is due to Blantyre's proximity as there is considerable migration to this city from its surrounding areas. Mzimba, Dowa and Ntchisi with average or small TPAs also suffered from net emigration. Mzimba, ranked as Malawi's fifth urban centre in 1966, was thus unable to provide sufficient attraction to encourage in-migration. Although it suffers from competition with the regional capital of Mzuzu, it still remains its district's capital.

Consideration of urban density statistics for both population and dwelling-units (Malawi, National Statistical Office, 1980a, 1980b)

finds that most of the smaller TPAs (3-10 km²) have higher densities than the largest, new TPAs. On the other hand, many are still relatively low in comparison with the urban environments of Blantyre, Zomba and Nkhota-kota (Table 3.3) and therefore must still include some rural areas. Taking this factor into account along with the original underestimation of the urban population in 1966, means that there should be a particularly sharp downward revision of urban growth rates for Machinga, Mponela, Mwanza, Chitipa, Chikwawa, Mangochi and Monkey Bay. It appears that Thyolo and Salima have sufficiently high population densities to make this rural factor relatively unimportant; a slightly lower growth rate for Thyolo on account of the original underestimation would still make it a fairly rapidly growing centre. Balaka is another such case. Empirical observation adds further evidence as both Balaka and especially

Salima present much more of an impression of an urban environment than most other small centres. Phalombe's position is somewhat spurious as it began from such a low base. The recorded growth rate is definitely too high and even this small TPA must include some rural people, yet the centre has received a boost from certain government policies and is probably growing quite rapidly.

By comparison the remaining small centres which cover larger TPAs (13-36 km²) display such low densities that the rural element of their 1977 populations must be extremely important. The exception is Nkhota-kota which is a unique case and a 4-5% AAGR is probably an acceptable approximation, as previously discussed. Ntcheu and Luchenza have densities not much different from their surrounding rural traditional authorities, and although the others are higher the overall impression must be that the distortion in every case is at least as extreme as was proven for Karonga which registered the highest 'raw' AAGR of all, but in fact has the highest population density amongst the range of larger TPAs (excluding Nkhota-kota) and is situated in a district with one of the lowest rural population densities in Malawi. This being the case, it seems feasible to suggest that as Karonga's true urban growth rate is considered to be about 5% maximum, the maximum AAGR for the other urban centres with large TPAs and low population densities was slightly lower (9).

For the larger centres with the exception of Lilongwe, urban growth rates recorded by the 1977 census are less problematic. None of them have a large mlimi component in the recorded labour force, and neither Zomba nor Mzuzu had their boundaries extended in the inter-censal period. Blantyre's boundary expansion was due to the inclusion of a major new urban housing area, South Lunzu. Therefore the official rates of growth for Blantyre, Zomba and Mzuzu appear to be acceptable estimates, and although Lilongwe's growth rate is an overestimate (see Chapter 7) its

true growth was nevertheless very high.

3.1.3 The Implications of Adjusted Urban Growth Rates

The above analysis leads to the conclusion that urbanization in Malawi is still at a very early stage: as a social or spatial phenomenon it is only occurring at any significant level in a very few centres. These include Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu but it seems that hardly any of the smaller urban centres are growing "rapidly at rates in excess of 6%" as stated by Mlia (op cit). Salima's growth may be about this level, and Balaka's slightly higher, and some evidence exists to suggest that Luchenza should also be regarded as a relatively thriving centre, largely on account of its trading and informal sector activities (10). Kasungu probably also experienced a higher than average increase in its true urban population. This again partly impressionistic view is supported by the fact that the massive development of tobacco estates in Kasungu district is likely to have contributed to the demand for urban services. This has led to relatively large numbers of application for leases of commercial plots there (TCPD, 1981, p.52).

The overall picture though is one in which, at the lower end of the urban scale, people are adapting an urban life-style at a fairly slow rate. This is not necessarily perceived in all government circles, but has been accepted by those involved in a project to develop Malawi's smaller urban centres. They assumed an AAGR of 4.5% in the intercensal period for all centres excluding Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and Mzuzu. This approximation was made after detailed study of trends in four centres: Mzuzu, Luchenza, Ntcheu and Kasungu, from which it was concluded that the small urban centres did not appear to be growing very fast (TCPD, 1980b). By adjusting Lilongwe's growth rate in accordance with a redefinition of its population in 1966, this study produced an overall national urban growth rate of 5.8% (see Table 3.4).

As a merely numerical observation, the fact that the majority of

TABLE 3.4
Adjusted Urban Growth Rates 1966-77

	1966 Census data	1966 Adjusted data ¹	1977 Census data	Adjusted AAGR%
Small Urban Centres	33,136	71,600	112,587	4.5
Blantyre	109,461	109,461	219,011	6.4
Zomba	19,666	19,666	24,234	2.0
Mzuzu	8,490	8,490	16,108	6.0
Lilongwe ²	19,425	45,380	102,924	7.7
Total Major Urban Centres	157,042	182,997	362,277	6.4
Total Urban Popn.	190,178	254,597	474,864	5.8

Source: adapted from Table 3-2, TCPD, 1981

1. Population of 1966 adjusted in accordance with larger township areas in 1977: for small urban centres this is a 'guesstimate' by the TCPD produced by a backward projection from the 1977 population using a 4.5% annual growth rate.
2. Lilongwe's adjusted 1966 population is based on the population living within the 1977 Town Planning Area. The 1977 population is therefore slightly larger than in Table 3.1 as the TPA extends beyond the gazetted boundaries.

Malawi's new urban population since independence is to be found in the major centres is relatively unsurprising, considering their share of the total urban population. However as a qualitative observation it has wide implications. Firstly the spatial impact of the experience of urban life is very unequal and not improving. Secondly the smaller centres are failing to counteract the attraction of the larger centres for rural-urban migrants. Thirdly, government perception of the targets for policies dealing with urbanization is likely to be distorted by the false impression given by apparent urban growth rates. This latter point holds true despite the fact that the TCPD is aware of the problem. Without a clear picture of the true urban population, and of which centres have really been expanding rapidly it is difficult to plan for future urban development. This needs to establish which factors are contributing to urban growth. Whilst it is quite obvious that Blantyre and Lilongwe exert the major attraction for migrants due to their size and the concentration of urban job opportunities there, it is difficult to see which characteristics encourage in-migration at the lower end of the urban scale when past trends for individual centres cannot be ascertained. The assumption of a 4.5% growth rate for all smaller urban centres cannot aid in the selection of the most thriving centres for future development plans. It must be significant that, of those which are here considered to have grown faster than this, three out of four are railway centres: Balaka, Luchenza and Salima. The first two are not even district capitals. This suggests that the administrative and service functions which have been the main cause of urbanization at the lower end of the urban system are insufficient to generate much urban growth under a laissez-faire approach to urban development, whilst these centres with a more direct economic role have greater potential.

The Malawian government avers that an over-concentration of migration to Blantyre and Lilongwe is undesirable. The answer to this is

felt to be the diversion of migration to the smaller urban centres, yet it is clear that a certain amount of confusion has been produced by a combination of conflicting information on the attraction already exerted by these centres, and the official distaste for urbanization as a general phenomenon. For instance one policy recommendation takes the line that "since the urban population growth is already quite high, any policy in the urban context should avoid to make towns too attractive (sic).....it should not be possible to raise one's standard of living markedly by simply moving from a rural to an urban area. This would be undoubtedly the case if access to most of the urban amenities.....were substantially subsidized" (TCPD, 1980a, p.21, emphasis in original). This accords with the "keeping-the-town-clean" attitude so characteristic of Malawian urban policies. Yet simultaneously the TCPD avers that "nothing is won with a "keeping-the-town-clean" policy" (ibid, p.20) whilst an earlier planning document stated that:

"[by the year 2000] an additional 670,000 will need to be accommodated in the smaller urban centres. This represents a five-fold increase in the numbers living in such centres. It is essential that these centres are developed properly, not only to accommodate the anticipated flood of rural migrants into such towns, but also to act as counter-magnets for Lilongwe and Blantyre, and thereby help to avoid the plethora of urban problems so apparent in large cities in other developing countries" (TCPD, 1979, p.1).

This recommendation was based on the assumption that smaller urban centres already exert considerable attraction and would grow at an AAGR of 7.7% (using census data with an adjustment for Lilongwe's boundary expansion) to the year 2000. This growth rate is equivalent to the national urban AAGR for 1966-77 (11).

The contradictions in these recommendations are evident. Yet both indicate policy directives which might lead to continued stagnation in the smaller urban centres. On the one hand it is suggested that care should be taken not to make the small centres too attractive to migrants which implies that special policies to increase their attractiveness relative to

Blantyre and Lilongwe would be avoided. On the other hand it is assumed that these centres already present a positive climate for rural-urban migration so that rapid growth is inevitable, which implies that their development need only be guided, rather than fostered. Despite the recognition of the ambivalence of recorded urban growth rates, the TCPD presents not only conflicting analyses to the government, but also leaves the way open for further government neglect of the smaller centres.

It is apparent that the proportion of the urban population in the four largest towns has increased in the inter-censal period. Blantyre and Lilongwe's proportion combined grew even according to official statistics from 66.8% to 67.5%; a downward revision of the 'urban' population of smaller centres would make the proportion in these two centres in 1977 even higher. If the government wishes to reverse this trend, specific policies must be devised to generate a more attractive environment in other urban centres in order to divert some rural-urban migration to them. First though the government must perceive the trend, and even the adjusted figures of the TCPD, shown in Table 3.4, would result in a fall in the large town proportion, as the 1977 census figures for the small centres are regarded as wholly urban.

A demographic survey prepared for Malawi by the World Bank in 1982 would do nothing to help this impression, if used by Malawian planners as an authoritative analysis of the country's population trends. The survey made great efforts to overcome the many imperfections and inaccuracies in the data base, and is in many ways the most satisfactory source of information on the parameters affecting changes in the population, particularly in terms of fertility and mortality. However the urban population trends were analysed on the bases of census figures only, adjusted only for Lilongwe. Using an urban growth rate of 7.6% per year (12) the report states that this is "far above any conceivable rate of natural increase, and obviously produced largely by migration from the

countryside into towns. The implied minimum number of intercensal migrants, assuming a maximum [urban] natural increase rate of 4% is 156,000; conversely a minimum rate of 2.5% would imply 204,000 intercensal migrants. The average annual number of [net] rural-urban migrants would be in the range of 14-18,000" (Hill, 1982, p.16).

The report goes on to say that if the anomalous figures for Zomba and Lilongwe are excluded, an overall national urban growth rate of 8.3% is produced. It is therefore assumed that this meant that all other urban centres grew at a very fast rate, and the report concludes that this is a sign that rural-urban migration is spreading throughout the urban system. This conclusion could only serve to support the impression that the smaller centres are thriving.

3.2 Components of Urban Growth in Malawi

Urban population increase can occur through three processes: natural increase, net in-migration from rural areas (or from other urban centres although this does not increase the overall urban population), and population reclassification due to boundary expansion. The latter aspect has already been discussed. Assessment of the relative contribution of the three factors is important for urban planning, but it is apparent that this is a difficult task in Malawi because of lack of data and the problem of separating migrants from the re-classified rural population.

3.2.1 Natural Increase

Fertility and mortality data are available for the urban population as a whole, and to some extent for Blantyre and Lilongwe separately. Crude urban birth and death rates have been calculated from the 1977 census as 45.9 and 10.6 per thousand respectively (the corresponding national rates were 48.3 and 25). These give an urban natural increase rate of about 3.5%. Although the census data are not altogether reliable, this rate appears quite credible and falls within the range for urban

natural increase assumed by the World Bank demographic survey (Hill, op cit).

3.2.2 In-Migration

One cannot necessarily assume that the above rate of urban natural increase is uniform across the urban system. However on the assumption that it will indicate the average rate for the smaller centres as a group, when it is related to the adjusted total growth rate (allowing for boundary expansion) for that category it implies that in-migration only accounts for about one-fifth of their growth. Whilst there is some doubt about the accuracy of the data it does indicate that the great majority of urban growth (excluding reclassification) is due to natural increase in most urban centres. This is unusual for developing countries where the proportion of in-migration is often over 50% at the early stage of urbanization, and now appears to be about half of total urban growth in many African countries (O'Connor, 1983).

Whilst in-migration to the small centres has been relatively low, it must have been much higher in Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Zomba, on the other hand, clearly experienced net out-migration due to the change in its status. Lilongwe's boundary changes necessitate a careful analysis (see Chapter 7), but this factor is unimportant in the cases of Mzuzu and Blantyre (see Section 3.1.2). Using the overall urban natural increase rate for Mzuzu this suggests that in-migration accounted for about two-fifths of its growth.

For Blantyre it is possible to be more specific about its natural increase rate as relevant data are available. Demographic variables by district tend to disaggregate Blantyre and Lilongwe 'urban', and urban data for the Southern Region can be used as a surrogate for Blantyre which makes up over three-quarters of the regional urban population. Blantyre's crude birth rate and death rate for the year 1976-77 were 45 and 11.1 per thousand respectively, giving a natural increase rate of 3.5% (the same as

the urban average). The birth rate was cross-checked with reported urban fertility rates for the Southern Region and is regarded as satisfactory (see Appendix 3.1). With an overall AAGR of 6.4% from 1966-77 (13) it is calculated that net in-migration accounted for ^{55% of} Blantyre's growth in the intercensal period. Thus Blantyre's growth has been reliant on in-migration to a much greater degree than the smaller urban centres.

The conclusion from this analysis is that rural-urban migration is not spread evenly through the urban system, but is heavily concentrated at the upper end of the urban hierarchy, particularly in Blantyre and Lilongwe.

3.2.3 Land Shortages in Malawi and the Future of Rural-Urban Migration

The pattern displayed by Malawi is one in which the process of urbanization is still at a very early stage. This implies that the rate of rural-urban migration will increase markedly in the future, if Malawi follows the trend in other countries. There is a further reason to expect this phenomenon in Malawi as a crisis has recently been reached in the availability of cultivable land.

Malawi has always been the most densely populated country in Southern Africa and with such a low level of urbanization, the availability of cultivable land is one of the most crucial aspects of its economic survival. The country is usually self-sufficient in food, and has managed to accommodate its expanding population by the expansion of farming on to new land. However this process has now reached its limits because there is virtually no land left. A national physical plan prepared in 1982 estimated that cultivable land in the Central and Southern Regions was already fully utilized, and that the land frontier would very soon be reached in the least densely populated Northern Region (TCPD, personal communication, 1982) (14). There is no evidence that the adoption of improved farming practices amongst smallholders has in any way been a significant contributor to increased food production, even in specific

areas covered by special agricultural projects such as the Lilongwe Land Development Programme (TCPD, 1980b; Kydd, 1985). In these circumstances it is likely that there will be a rapid increase in rural-urban migration in the near future as people are inevitably pushed off the land. One of the aims of the aforementioned plan is to estimate the likely numbers of rural-urban migrants this process will produce.

The significance of the relatively low level of rural-urban migration experienced up to the 1980s is recognized by Malawian town planners:

"it is most important to state that two thirds of the urban population growth is due to natural growth and only one third to migration....If migration patterns follow the general trends observed in other countries, the rural-urban population transfer might well increase in the near future" (TCPD, 1980a, Annex 3, ps. 5,6).

In relation to the need to adopt "more "efficient" techniques in agriculture, planners also made the following point:

"policy based upon this principal feature would undoubtedly bring forth accelerated rural-urban migration since the modernization of farming practices will lead to a substitution of labour. In search of an economic basis for their livelihood, the labour surplus created in the rural areas would be pushed into urban areas. A "land efficiency" policy should therefore be designed to avoid as far as possible the deterioration of rural employment opportunities" (ibid, Annex 3, p.24).

The usual distaste for rural-urban migration is evident in this statement, yet it is clear that the authors are prepared for a rapid surge in urban growth. Had the census figures actually given a true picture of past trends, this would have meant that Malawi was about to experience a process that would be virtually without parallel, with a national urban growth rate of well over 10% per year.

3.2.4 Components of Migration to Urban Centres

The Malawian population is extremely mobile but much of the internal migration is rural-rural in nature, largely in response to constraints on land availability. For example the districts of Kasungu and Mchinji experienced very high rates of in-migration in the inter-censal period

accounting for 29% and 26% respectively of their total growth, mainly due to the demand for labour on the tobacco estates developed in these districts (TCPD, 1981; Christiansen, 1984). Increasing pressure on land in the Southern Region has altered the pattern of overall internal migration in Malawi. Previously it gained the most by net in-migration, but now this position is taken by the Central Region as shown in Table 3.5.

The 1977 census and the 1970-72 national sample census provide some data on internal migration for 1976-77 and 1971-72. The newer census only breaks down this data by district, or for rural and urban categories by region. The earlier sample census provides sufficiently disaggregated data to allow comparative analysis of all internal migration events by category (i.e. rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-rural, urban-urban). It also discounted migration that would last less than three months, and therefore excludes short-term visits, which the 1977 data does not. However the data from the sample census are not altogether reliable and should only be viewed as an indication of the true situation.

Table 3.6 shows the estimated number of migrants by category for 1971-72 and 1976-77. It indicates that intra-rural migration is by far the most important type of migration, but that about one-fifth of total internal migration in 1971-72 was rural-urban. The gross number of rural-urban migrants in both years was extremely high (about one-third of the total 1977 urban population from 1976-77). However return urban-rural migration was also very high. Many of these migration events must also relate to what are essentially visits, although as stated short-term visits should be excluded from the 1971-72 data.

The 1977 figures appear to imply that there was a large fall in return migration from urban areas relative to the situation in 1971-72, although the gross figures are still large. However the 1977 census greatly underestimated the degree of urban-rural migration. For example

TABLE 3.5Internal Migration Balance by Region, 1965-66 and 1976-77

Region	Internal Migrants gained		Internal Migrants lost		Net Internal migrants	
	1966	1977	1966	1977	1966	1977
Northern	33,625	28,701	54,130	73,475	-20,865	-44,744
Central	149,627	152,004	139,961	85,049	+9,666	+66,955
Southern	270,890	98,583	299,691	120,764	+11,199	-22,181

Source: Hill (1982) (based on Malawian census figures for 1966 and 1977)

TABLE 3.6

Categories of total internal migration in Malawi:
1971-72 and 1976-77

Category of migration	1971-72		1976-77
	no. ¹	% ²	no.
Rural-Rural	432,000	52	n.a.
Rural-Urban	159,000	19	162,916
Urban-Rural	144,000	17	98,799
Urban-Urban	93,000	11	n.a.
Net R-U migration	15,000		64,117
Total internal migration	828,000	99	n.a.

Source: Malawi Population Change Survey, 1974, Table 23.
 Malawi Population Census, 1977, Table 51.

1. Rounded to nearest thousand.
2. Less than 100% due to rounding.

only about 24,000 out-migrants were recorded from Blantyre, whilst 168,000 residents reported in 1977 that they had been living there a year before. Taking into account natural increase this implies gross in-migration of 45,000 people, and that Blantyre's growth in that year due to net in-migration alone was over 10%. This is regarded as inconceivable as it suggests an overall growth rate of more than twice the average over the past five years (see Appendix 3.1) for 1976-77. The recorded urban population of 382,000 in 1976 is also incorrect since it implies a 23% growth in the total urban population for that year. This under-enumeration of out-migration from urban areas is probably due to many people not recording themselves as previous urban residents in 1976 because they were short-term migrants or visitors who had either forgotten, or did not perceive it as relevant, that they had been in urban areas a year ago. The 1977 census figures on the other hand would include this itinerant population. Taking these factors into account the evidence can only be interpreted as indicating a very high level of circular migration between rural and urban areas throughout the intercensal period.

The only data on duration of migration comes from the 1970-72 sample census, but it does indicate that short-term migration occurs at a significant level. About 15% (almost 38,000) of migrants to urban areas were estimated to go for a period of three to six months, and 25% for three to twelve months (even shorter-term visitors were of course excluded).

The 1972 data also suggest that circulation within the urban system was operating at a high level. This evidence is somewhat puzzling because although it is suggestive of step-wise migration this would be expected to be reflected in more growth at the lower end of the urban hierarchy than has occurred.

One other component of migration is returning migrant workers from abroad. The overall national growth rate of 2.9% was affected by this

factor as there has been a fall in the number of new migrants, particularly after the 1974 air crash at Francistown when new recruitment to South Africa was halted for some years. In the early 1970s it appears that migration to urban areas by returning Malawian migrant workers was counterbalanced by Malawian emigration abroad, and was a small proportion (about 2% or 3000) of total in-migration to urban areas (NSO, 1973). It was also a small proportion of all returning migrants (about 5%). In-migration to urban areas from abroad was at a similarly low level of about 3500 (including foreigners). This evidence that returning migrants have not made a major contribution to urbanization in Malawi is further supported by the work of Christiansen and Kydd (1983). They contend that the 330,000 (net) in-migrants to Malawi in the intercensal period were nearly all absorbed into the rural sector (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 for a more detailed analysis with reference to the context of urban policy making).

3.3 Conclusion

Urbanization is still at a very early stage in Malawi. However the alteration of urban boundaries has meant that large numbers of essentially rural people have been re-classified as urban and this, combined with rural-urban migration, has led to an increase in the apparent urbanization level from 4.8% in 1966 to 8.5% in 1977.

Elimination of the 'boundary factor' indicates that net rural-urban migration has been at a low level to small urban centres, with some exceptions, although it is a very significant factor influencing growth in the major towns, except Zomba. The latter has suffered net out-migration due to the relocation of the capital to Lilongwe, which in turn has experienced a very high intercensal growth rate. The relative stagnation of most of the smaller centres in terms of the increase in their truly urban population suggests that these centres need to receive special

development efforts if they are to fulfil the roles of efficient service centres to Malawi's mainly rural population, and as alternative destinations for rural-urban migrants. However it appears that attitudes towards the development of these centres is ambivalent, which may be partly due^{to} the false impression of their growth given by census figures.

Gross rural-urban migration in Malawi is high, but the most prevalent form of migration still appears to be circular, on a both short and long-term basis, as indicated by very high levels of return urban-rural migration.

The evidence implies that the process of rapid urbanization experienced in so many African countries has only just started in Malawi. There are also reasons to believe that a rapid increase in rural-urban migration is inevitable in the near future. Continued neglect of the small urban centres will ensure that the direction of this migration will remain concentrated at the top of the urban system, which is likely to lead to problems unacceptable to the present Malawian government, such as squatting and widespread informal employment.

Notes for Chapter 3

1. Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba, Mzuzu, Salima, Balaka, Dedza and Mangochi.
2. Interpreting the effect of Lilongwe's new boundaries in order ^{more truly} to estimate its intercensal growth rate is a complex problem, and will be examined in greater detail later.
3. This figure is taken from Table 3.1 and has been calculated on the basis of the recorded 1966 and 1977 populations of the 32 centres designated as urban in the latter census only.
4. TPAs are those areas for which the TCPD has prepared outline zoning plans) (Malawi, NSO, 1978).
5. The TCPD calculates this according to census statistics on activity status in the Karonga TPA given in Volume 2 of the census. These show 1749 people registered as employer, employee, family business worker or self-employed, and 1488 as mlimi (self-employed farmers). On the basis of a 28% employment rate and the assumption that this implies 2.57 dependents per worker (ratio 72:28) the number of 6,250 dependent on urban jobs was produced. This presumes that there were no employees in agriculture. This may be a reasonable assumption in the Karonga area where large estate production does not figure.
6. This process is likely to continue as at least 76 has. were ear-marked for various new urban facilities and a similar amount was likely to be designated for primary schools in the TPA (TCPD, 1981, Annex 2, p.18). The TCPD estimated that the peasant population would fall to 5,300 by 2001 due to "losses of agricultural land being converted into building land" (ibid, Annex 1, p.16).
7. Backward projection yields a total of about 1100 jobs corresponding to an urban population of 3971 in 1966. This implies that about two-thirds of the urban population lived outside the 1966 'boma' boundaries and adds weight to the view that the 1966 census underestimated urban populations.

8. A further 2500 in specifically rural occupations (i.e. agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry) were enumerated for all urban centres excluding Blantyre and Lilongwe (Malawi, N.S.O., 1980b, Vol.11, Table 4.3),
9. This applies even to Nsanje and Ngabu which appeared to grow at extreme rates. Nsanje's growth was very distorted by boundary changes (TCPD, personal communication, January 1983), and Ngabu has been assigned a TPA which is even larger than Zomba's gazetted boundaries in 1977.
10. This opinion is supported by a study by the TCPD which states that "it seems as if the "informal" sector activities around the trading centre and market are considerably more developed than at comparable small towns in the Central and Northern Regions" but the writer admits that "this is merely a conjecture based on a passing observation" (TCPD, 1981, p.54).
11. In this report the TCPD assumed that this growth rate of 7.7% was a suitable surrogate for the small urban centres in Malawi.
12. There is a small discrepancy here with the TCPD figure, due presumably to the use of Lilongwe's gazetted population in 1977, rather than that in the TPA.
13. This rate of increase is assumed to have been fairly constant over that period as data from the 1970-72 national sample census, and the 1972 Blantyre sample census give an AAGR of 6.5% from 1966-72 (see Appendix 4.1).
14. The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources estimated in 1977 that the overall cultivated area would exceed the suitable arable land available in 1983 by 380,000 acres. In the Southern and Central Regions unsuitable land would increasingly come under cultivation and the total cultivated by 1983 was projected to be 117% and 110% of the available arable land respectively (Malawi, National Rural

Development Programme, 1978).

CHAPTER FOUR

The Urban Hierarchy: Patterns, Policies and Problems

4.1 Introduction

The concept of an urban hierarchy relates to the functional organization of urban centres which make up an urban system. Different hierarchies can be delineated for different functions or characteristics: for example provision of goods and services, or of administrative or transport functions. Thus a purely administrative or transport hierarchy can be described, or a combination of functions and characteristics can be used to produce a more complex functional hierarchy. A well differentiated hierarchy will have a number of different levels and is usually pyramidal in form, with many lower order centres at the base and decreasing numbers of increasingly higher order centres in the levels above. The top category may include only one centre.

The nature of the urban hierarchy is influential in determining the spatial impact of social, economic and political development within a country. Since the regional spread of development is a crucial aspect of the development process, anything which affects this diffusion is important. Analysis of an urban hierarchy may lead to the identification of factors which hinder development, and suggest remedial policies. The development of this theory relating to the relationship between an urban hierarchical structure and the level of accessibility to urban goods and services is based on the early works of Christaller (1966) and Lösch (1954), and has since been elaborated by many economists and geographers (e.g. see Berry and Pred, 1965).

Several studies of African urbanization have stressed the importance of the urban hierarchy as one of the structures through which development can be channelled. For example this has been identified in Sierra Leone by Riddell (1970), in Kenya by Soja (1968) and in Tanzania by Gould (1970). In the last study it is stated that:

"underlying the very modernization process.....are the dynamics of that most spatial of systems - the central place structure; a system of nodes of various sizes, at differing distances, linked with varying intensities, influencing areas contiguous and between, structuring, focusing and serving their hinterlands, and acting as emergent poles of attraction for the surrounding population."
 (Gould, 1970, p.169, emphasis in original)

The conclusion of such studies is that 'development' does not spread evenly from its place of origin because the capacity to adopt new innovations is unequally distributed. Although distance is always an important factor, urban places have a higher potential to adopt many new innovations and this potential increases with 'size' or level in the urban hierarchy (Friedmann, 1973). Since modernization or innovations tend to be generated or adopted at the top of the urban hierarchy (ibid) these are diffused in stages down through each level of the hierarchy, with each centre operating as the origin of an innovation for its own local urban sub-system. It is suggested that this process operates most efficiently in a balanced urban hierarchy. This implies that the ratio and spatial distribution of higher to lower order centres at each level should allow a high level of interaction and accessibility between them and that if the gap between hierarchical levels is too large (i.e. the system is minimally differentiated) this will impede the process of diffusion.

Innovation or modernization may not necessarily be synonymous with development of course, and therefore a balanced urban hierarchy may assist the spread of changes which are decidedly negative in their impact. Examples are V.D., or cultural breakdown due to the erosion of traditional values without their replacement by appropriate new structures (Adams, 1970, p.36). The assumption that small towns in Africa are less exploitative than large towns has also been challenged (see the special issue of Africa, 1979, vol.49, no.3), which introduces the problem that special efforts to develop the lower end of the urban hierarchy might also serve to facilitate the channelling of surplus value from the rural areas. It should be noted however that the small centres considered here tend to

be much smaller than those covered in these studies.

The creation of a balanced urban hierarchy is only one method of spreading development, as it assumes that innovations are generated from above. The creation of development impulses at the specific level of the urban hierarchy that is expected to benefit most from a particular change should by-pass the process. Since the lower levels of the hierarchy tend to be those which serve the majority of the population in many developing countries, it is also frequently asserted that certain types of development should be concentrated there. Not only does this allow for a more immediate impact on the population, but it also avoids the problem of the diffusion process being weakened by the imperfect structure of the urban hierarchy, which is also a common phenomenon in developing countries (Johnson, 1970; Funnell, 1970, 1976; Taylor, 1972).

The first half of this chapter analyses the nature of the urban hierarchy in Malawi, drawing attention to problems that exist with reference to the theoretical points above. Government policies affecting the general context within which urbanization is occurring, and specific urban policies directed at the smaller centres are considered in the second half.

4.2 The Urban Hierarchy in Malawi

The analysis of Malawi's present urban hierarchy takes two approaches. The first method uses information on central place functions in all the urban centres below the level of Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zomba to discover the degree of differentiation in functional importance between centres. These three are excluded because not only is it absolutely clear that they are at the top of the hierarchy, but also because in order to differentiate between the smaller centres very low order functions have to be included in the analysis (e.g. groceries), and enumeration of such functions in the major towns would have been difficult and of little

value. The aim of this analysis is to see whether a multi-level hierarchy is developing below the level of the largest towns, in which there are clearly demarcated differences in the level of goods and services offered at each level. Such analyses have been done for several countries in Africa (e.g. Grove and Huszar, 1964; McKim, 1978; Abiodun, 1968, 1971; Harvey, 1966; Obuhdo, 1970. For a critique and analysis of this method see Davies (1966)). It has been hypothesized that if the spatial expression of the system forms a set of nested hierarchies with regional centres serving a network of smaller sub-regional centres, each of which in turn is easily accessible to a set of lower order central places and so on, this is the most effective way of offering goods and services to the population in terms of accessibility.

The second approach analyses the nature of interactions between urban centres in Malawi. A balanced, multi-level hierarchy not only ensures the most equitable spread of access to similar urban functions, but also allows effective transmission of information flows through the system (Berry, 1972; Hagerstrand, 1972). Analysis of the nature of flows can be used to draw conclusions about the form of the urban hierarchy (McKim, 1978; Funnell, 1976). McKim has emphasized the value of interaction analysis as a method of understanding structures and processes inherent in spatial organization, feeling that it "can yield valuable insights which cannot be gained from the analysis of static areal attributes or functional inventories of central places" (McKim, 1978, p.113). Friedmann also argues that one of the salient features of a nation's settlement system is that:

"each subsystem stands at the node of a communications network that originates, absorbs, and transmits impulses of change to the other subsystems" (Friedmann, 1973, p. 72).

In addition he states that:

"a change in the relative position of one of the subsystems in the hierarchy of dependency relations signifies a change in the structure of the system as a whole" (ibid, p.72).

One change that has occurred in the Malawian urban system is the relocation of the capital to Lilongwe. It is hoped that analysis of the pattern of interaction between urban centres will show whether the Lilongwe sub-system has altered its relative position, and thus allow conclusions to be drawn about the significance of the relocation for other parts of the urban system.


4.2.1 The distribution of Central Place Functions


In order to assess the degree of differentiation in the smaller urban centres they were assigned points according to the range and order of central place functions they performed. These functions were split into three categories: the urban economy, administration and welfare (essentially public services), and their coordinating role in the provision of services for agriculture, forestry and fishing (see Appendix 4.1 for a more detailed explanation).

Information on these aspects of urban functions in Malawi was collected from a variety of sources. A central place survey conducted by the TCPD in 1979 provided the main body of data. This was up-dated and new data was provided by the National and Commercial Banks, ADMARC, the government department telephone and telex directory of 1980, and an official series of maps illustrating development projects for 1981/82-83/84. Further data and a cross-check on the original TCPD survey was produced by empirical research in a number of centres in July-August 1980 (1).

The final values attained by each centre are illustrated in Figure 4.1 (see Appendix 4.1 for an explanation of the methodology). This shows that there is a certain level of differentiation between the centres which could form the basis of an incipient hierarchy, and three tiers are tentatively defined. However the absolute difference in functional importance between each tier is not very great. The centres assigned to the higher category are Mzuzu, Salima, Karonga, Kasungu, Dedza, Mangochi

Fig 4.1 OVERALL VALUES ATTAINED BY CENTRE
CENTRAL PLACE ANALYSIS





Map 4.1 MALAWI's URBAN HIERARCHY c. 1980


and Mzimba. These do not entirely correspond to the most populous centres, but there is a good correlation between those in the lowest tier and the smallest centres by population.

The spatial distribution of centres according to their hierarchical level identified in Figure 4.1 is shown in Map 4.1. The coverage of the Northern and Central Region is very sparse but reasonably well distributed for first and second order centres. In the Southern Region there is a great lack of intermediate centres between the level of Blantyre and Zomba and the second tier of lower order centres. The majority of lower order second and third tier centres are found here but the implication is that access to urban services in this most populated and densely settled region is relatively poor, except for those with access to Blantyre or Zomba. This runs counter to the more generally accepted view that the Southern Region is the most developed in Malawi. Instead it appears that the 'core' region is spatially limited to parts of the Shire Highlands around Blantyre and Zomba (2).

Although this general spatial description yields some information which might direct urban development policy, there is no clear relationship between hierarchical rank and economic strength. This becomes clear when the 'urban economy' factor is disaggregated from the other central place functions. The ranking on this variable alone (Figure 4.2) differs significantly from that in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.3 plots the rank of each centre for all functions, and for urban economy functions alone. It is clear that the relative strength of the urban economy in several centres bears little relationship to the overall strength of their central place functions. All those centres which fall far below their overall rank on this variable are district capitals, but all those which attain a much higher rank are not.

This analysis has thus singled out a significant factor in Malawi's urban system: that the location of some district centres in accordance

**Fig. 4.2 'ECONOMIC' VALUES ATTAINED BY CENTRES
IN CENTRAL PLACE ANALYSIS**






Fig.4.3

**COMPARISON OF RANKS ATTAINED BY CENTRES FOR
ECONOMIC VALUES AND OVERALL CENTRAL PLACE VALUES**

with colonial administrative purposes has been disadvantageous to their economic development. On the other hand, economic development has been stronger in the few centres which were located primarily according to economic, rather than administrative factors. For instance the development of Balaka, Luchenza and Liwonde was stimulated by the railway. The latter has only emerged as an urban centre since Independence, due to the completion in 1970 of the

rail connection to the Mozambique border and Nayuci and thence to the port of Nacala. Monkey Bay also owes its development to transport as it is a major port and repair centre for lake shipping; it is also a centre for tourism and fishing. Ngabu's central position in the Shire Valley on the main road connecting the district centres of Chikwawa and Nsanje has led to its development as a major service centre, and its selection as the headquarters of the Shire Valley Agricultural Development Project and of one of the National Rural Development Programme's Agricultural Development Divisions.

The apparent strength of many administrative centres stems from government policy. Many higher order welfare and administrative facilities such as secondary schools, district hospitals, magistrate courts, and district veterinary and agricultural offices are located in them because they are established targets rather than because of any specific locational advantage. In some cases these two factors are combined in a district centre. This appears to be true particularly in the upper tier of this section of the urban hierarchy where there is a close correlation between overall functional rank and urban economy rank (see Figure 4.3). However there are large discrepancies elsewhere, particularly in the cases of Rumphi, Mwanza, Chikwawa and Dowa. The district administrative and welfare functions of the latter two, for example, might well have been more effectively located (in terms of convenient access for the rural population) at the non-district centres of

Ngabu and Mponela.

There is thus a degree of confusion at the lower end of the Malawian urban hierarchy which suggests that it may not be an entirely effective structure for the efficient distribution of goods and services. Mlia (1978) has argued that the problem stems from colonial and missionary policies:

"At present one can think of many facilities that appear to be poorly located. This is particularly true of installations inherited from the colonial period. Consider, for instance, the location of Kasupe [Machinga] and Dowa district headquarters or a number of mission secondary schools or hospitals. How well located are they in relation to the population they are supposed to serve? Imagine the impact these installations would have made on the rural environment if our colonial masters had not been pre-occupied with the idea of settling in cool and scenically beautiful places. The interests of the people to be served should come first." (Mlia, 1978, p.11)

This lays the blame entirely on policies formulated prior to independence, but does not explain why the situation has been perpetuated since. Criticism should also be levelled at present policy makers who have used the inherited colonial centres as a convenient and established structure to which urban projects are directed.

This analysis has indicated that, whilst there is a degree of differentiation in the overall functional strength of Malawi's smaller urban centres, the situation is not clear-cut. However this method only describes the distribution of 'static areal attributes' (McKim, op cit) and tells us nothing of the operation of the dynamics of the urban system (e.g. innovation and information flows).

4.3 Analysis of communication flows between urban centres

Origin-destination data for flows in the urban system can yield a picture of the system's dynamics, and further conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the urban hierarchy. The most suitable data for Malawi were the annual schedules of telephone call distribution which included all the urban centres under study. Schedules for 1979 and 1982

have

were obtained from the Postmaster General in Blantyre. Alternative flow data (e.g. postal flows) were unavailable. Telephone call data has been used for similar analyses of urban systems by Gould (1970) and Hirst (1973, 1975) for Tanzania, Leinbach (1973) for Malaysia, and Soja for Eastern Africa (Soja, n.d.).

The schedules gave the destination of all calls made on manual exchanges for a sample period. All centres had manual exchanges in 1979 giving a complete matrix of manual calls between each pair of centres. By 1982 a number of smaller urban centres had automatic exchanges only, so for these centres the schedule only shows calls which originated from other manual exchanges. A major problem in using such data is the exclusion of any calls made between automatic exchanges. The analyses referred to above largely ignored this problem. However where a pair of centres both have automatic exchanges, as well as manual exchanges, it is not possible to draw valid conclusions about the strength and direction of their interaction based on manual exchange data only. This problem relates mainly to the nature of flows between Blantyre, Lilongwe, Zomba and Mzuzu. However the methods of analysis mainly rely on the proportional distribution of calls rather than their absolute magnitude. For nearly all centres it is considered that the relative strength of recorded (manual) interaction with, for example, Blantyre compared to Lilongwe, is a satisfactory surrogate of the relative strength of all interactions (manual plus automatic) with those centres. In addition the majority of centres in both years had only manual exchanges, and where there was a choice between manual and automatic exchanges (as was the case for all other centres in 1979) many potential automatic calls go through manual exchanges due to technical difficulties or lack of information.

4.3.1 The Matrices of Telephone Calls

Initial inspection of the origin-destination data for urban centres immediately indicated the relative weakness of inter-urban linkages.


There were few cases of significant numbers of calls between any pair of towns (dyads). In both 1979 and 1982 nearly every urban centre sent and received its largest single number of calls to its regional capital (Blantyre, Lilongwe or Mzuzu). In Tanzania Hirst (1975) found that Dar es Salaam alone was overwhelmingly dominant and in Malawi it appears that such primacy has not developed. However as Hirst concluded for Tanzania, the matrices do suggest that the urban hierarchy is underdeveloped. A more developed hierarchy would be expected to yield a more complex pattern of dominance, with intermediate towns interacting with their smaller regional sub-centres more than the latter did with the regional capital. In Malawi therefore it appears that the urban centres below the level of the regional capitals are insufficiently differentiated to encourage hierarchical associations, despite the evidence indicating a certain degree of functional differentiation. This hypothesis is borne out by further analysis of the data.

4.3.2 Nodal Flow Analysis

Nodal flow analysis provides one method of ordering and grouping ^{MS}cent by the strength of flows operating between each pair of points, where each centre is regarded as a point. As described by Nystuen and Dacey (1968), a nodal flow from a centre only exists if its dominant or largest association is with a 'larger' centre. In an analysis of telephone call flows, size is determined by the magnitude of all in-coming calls received by each centre. Therefore there may be discrete structures of subordination within any urban system, as more than one centre may prove to be independent (i.e. does not have its strongest association with a larger centre).

Analysis of the 1979 Malawian telephone data covering all manual exchanges (including non-urban centres) by this method shows clearly the dominance of the regional capitals (Map 4.2). However four Central Region centres, including the urban centre of Ntcheu, were most strongly

Map 4.2
NODAL FLOWS 1979



associated with the southern system rather than with Lilongwe. The 1982 data showed a very similar pattern (Map 4.3). It should be emphasized that the exclusion of automatic calls makes it impossible to draw any conclusions about the nodal flows of the four largest towns, and therefore to assign a hierarchy of dominance between the three regional sub-systems identified. None of the regional capitals had a nodal flow according to the manual data (except Lilongwe in 1982), as shown on the maps, but this should not be interpreted as meaning that the sub-systems are discrete. If it had been possible to analyse the sum of automatic and manual calls between these centres it is probable that some pattern of interaction would have been found.

The hierarchical associations identified by this technique are shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The 1979 pattern is extremely simplistic and points to the dearth of centres performing intermediate functions. The six intermediate links identified are all weak; three centres are dominant to one other centre only, and even Zomba is only dominant to three. The 1982 pattern is even more simplistic as only two intermediate links were identified. Nodal flows for eight centres (3) could not be defined as no manual calls were made as discussed above. The nodal flow from Champhila to Blantyre may indicate the strength of Blantyre's influence over Mzuzu's.

If this analysis is compared to McKim's (1978) work on the Kenyan urban hierarchy, it is clear that the Malawian pattern is simplistic even in African terms. The Kenyan data indicated a five level hierarchy in 1969, with Nairobi at the apex, and a number of centres subordinate to most intermediate dominant centres. District centres in Kenya tended to dominate their local centres, but this is exceptional in Malawi. However McKim found that few district centres had nodal flows to their own provincial headquarters, and concluded that this indicated that the boundaries utilized for planning cut across functional areas which was




Fig. 4.4 HIERARCHICAL ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED BY NODAL FLOW ANALYSIS 1979





Fig.4.5 HIERARCHICAL ASSOCIATION IDENTIFIED BY NODAL FLOW ANALYSIS 1982



NOTE: This figure does not indicate any supposed hierarchical ranking for Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu

The Nodal Flow of Manual Calls from Lilongwe to Blantyre is shown for information only

- Chilumba
- Chitipa
- Chelinda
- Rumphi
- Ekwendeni
- Likoma
- Chintheche
- Nkhata Bay
- Livingstonia
- Embangweni
- Champhila
- Chisemphe
- Madisi
- Nkhota - Kota
- Ntchisi
- Dowa
- Mponela
- Kasiya
- Kapiri
- Mchinsi
- Likuni
- Sinyala
- Nathenje
- Namitete
- Nambuma
- Nkhoma
- Mlangeni
- Mtakataka
- Chipoka
- Ntcheu
- Monkey Bay
- Namwera
- Ntaja
- Zomba
- Machinga
- Mwanza
- Chikwawa
- Ngabu
- Chiromo
- Phalombe
- Chiradzulu
- Nsanje

likely to be disadvantageous. A positive conclusion from the Malawian data is that administrative boundaries appear to be closely correlated with functional regions. The possible exception is the district of Ntcheu, and the railway centres of Chipoka and Mtakataka, which are in the Central Region but appear to be functionally related to the Southern Region.


4.3.3 Transaction flow analysis

Transaction flow analysis is a more sophisticated analytical method than nodal flow analysis, allowing all important interactions to be identified. It also accounts for direct and indirect associations, but cannot identify the largest nodes nor hierarchical associations. It has been used to analyse the degree of political integration in East Africa (Soja, n.d.), and of the pattern of urban dominance in Kenya (McKim, 1974).

Transaction flow analysis essentially transforms the original telephone matrix so that salient flows can be identified. These are interactions of greater than expected strength, given the magnitude of total interactions with the whole system of both the origin and destination. The expected interaction is related to the proportion of all interactions received at each point, ignoring the effect of distance. Appendix 4.2 explains the assumptions and methodology of this technique in greater detail.

The strength of the association between each pair of centres is termed the relative acceptance. Centres are mutually salient when the relative acceptance values in both directions are more than twice the expected value. The computed values from the 1979 data for the Malawian urban system are shown in Map 4.4.

The Northern system is the most strongly integrated, all centres having mutually salient flows with Mzuzu at least four times the expected




MAP 4-4 MUTUALLY SALIENT FLOWS BETWEEN URBAN CENTRES; 1979

value. Lilongwe's influence over its own regional sub-system is again identified, as it is mutually salient with every Central Region urban centre, except Kasungu. The southern part of the country contains two unconnected systems: one is clearly centred on Blantyre and involves mainly those centres to the south and west of Blantyre. The other southern sub-system has no clear focus, but its pattern supports the earlier suggestion that the administrative boundary between the Central and Southern Regions appears to cut across a functional system which here includes the centres of Dedza, Ntcheu, Balaka, Liwonde, Machinga, Zomba and the southern lake towns of Mangochi and Monkey Bay.


The pattern of mutually salient flows in 1982 (Map 4.5) is very similar, although as some centres registered no manual exchange calls mutual salience could not be assigned between several centres. Maps 4.6 and 4.7 show non-mutual salient links (transactions between dyads which operated in one direction only). One important point that does emerge is that Blantyre's influence does extend throughout the Southern Region, although its interaction is sometimes indirect. The Central-Southern sub-system is shown to be even more cohesive, as a number of one-way links exist, whilst Kasungu appears as another focus in the Central Region. One sub-system identified in both years is located in the tea estate area south-east of Blantyre, and includes Luchenza, Thyolo, Mulanje and Phalombe. The lack of integration between this sub-system and the nearby centres in the Shire Valley (i.e. Chikwawa, Ngabu and Nsanje) illustrates the effect of the natural barrier of the Shire escarpment.

4.3.4 Regression Analysis of Telephone Calls


The two techniques already used have indicated that the mass of urban centres, measured in terms of their total interaction, has a large effect on the degree of interaction between centres. Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu are clear foci in the communication network. However the patterns



Map 4.5 MUTUALLY SALIENT FLOWS BETWEEN URBAN CENTRES, 1982



MAP 4.6 NON-MUTUAL (ONE-WAY) SALIENT FLOWS BETWEEN URBAN CENTRES, 1979



MAP 4.7 NON-MUTUAL (ONE-WAY) SALIENT FLOWS BETWEEN URBAN CENTRES, 1982

identified suggest that below these centres 'mass' differentials do not have much influence, and that the urban hierarchy is basically two-tier. No account of distance has been taken in these analyses, although it is expected that in less developed countries with poor transport the friction of distance is likely to be an important influence on inter-urban interactions.

A regression analysis of the data of the basic gravity model type helps to clarify the relative influence of mass and distance in determining the degree of interaction between centres. When such a regression was computed for the matrix of telephone calls between urban centres in Malawi in 1979 (4) it was found that 47.2% of the variance was accounted for by mass and distance variables together, the form of the equation being:

$$\begin{aligned} \log(\text{calls}) &= 1.78 + 0.0047(\text{origin mass}) + 0.0063(\text{destination mass}) \\ &\quad - 0.6009(\log \text{ distance}) \\ r^2 &= 0.472 \end{aligned}$$

As expected therefore a significant proportion of Malawi's communication pattern can be predicted by distance and mass variables.

The r^2 value is similar to that calculated for telephone call matrices in Tanzania and Malaysia which were 0.506 and 0.51 respectively (Hirst, 1975; Leinbach, 1973). Disaggregation of the distance variable in these studies found that it accounted for most of the variation in the call pattern. From this it was deduced that the urban hierarchies of both countries were little developed, because the step-wise interactions between urban centres of different sizes expected of a developed hierarchy were not operating. In the Malawian case, regressing the independent variable (number of calls) on mass and distance variables separately showed that distance was a very weak explanatory variable, accounting for only 7.7% of the variance. The two mass variables together, on the other hand, explained 37.1% of the variance (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6). However further analysis of the data by a succession of regression models

TABLE 4.1

Regression Results: All Inter-Urban Interactions

Dependent Variable	Coefficients for each Independent Variable*				
	Intercept	Origin Mass	Destination Mass	log. distance	r ² #
log. calls =	1.78	0.0047	0.0063	-0.6009	0.472
	1.9217	-	-	-0.5293	0.077
	0.4887	0.0045	0.0061	-	0.371
	0.624	-	0.0056	-	0.228
	0.672	0.0038	-	-	0.101

- * t values of each coefficient tested and found significant at 0.0005 confidence interval.
- # f value of r² tested and found significant at 0.0001 confidence interval.

TABLE 4.2

Regression results: interactions excluding dyads containing
Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zomba


Coefficients for Each Independent Variable*					
Dependent Variable	Intercept	Origin Mass	Destination Mass	log.distance	r ² #
log. calls =	2.0166	0.0356	0.0511	-0.9191	0.405
	2.0511	-	-	-1.1833	0.236
	0.2183 ¹	0.0188 ²	0.0322	-	0.06
	0.3762	0.0194	-	-	0.014
	0.3109	-	0.0326	-	0.047

- * t values of all coefficients tested and found significant at 0.0005 confidence interval, except those separately marked
- # f value of r² tested and found significant at 0.0001 confidence interval
- 1. significant at 0.005 confidence interval
- 2. significant at 0.025 confidence interval

Fig. 4.6

% VARIATION ACCOUNTED FOR BY DIFFERENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF TELEPHONE CALLS

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


D = Destination
O = Origin

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES USED

Fig. 4.7

% VARIATION ACCOUNTED FOR BY DIFFERENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF TELEPHONE CALLS WHEN BLANTYRE, LILONGWE & ZOMBA DYADS EXCLUDED



INDEPENDENT VARIABLES USED

found that the basic model was distorted by the very high number of interactions with Blantyre and Lilongwe, and to a lesser extent Zomba. These three together accounted for 40% of all incoming and outgoing calls in the urban network. When all dyads containing these three were excluded from the regressions, the results were almost the reverse of the overall model (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.7). Distance alone now explained 23% of the variance compared to only 6% for the mass variables together. The latter were therefore virtually negligible in determining the pattern of communication flows within most of the urban system.

Analysis of the pattern of high standardized residuals from this model served to confirm the strength of the regional factor identified in previous analyses. For example almost all interactions between towns in the Northern Region and Mzuzu were much higher than predicted by mass and distance variables taken together or alone.

The results of these regression analyses support the conclusion that the urban system below the level of the major towns does not form a coherent hierarchy. The fact that distance exerts a strong negative influence on the degree of interaction between the smaller centres has negative implications in terms of innovation diffusion, as it is likely that other information channels are similarly incoherent. Yet the smaller centres are forced to overcome the friction of distance to interact with major centres due to the lack of intermediate centres to act as 'middle-men'.

It is clear that urban interactions in Malawi are operating within two very different modes, and that the major discontinuity occurs at the highest level of the urban system. The use of a binary coded variable in place of the original mass variables can help to elucidate this (Hirst, op cit). Therefore three further regressions were computed in which the mass variables were replaced by scores of one for every dyad containing Blantyre, Lilongwe or Zomba. The results showed that the discontinuity

occurred when either Blantyre or Lilongwe were involved in interactions, but Zomba did not have sufficient influence to yield a significant result. Combining the dummy variable so that both Blantyre and Lilongwe scored 1 and other centres 0 in one regression, increased the overall variance accounted for to 50%. In the Tanzanian case analysed by Hirst (op cit, p.283) he concluded that the improvement in the regression model yielded by use of a binary variable (for Dar es Salaam dyads) had "captured the essential feature of Tanzania's urban structure more effectively and more efficiently than the original mass variables". The Malawian results suggest that the "essential feature" of its urban system is an hierarchical step between two major cities, and the rest of the urban network. It also supports the earlier conclusion that Zomba's loss of status has removed the essential characteristic which made it significantly different from other Malawian towns.

When the Blantyre and Lilongwe models were compared it was found that 26.8% of variance was accounted for in the former (i.e. when only its mass was weighted), and only 14.7% in the latter. The equations were:

- 1) Blantyre dyads weighted:-

$$\log(\text{calls}) = 1.8092 + 0.8555(\text{mass}) - 0.5307(\log d) \quad r^2 = 0.268$$
- 2) Lilongwe dyads weighted:-

$$\log(\text{calls}) = 1.9501 + 0.3535(\text{mass}) - 0.5647(\log d) \quad r^2 = 0.147$$

All the coefficients are very similar except for that of mass. From this it is deduced that Blantyre's mass is a more influential factor in determining the pattern of Malawi's phone-calls than Lilongwe's.

Hirst and Leinbach's studies also found that the capital cities in Tanzania and Malaysia generated their calls with little regard for the friction of distance. A town at the top of an urban hierarchy might be expected to channel information flows through secondary centres which are spread more evenly across national space, and therefore mass rather than distance of destination should be an important influence. The Malaysian results showed that Kuala Lumpur had a low coefficient for distance but a

high one for mass of destination. The data for Blantyre and Lilongwe showed an even more extreme pattern, using two separate models for each centre based on out-going and in-coming calls respectively. Neither the distance nor the mass of other centres were found to be significant in explaining the pattern of calls from or to Blantyre. However distance did account for 20.1% of variance in the number of calls sent by Lilongwe, and 19.5% of calls sent to it, whilst mass was also insignificant (see Table 4.3).

These results again point to the lack of secondary centres through which the two main cities could channel their information flows. Blantyre had also overcome the distance factor in its pattern of calls, presumably because it was virtually the only source of so many goods and services and all centres must interact with it to some degree regardless of their size and proximity. Lilongwe's interactions are limited by distance however, which suggest that its administrative power is weaker in the further reaches of Malawi.

Having discussed the nature of Malawi's urban hierarchy, the issue of government policies affecting urbanization will now be considered.

4.4 Post-Independence Government Policy and the Urban System

Government policies which affect urbanization operate at two levels. In Malawi there are specific urban policies such as those related to the development of particular urban centres (e.g. Lilongwe), levels of the urban hierarchy (e.g. district centres), and the location of industrial estates and housing schemes. At another level there are a range of policies which affect the context within which urbanization occurs. Policies affecting rural development can influence the rate of rural-urban migration for example. Therefore an analysis of urban policies in Malawi cannot be made without an adequate evaluation of the national policy context within which they are made and this is considered below. The last

TABLE 4.3

Influence of mass and distance variables
on interactions with Blantyre and Lilongwe

Variation accounted for by independent variables (r^2)		
Regression model	Blantyre dyads	Lilongwe dyads
Incoming calls on:		
1) Mass and distance	insig.	0.208
2) Mass only	insig.	insig.
3) Distance only	insig.	0.201
Outgoing calls on:		
1) Mass and distance	insig.	0.309*
2) Mass only	insig.	insig.
3) Distance only	insig.	0.195*

Note: * significant at .01 confidence interval; other r^2 significant at .001 level.

part of the chapter evaluates direct urban policies affecting the smaller centres.

4.4.1 The Context of Urban Policy Making in Malawi

The Malawian government's development approach concentrates heavily on the agricultural sector. There is clear evidence in its official stance that large-scale rural-urban migration is seen in a very negative light. Although most African governments display concern about the speed of urbanization in their countries, which sometimes leads to the adoption of extreme measures such as bulldozing squatter settlements or "retour a la terre" strategies (none of which appear to be very effective), the Malawian government takes a particularly rigorous stance on this issue. Rural-urban migration which would lead to an imbalance between job-seekers and employment is strongly condemned. There appears to be little regard for the absorptive capacity of the urban informal sector, nor of the concept that in areas where the rural marginal productivity of labour is very low (e.g. in the Southern Region where land is greatly over-utilized and population density very high) the individual migrant's productivity and income in urban centres may exceed his/her rural potential, even if their employment is 'marginal'.

Beyond these economic considerations however there appear to be two other strands to the official anti-urban stance. One is a political unease about the emergence of an unsatisfied, but possibly politicized, urban proto-proletariat. The evidence for this is impressionistic rather than direct, but it is an attitude often attributed to African governments, and in Malawi residential zoning in Lilongwe may well reflect such political considerations (see Chapter 6). The second strand reflects a certain puritanism evident in Malawian official attitudes to a range of social issues. In this context urbanization often appears to be viewed as a corrupting influence. The reverse side of this coin is the clearly expressed official view that the role of Malawians is to remain as rural

peasants and "work hard in the fields". Not only does this exhortation commonly form headlines in the daily newspaper, along with calls to "grow more maize", but a similar theme often dominates parliamentary debate, particularly in the speeches of the President (who holds the portfolio for agriculture). The President frequently details his perception of the progress of maize growing in districts that he visits, and emphasizes that the sale of maize is regarded as a far more appropriate method of raising cash than any alternative employment. The issue of food self-sufficiency amounts to a national obsession at official levels, and it is pursued with such vigour that it cannot fail to affect national awareness, or individual politicians' perceptions of what is expected of their constituents. It is worth quoting at length from one presidential speech to illustrate the extraordinary emphasis given to this issue:

"Freedom to me must mean food for the people....but if we are to have this, then it means hard work on the part of everybody in this country....We have no gold mines....Our mine is the soil. Therefore everyone must work. If one cannot work, as I cannot at Chemwari (5), then you must spend money to employ someone to do the work for you, as I am doing....At least we feed ourselves....We are the only country in Africa, as I am speaking, at least this part of Africa....that is not asking either the USA or the Dominion of Canada for maize and other kind of foodstuffs. To me it is shameful, Africa....is very rich agriculturally....I am glad my people are working hard. They have listened to my appeal to them to work hard in the fields. They are working hard in the fields. As a result there is no shortage of food here....even those districts of the country which knew nothing about agriculture before, now....produce all kinds of crops, not forgetting maize. For example I am happy to see that the people in Chitipa, even Karonga itself, Nkhata Bay, even Mzimba, let alone Nkhotakota, do produce maize....I am happy. Because these places never knew anything about maize before....now everyone of these districts announces bags of maize produced. I was amazed to hear some of the numbers of bags produced even by Nkhata Bay, Nkhotakota and Kanyende's areas....grow maize for money.

Instead of going to South Africa, Rhodesia and other places like that, plant maize for money, you will make much more money at home....if you grow maize and sell that maize to ADMARC, rather than if you would if you went to South Africa or Zimbabwe or Zambia. Because if you went there the most you get is £5 a month....But if you grow maize, oh K500 even K1,000. Therefore it is better to stay at home, engage yourself in agriculture.

I am glad people had listened up North....even such places as Kasungu, Lilongwe, Dowa, where they have always had maize, they are growing much more of it now....not only for food....they are

growing it for money, to sell to ADMARC, to sell to Press Produce.

I have given orders both to ADMARC and Press Produce that they have to buy any maize offered by my people in the villages, whether they make profit on that maize or not....any surplus maize....must not be thrown away or allowed to get rotten....That is why I ordered the building of those silos [in Lilongwe]" (Hansard, December 18, 1981).

National prestige and financial self-interest (Press Produce is part of Press Holdings which is essentially a private presidential enterprise) are both evident in this statement. Whilst political pressure of this kind, carried through to village level by local Malawi Congress Party officials, must have an effect on the national psyche and discourage people from leaving the land, the rhetoric is also backed by one of the most rigorous wage policies in Africa.

Restraints on urban minimum wages are seen by the government as one way of discouraging rural-urban migration. From 1969-77 real wages for unskilled urban employess fell by 30% (Ghai and Radwan, 1983, p.90). Real incomes also fell for rural peasants and estate workers in the 1960s and 1970s (ibid; Kydd and Christiansen, 1982; Christiansen and Kydd, 1983). This has led to criticism (ibid) of agencies like the World Bank which have cited Malawi as an African 'success' story (e.g. see Acharya, 1978; 1981a; 1981b). Kydd and Christiansen (1982, p.350) have stated that "any 'success' that Malawi has enjoyed has been seriously harmed by declining real living standards for the majority of the population".

However in the context of rural-urban migration, the gap between rural and urban incomes is a crucial factor, even when they are both falling, as well as the number and location of wage-earning opportunities. The data in Table 4.4 show that in Malawi the rural-urban income gap is not very wide and has diminished since Independence. Estate workers in fact obtained comparable incomes to those on minimum urban wages in 1968, and the 1969-77 fall in real terms of average minimum rural wages was only a third of that suffered by urban minimum wages. Also by 1977 average income in the smallholder sector was higher than the urban minimum

TABLE 4.4

Indices of income levels
in rural and urban areas in Malawi

	1969	1977	% change
Average smallholder production (K p.a.)	117.9	176.0	
Subsistence	90.6	130.0	
Cash	27.3	46.0	
Average agricultural wages (K p.a.)	97.8	152.4	56
Minimum rural wages	82.8	90.0	9
Fall in real terms minm. rural wage			-9
Av. estate worker's income (all sources)*	140.0 (1968)	n.a.	-17
Minimum urban wages (Blantyre) (K p.a)	137.0	144.0	5
Low income cost-of-living index (1970=100)	91.3	170.7	
Fall in real terms minm. urban wage			-30

* includes free housing, other income in kind and cash from self-employment

Source: data from Ghai and Radwan, 1983.

wage, although the majority of this income derived from subsistence production rather than cash. Whilst the smallholder sector undoubtedly suffered during the 1960s and 1970s because its viability was eroded by ADMARC taxation through crop-pricing policies and the diversion of agricultural development resources to the estate sector (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982; Christiansen and Kydd, 1983; Ghai and Radwan, 1983), in the 1980s there have been significant price rises for both staple food crops and cash crops for this sector. These were largely a result of pressure exerted by the World Bank which made two Structural Adjustment Loans to Malawi (SAL) in 1981 and 1983: one of the conditions was that crop prices (particularly cash crops) should be raised. From 1980-82 peasant producer prices increased by 113% for maize, 25% for cotton, 12% for tobacco and 6% for groundnuts. Further increases in 1983 raised maize prices by 4.5% and export crop prices in the range 29-50% (Kydd, 1985).

The SALs also led to deregulation of many price controls on goods which would have also hit the urban poor in the 1980s (ibid). Whilst minimum urban wages are only a guide to the real income levels of the urban employed, it is argued that in Malawi they do give a real indication of the wage levels in many of the jobs available to the average unskilled rural-urban migrant (e.g. in construction, manufacturing and the service sector). As Ghai and Radwan (1983, p.95) point out, government policy is to maintain the present level of minimum wages, and seeks to "control rural-urban migration through reducing income differences between peasants and wage earners....the weak trade union structure....and the small number and effective organization of employers....further facilitated the implementation of this policy".

Another factor which has arguably affected the rate of rural-urban migration in Malawi, and which is again the indirect result of government policy, has been the massive increase in wage employment in the agricultural sector. Domestic wage employment increased by 7.2% per year

from 1964-78 (9% per year from 1968-78), representing one of the fastest employment growth rates recorded anywhere in the world in that period, and 58% of the increase was in agriculture (Ghai and Radwan, 1983, p.76). Estate employment growth alone accounted for a large proportion of this, growing by 11.5% per year from 1964-72 and 9.6% per year from 1973-78. By 1977 the estates accounted for about 130,000 employees, equal to the the total domestic wage employment in 1966 (ibid) and by 1980 50.8% of all paid employees in the country were in the agricultural sector as a whole (compared to 10.9% in manufacturing) (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982, p.364). This expansion of the estate sector has been encouraged by the government through a variety of measures: political, bureaucratic and business elites have been strongly encouraged to lease large and medium-sized estates primarily for tobacco (this policy is indicated in Banda's quoted speech); much of the available unused cultivable land has been appropriated to this sector (sometimes leading to the eviction of peasants) whilst land rents have been kept minimal (6); agricultural wage rates have been kept low; and the real return to peasant labour restricted by ADMARC pricing policies (at least until the 1980s) encouraging peasants to work for low wage rates on the estates. Public and private resources have also been diverted on a massive scale. ADMARC's investment and loans to the estate tobacco sector were 50.9% of their total investment and loans in 1978 (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982, p.368); and ADMARC's and other Malawian interests' financial control of Malawi's two commercial banks was used to push the banks into major loan commitments to the estate sector. In 1980 53% of commercial bank advances went to agriculture (compared to 13% from 1965-72) "at the direction of the government, with scant regard to standard lending criteria" (ibid, pp.368-369) (7).

Estate employment expansion coincided with a massive return migration of economically active Malawians who had been abroad, primarily in

Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, caused by changing policies for foreign labour in these host countries; a temporary ban on recruitment to the South African mines after 1974 by President Banda, since when the flows have been at a much lower level; and possibly the President's rhetoric against international migration. The latter is tentatively suggested as a possible factor in the return migration by Christiansen and Kydd (1983, p.322) for example. Indeed it is clearly possible that Banda's position on this is not only affected by consideration of national prestige related to a desire not to appear dependent on external sources of employment to maintain the population, but also by a desire to have a large surplus supply of labour in the country to depress agricultural wage rates. Christiansen and Kydd (op cit) estimate that from 1966-77 Malawi experienced a net in-migration of 330,000 economically active people from abroad, of which 175,000 were men (8). In their opinion the vast majority have been successfully absorbed in the agricultural sector (ibid, p.325). They estimate that about one fifth became wage employees on estates, another fifth work as smallholders and part-time on estates, and most of the rest returned to subsistence and cash-crop farming. They also estimate that there has been a fall in male full-year employment in peasant agriculture, due to more involvement in part-time estate employment. If their estimates are correct this suggests that despite the fact that the decrease in remittances must have caused severe problems in the peasant sector (in 1968/69 the poorest 43% of smallholder households derived 65% of their cash income from remittances (Ghai and Radwan, 1983)), and that returnees from urban centres abroad might have been expected to have a high propensity to migrate to urban areas in Malawi, they must have opted to remain in the rural areas. This again supports the contention that the alternative of urban employment (particularly for the unskilled) in Malawi has not been a major draw, presumably because the income differential is low and also because estate

work was available for many.

Further evidence is supplied by Christiansen (1984) in a study of internal migration patterns. He emphasized that rural-rural migration is far more common than rural-urban migration and that the districts with the largest net in-migration are centres of estate development (9). He concludes that "interestingly the typical pattern of rural-urban migration does not seem to have characterized migration in Malawi. The majority of net migration is rural-rural" (ibid, p.147).

General policies and attitudes towards development and the agricultural sector have therefore created a framework which is considered to have strongly influenced urbanization since independence, particularly those factors which affect rural-urban migration.

4.4.2 Direct Urban Policy

Up until the 1980s Malawi lacked any coherent policies relating to the pattern of urban settlements. The Statement of Development Policies 1971-80 which has formed the basis of much of Malawi's development programme since independence contains only one specific section relating to urban strategy which is reproduced in its entirety below:

"Until recently Malawi has suffered from the "primate city syndrome" with one moderately large urban centre (Blantyre) nearly ten times as big as the next largest town. This trend is now being reversed with the siting of the New Capital City at Lilongwe in the Central Region and with the creation of new urban growth points such as Liwonde. The new industrial location policy, which requires all new "footloose" industries to be sited in Lilongwe, is also helping to bring about a more even distribution of urban population. This will have beneficial effects on rural areas, in that it will provide them with easier access to urban facilities. With a large number of small urban centres spread around the country, the contrast between urban and rural living conditions will become less pronounced. However, it will still be necessary to avoid making town life too attractive if disruptive rural emigration is to be avoided." (Malawi, Statement of Development Policies, 1971-80, p.121)

The references to Lilongwe's impact on future urban and industrial development are, to some extent, questionable (see Chapter 5). Furthermore since Liwonde was the only small centre which received any

special attention during the planning period, the presumed impact of industrial decentralization policies on rural areas was not forthcoming.

The major element of Malawi's urbanization policy has undoubtedly been the relocation of the capital. This has been presented as a means of achieving an improved regional balance in urban growth, by providing an alternative to Blantyre. Analysis of this aspect of urban policy in Malawi is one of the major aims of this study. It forms the basis of the following chapters and will not be considered in detail here.

Despite the lack of a coordinated national urban policy, a number of recommendations have been made over the years directly concerning the development of the urban system. At the beginning of the 1970s recommendations were made for both Lilongwe and Blantyre which were intended to generate a more balanced urban pattern within their local regions. For Lilongwe the policies were formulated by the Physical Planning Division, and those for Blantyre came from the Blantyre Planning Team of the Town Planning Department (TPD). In both cases the planners recommended the development of a local network of "satellite towns" and an integrated settlement hierarchy which would stabilize local regional development, relieve pressure on the land, and improve service provision for the regional populations, as well as providing alternative destinations for rural-urban migrants (Physical Planning Division, 1971; TPD, Blantyre Planning Team, 1973).

The Blantyre plan, as well as other official statements during the 1970s drew attention to the importance of the policy of diverting industrial development to other growth centres. However as indicated, the implementation of such a policy has been limited to the case of Liwonde, apart from the new capital. An industrial estate was built at Liwonde in 1974 by the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC). Inasmuch as this is the only fully-equipped industrial estate outside Blantyre and Lilongwe, Liwonde has a potentially significant role in regional development.

However despite its advantageous location on the Nacala rail link its development has been very disappointing. In 1977 two industries were established to produce brushes and plastic shoes, but the only other development was a canning factory established by the MDC which has since closed down. This case illustrates the difficulties of encouraging the spatial spread of significant industrial development in a country which has a very weak economic base for urban-based industry.

The policies recommended for Blantyre and Lilongwe and their local regions might have had a significant impact on the development of the smaller centres surrounding them, but they were never implemented. One problem which hinders urban policy formulation and implementation in Malawi appears to be the expectations and attitudes of key decision-makers (which often means the President). For example the government response to the Blantyre Planning Team's Interim Report was negative. Although the original terms of reference did not include halting Blantyre's growth, one of the criticisms was that the recommendations would not produce the 'required' aim of stopping Blantyre's growth altogether by the early 1980s (Blantyre Planning Team, op cit). Another problem was that until 1977 the main authority involved in settlement planning, the TCPD, was only a unit of the Ministry of Works and Supplies and had very little power. Its transfer to the Office of the President and Cabinet enabled it to play a more active role in national development planning thereafter. Financial factors have also prevented policy implementation: the fact that the Blantyre plan's estimated cost equalled the initial estimates for relocating the capital also counted against it. Development funds in Malawi are limited, and most projects are almost entirely funded by aid. Projects can only be implemented if donors can be found and the development of the urban sector generally has a low priority. The capital relocation has taken priority over other urban projects for any development funds which might be allocated for this sector.

4.4.2.1 The District Centres Development Programme

The formulation of a District Centres Development Programme (DCDP) in the 1980s has improved the chances of policies being implemented which will lead to the development of a more integrated and functionally complex urban hierarchy. It is a separate and identifiable target for urban development funds and provides a convenient target for aid donors. It is essentially aimed at developing the urban system below the level of Blantyre and Lilongwe and was initiated by the TCPD. A German consultancy firm, GITEC Consult GMBH, was hired to prepare a feasibility study for the programme and to produce detailed recommendations for the development of particular centres.

The basic proposals, published in 1980, relate to two main recommendations. One was that decentralized urban development is absolutely crucial to Malawi's overall economic development. It is stated that rapid urban growth is inevitable, and that the secondary sector will have to be developed to provide an economic base for the urban population. The consultants produced various forecasts of the urban population by 2000, and of the 'marginal' urban population, according to different assumptions about demographic variables and economic growth, particularly in the agricultural sector. The 'marginal' urban population is defined as that without an economic base for their livelihood, or as the 'squatter' population. For example one likely scenario produced an urban population of about 2.2 million by 2000, equivalent to an urbanization level of around 20%, and a projected marginal population of 830,000. More optimistic assumptions about growth in the agricultural sector however gave much lower estimates of the urban and marginal population. On the grounds that Malawi's circumstances dictate that industrial development must be promoted through agricultural development, the consultants felt that the focus of economic policy should remain on the agriculture sector, but emphasized that since decentralized urban development is a

complementary policy for obtaining accelerated growth in that sector it is very important for Malawian development.

The second recommendation basically relates to the role of spatial linkages within the urban system. It is assumed that decentralization will not generate the positive rural-urban relationships necessary for the development of both rural and urban sectors if there are not strong spatial linkages between the units of the urban system. Furthermore it is emphasized that such linkages can only be effective in "an articulated spatial system....[where] towns of different sizes and at different hierarchical levels have to perform specific functions as nodes for linkage diffusion" (TCPD, 1980a, p.22). In other words the district centres programme is aimed at manipulating the present urban system to produce a clearly identifiable urban hierarchy. As has been seen, at present hierarchical development in the Malawian urban system is negligible.

The form of the urban hierarchy proposed by this programme comprises six levels: national centres, regional centres, sub-regional centres, main market centres, rural centres, and villages (see Table 4.5). 36 centres were ranked according to a number of variables to indicate not only their existing functional roles (10), but also their potential for development, and their existing linkages with their rural surrounding (see Appendix 4.4). These centres included nearly all the official urban places (except Lilongwe, Blantyre and Mzuzu which were already assigned as national or regional centres) plus nine other centres included because of their location or economic functions. From these indicators 9 sub-regional centres were selected to receive priority treatment for development to a relatively high functional level, since this intermediate level is the most identifiable gap in Malawi's urban hierarchy. The final ranking of the 36 centres is shown in Table 4.6, which also indicates their planned functional role, and the priority they should receive.

TABLE 4.5

Recommended Urban Hierarchy and Projected Growth Rates to 2000

Type of Centre	no. of centres	Urban Population : 2000			
		7% total AAGR		5.5% total AAGR	
		Population	AAGR%	Population	AAGR%
1. National centre: Blantyre Lilongwe	2	700,000 600,000	5.0 8.0	500,000 500,000	3.6 7.0
2. Regional centre: Mzuzu	1	135,000	8.3	100,000	6.7
3. Sub-regional centres	9	230,000	7.5	180,000	6.0
4. Main market centre	30-35	350,000	5.4	250,000	3.6
5. Rural centres	200-250	200,000	-	70,000	-
6. Villages	-	-	-	-	-

Source: TCPD/GITEC, 1980b, Table 5-6

* including centres not qualified as urban

Table 4.6: Final Ranking of Centres for DCDP

Rank	Name of Centre	Regional Location	Main Function of Centre	Other Functions to be Performed by Centre	Comparative Advantages Indicator		Development Potential of Hinterland	
					Index	Rank	Index	Rank
FIRST PRIORITY CENTRES								
(1)	Mzuzu	North	Regional Centre for Northern Region	All lower level service functions and Industrial Centre for Northern Region	n.a.		100	n.a.
(2)	Kasungu	Central	Sub-regional Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	121	4	179	2
(3)	Salima	Central	Sub-regional Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	130	2	120	6
(4)	Bangula	South	Sub-regional Centre	All lower level service functions	113	10	100	n.a.
(5)	Mchinji	Central	Sub-regional Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	118	8	87	8
(6)	Karonga	North	Sub-regional Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	122	5	83	9
(7)	Zomba	South	Cultural Centre	Main Market Centre and all lower level service functions and District Administration	165	1	80	11
(8)	Liwonde	South	Industrial Sub-Centre	Sub-regional Centre and all lower level service functions and District Administration	122	5	49	16
(9)	Luchenza	South	Industrial Sub-Centre	Main Market Centre and all lower level service functions	117	9	94	n.a.
SECOND PRIORITY CENTRES								
(10)	Dwangwa ⁷⁾ (Nkhosakota)	Central	Sub-regional Centre	All lower level service functions	103 (112)	14 (11)	100	n.a.
(11)	Mangochi	South	Sub-regional Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	94	21	67	14
(12)	Eutheni (or Mzimba)	North	Sub-regional Centre	All lower level service functions	78	31	109	7
THIRD PRIORITY CENTRES								
(13)	Balaka	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	124	3	49	16
(14)	Nkhata Bay	North	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	122	5	77	12
(15)	Nkhosakota (or Dwangwa)	Central	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	112	11	73	13
(16)	Mzimba (or Eutheni)	North	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	110	12	109	7
(17)	Rumphi	North	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	109	13	83	9

Table 4.6 (cont'd)

Rank	Name of Centre	Regional Location	Main Function of Centre	Other Functions to be Performed by Centre	Comparative Advantages Indicator		Development Potential of Hinterland	
					Index	Rank	Index	Rank
(18)	Nehalo	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and Industrial Sub-Centre	102	15	136	4
(19)	Ngabu	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	102	15	136	4
(20)	Uciza	Central	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	98	17	24	23
(21)	Ntcheu	Central	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	98	17	45	20
(22)	Nsanje	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	98	17	9	24
(23)	Mponela	Central	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	95	20	46	19
(24)	Tnyolo	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	94	21	139	3
(25)	Chilumba	North	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	91	23	83	9
(26)	Monkey Bay	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	89	24	67	14
(27)	Namwera	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	89	24	67	14
(28)	Mwanza	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	89	24	32	21
(29)	Chikwawa	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	89	27	130	4
(30)	Lirangwe	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	83	28	100	n.a.
(31)	Chitipa	North	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	83	28	48	17
(32)	Kasiya	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	81	30	100	n.a.
(33)	Chipoka	Central	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions	77	32	120	6
(34)	Dowa	Central	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	75	33	46	19
(35)	Ntchisi	Central	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	74	34	31	22
(36)	Mulanje	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	74	34	48	17
(37)	Chiradzulu	South	Main Market Centre	All lower level service functions and District Administration	63	36	51	15

1. See Table 4f in Appendix 4

2. See Table 4e in Appendix 4

A number of points can be made about the feasibility and suitability of these recommendations. The projected growth rates of the various levels of the hierarchy (Table 4.5) are based on the assumption either of a laissez-faire approach to population growth, or of government efforts to improve rural living standards and push family planning. The 5.5% urban growth rate associated with the latter policies is stated to lead to a 'viable' urban population by 2000 of 1.6 million. However considering the evidence of increasing pressure on land resources over the next 20 years, these policies would not necessarily be effective in decreasing urban growth rates to this extent. The postulated lower growth rate for Blantyre is also unlikely since it is based on a number of assumptions about government policies relating to Lilongwe's status versus Blantyre's which are not being implemented. For instance the report suggests that the "present policy of discouraging further growth in Blantyre (mainly the restriction of land use for industrial purposes) will undoubtedly assist to divert growth to other centres" (TCPD, 1980b, Section 5.4). Yet a new industrial estate has recently been opened in Blantyre (see Chapter 8).

There is also a degree of non-compatibility between the DCDP and two rural development programmes which have ramifications for settlement development: the National Rural Development Programme (NRDP), and the Rural Growth Centres Project (RGCP). Although there is meant to be co-ordination among them, it is possible to identify conflicts in the choice of centres that the different programmes focus on, leading in some cases to wasteful diffusion of actual and planned investment in a number of centres, rather than the concentration which would allow intermediate centres to develop (see Appendix 4.5).

In terms of implementing the programme a number of problems were also identified by the consultants. The most significant was the way in which most small centres are administered. Urban development in centres without Town Councils is the responsibility primarily of the District Council

(DC). Evidence suggests that such administration operates to the detriment of urban centres, and this in some ways helps to explain the underdevelopment of most of Malawi's urban system.

DC finances are structured in such a way that there is an actual disincentive to promote development in urban centres. DCs have access to limited funds which come from their share of the district's minimum tax levied per adult male (50-75% of which is taken up by collection costs because of widespread evasion), licence fees, market and resthouse fees, council service fees, interest on investments, and government grants (which are very low). Their annual budgets come under the control of the Ministry of Local Government and "it appears that it is the main concern of this Ministry that the local authorities balance their books; little attention is given to the question of what impact the budget might have for development" (TCPD, 1980a, p.60). Because of this, although the DCs have very wide socio-economic responsibilities, they prefer to concentrate on projects likely to yield high and immediate returns like resthouses, taverns and beerhalls. Thus physical infrastructure such as roads and water supplies, essential for fostering urban-rural links and the development of trade and commerce, is neglected as they have long gestation periods before they yield returns. In addition, although Town Councils fare rather better as urban administrative authorities, DCs are particularly reluctant to spend their scarce funds on urban centres if this might lead to them being elevated to Township status, because capital assets and important revenue sources are then lost to the Town Council (TCPD, op cit). Therefore the motivations of present decision-makers may hinder implementation of many of the recommended infrastructural improvements of the DCDP.

This evidence also suggests that the rural areas are in fact parasitic on smaller urban areas, thus partially causing the underdevelopment of Malawi's urban system and the lack of attraction of

small centres for migrants, as indicated in the following statement:

"As already observed in the pilot centres of Ntcheu and Luchenza, Karonga District Council makes virtually no effort to improve the living conditions in Karonga, but rather takes the approach to plough back the considerable revenues generated by the town into rural areas" (TCPD, 1981, Annex 4, p.1).

The consultants recommended that Township status should be conferred on certain centres to enhance their development prospects. This requires parliamentary legislation and at present urban centres can only be elevated to Townships if they are self-sufficient in raising revenues to cover recurrent expenditure. The centres are therefore in a 'Catch 22' position: they cannot develop and fulfil their expected DCDP roles unless they are run by Town Councils, but they cannot become Townships until they develop. Implementation of the DCDP is further hindered by the fact that the TCPD only has direct planning control in Townships; elsewhere the only control operates through a leasing system which is channelled from the local headman, to the District Commissioner and up to the Land Evaluation Department which makes the final decision (TCPD, personal communication, 1982).

The inability to acquire leasehold or freehold land by Town or District Councils to develop and sub-lease is another disincentive to urban development, as this might encourage them to provide serviced plots for subsequent rental to local entrepreneurs. The possibility of transferring leasehold land to local urban authorities, without subsidy, was allowed by the Land Commissioner but this would not be nearly as effective as giving councils subsidized, freehold land for development (TCPD, 1980b). Furthermore Town Councils cannot levy rates on government property which only yields a nominal grant, and tends to use up an unwarranted amount of central land for administrative functions. It is estimated that Town Council income would increase by 30-35% if this practice was abolished (ibid), thereby enhancing development prospects for some small centres, but the current government is unlikely to give this

matter a high priority.

A further problem faced by the DCDP is the scattered nature of urban settlements which in part relates to the inherited colonial pattern. Yet the problem has been perpetuated by the current administration which disregards the advantages of nucleating urban developments for a variety of reasons. Some that might be suggested are lack of financial incentives for government properties to limit their use of urban land, and a general suspicion of low-income residential areas and the 'bright-lights' effect on certain institutions (11). For example the detached location of an ADMARC centre in Mzuzu "does not seem to be consistent with urban planning objectives" (TCPD, 1980a, p.50), and a vast new Traditional Housing Estate for Kasungu was built beyond the original housing zone forcing people to walk "exceedingly long distances" (ibid, p.52). The TCPD feels these factors tend to dissipate the potential of urban centres to develop internally, as well as affecting their service function for the rural population.

The final hurdle for the DCDP is finance. The 1980 plan estimated that about K8.6 million would be required to implement the first phase which covered the sub-regional centres, Mzuzu, Zomba, and Ntcheu as a test-case main market centre. Actual implementation of the proposals has been very slow and by 1982 the German aid which had been forthcoming was insufficient even to cover these centres. The donors' assessment led to Ntcheu being dropped and most of the available money was earmarked for Mzuzu, and emergency flood works in Karonga (TCPD, personal communication, 1982).

4.5 Conclusion

An analysis of the role of Malawi's smaller urban centres by their central place strength and their role in the communications network showed that there is a lack of urban hierarchical development in the country.

Their functional roles are essentially simplistic and do not provide a strong base for the provision of services to the rural population, and the form of the urban system does not promote the diffusion and spread of innovations and information flows. The evidence suggests that an administrative base for urban development in Malawi has not led to complementary economic development, and that the ex-colonial district headquarters have distorted the allocation of urban development investment away from centres with greater potential.

Urban policies in Malawi have been piecemeal for most of the period since Independence and their main aim has been to control, rather than foster urban development. In combination with a number of institutional problems identified with respect to urban development, it can be concluded that a major cause of the underdevelopment of Malawi's urban system has been the nature of government administration which has prevented small centres, under District Councils, benefitting from the real and potential funds they generate.

A number of recent government projects, particularly the District Centres Development Programme but also the Rural Growth Centres Project and the National Rural Development Programme, provide a framework within which the development of small centres can be accelerated, and manipulated, both to promote positive rural-urban relationships and ^{to} accommodate the expected rapid increase in the urban population. However the financial status of Malawi is a barrier to the implementation of these policies.

Blantyre and Lilongwe are clearly the most important centres in Malawi's urban system and it is intended to analyse these two centres in detail in the following chapters, with particular reference to Lilongwe's new status and its role in relation to that of Blantyre.

Notes for Chapter Four

1. The centres surveyed were Mzimba, Rumphu, Karonga, Nkhota-kota, Ntchisi, Dowa, Salima, Ngabu, Chiradzulu, Machinga and Liwonde.
2. A thorough analysis of Malawi's space economy in terms of Friedmann's (1973) concept of core and periphery can be found in Mlia (1975, Chapter 3). The core region defined in his analysis is relatively restricted within the Southern Region.
3. Kasungu, Balaka, Mulanje, Thyolo, Luchenza, Mangochi, Salima and Dedza.
4. Although all the regresssion models computed for the 1979 data were repeated with the 1982 data the results were essentially very similar and they are therefore not detailed here. Also the introduction of automatic exchanges in several smaller centres meant that no calls were recorded from them, and the logarithmic transformations of the regression (see Appendix 4.3) meant that they were ignored in the models, and the results are regarded as generally less representative of the whole urban system.
5. Chemwari is one of the President's tobacco estates.
6. This practice has been criticized in a government report on land tenure in Malawi which stated: "It is evident....that the current level of agricultural rents is significantly lower than the true worth of the land. Profits from tobacco and maize grown on an estate basis are in hundreds of kwacha per acrea and current rentals in tambalas per acre. Letting good agricultural land on this basis not only deprives Government of a reasonable rental income, but it can also lead to this most valuable commodity being treated with less respect than it deserves (Government of Malawi, OPC, Land Department (Valuation), 1978, p.11). Economic factors therefore have been neglected in order to foster elite political support.
7. This practice, combined with poor management on the estates, was one of the many economic problems tackled by the World Bank in the context

of its SALs (Kydd, 1985).

8. In 1966 226,000 migrants were working outside the country. in 1972 487,000 of the de jure population (including dependents) were abroad, of which most were in Rhodesia and 124,000 in South Africa. By 1977 this had fallen to 275,000: about 5% of the de jure population (Christiansen and Kydd, 1983, p.313).
9. He even suggests that Blantyre experienced net out-migration from 1976 to 1977 on the basis of census data, although as this pertains to Blantyre district as a whole, and as suggested in Chapter 4 this rural-urban data probably includes many people who were temporary visitors rather than residents or employees, this is probably a misinterpretation.
10. The TCPD's 1979 functional data for smaller urban centres, which formed part of the data base for the analysis of the urban hierarchy earlier in this chapter was also used by the DCDP.
11. This factor is said to have affected the location of a new girls' school for Phalombe which was sited some distance outside the main settlement. The decision was finally made by the President against the TCPD's recommendations, the suggestion being that contact with 'urban life' was undesirable (TCPD, personal communication, 1982).

CHAPTER FIVE

The Origins of the New Capital Project:

An Analysis of Decision-Making

Less than a year after Malawi gained independence, on January 22 1965, the new President, Dr. Banda, announced in Parliament that it had been decided to move the capital from Zomba to Lilongwe. Although Zomba's status had been subject to criticism throughout the colonial period, the choice of Lilongwe was a departure from the usual conclusion reached: that Blantyre should assume the role of national capital. In terms of the original analyses of Zomba's disadvantages, as discussed in Chapter 2, Blantyre was the obvious choice to replace it; indeed the earlier arguments often concentrated on those factors which specifically highlighted Blantyre's attributes in relation to Zomba's. It had been emphasized that Zomba was not on the railway and that the location of several government departments in Blantyre necessitated much wasteful commuting between the two centres, that more efficient co-operation between the administration and the private commercial and industrial sector could be obtained if the government was established in Blantyre due to its pre-eminent role in these sectors, and that government officials would benefit from better facilities for recreation, shopping and social life (see Pachai, 1971; Potts, 1985b).

However these considerations did not really address the issue of a new capital's national role in terms of its spatial impact on the economy, or its role as a symbol of national pride. Capital cities as centres of national administration, and urban symbols of power and nationalism, have a special status within an urban network and their location has a strong influence on their potential to fulfil these roles effectively. In addition in most countries the capital is also the most important economic centre and this has ramifications for the spatial distribution of economic power. The relocation of a capital therefore presents an

opportunity to choose a site which will be most conducive to the realization of the political and economic objectives of national decision-makers. The motivations of a colonial administration differ from those in power in a newly independent country, and one outcome of this has been the development in Africa of 'colonial' capitals which suited the needs of the colonial power but which are in many ways inappropriately located in terms of the needs of both the indigenous population and an elected government which needs to consolidate its support (Potts, 1985b).

In consideration of such factors there are several points which weighed against the choice of Blantyre in 1965. It was strongly associated with the colonial regime and was still the focus for the expatriate population and was therefore unlikely to provide the Malawian people with a symbol which could be identified with their independent status. In some ways its relative modernity made it more symbolic than Zomba of the colonialism from which Malawi had only just emerged through political, and sometimes violent, struggle. There was also an increasing awareness that both political and economic problems were associated with spatial imbalances in development, and relocation to Blantyre would have perpetuated the existing marked inequalities in the regional spread of development. In addition, since Blantyre had always been the favoured choice of the colonial administration to replace Zomba, it is perhaps not surprising that it was rejected in favour of an alternative, which, although still a colonial creation, would show that the new government did not intend its policies to be dictated by past decisions.

Against these factors however can be ranged a series of arguments which counted heavily in Blantyre's favour, even for a newly independent administration. They generally relate to a short-run financial cost-benefit analysis of relocation. Thus although supportive of Lilongwe's selection from the regional planning perspective, Mlia (1975b, p.396) points out: "It can be categorically stated....that the opportunity

cost would have been lower if the capital was moved to Blantyre than to Lilongwe". Blantyre represented a large proportion of Malawi's fixed capital and this has been an important factor militating against the relocation of inconveniently located capitals. It was Malawi's primate city at independence, six times larger than Zomba or Lilongwe in population terms, and its share of relatively modern urban infrastructure was even more disproportionate. It was the most important communications centre in the country, especially in terms of international communications. It was also the main centre for the manufacture and importation of building and construction materials; and since five out of fourteen government ministries, thirteen ministerial departments and nearly all diplomatic missions were already located there it was clear that the expansion necessary to accommodate the new capital could have been achieved relatively cheaply and conveniently. The cost of establishing the capital at Lilongwe had to be much greater, especially since that also involved an extension of the railway and the construction of a new international airport.

Decentralization policies are nearly always subject to criticism about the short-term financial costs incurred which could have been avoided by further concentration. Such criticism tends to overlook the issue of social and political costs and benefits, and also the long-term economic benefits that such policies may achieve. However it cannot be denied that Malawi's economic circumstances at independence were an extreme disincentive to embarking on a very expensive programme such as the move to Lilongwe. Monetary GNP in 1965 totalled only K74.7 million (c. £37.35m) (NSO, 1978), whilst total government expenditure in the same year was K9.46 million (c. £4.73 million) (Malawi Government, 1970). Up until 1973 the government could not even meet its recurrent expenditure and had to receive British budgetary aid totalling nearly K50 million (NSO, op cit). Even in comparison to other less developed countries Malawi was

poor, and therefore criticisms levelled at the new capital city programme on the basis of its cost, or the fact that it had ignored the cheapest option, were in many ways justified.

In this light the decision to move to Lilongwe indicates that the motivation behind the project must have been very strong. An analysis of the various local factors which influenced this decision can therefore help to identify their relative contribution to the process of decision-making. These factors fall into three categories: the inadequacy of Zomba's position, regional planning issues, and political motivations.

5.1 Zomba: the Problems of the 'Colonial' Capital

Zomba's status as the national capital was undoubtedly anomalous in many ways. Its location did not fit in with the pattern established for most other African colonial capitals: it was not associated with the development of trade and the growth of agricultural exports, nor was it an important transport focus.

However the choice of Zomba in 1886 occurred when the pattern of economic development was still fluid. The motivations behind its choice have previously been discussed in Chapter 2, and it is evident that in addition to its proximity to the major slave trading route, major factors involved in its selection were the personal idiosyncracies of the early Commissioners representing the colonial government. At the time it is perhaps unsurprising that such factors should predominate; however as the colonial economic pattern became established and it became evident that Zomba was not centrally located in relation to transport and estate development, it might have been expected that the capital would have been moved. In Kenya and Zambia for instance, the consolidation of economic and transport patterns led to the relocation of the administrative headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi in 1907 (McKim, 1978), and in Zambia's case from Livingstone to Lusaka in 1935 (Kay, 1967).

on ~~four~~ occasions

Although similar considerations led ⁿ to serious debate about the possibility of relocating Nyasaland's capital on four occasions, a variety of factors, including disagreements about future transport development and "the delays....financial limitations and apathy of the Colonial Office" (Pachai, 1971, p.45) resulted in Zomba retaining its status throughout the colonial period. At independence the old arguments against Zomba remained as pertinent as ever, and new issues were now added. A brief summary of these arguments helps to clarify the situation inherited by the new government. Zomba suffered from a number of physical drawbacks: its position at the foot of a plateau made expansion difficult and the hilly terrain led to scattered housing and expensive road construction. It was also on a cyclone belt and in a malaria area. The division of administrative functions with Blantyre was clearly anomalous and inefficient, and the lack of a railway connection was another drawback, which had undoubtedly contributed to the general lack of secondary sector development. In comparison to Blantyre, Zomba remained an economic backwater, and the uncertainty surrounding its status may have contributed to the lack of maintenance or modernization of its administrative infrastructure. Consequently the national buildings were in need of considerable redevelopment and expansion if Zomba were to remain the capital, which somewhat lessened the opportunity cost of relocation. In addition it has been suggested that the antiquated nature of the buildings and their poor layout would do little to promote a sense of national pride (Mlia, 1975b). The issue of centrality also militated against Zomba at independence, since this factor now became an important consideration as a elected government can ill afford to appear remote to the population.

In comparison to other countries which have emphasized the importance of centrality as a factor behind their capital relocation programmes (1),

Malawi's circumstances were less severe. Zomba's location in the Southern Region did make it relatively inaccessible to the population of the Northern and Central Regions, yet 50% of the population lived in the Southern Region, and Zomba was located in the most densely settled area of the country. However the particular configuration of Malawi's boundaries made the location of a capital city at either 'end' of the long strip of national territory particularly inappropriate, and was likely to cause suspicion that the areas furthest from the capital would be neglected. The easiest way to alleviate this problem in Malawi was obviously to locate the capital in the Central Region. This would have *had* the effect of making national policy-makers appear more accessible to the whole population, even if in reality it did not alter the direction of development. A shift in the administration's location will not necessarily result in improved representation of the development needs of particular areas and is therefore no guarantee that future policies will endeavour to spread 'development' more fairly. It is to be expected that the immediate area surrounding a new capital would benefit since national policy makers would be involved by virtue of continued contact, but heightened perception of problems elsewhere may not result simply because they are less far away than previously. Whilst physical distance is a hindrance to the perception of development needs in remote areas, a national executive which is isolated by its attitudes is also a hindrance. Thus an emphasis on the advantages of a central administrative location can be merely a political palliative which manipulates the electorate's perception of the government's objectives to gain support, although in reality the objectives have not necessarily changed.

Almost immediately after the announcement in Parliament, a team of consultants, Brian Colquhoun and Partners, was appointed to prepare a report on the proposed move. Among the points they were required to

analyse was the cost of maintaining and extending the government buildings in Zomba and Blantyre over a period of 10 years, in comparison to the cost of new buildings in Lilongwe. The firm's estimates were £3.6 million and £13.5 million respectively. The Ministry of Works later revised the Lilongwe costs downwards to £11.8 million, but they were still much higher than the alternative. In October 1965 a further survey was commissioned from H. Hindle, the Regional Public Administration Advisor of the Economic Commission for Africa. The "Hindle Report" was received in December 1965 and contained a further downward revision of the cost of buildings in the new capital to £11.2 million (Pachai, 1971). These initial calculations therefore suggested that the cost of maintaining the status quo would be about one-third of that of building a new capital, but paradoxically were seen as a further justification of the move as indicated in the following statement:

"If Zomba were to remain the seat of Government, many of the existing structures would require to be replaced....Thus, much of the cost of building the New Capital would have been incurred by the need to provide additional or replacement facilities in either Blantyre or Zomba." (Economic Planning Division, c.1971)

The emphasis on this point must be judged as either naive or as a deliberate attempt to make the project appear in a favourable financial light. Anyway, the cost of the government buildings per se would only be a proportion of the total cost of a new capital: such a development would also imply major expenditure on urban infrastructure, residential buildings for the population influx which would accompany the administrative move, an expansion of education, health and recreational facilities, and the provision of improved transport facilities which, in the case of Lilongwe, implied the massive cost of a railway link and airport.

Another point made about Zomba was that many of the existing, structurally sound government buildings could be used to house a University, thus further lightening the financial burden. Reference to

this advantage was made in October 1965 when President Banda presented a further statement to Parliament on the capital relocation project, after receiving the 'Colquhoun' Report (Malawi Government, 1965). This factor then became a usual element of later reports on the project (e.g. Economic Planning Division, op cit; Richards, 1974; CCDC, 1978). However virtually all the administrative, academic and residential buildings of the University are new structures on a site some distance from the town centre. Hence maximum use of the old buildings was not made.

Although there were a number of justifications for moving the capital from Zomba, it is apparent that the government's analysis of the problem presented an unrealistically favourable picture of the financial cost of the exercise. The implication is that the government was deliberately selecting factors which supported the decision to move.

5.2 Regional Planning Issues

"Lilongwe is in the most central place of the country for political and administrative purposes. An important overall objective in shifting the capital from Zomba to Lilongwe is however, that this will provide a new growth with [sic] augmenting not only agricultural activity in the Central and Northern regions, but also industry and commerce. The development of the New Capital will involve annual expenditure of K5 million over the current decade but this will not be at the expense of investments in other deserving projects. To the contrary, the development of the New Capital and the surrounding agricultural projects are planned to be mutually reinforcing as part of an integrated programme accelerating development in the Central Region and also aiding in a fuller exploitation of the region's potential. The Northern Region is expected to benefit enormously from the spread effects of the new capital city development, with major economic activity generated in the centre of the country." (Economic Planning Division, c.1971, ps.3-4, emphasis added)

That Lilongwe's development was explicitly related, in official circles, to Malawi's regional planning needs is evident from the above statement. This view of Lilongwe's role is reinforced by references in both official and unofficial literature to Lilongwe as a 'growth point' (e.g. NSO, 1978, p.10; Richards, 1974, p51; Mlia, 1978, p.9). The capital city programme was therefore directly linked to the concept of 'growth

centres' as envisaged and promoted by Friedmann (1966), and this implies that the new capital's development would be specifically planned to encourage the emergence of features which would enable it to fulfil this role. Theoretically such planned development would involve the establishment of 'propulsive' industries, various incentives to counterbalance the attraction of the 'core' area, and an urban economy characterized by the existence of many backward and forward linkages with the surrounding regional economy. It is clear that the association of the new capital project with the issue of regional equity would give it a greater appeal as it added a further justification for the move, and could be used to counter criticism that Lilongwe would only be a prestige symbol which Malawi could ill afford.

The mere assertion that Lilongwe would act as a 'growth centre' however would have little effect on its actual role unless specific action was taken to guide its development, although the rhetorical promotion of this aspect may well have improved its image. In addition, it is clear that the validity of the 'growth centre' concept is questionable, and the approach has attracted much criticism (see Chapter 1). However it can be shown that the spatial distribution of economic development in Malawi did provide a very real justification for the choice of Lilongwe as a suitable site for locating a 'growth centre', given that at the time of its inception the concept was more generally accepted as a valuable tool for regional development.

5.2.1 Spatial Imbalances in Malawi's Development in 1964

At independence Malawi inherited an economy characterized by its dependence on agricultural exports, and a severe imbalance in the spatial spread of modern economic activities. These aspects of the Malawian economy have been emphasized in much of the literature on Malawi (e.g. Kydd and Christiansen, 1982; Kaluwa, 1982). In terms of export crop production, industrial and commercial establishments, and the provision of

transport and communication infrastructure, the Southern Region's share was overwhelmingly dominant. The degree of concentration was far greater than the South's 50% share of the population would warrant.

The development of the Southern Region was clearly associated with the historical pattern of European settlement. This was concentrated in the Shire highlands where the great majority of tea and tobacco estates and factories were found. In response to this concentration Blantyre/Limbe developed to become the country's main service centre and soon emerged as the commercial capital. Both European and African monetary demand was concentrated in this area as the estates were the main employers of African labour, and the process of cumulative causation ensured that a large share of urban-based African demand was located in Blantyre. Modern industrial activity in Malawi was confined to two major categories: processing of agricultural produce for the export market and 'demand-based' light industries which relied on local demand for a range of relatively simple products. The Shire highlands monopolized both industrial categories, as well as dominating the monetary agricultural sector and accommodating the national capital at Zomba.

The polarization of economic development in the Shire highlands has been identified by Mlia (1975a), using a principal components analysis of forty-one indices describing the socio-economic characteristics of Malawi's 23 districts. The clustering of indices on a variety of factors highlighted the contrast between the nature of development in the Shire highlands (and particularly Blantyre), and the rest of the country. Most of the data related to the late 1960s and consequently the pattern described is relevant to the pattern of development which faced decision-makers when the capital relocation programme was conceived. Mlia (op cit, p.112, p.115) concluded from his analysis that:


"the available evidence generally suggests that Blantyre stands at the apex of Malawi's primary core region. While the actual extent of the core region cannot be defined precisely, it can be conceived as roughly coinciding with the Shire highlands....comprising

Thyolo, Mulanje, Chiradzulu, and large portions of Blantyre (2) and Zomba districts....The rest of the country outside the Shire highlands can conveniently be considered as being one big periphery."

The Blantyre Planning Team also emphasized the skewed nature of industrial and employment patterns in favour of the commercial capital. They estimated that in 1972 59% of manufacturing jobs were accounted for by Blantyre, when its population was only 3.7% of the national total (Blantyre Planning Team, 1972, cited in Mlia, op cit). Furthermore it was estimated that Blantyre also accounted for 66% of Malawi's monetary GDP (but see Appendix 5.1).

In terms of spatial economic structure it was therefore possible to divide Malawi into a core and periphery at the time of independence. Map 5.1 illustrates the areal extent of the core, taking into account not only Mlia's factorial analysis but also the distribution of tea and tobacco estates and the location of Blantyre and Zomba. This clearly shows that the spatial impact of the core was very limited. Most of the Southern Region is excluded and could in fact be regarded as equally undeveloped as the Northern and Central regions. Smallholder incomes in the Southern Region were no higher than elsewhere, for example, and the rate of labour migration to other countries was almost as high as in most other districts (Mlia, op cit). Clearly the Shire highlands were not the focal point of development for the African population, and Mlia (ibid) has described the core as an "alien arable enclave" like the "White Highlands" of Kenya.

The limited areal impact of the existing core implies that the nature of the economy and of rural-urban linkages was unlikely to allow another urban-industrial complex, in Lilongwe, to produce automatically the very far-reaching effects on the Central and Northern regions that policy statements suggested. However it is clear that from a regional planning perspective, the siting of the new capital away from the Southern Region was logical, if a growth centre policy was to be pursued. Had Blantyre become the new capital on financial grounds this would merely have served



to perpetuate and enhance the existing spatial imbalances. Indeed, according to the second parliamentary statement on the establishment of a new capital Blantyre had in fact been considered as a possible site, but it was rejected because "any further emphasis in the south could only lead to a lop-sided and inequitable development to the detriment of the Central and Northern regions" (Malawi Government, 1965, p.3). There appears to be no evidence that any other site really was considered apart from Lilongwe however.

5.2.2 Lilongwe: a Regional Planning Perspective

Lilongwe was virtually the same size as Zomba by 1966, and thus jointly second to Blantyre. Inasmuch as its existing infrastructure lessened the total cost of the project therefore, it was the least expensive site for the new capital development, once Blantyre was eliminated on regional planning grounds. Although the Northern Region had a strong claim to a growth centre, it was Malawi's least developed region economically, and the obvious choice of Mzuzu would have been much more expensive and would not have satisfied the criterion of centrality. In any case, both the Northern and Central regions were almost equally disadvantaged when compared to the Southern Region, in terms of secondary and tertiary sector development (3), and consequently the location of a new capital in either served to improve the spatial distribution of these sectors.

Another factor in Lilongwe's favour was that it is located in an area which is characterized by a relatively thriving smallholder economy. The Central Region has fairly fertile soils, and the average size of smallholding is larger than in the other two regions: in 1968/69 this was estimated to be 4.7 acres, compared to 3.5 acres and 3.2 acres in the Northern and Southern regions respectively (Malawi, 1978). During the colonial period the area round Lilongwe had become the centre of African tobacco production. This development had begun shortly after the First

World War and was encouraged by the colonial government, which established a Native Tobacco Board. In 1930 the Imperial Tobacco Company set up a factory in Lilongwe, but the establishment of an auction floor was thwarted by pressure from buyers at the original floor in Limbe. This suggests that the vested interests of the European population had a detrimental effect on Lilongwe's development, since natural economic forces were already in action to enhance its economic status. The spatial imbalances inherited at independence could therefore be seen as not only the result of the usual process of cumulative causation, but also of deliberate efforts to prevent the realization of economic potential in other areas (4). In this light it may be fair to conclude that Lilongwe fulfilled a further aspect of growth centre theory as, to some extent, its hinterland could be termed a 'resource frontier' (Friedmann, 1973, p.276). The neglect of potentially productive opportunities in the periphery, due to the core's immediate impact on investors' perceptions, is one element of Myrdal's 'backwash' effects, which tend to prevent the 'trickle-down' of development from economically advanced areas. The underdevelopment of the Lilongwe area may therefore have continued if the government had not taken direct action to enable its potential to be exploited.

Estimates of farm cash income and income from ADMARC purchases for 1968-69 (Table 5.1) illustrate the Central Region's non-estate agricultural strength. By comparison the Southern Region's African rural population was clearly at a disadvantage, particularly in terms of farm cash income. In fact the only Southern Region district which had comparable incomes on either index to the Central Region was Chikwawa, whilst the lowest incomes were found in the four districts which comprised the economic core.

Although there is a lack of empirical evidence about how exactly the spread effects of a growth centre are supposed to stimulate its surrounding region, a study by Gilbert (1975) on Antioquia in Colombia showed that

TABLE 5.1


Estimated Incomes from Non-Estate Agriculture by Region 1968-69

REGION	Farm Cash Income		Income from ADMARC Purchases	
	Total (K'000)	Per capita (K) (rural popn.)	Total (K'000)	Per capita (K) (rural popn.)
NORTHERN	1,289	2.8	491	1.1
CENTRAL	4,550	3.0	3,750	2.7
SOUTHERN	2,267	1.5	3,038	2.0

Source: adapted from Mlia, 1975a, Table 1

growth centres may have little impact on surrounding agricultural areas unless there are simultaneous effects to improve agricultural and social conditions. Although some of the area surrounding Antioquia was part of Colombia's coffee belt and characterized by greater equality of land tenure and incomes than usual in Colombia, and was considered to offer a favourable environment for economic growth, it was found that the positive impact of the centre fell away very sharply with distance and was very limited beyond a radius of about 50 kms. Gilbert points out however that the more remote areas were still influenced by Antioquia, although in a negative sense. Much of these areas was used for cattle ranching, and the profits tended to be invested and consumed in Antioquia due to the concentrated banking system and the entrenched system of absentee landlordism.

The nature of the agricultural economy in the region of Lilongwe in the mid 1960s did offer some advantages in terms of the above type of analysis. Given that it was based on smallholder production generating a relatively high level of income, and that this was distributed fairly equally amongst the population, it is clear that the potential to respond to any stimulus offered may have been fairly high. The backwash problem relating to private investment of rural profits in the growth centre was less likely to occur, since the landholders lived on the land. Also both agricultural and social development were receiving specific attention in the region, as there were a number of major agricultural development projects located there. One was the Lilongwe Land Development Project (LLDP) itself, while the Kasungu Flue-Cured Tobacco Scheme, started in 1968, and the Lakeshore Rural Development Project were also within the Central Region (see Map 5.2). A growth centre needs to take advantage of opportunities generated by its hinterland as well as vice versa, because if it can build its economy partly on the demands of its surrounding region, its economic development should be self-generating to some extent.



Map 5.2
MALAWI: ECONOMIC CORE, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CAPITALS AND MAIN TRANSPORT NETWORK

This also ensures the promotion of rural-urban linkages which are emphasized by growth centre theory. If the existing agricultural economy is so severely underdeveloped that producers are unable to take full advantage of any spread effects which do emanate from a growth centre, the impact of the centre on agricultural development is going to be severely reduced.

- Theoretically ^{however} the above projects would enhance the ability of Lilongwe's hinterland to respond to stimuli, if Lilongwe's development was guided to ensure that appropriate linkages were generated. The LLDP and Kasungu Scheme are both integrated development projects aimed at increasing rural welfare and infrastructure, as well as agricultural production and incomes. Inasmuch as these could be successful in altering rural-urban relationships in the Central Region by enabling the rural areas to generate effective demand for urban-based produce and services (e.g. agricultural machinery, crop processing, cheap consumer goods), the climate for linkages between Lilongwe and its hinterland to be of a reciprocal, rather than one-sided, nature was positive.

The improved regional transport infrastructure which accompanied Lilongwe's development could also benefit the rural areas and allow effective access to the services of the new core. However it could also be argued that improved accessibility enhances the action of backwash effects (e.g. by easing the process of rural-urban migration which may select the most educated and dynamic elements of the rural population).

There were therefore a number of factors in 1965 which justified the choice of Lilongwe, if regional planning objectives were to be met. Yet it is interesting to note that there appears to have been no attempt to consider other centres which may have offered a similar potential; it is arguable for instance that Salima in particular might have met a number of criteria. Although it was much smaller than Lilongwe, the cost of the new construction would have been lower as it was the railway terminus, and

materials from Blantyre and abroad could have been transported relatively cheaply. Salima is also very near the lake, and therefore the capital would have been more accessible to all the lakeside centres, and a number of agricultural projects along the lake shore. In fact Salima's transport links to both the Northern and Southern regions were better than Lilongwe's, and its position was equally central (5). The railway link is clearly a crucial point, considering the emphasis on the disadvantages Zomba suffered from being off the railway, and this represented a clear advantage over Lilongwe. Furthermore the 1968/69 incomes per head from ADMARC purchases in Salima district were the highest in Malawi, after Chikwawa (Mlia, 1975a).

It can never be stated with certainty how much regional planning considerations contributed to the process of decision-making leading to the choice of Lilongwe as the new capital. The lack of evidence that alternative sites were really considered does tend to suggest that regional planning was not an important motivation. The fact that Lilongwe's selection can be related to Malawi's regional planning needs does not in itself make regional planning a primary objective, and such an assumption might easily be the result of post-hoc rationalization. The significance of these points is clarified in the next section, which analyses the evidence for political motivations being the most important contributor to the decision not only to move the capital, but also to site it at Lilongwe.

5.3 Political Motivations

In order to understand the political motivations behind the capital relocation programme it is necessary to analyse the nature of the Malawian government, and in particular the influence of the Life President, Dr. Banda.

Nyasaland's bid for independence was inextricably linked with the

tremendous antipathy of the African population to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (see Chapter 2). Dr. Banda had been a vocal critic of the establishment of the Federation on Nyasaland's behalf despite the fact that he had been out of the country for over 20 years, and was resident in Britain at the time. His arrival in Nyasaland in 1958 to assume the leadership of the struggle was greeted with popular acclaim, the younger and more radical nationalists feeling that his status as an elder statesman would add weight to their claims for both the end of the Federation and eventual independence. However it was to become clear that Banda's ideas about the future of the country, and his own role, did not match the ideology of many of his younger associates.

In 1959 Banda was imprisoned by the colonial government in Gwelo in Southern Rhodesia. It was here that he claims to have formulated the idea that Lilongwe should become the new capital of the country, once independence was gained. Kadzamira (1977, p.66) writing about the development planning process in Malawi points out that Banda is "the architect of Malawi's development". He emphasizes the key role played by the President in all post-independence policy formulation and implementation, including the major development projects which provided the basis of the Malawi Congress Party's economic policies, which he states were formulated by Banda alone during his imprisonment (ibid, p.68, 69, 73, 81; Kadzamira, 1976, p.279) (6). Banda's role is also highlighted by the following quotation from a Capital City Development Corporation publication:

Dr Banda, as might be expected, did not waste his time in Gwelo prison in self-pity but rather exercised his mind in formulating guidelines for the development of Malawi when it should become independent. One of these guidelines pointed very definitely to Lilongwe...." (Richards, 1974, p.13)

It can be categorically stated therefore first, that the initial impetus for the capital relocation programme came from the President, second, that the choice of Lilongwe was made before the idea was presented for

the consideration of other members of the national executive, and third, that this location was the personal choice of Banda. Indeed the national commission to look into the question of relocating the capital was only established after the initial parliamentary proclamation on the subject.

There is no doubt that Banda's motives for this choice were the true ones behind the initiation of the project, although one can only speculate as to what these were. The preceding analysis has shown that there were a number of factors which generated a climate from which a capital relocation programme might naturally emerge. Undoubtedly the President's initial decision was partially a result of these general circumstances, as no personal decision is made in a vacuum. However a number of factors suggest that beyond this, the President's individual influence according to his personal wishes was equally, if not more, important.

Given that he was the source of the decision to move the capital, and the choice of Lilongwe, there is no evidence that the eventual parliamentary statement was the result of an intermediate process of group analysis. Whilst this is not to suggest that there was no discussion at all, political events in Malawi at the time emphasized that the President was not open to criticism of his ideas, nor, once he had set his sights on a particular project, to influence from any source. This determination extended even to those to whom he owed his status, as they had created the background for Nyasaland's independence, and had supported his sudden rise to power. Thus it was the younger ministers (7), whose socialist aspirations were utterly opposed by Banda's conservative and capitalist alignment, who were the first to suffer from the series of purges of the national executive initiated by Banda during his rule, which led them to leave the country in 1964 (Chiume, 1975).

The parameters of this study preclude a detailed analysis of the evidence demonstrating the extraordinary power wielded by Dr. Banda within

Malawi, and the methods of control which allow it. This is well documented elsewhere (e.g. see Williams, 1978; Hodder-Williams, 1979; Weisfelder, 1980; Worrall, 1974). Suffice it to say that it is undeniable that the locus of true decision-making power lies with the President, and that many major decisions are made by him alone. Thus it is widely recognized that "Malawi has a distinctly personalist regime dominated by the whims and idiosyncracies of its President" (Weisfelder, 1980, p.16)..

Banda was therefore in a position to implement policies which reflected his personal motivations, and a number of factors can be suggested which might have been influential. To some extent his motives would parallel those of any new government, inasmuch as he also had need of popular support and an effective location for his administration. However it is also clear that he was prepared to ignore these factors if they should be personally inconvenient, as there was considerable popular support for the individuals he ousted at an early stage. Thus not too much weight can be given to possible consideration involving the need to legitimize the government by choosing a more central location for the capital to allay regional jealousies. Yet there were political considerations which may have encouraged a northwards shift in administration.

Despite the fact that the Northern Region was sometimes referred to as the 'dead North', it enjoyed the highest standards of educational achievement. The reasons for this are complex: in general this pattern resulted from factors influencing the distribution of missionary education and the nature of colonial grants to schools. (8). The consequence of this was that the articulation of the North's development needs was particularly significant due to the greater proportion of educated people amongst the local population. This factor had little impact on the colonial administration, but it did produce a situation whereby, at independence, the share of 'proximate policy makers' (9) originating from

the north was disproportionately large. In 1966 12% of the national population was resident in the Northern Region, but 25-30% of cabinet ministers and parliamentary secretaries came from there, whilst less than 30% came from the Southern Region. These facts illustrate a general situation in which the Southern Region, and the Shire highlands, were no longer able to exert a dominant influence on policy decisions. Mlia's analysis of these factors concludes that this was a significant element influencing the direction of policies in independent Malawi, which has resulted in specific efforts to improve the spatial distribution of development projects, because "the authority-dependency relationships are presently in favour of the periphery" (Mlia, 1975a,p.210).

As stated above, the actual nature of Malawian politics suggests that these factors were probably less important than Mlia, for instance, assumes. Nevertheless the circumstances did mitigate against choosing Blantyre on financial grounds, and therefore probably were perceived as one reason why a move away from the south could be justified.

Another, and more personal, motive which may have influenced the President's choice was the issue of regional and ethnic loyalty. Connell (1972) alludes to the fact that Banda's birthplace was near Kasungu in the Central Region, and that this area, including Lilongwe, is the core territory of his ethnic group the Achewa. The implication is clearly that the choice was influenced by either personal emotional ties, or a desire to ensure the continued political loyalty of his most important supporters. By comparison with many other African countries conflict among Malawi's ethnic groups has not been a major political problem. One reason may be that the colonial administration did not favour any particular group as a specific policy (10), and the distribution of ethnic groups (see Map 5.3) did not leave any of the strongest groups in control of the core. The Angoni and Ayao had been the militarily strongest groups at the time colonial rule was imposed, for instance,

whilst the Achewa have always been numerically dominant (accounting for 28% of the total population in 1945) (11). The Alomwe are the second largest group and are dominant in most of the core, but they mainly entered the territory from Mozambique during the colonial period, and have never wielded any special influence or power (Mlia, 1975 a).

Banda's choice of Lilongwe clearly favours the Achewa, in contrast to other African countries embarking on similar projects, which have attempted to choose neutral sites for their new capitals (e.g. Nigeria, Botswana) (Potts, 1985b). Another example of presidential favouritism for this region is the location of Kamuzu Academy, an extraordinary secondary school which is modelled on elitist British public schools. This school was built on the President's direct orders, and is located near Kasungu, close to a tree under which he states he learnt to read. The official line is that it was built with the President's own money. However Banda has a 99% share-holding in Press Holdings, which he says he holds on behalf of the nation. Press, with its subsidiaries, has been estimated to account for almost 30% of Malawi's economic activity (New Statesman, 1980). It is therefore arguable that the school was built with the nation's money, without consultation. In addition, there is evidence that many enterprises, institutions and individuals were 'requested' to make private donations for the project, and around that time ADMARC made an unsecured loan to Press of K26 million (Financial Times, 1981).

The final and perhaps most important individual motivation that can be suggested is that the new capital is a source of personal gratification. This is more a symptom of the President's personality than a specifically political factor; however the nature of political interaction in Malawi is strongly affected by the fact that Banda expects to receive overt displays of loyalty and gratitude for all his actions, and is highly susceptible to flattery. Physical symbols of his prestige abound, and there is no doubt that the new capital plays a similar role.

The President associated himself directly with its establishment, rather than allowing it to be seen as a national decision, and his key role in master-minding both the initial decision to move, and the actual construction of much of the new part of the city is emphasized. The following quotations from the CCDC's publicity illustrate this point very clearly:

"...one of the Life President's most cherished ambitions was fulfilled by the formal recognition of Lilongwe as the "National Capital City of Malawi"."

"...the Life President directed that the Secretary for Works and Supplies should become additionally the Chairman of the CCDC. The advantages of single control, by direct access to His Excellency who was also Minister of Works and Supplies, soon became apparent."

"...direct access to His Excellency the Life President was vitally important...[who was] always prepared to accept ultimate responsibility."

"It [the new capital] is an expansion of the identity of the people of Malawi. May it always serve as a proud reminder that the first great Malawian leader and the father of the nation had the strength of will and self-discipline to set out on a journey on their behalf "from vision to reality"."

(Richards, 1974, ps.11, 24, 29-30, 62, emphasis added)

5.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is considered that political factors, and in particular the personal desires of the Malawian President, were the primary motivations for the new capital project and its location at Lilongwe. Zomba's drawbacks, and regional planning issues helped to justify the move, but although it can be rationalized as being in the interests of a democratic, nationalistic Malawian government, this does not necessarily mean that the decision was the result of a democratic, parliamentary process. There is considerable evidence that it was not the result of group decision-making, and that the original cost analysis was deliberately misleading in order to allay criticism. Banda's almost unique power within his own country makes viable the conclusion that Lilongwe began as a personal prestige symbol at a politically advantageous location, rather than as a rational element of an attempt to restructure

Malawi's space economy more equitably.

Notes for Chapter Five

1. For instance in Tanzania and Nigeria, the coastal locations of the colonial capitals made them inaccessible to the majority of the population (for a more detailed discussion of this point, see Potts (1985b).)
2. At this time Blantyre district was very extensive and stretched to the Mozambique border on the western side of the River Shire, an area unaffected by the relatively high levels of economic development experienced in the area surrounding Blantyre itself. The later division of the district into two, Blantyre and Mwanza, has removed this ambiguity.
3. The main exception to this general situation relates to social development and education in particular. Educational achievement in the Northern Region was higher than elsewhere; this point is discussed further in the following section on political motivations.
4. It is significant that this process was also disadvantageous to the African communities of the Southern Region. For instance the government deliberately avoided encouraging smallholder production in the Shire highlands, because the estate owners opposed it on the grounds that this would disrupt their labour supply, which they always complained was insufficient. Thus there was no African cotton production in Zomba and Blantyre districts, despite the facts that they were suited to cotton, were important areas of European cotton growing, and that generally the government promoted African cotton production very strongly (see Mlia, 1975 a, pp. 119-140 for a more detailed analysis of the impact of colonial policies on the spread of agricultural development.)
5. In particular, for instance, the Dwangwa Sugar project is located north of Salima near Nkhota-kota (see Map 5.2). Sugar has assumed great significance in the Malawian economy in recent years, surpassing

tobacco as the most valuable export in 1980, a year of poor tobacco prices (Kydd, 1982). However this is a relatively recent phenomenon, and could not have influenced the capital relocation decision at the time it was taken.

6. Apart from the capital relocation to Lilongwe, Banda's so-called 'Gwelo Plan' envisaged a University in Zomba, and a lakeshore road. In January 1965 he added another project, the Nacala rail link (McMaster, 1974). All these projects have been implemented.
7. These ministers, Chirwa, Chipembere, Chiume, Chisiza, Bwanansi and Chokau, later developed opposition movements in neighbouring countries, which have been continuously harassed from Malawi. This culminated in the assassination of Dr. Atati Mpakati in 1983, and the imposition of death sentences on Orton and Vera Chirwa in the same year (later commuted to life sentences).
8. A detailed analysis of the causes of educational patterns is given in Mlia (1975a, pp. 153-161.)
9. This term refers to all those with immediate legal authority to decide on specific policies and immediate participants in decision-making. The term is used by Mlia (1975a; 1975b) in his analyses of the influence of regional representation on Malawian policy making, and is attributed to Lindlam (1968).
10. Clearly the spatial impact of economic and educational development did affect ethnic groups differently, but there is no evidence that this was deliberate, although the importance of Christian missionaries may have disadvantaged the Muslim Yao.
11. Later estimates of the proportional distribution of Malawi's ethnic groups are categorized by language. This fails to distinguish between the Anyanja and Achewa, who both speak Chichewa.

CHAPTER SIX

Finance and Planning for the New Capital

The expense of financing the transferral of capital cities has led to criticism even of countries much richer than Malawi. Malawi's available resources made it certain that the project could not begin to be implemented unless major external aid was forthcoming.

Unsurprisingly Malawi automatically turned to Britain for funds. The British Overseas Development Ministry had sent an economic advisory mission to Malawi in 1965 to assess aid requirements, which had prepared a favourable report ensuring British development support. However the British and Malawian government had agreed that the focus should be on agriculture, along with transport development directly linked to supporting this sector, secondary and tertiary education, and private sector industrial growth (Morton, 1975). The British considered that the new capital project did not fit into these categories, and refused to aid it. Furthermore they indicated that the project was undesirable, particularly in terms of the opportunity cost of projects foregone. There were clearly doubts about the contribution of Lilongwe to regional development and national income, and it was stated that the project would not contribute to the key priority of short and medium term economic expansion. In an unusual step Britain actually threatened to 'reconsider' its aid commitment if Malawi went ahead with the project (ibid) (1). Undeterred however, Malawi continued its search for funds and commissioned feasibility studies for the project.

As previously discussed, the British consultants Brian Colquhoun and Partners were appointed in 1965 to examine the general wisdom of the move, and decided in its favour (Richards, 1974). A South African mission, headed by Reutenbach, the Chairman of the South African Resources and Planning Advisory Council, also supported the move in a report submitted in 1967 (Morton, 1975). According to McMaster (1974), the United States,

West Germany and the World Bank were all approached for financial help without success. Finally negotiations with South Africa achieved their objective, and an initial loan of eight million rand (4.7 million) was agreed in 1968, which had a grant element of about 60%.

The fact that Malawi was prepared to accept South African help, despite being a member of the OAU and an independent black-ruled state on the front-line of black-white conflict in Southern Africa, requires some comment. Much has been written about Malawi's anomalous relationship with the Republic (e.g. see Leistner, 1967; McMaster, 1974; Chipembere, 1971; Hughes, 1973; Munger, 1969). Briefly this situation is the result of Banda's own idiosyncratic view of Southern African politics, and his personal ideology of so-called 'pragmatism' is reflected in Malawi's foreign policies. There are diplomatic relations between the two countries, for example, and substantial financial help has been received from South Africa, which also made a loan for the Nacala rail link. South Africa's infiltration into Malawi was therefore enhanced by Britain's selective stance on development aid at that time (Morton, op cit). For South Africa, the loan for Lilongwe represented an opportunity to fulfil a foreign policy aim of increasing the dependence of black-ruled Southern African states on the Republic, and also possibly to gain a very convenient Central African military air-base once Lilongwe's airport was built.

6.1 The Lilongwe 'Master Plan'

A master plan was commissioned from a firm of architects in Johannesburg, Imex Pty. Ltd. This was received in 1967 but according to Richards (op cit) certain elements proved unsuitable for the needs of a poor and undeveloped economy. Although it has not been possible to ascertain exactly how much the original plan was then altered, it appears that it was over-ambitious in technical and financial terms. The major

points of contention were technical problems, neglect of established local practices, insufficient attention to the need to use local materials and industry, and expense. The planned transport scheme for example, had taken little note of local circumstances, as it envisaged mass transit public transport, which would have been beyond United Transport Malawi's (UTM) financial and material capabilities. It also assumed that vehicle ownership would be "as high as elsewhere in the world" and that roads should be provided "on the basis that nearly every family in Lilongwe will eventually own a motor-car" (Gerke and Viljoen, 1968). This assumption was clearly unrealistic, if not ridiculous.

A revised master plan was therefore drawn up by the Ministry of Works and Supplies, which included the Town Planning Department (TPD). This plan in theory retained "what was good" and rejected "what was unacceptable" from the South African plan and was directed to encompass three major points. First Lilongwe was to be a multi-purpose city functioning as both the national administration and a new commercial industrial centre. Second, the 'old town' was to be integrated into the new city, and finally the plan was to include provision for Lilongwe's future transport role as it was now "a certainty that it would become the site of the new international airport and an important rail centre on the future rail link from the Zambian border via Salima to the existing railway network" (Richards, op cit, p. 24).


The plan that resulted is shown in Maps 6.1 and 6.2. There are four elements in the plan which have a direct impact on the quality of life experienced by the city's inhabitants. These are considered below.



6.1.1 Land-Use Zoning

The very strict zoning between land-use types, including division of residential areas prevents the intermixture of functions spatially. The 'new town' development in particular gives the impression of a virtually clinical degree of orderliness, and perceptually the impact is very

27

Areas
1,2,3 etc






**Main area of planned
development**




Old Lilongwe


Map 6.1
LILONGWE 1982: BOUNDARIES PLANNING AREAS &
OLD MUNICIPALITY



Map 6.1

LILONGWE 1982: BOUNDARIES PLANNING AREAS & OLD MUNICIPALITY





**Map 6.2 LILONGWE:
ZONING OF MAIN AREA**

- Government administration centres
- Police, military, hospital, etc.
- High density traditional housing
- High density permanent housing
- Medium density housing
- Low density housing
- Commercial

- Industrial
- Open space parks
- Forestry
- Agricultural grazing
- Conservation centre
- Undetermined
- Cemeteries

- Main roads
- Railway
- Minor roads
- Capital city designated boundary
- Capital city controlled area boundary

Source: Town & Country Planning Dept, Malawi

artificial. Class divisions between the city's different residents are physically delineated by their residential location: this can only lead to the perpetuation of class differences, maintain a lack of social interaction between economic classes, and prevent a social awareness of the circumstances of the poorer classes by those in higher socio-economic categories. This situation appears unfortunate for future social development and seems particularly inappropriate for a city which is supposed to symbolize the national identity of the entire Malawian population. The cause may be attributed to the original South African influence on the plan, although it is clear that the Malawian government has chosen to continue the policy of urban residential segregation established under colonial rule, and it is probable that the pattern is a result of a combination of these influences.

6.1.2 The 'Garden City' Approach

There has been a considerable effort to make Lilongwe a 'garden city'. The success of this policy is undoubted: there are vast areas of open 'bush' intervening between built-up areas, as well as landscaped and planted areas. This is partly the result of the very extensive area covered by Lilongwe's boundaries. The original 'Designated Area' was declared on 31st August, 1968 (TPD, 1978c) and covered 37,018 acres. This has since been considerably extended, particularly with the inclusion of the area up to Lumbadzi to include the new airport (see Map 6.1), and the city boundaries now include an area of 67,842 acres (TPD, 1978b). As Map 6.1 shows the main body of zoned urban land-use covers a large part of the designated area, although Lumbadzi is separate. There has been no attempt to concentrate land-use zones within this main area consisting of what is termed the 'Old Town' and 'New Capital', nor has the plan been implemented in spatial phases so as to gradually incorporate different zones and avoid the emergence of a disjointed spatial structure.

The general form of the city is linear, on a north-south axis,

stretching from the 'Old Town' to Lumbadzi. There are supposedly four focal areas: the old town, the new CBD, the industrial area of Kanengo, and the airport/Lumbadzi. These are all meant to contain a variety of higher-order service function such as shopping areas, post offices and banking facilities (TCPD, personal communication, August 1982). The latter two in particular had not progressed very far by 1982. Although the linear form of the city necessitates a number of such centres it is probable that income levels do not produce sufficient demand for each to develop a full range of functions, which could have been more effective if concentrated in a more compact urban environment. As many areas had not been completed or even begun by 1982 (thirteen years after construction began), the physically unintegrated nature of the city was very apparent. The distribution of land-use zones is shown in Table 6.1. Over a third of available land is not zoned to become 'built-up', and the space set aside for some types of land-use (e.g. institutions, government administration) is vastly in excess of that necessary for the buildings themselves, which contributes to the scattered nature of the built areas.

The lack of spatial integration hinders perception of the city as a cohesive whole, and the physical impact of the new structures, some of which are of considerable aesthetic value in terms of architectural style, is consequently hampered (see photos). The symbolic and perceptual impression of most cities in which the individual attributes are areally co-ordinated tends to be greater than the sum of its parts, but in Lilongwe it is arguable that the reverse is true.

6.1.3 The Transport Problem

On a less 'cultural' level, the immediate physical result of the city's morphology is that the population often has to cover long distances to get to work, or to use various urban services such as shopping centres. Inadequacies in public transport, discussed in a later section, compound this problem for the vast majority of the population who cannot afford

TABLE 6.1

Land-Use Zones in Lilongwe

Land-Use	Acreage	% of total	
Government Administration	435	0.65	
Institutions	3290	4.85	
Commercial	800	1.18	
Industrial	7115	10.49	
Residential	25280	37.26	
Cemeteries	114	0.17	36.18
Open Spaces/Parks	7530	11.10	
Forestry	3748	5.52	
Agriculture/grazing	8240	12.19	
Conservation centre	450	0.66	
Ornamental lake	510	0.75	
Undetermined	4040	5.96	
State Residence	6290	9.27	
TOTAL	67842		

Source: Town Planning Department, 1978b, Table 2D

private transport (even a bicycle). This may reflect the unrealistic transport assumptions of the original plan, as the revised plan may have paid insufficient attention to re-zoning residential and employment areas to allow for the realities of Malawian travel.

Many low-income housing areas are inappropriately sited, with low-income groups housed far from their work places. For example, Area 25 was zoned to house some low-income residents of the 'Old Town' and many people were resettled as the new plan was implemented. Yet most of the main residential area of Area 25 is some distance from the main industrial area of Kanengo (Area 29), and miles from the 'Old Town' itself. Furthermore Area 25's early development as a site and service residential area occurred before Kanengo was properly established. Even now Kanengo still cannot offer employment to all the residents of Area 25. By the 1980s both the TPD and the CCDC were prepared to admit that this was a major problem. Whilst this may be the result of planning mistakes combined with the 'garden city' approach, a possible implication is that there was a deliberate policy to distance the poorer sections of community from the core areas of urban infrastructure because they are perceived as a potential source of political unrest. The effect on the population's quality of life is clearly detrimental, the most obvious drawback being the high commuting costs incurred, although many simply walk long distances every day.

6.1.4 Spatial Integration

A further consequence of general planning practices for Lilongwe is that, despite the directive to integrate the 'Old Town' with the new developments, this has not been achieved. Some new development has occurred in the vicinity of old Lilongwe, but there is a definite 'gap' between it and the new CBD which is the closest existing part of the 'New Capital'. The intervening space of about 4 kms. is open bush and includes a nature sanctuary which might easily have been accommodated elsewhere on

the river. Again the reason is unclear, but it may be because it had already been determined that the government ministries' complex would be located on Capital Hill, a site both aesthetically pleasing and easy to defend, and in order to serve this complex and associated high-income residences, the new CBD had to be nearby. This analysis is admittedly speculative, but it is a fact that Capital Hill is surrounded by a security fence and there is only one guarded entrance.

The location of the new city market is also worthy of note. It was originally planned for a site within the new CBD. Its eventual location was however much less convenient: it is some 20 minutes walk from the CBD and considerably further from existing residential development, in the middle of open bush land.

These factors further contribute to necessary travelling time, and again must be particularly onerous for the low-income residents.

6.2 The Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan

The Lilongwe master plan was basically only a zoning plan, although much of the city's development during the 1970s was in accordance with its guidelines. A more comprehensive plan, the Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan (LUSP), was later prepared by the Town Planning Department within Malawi, which superceded and updated all previous plans. The LUSP, published in 1978, is an "Outline Scheme" under the 1948 Town and Country Planning Act, and is the official planning document directing the city's strategic and overall development. It analysed and made recommendations about the existing and potential structure of Lilongwe, as envisaged by the master plan, with respect to "the social, economic and physical systems of an area, so far as they are subject to planning control or influence. The structure is, in effect, the planning framework for an area and includes such matters as the distribution of the population, the activities and relationships between them, the patterns of land use and the development

the activities give rise to, together with the network of communications and the systems of utility services" (HMSO, 1970, quoted in TCPD, 1978a, p. I-6).

The LUSP is divided into four sections. Background information is provided in the first, which covers the existing situation in 1978 and future projections of possible developments, with reference to almost every aspect of the city, from population growth and structure, and employment, to conservation and townscaping, city management and finance. Section Two contains the Plan's aims and objectives with respect to these aspects, and contains recommendations on monitoring of plan implementation. The third section constitutes the legal statements and definitions involved in the plan, and describes the legal framework covering the sorts of buildings which may be erected in any land-use zone, as well as technical data on legal densities of building in different zones, the appearance of buildings, etc. The final section considers Lilongwe's regional and national setting. and, for instance, makes recommendations for the creation of a sub-regional urban hierarchy to promote Lilongwe's spatial impact on its hinterland. These are closely related to those made in the Plan for the Lilongwe Region (see Chapter 4), although the hierarchy suggested takes the form recommended in the District Centres Development Programme (TCPD, 1980b).

Those involved in plan implementation were thus provided with a definite set of guidelines. However since this detailed plan was not published until nine years after the initial construction began in 1969, during which time it proceeded in line with the master plan, a number of problems had already emerged, and the LUSP made several criticisms about the city's development up to 1978. Social infrastructure had not kept pace with other construction for instance, and there was a shortage of housing, schools and clinics, as well as insufficient allocation of areas for firewood cultivation. Some of Lilongwe's problems may have arisen

because its development was pushed ahead before a detailed plan was available, although of course this would not have guaranteed their avoidance, especially as some of them derive from the original land-use zoning.

6.3 The Capital City Development Corporation

A major problem inherent in the implementation of development plans is that they frequently require the co-operation of a number of different agencies which are all involved in plan execution. This can cause friction and hold-ups as the administration of all the different aspects of the programme needs to be phased to coincide. The development of Lilongwe successfully avoided this problem through the establishment of an autonomous statutory authority which had complete control over virtually every aspect of development within the designated area: the Capital City Development Corporation (CCDC).

The CCDC was established by Act of Parliament in 1968 with the authority to act "as agent for the Government....to administer and supervise the orderly construction, development and maintenance of the Capital City, including buildings for the Government, and for industrial, commercial and other purposes, the construction, maintenance, repair and renewal of dwelling houses, factories, stores, and other buildings, roads, transport facilities, water supplies, surface drains, sewage disposal works and services of any other description and the provision of community centres, theatres, libraries, halls, gardens, swimming pools, and amenities of every description....either alone or in association with or as an agent of any person" (CCDC, 1978, pp.4-5).

There were other governmental agencies involved in plan execution. The Malawi Housing Corporation was chiefly responsible for the provision of medium density and high density permanent housing, although other residential construction fell to the CCDC (TPD, 1978a). The Lilongwe

City Council is the Local Education Authority and administers primary education, as well as local authority functions not administered by the CCDC during its existence, and the Ministry of Education is responsible for secondary and tertiary education. UTM, a private company, is responsible for public transport.

The establishment of the CCDC undoubtedly helped to speed the process of plan implementation in the early stages. It insisted that the master plan should specify land-use which prevented friction^{over zoning} between local authorities and other agencies. The President's influence in the CCDC also meant that it was a powerful, if undemocratic body. All members, including the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, were appointed by the Minister of Works and Supplies, a post held by Banda. The first Chairman was also the Secretary of Works and Supplies; other members included the Mayor and several councillors from the Lilongwe City Council (LCC) (Richards, 1974).

The CCDC was run on a commercial basis, acting in a similar way to a New Town Development Corporation. The initial R8 million advance from South Africa, on-lent by the government, provided its seed capital, but further funds had to be raised through its own initiatives. Some of this came from the government, but always in the form of loans, rather than grants (see Appendix 6.1). The terms of the largest government loan were relatively soft; later loans carried a 9.5% interest rate but repayments did not commence until the 1980s (see Section 6.4 below). However the corporation was forced to raise commercial loans as well, in order to fulfil its responsibilities. They found that financiers were reluctant to lend to them as a statutory body, and the loans raised were often at extremely onerous interest rates. Further funds were meant to come from their general activities of developing land for sale or rent (including development charges). Loan repayment was their responsibility, although the government guaranteed some of the commercial advances. A major

consequence of these factors was that the CCDC's administration and priorities had to reflect their commercial orientation, and this inevitably meant that some of their major responsibilities, which were inherently 'unprofitable', were unlikely to receive due attention. A key example is low-income housing, of which there has always been a severe shortage since the capital programme began. It is clear that the CCDC was reluctant to provide the massive investment necessary to keep pace with the rapidly growing population, since low-cost site and service plots yield no profit, although the subsidy element in Lilongwe is very small (Pennant, 1982). Whilst finance for this sector is a problem in all less-developed countries, it is suggested that the CCDC's commercial nature made it very difficult to fulfil its obligations in this sphere, given the likely prioritization of its various responsibilities.

The CCDC's major problem was undoubtedly financial. Shortages of funds slowed the progress of construction, and a number of projects had to be shelved during the 1970s, including the new and extremely expensive State Residence and the transfer of the High Court and parliamentary buildings (Financial Times, 1981). The former is still not completed, and transfer of the latter two is still only at the planning stage due to continued lack of finance (Metcalf, personal communication, February 1986).

The corporation's initial assets, apart from the South African loan, included the land designated for the capital (2). The CCDC's land included freehold title to about 24,000 hectares by 1980 (CCDC, 1980) but excluded land already held freehold by other bodies. The Malawi Housing Corporation (MHC) for instance owns freehold land and will not in fact develop land unless it is given to them freehold (TPD, 1978b). Other small pockets of freehold land also existed (e.g. embassies, major industrial concerns) (Richards, 1974; TPD, 1978a), and government land was transferred back to the government (Dept. of Lands, interview, August

1982). The value of both developed and undeveloped land was estimated as a book asset of K9,041,298 in the CCDC's 1980 accounts (CCDC, op cit).

Thus nearly all Lilongwe's land came under the CCDC's direct control, with all users having to pay the corporation development charges (except for occasional charities), and rent. However whilst the CCDC implemented the master plan, all planning applications are vetted by the Lilongwe Town and Country Planning Committee, a body nominated by the President, and part of the TPD (TPD, interview, August 1982). Thus the ultimate authority on planning applications is the President.

The CCDC also received all ground and lease rents from land and property in Lilongwe district which is owned by city residents. This is collected by the government and passed on to the CCDC as a grant. This implies a direct transfer of funds from hinterland to city, and could be viewed as detrimental to regional development (although the government could have used the money for projects outside the city anyway, and this at least ensured it remains within the district).

Despite these assets, the CCDC found its finances insufficient to carry out its responsibilities as early as 1972. It decided to set up a series of property companies, beginning with the Malawi Property Investment Company (MPICO), in which the CCDC had a 60% share holding. The objective was to attract international and local commercial investment, and MPICO created subsidiary companies to suit the needs of particular investors and projects (CCDC, 1980). The companies were successful in attracting private investment capital both internally and externally, and by 1980 there were 17 associated and subsidiary companies in the group, including four wholly owned by the CCDC (the largest being Airport Developments Ltd.), with provided or assured funds of K30 million (ibid). Investors included Barclays Bank, Standard Bank, Bank of America and the Commonwealth Development Finance Co. Ltd. (Richards, op cit). There is also a strong South African influence, as Old Mutual owns 23% of

MPICO (Moore, personal communication, 1984). The corporation retained direct control of these companies (Richards, 1974), although its main direct role in some was the provision of management services (CCDC, op cit). However some of the companies had in fact only two shareholders, both from the CCDC (ibid). It is undeniable that this move allowed the capital project to progress through the 1970s at a rate otherwise unattainable, and it was even reported that "the net result has been that Malawi now has a virtually completed new capital at little direct cost to the government" (The Times, 1978). However to call the capital "virtually completed" in 1978 was certainly over-optimistic as major elements of the outline plan were still non-existent, and there was a major shortage of housing.

This view also ignored the long-term aspects of this development, besides neglecting to account for the other massive infrastructural costs involved in building the new capital (e.g. transport, public utilities, low-income housing). The incentive for investment in these companies was that they would yield a high return (CCDC, interview, August 1982), and although it is not certain whether the CCDC guaranteed a specific return, the companies did yield regular dividends. However the true financial position of these companies did not always allow dividends to be paid from company profits, and in 1982 I was informed that dividends were being paid by the National Bank of Malawi. By 1979/80 it was already apparent that the structure and future of the group faced massive problems: heavy borrowings from external lenders at floating interest rates (the peak was 21%) creating impossible debt conditions. The 1980 accounts showed that the subsidiaries had increased their debt to the CCDC, which had made a number of unsecured loans to them, by K1.2 million. MPICO eventually had to sell off many of its assets, to pay external lenders (Metcalf, ibid).

There are therefore a number of aspects about the funding of

Lilongwe's construction which suggest that substantial national funds were diverted to support the CCDC. The CCDC was wound up in 1984, and its responsibilities passed to the LCC. The debts it incurred are likely to remain a considerable burden on the country for the foreseeable future.

6.4 The Cost of the New Capital

The monetary cost of the new capital is only one element of any cost-benefit analysis of the project, as less tangible social and political effects as well as economic gains have also to be considered. These all have implications for the project's impact on other aspects of Malawi's development. The relative importance of the actual expenditure on a project in such an analysis is largely a function of the country's overall financial position. Thus in many ways the cost element is mainly relevant in terms of the relative proportion of available funds it uses, rather than the absolute cost.

It is impossible to be exact about the cost of the new capital, partly because of ambiguities in development expenditure accounting. The government has always tried to present a relatively low-cost picture in its various statements and planning documents, presumably to avoid internal and international criticism that Malawi's overall development would suffer significantly because of the diversion of development funds to the project. Thus the initial government estimate of the cost was £15-20 million (K30-40 million), which was soon revised to £25-30 million (K50-60 million) (Connell, 1972; Economic Planning Division, c.1971). On the basis of an expenditure of K50 million in ten years, the Economic Planning Division estimated that Lilongwe would account for only 7% of gross fixed capital formation, and 13% of the government's development programme from 1971-80, compared to 19% and 29% respectively for agriculture and transport. In 1971 they confidently stated that "the allocation of K50 million to the New Capital will neither reduce the

growth performance of the Malawi economy nor lead to insupportable debt servicing commitments" (ibid).

Oil price rises helped to cause massive escalation in the cost of all development expenditure in the last decade, and must have led to corresponding increases in the cost of the capital project. Thus whilst total development expenditure from 1971-80 was originally estimated at K374 million, total expenditure from 1971-79 was K475.3 million, and in 1978/79 alone was over K120 million, well above the expected yearly average. Yet over the same period the official record of governmental development expenditure on the new capital was only K18.5 million, a mere 4% of the total, and less than the original estimates.

It is obvious that accounting procedures were very narrow in their definition of government expenditure on Lilongwe, since most of the direct cost of internal construction was borne by the CCDC. Table 6.2 shows official estimates of expenditure on the development account from 1964-1982/83 by selected functions. Expenditure on the 'New Capital' is recorded as a separate category and appears as a relatively minor expense, totalling K24 million over the period. Table 6.3 shows the proportion of total annual development expenditure on each category. It can be seen that the cost of the new capital, according to government accounting, peaked in the early construction period of the early 1970s, when it was about half of expenditure on agriculture. As previously noted, the Malawian government's attitude towards welfare services such as health and education is that it cannot afford to provide a full service and therefore concentrates on providing facilities which are believed to yield the most immediate economic returns (e.g. by improving health services in areas where specific agricultural projects have been established). By comparison to many other African countries the proportion of development expenditure on these functions is low, although educational development immediately after independence was significant due to the need to provide

TABLE 6.2

Central Government Expenditure on Development Account by Function 1965-1982/83 (K'000)

FUNCTION	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969/70 ¹	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75
Natural Resources of which: Agriculture	1096 225	1697 659	2322 1278	2454 1291	3391 2656	6500 5466*	6643 5606**	8717 6981	7855 5837	9612 7105	13,096 8,858
Social Services Education ² Health Community Devt. etc.	1176 1150 0 26	1499 1320 99 78	1291 1026 206 59	958 748 168 42	2104 1335 189 520	2784 2546 205 33	2965 2848 105 12	2191 1849 339 3	1971 1625 302 44	2795 1363 1266 166	3,389 1,168 2,103 117
Transport & Communications Posts & Telecommunications Transport: of which: roads railways	532 122 410 na na	2282 265 2017 na na	4103 441 3662 na na	2724 484 2240 1766 214	5169 513 4656 3638 172	6993 610 6383 3727 2212	18504 885 17619 7492 10103	7359 839 6520 5786 441	6311 1071 5240 4077 656	7515 1596 5919 3853 1691	12,376 1,703 10,856 7,153 2,509
Other Economic Services of which: Govt. Bldgs. New Capital	2566 197 0	3979 714 50	5043 1434 55	3978 1110 98	3926 500 204	5041 679* 1602	7057 769** 2630	12900 1159 3390	10565 2007 3834	10322 3973 3584	11,913 6,821 1,786
Total Expenditure	5370	9457	12,759	10,114	13,960	21,318	35,169	31,167	26,702	30,244	40,774
	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82*	1982/83**			
Natural Resources of which: Agriculture	13,982 9,945*	12,094 8,917	15,912 12,552	14,113 10,708	20,208 15,105	23,182 15,475	37,120 26,938	30,123 23,539			
Social Services Education ² Health Community Devt. etc.	2,951 1,060 1,796 95	3,114 1,338 1,674 102	5,091 4,174 874 42	8,016 6,992 1,007 17	7,844 5,112 2,726 5	11,859 7,613 4,246 0.1	17,472 14,784 2,687 -	35,161 30,849 4,312 -			
Transport & Communications Posts & Telecommunications Transport of which: roads railways	36,469 3,262 33,207 12,686 19,254	23,974 2,948 21,025 12,484 8,273	34,824 3,382 31,443 14,903* 19,728*	61,155 2,921 58,235 27,115** 15,646**	44,320 3,090 41,230 na na	68,780 2,193 66,588 na na	47,423 1,427 45,996 na na	38,444 3,116 35,328 na na			
Other Economic Services of which: Govt. Bldgs. New Capital	16,603 8,872* 1,648	16,725 3,987 2,845	20,069 1,631 961	30,207 12,477 505	55,573 32,395 545	71,079 39,743 0.4	36,710 16,736 -	49,053 17,578 -			
Total Expenditure	70,005	55,907	75,896	113,491	127,945	174,900	138,725	152,781			

Notes: 1. 15 months Jan 1969-March 1970

Sources: 1. Malawi Government, Approved Estimates of expenditure on development account, 1970/71; 1976/77; 1982/83.

2. Education and Culture from 1977/78.

*revised estimates

**estimates

2. NSO, Malawi Statistical Yearbook 1978.

TABLE 6.3.
Percentages of Total Government Expenditure on Development Account for Selected Functions 1964-1980/81

FUNCTION	% total annual expenditure																	% of total expenditure	
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969/ 70#	1970/ 71	1971/ 72	1972/ 73	1973/ 74	1974/ 75	1975/ 76	1976/ 77	1977/ 78	1978/ 79	1979/ 80	1980/ 81	1964-80/81	1969/70-80/81
Agriculture	4	7	14	13	19	26	16	22	22	23	22	14	16	17	9	12	9	14	14
Education	21	14	11	9	10	12	8	6	6	5	3	2	2	5	6	4	4	5	5
Health	0	1	2	2	1	1	0.3	1	1	4	5	3	3	1	0.9	2	2	2	2
TRANSPORT of which:	8	21	29	22	33	30	50	21	20	20	26	47	38	41	51	32	38	37	38
Roads	na	na	na	18	26	17	21	19	15	13	18	18	22	16*	22**	na	na	19 ¹	20 ²
Railways	na	na	na	2	1	10	29	1	2	6	6	28	15	21*	13**	na	na	15 ¹	16 ²
Govt. Bldgs	4	8	15	11	4	3	2	4	7	12	17	13	7	2	11	25	23	14	14
New Capital	0	0.5	0.6	1	1	8	7	11	14	12	4	2	5	1	0.4	0.4	neg	3	3

Notes: 1. Road and railway expenditure 1967-1978/79 as % of total development expenditure 1967-1978/79. Source: calculated from data in Table 6.1

2. Road and railway expenditure 1969/70-1978/79 as % of total development expenditure 1969/70-1978/79.

* revised estimate

** estimate

15 months Jan 1969-March 1970.

very basic facilities not established in the colonial period. Officially recorded annual development expenditure on the new capital has been comparable^{to}, and sometimes greater than, that on either of these categories.

However this categorization of the new capital's cost cannot be seen as a true representation of the real opportunity cost of the project to the government's development funds. The vast majority of the cost shown in Table 6.2 is made up of government loans to the CCDC, as shown in Table 6.4a (3). In 1975 planned loans totalled K20 million, and by 1980 outstanding government loans totalled K12.8 million (CCDC, 1980), excluding the original on-lent South African loan of which K10.5 million was still outstanding. The largest element of the government loan was made at a 'soft' interest rate of 4.5%, but the CCDC had already defaulted on two payments in 1980 (payment of other government loans did not commence until after this date, the last for which accounts are available). These facts imply that the opportunity costs of these loans was greater than expected, as alternative commercial investment would have yielded higher returns. Furthermore the value of the public land ceded to the CCDC (estimated at K9 million in 1980) does not appear to have been accounted for in any way.

Of even greater significance is the fact that items entered under general headings such as transport and government buildings are directly related to the capital project. This means that the project's true cost is much greater than suggested by official categorization. Also although expenditure on the 'New Capital' is shown to have ended in 1981/82, in fact further costs are still being incurred during the 1980s. Tables 6.4a and 6.4b attempt to estimate the importance of this factor, as indicated by the government development accounts of 1976/77 and 1982/83 (4). These figures should not be regarded as definitive because of the subjective difficulties of identifying those elements of expenditure in other

TABLE 6.4a

Planned Development in Selected Sectors in Malawi:
Total Government Costs as Estimated in 1975
and Proportion Attributable to Lilongwe

Category	Planned expenditure (existing projects)		Expenditure to 31/3/75		% categ. total spent by 31/3/75
	K'000	%	K'000	% of categ.	
1. New Capital of which: govt. loans to CCDC	22,336 20,023	100 90	16,183 15,913	100 98	72 79
2. Government Buildings of which: a) presidential residences b) other government bldgs. c) govt. bldgs. in Lilongwe as % of 2(b) ^{1,2}	31,596 13,878 17,718 8,035	100 44 56 45	14,958 8,591 6,367 3,903	100 57 43 61	47 62 36 49
3. Health of which: Lilongwe	10,278 4,977	100 48	4,308 1,986	100 46	42 40
4. Transport of which: Lilongwe	133,481 61,520	100 46	37,929 3,052	100 8	28 5

Source: calculated from Malawi Government, Approved estimates
of expenditure on development account for 1976/77

- Notes: 1. This figure includes the estimated cost of State House in Lilongwe, which is officially categorized as separate from other presidential residences.
2. Over K1,000,000 was designated for an unspecified category of 'other government buildings'. These were probably attributable to Lilongwe and would increase the total proportion of planned expenditure on government buildings there to 70%.

TABLE 6.4b

Planned development in selected categories:
1982/83 Estimates of Government Expenditure and
Proportion Attributable to Lilongwe

Category	Planned expenditure (existing projects)		Expenditure to 31/3/81		% categ. total spent by 31/3/75
	K'000	%	K'000	% of categ.	
1. Government Buildings	124,926	100	89,983	100	72
of which: a) presidential residences	2,059	1.7	1,627	1.8	79
b) other government bldgs.	122,237	98.3	88,356	98.2	72
c) govt. bldgs. in Lilongwe as % of 2(b) ^{1,2}	116,883	96	83,563	95	71
2. Transport	292,528	100	195,422	100	67
of which: Lilongwe	106,831	37	86,756	44	81

Source: calculated from Malawi Government, Approved estimates
of expenditure on development account for 1982/83

Notes: 1. Includes Lilongwe State Residence.

2. Includes K71.5 million planned expenditure on Malawi Army Buildings, which
would be almost entirely due to further expenditure on the Lilongwe Army
Barracks.

categories which would not otherwise have been made if the new capital project had not been implemented. For instance, one can only make reasoned assumptions as to whether the railway from Salima to Mchinji would have been constructed even if Lilongwe had not been chosen, and obviously some road improvements in the area would have ^{anyway} occurred. Nevertheless it can be stated that many infrastructural development which accompanied the new capital's development were made because of the capital project, and not in spite of it.

A number of assumptions have been made in Tables 6.4a and 6.4b on the basis of the alternatives available had Lilongwe not become the capital, and the opportunity cost of not selecting Blantyre, or remaining in Zomba. With respect to government buildings it is felt that the cost of new buildings in Lilongwe can definitely be allocated as a cost of building a new capital, as considerably less expenditure would have been necessary in Zomba or Blantyre. Most of the estimated and expended cost of presidential residences has been excluded when calculating the proportion of development expenditure in this category accounted for by Lilongwe, as the very high cost of these is regarded as an anomalous element in an analysis of 'development' expenditure, although it is indicative of the structure of decision-making power and of government priorities (the total planned expenditure on health in 1976/77 was less than that for presidential residences for example). However the New State House at Lilongwe has been included as part of Lilongwe's costs.

The allocation of health expenditure to Lilongwe in the later 1970s was also a very high proportion of total planned and completed development. The main element of this was the new general hospital in Lilongwe, with a very small share taken by a new medical auxiliary school. Although the latter may have been a necessary expenditure, it can be assumed that the hospital was definitely attributable to the decision to initiate a new capital. Alternatives would have been to expand the existing hospital at

Blantyre, and/or to expand primary and preventive health care, perhaps combined with the upgrading of an existing district hospital in the Northern or Central Regions.

The transport sector has consistently received the largest single share of Malawi's development expenditure. A significant proportion of this has gone on the new railway links to Nacala, and from Salima to Lilongwe and thence to Mchinji, and these are reflected in sudden rises in the cost of railway development in certain years (see Table 6.1). The present analysis has included the cost of the Salima-Lilongwe-Mchinji link as directly attributable to Lilongwe's development. There are a number of reasons why this appears to be a fair assumption. First this development was not included in Banda's "Gwelo Plan" guidelines. This is significant since the other two major transport projects (the Nacala link and the lakeshore road) were included, and it seems probable that if the decision to construct the railway had been made independently of the Lilongwe project, such an expensive and important development would have been derived from these early guidelines. Secondly it seems improbable that the government could justify this railway on the grounds of improved transport of agricultural produce in the Central Region alone, and the extension to the Zambian border from Lilongwe has proceeded without any definite plans for a link from Zambia which might otherwise have made the project independently viable. The government also stated that one purpose of the railway was to cater "for the increasing demands of the rapidly growing new capital" (Department of Information, 1978). All these factors imply that Lilongwe's development as the new capital was the major *raison d'être* for this railway and that it can be regarded as part of the capital's cost, especially as the opportunity cost of selecting Blantyre, or providing a rail link to Zomba would have been much less.

Although the Mchinji link had not been begun by 1977, the year to which Table 6.4a refers, it can be seen that transport costs related to

Lilongwe are estimated to be almost half of total estimated expenditure on existing projects at that time. Lilongwe's share of transport costs are a very important element in any cost-benefit analysis as this expenditure is the largest proportion of estimated allocable cost of the project. The figures in Tables 6.4a and 6.4b are somewhat conservative estimates however, and do not, for instance, included the cost of new plant vehicles and equipment for the Balaka-Lilongwe stretch of railway (K14.5 million in 1976/77) on the grounds that some of this expenditure was inevitable. Similarly no element of the cost of the improved Zomba-Lilongwe road has been included (K9 million in 1976/77), although it has been assumed that major expenditure on improved Lilongwe road links to Mchinji and Kasungu should be allocable to Lilongwe, as their prioritization is considered directly attributable to the capital's development.

Whilst the capital project can never be costed exactly because of the various problems outlined above, the evidence is that significant proportions of planned and completed development expenditure in a variety of sectors have been allocated to the project, and that the relatively positive picture of its impact on development spending in other sectors indicated by official government estimates of the project is an insufficient basis for analysis of the true economic costs and benefits. Thus in 1976/77 almost a half of the total cost of existing projects in health, transport and government buildings are regarded as allocable to Lilongwe. In 1982/83 when the capital projects was already officially excluded from development accounts, nearly all the current cost of government buildings was for Lilongwe, plus a third of total transport costs, reflecting in particular the development of State House, army buildings and the new airport, as well as continued expenditure on railways. The total cost of the new airport has been estimated at K82 million (Financial Times, 1981) (5). It is considered here that the airport could definitely not have been justified in the absence of the new

capital project, despite the inadequacies of Blantyre's Chileka airport for wide-bodied jets.

According to government accounts the estimated cost of all existing development projects in 1976/77 was K383 million. On the basis of the data in Table 7.3a the then current cost of the capital was at least K96.9 million. Thus the new capital accounted for about a quarter of the government's development programme during the latter half of the 1970s, and approximately a third of the total of non-natural resource projects. An identical picture is found if similar calculations are made with reference to the 1982/83 accounts: the current cost of the new capital related projects was K224 million representing a quarter of total current projects' costs of K886 million, and a third of K672 million allocated to non-natural resources projects.

6.5 Conclusion

The development of Lilongwe as Malawi's new capital city has required an enormous effort on the part of planners, construction workers and government agencies. The strength of purpose and single-mindedness with which the project has been pursued has provided the country with one of its major achievements in the years since independence. Yet there is no doubt that the opportunity cost of the new capital has been very high, and that the achievement has only been gained by incurring heavy external debts ^{by} both the government and the CCDC. About 80% of Malawian development expenditure is financed by aid and the rest is borrowed overseas on commercial terms. Even with low interest rates on some of the loans made as aid, it is estimated that about 40% of annual revenue went to debt repayments at the beginning of the 1980s. It is sometimes argued that if aid for a specific project would not have been forthcoming for alternative projects, then there is no opportunity costs in terms of development in other sectors. This may well be true of the original South

African loan, for instance, but it is difficult to ascertain the position of other donors such as Canada which financed the railway. Nonetheless when a country is as aid-dependent as Malawi it can be suggested that an opportunity cost does exist even in these circumstances. This is because, apart from the considerable burden of debt repayment which diverts government revenue from internal development, potential donors are likely to assess a government's ability to pay, and projects which have significantly increased indebtedness may have the effect of discouraging donors from aiding other projects.

Development accounting procedures make it impossible to cost the project precisely, and the benefits of many of the associated infrastructural investments have development implications beyond the immediate confines of the capital project; but the current retrenchment in the Malawian economy and its future development plans result from a balance of payments problem which has been partly caused by expenditure on the new capital.

Criticism of the project on economic grounds is clearly justified, especially if it is judged that the new capital has little to offer in terms of economic development. Thus Williams (1978, p. 293) has written:

"The readiness of the president to devote most substantial quantities of very scarce resources and to incur heavy foreign liabilities that exacerbate the already serious balance of payments problem, in order to pursue the political dream of building the national capital among his own Chewa people, cannot easily be reconciled with the view that the economic development of the country was his major priority."

In some ways however Lilongwe is a symbol of Malawian development priorities, which as a whole, can partly be criticized as failing to grapple with the country's most urgent needs. Therefore one can speculate that even if the finances for the capital project had been directed to alternatives, these would not necessarily have had a greater impact on economic development. Nonetheless the relevance of expenditure on the capital and associated projects to the overall economic situation is

undeniable, and it cannot be justified as a wholly necessary expenditure. Had the country not incurred the debt associated with Lilongwe, the severity of the country's recession would have been lessened.

The Malawian economy was in crisis by the end of the 1970s, leading to intervention by the IMF in 1979. The country's external debt rose from K399 million to K504 million between 1979 and 1980, with a corresponding increase in debt servicing from K32.9 million to K47 million. Malawi was therefore forced to revise its planned development programme for 1981/82-1985/86, which has been described as a "sober, almost masochistic document" (Financial Times, 1981). In addition severe measures to rebalance the economy were introduced: budgets were cut, taxes increased, a credit squeeze was initiated, and efforts made to limit imports by a 3% import levy. Parastatal bodies like the Spearhead Group of the Malawi Young Pioneers and ADMARC have been overhauled due to evidence of inefficiency and extravagance; even Press Holdings was subjected to examination. The government raised prices for basic services and rent, but continued to hold down wages (ibid). During the 1980s these measures must have had a negative impact on the already low living standards of the Malawian population.

These problems have clearly been caused by a variety of factors, of which perhaps the most important is the current world recession, and debt repayment has become an overwhelming burden for so many less-developed countries that Malawi's circumstances are not unusual. Yet the evidence presented above regarding the CCDC's financial experiences, and the proportion of overall expenditure related to the new capital demonstrates that the government's insistence that the capital project would not "lead to insupportable debt-servicing commitments" was incorrect, and it is clear that the project made a major contribution to Malawi's present financial situation. More specifically, the scale of the cost of the new capital must also have had a detrimental effect on development in other

sectors of the national economy, and has diverted funds which could have had a significant impact on aspects of national welfare. In particular one might single out the relatively low level of development in the education and health sectors, and small-scale peasant agriculture.

The annual Economic Report of 1982 (Economic Planning Division, 1982) predicted further falls in economic growth rates and the description of the performance of both the public and private sectors is generally pessimistic. Existing debts and servicing commitments are described as "very burdensome", and it is emphasized that predictions are based on the assumption that reserves will be maintained and that the current deficit will be covered by continued inflows to government. However it is also stated that "it is not clear that such inflows can realistically be anticipated" and that if the government is forced to reduce expenditure further, the future economic prospects would be even worse (ibid, p.12). In relation to Malawi's dependence on foreign capital, Williams (1978, p. 327) predicted that a situation might arise whereby "the government will have to choose between a sharp fall in the rate of economic growth and the risk of severe disaffection among some of its closest supporters". It is possible that this analysis was proved correct when in 1983 a number of political events occurred in Malawi which were suggestive of an increase in internal dissent amongst the national executive. This culminated in rumours that the President was to take a year's sabbatical (which in practical terms would have meant the end of his rule in Malawi), and that the Head of the Reserve Bank might assume power. These events may have been partly caused by economic problems.

The capital project has also drawn Malawi into a close, and arguably unethical, relationship with South Africa. The role of Lilongwe in establishing this relationship has been emphasized by Weisfelder (1980, p.17):

"Malawi's grinding poverty and commercial dependence on Mozambiquan ports can help to account for Banda's accommodationist tactics

towards white Southern Africa prior to the demise of Portuguese colonialism. But only the fulfillment of Banda's development priorities, particularly his personal vision of a new capital at Lilongwe, provides the key to understanding his unique stance within the region" (emphasis added).

Malawi has become increasingly dependent upon South Africa which provides a high proportion of its imports (38.4% in 1978) although taking only a small proportion of its exports. It also holds a significant share of the government's external debt. Although no further South African loans for the capital per se were made after the initial R8 million, many South African planners and personnel were involved in the project, as South Africa provides technical aid in the form of skilled personnel seconded for two years or more (McMaster, 1974) (6). South African construction firms have also been involved in the actual construction of the new capital. The South African Roberts Construction Company won a contract to build four government buildings in 1972 for instance (ibid), and South African capital has also been involved in the CCDC's property companies. Such involvement is definitely detrimental to Malawi's standing within black-ruled Southern Africa and may, for instance, harm the country's prospects of sharing in any benefits that might be realized from the SADCC regional grouping. It also makes Malawi very vulnerable to the exigencies of South African foreign policy, and therefore represents a constraint on the country's future choice of development paths.

It is possible that South African influences on planning processes have been detrimental to Lilongwe's development. However the elements identified as problems probably mainly reflect the priorities given to internal planners by the government, given that the original South African plan was revised. The analysis of the city's planned development in this chapter has shown that this has tended to neglect the needs of ^{the} majority of the city's population, which could not be accommodated by directives to build a spacious and visually appealing 'garden city'. Consideration of security also appears to have affected the accessibility of the low income

population and it is clear that this sector is the most severely affected by the financial constraints on the city's development. Further consideration of the problems of the low income population, particularly with respect to housing and transport, is given in the next chapter which deals with Lilongwe's physical development and population growth.

Notes for Chapter Six

1. Morton (1975) considers whether Malawi's dependence on aid has been used by donors to direct government policies. Although she concludes that this has not generally occurred, Britain did attempt to influence Malawi not to embark on two projects in particular: the new capital and the Nacala rail link and tried to discourage other donors from funding it (McMaster, 1974).
2. This land was originally designated by government order in 1968 by the Capital City Development Corporation Designation Order describing the area to be included in the Capital City of Lilongwe (Malawi, Government Notices of 1968, GN no. 160). This extended the boundaries which had been last defined in 1966 (Malawi, Government Notices of 1966, no. 157). The boundaries have since been extended further in 1972 and 1982.
3. The other government costs shown in 1975 were: perimeter fencing for Capital Hill, special expenditure on telecommunications, street lighting, the new market, and a U.K. loan of K1.5 million for traditional housing (Malawi Government, 1976).
4. The development accounts give the estimated total cost of all existing development projects at the time, including those planned for the near future and not yet begun, and those already completed. In most categories of development expenditure the share of 'Lilongwe' projects is small, and only those categories in which it has had a significant impact have been selected for analysis. Therefore the two sets of accounts analysed in the tables provide a guide to the proportion of planned and completed expenditure in certain other categories, allocable to Lilongwe, from about 1975-80, and 1980 on.
5. The new airport was financed with loans from Japan, and the African Development Bank.
6. For instance a South African was appointed as Malawi's Director of

Information for two years from 1969. South Africans have also held appointments as the general manager of Air Malawi, and the head of the Malawi Development Corporation (McMaster, op cit).

CHAPTER SEVEN

Physical Development and Population Growth in Lilongwe(1)

7.1 Physical Development of Lilongwe

The physical construction of Malawi's new capital city along the lines of the master plan began in 1969. Preliminary work on Capital Hill, the site of the ministerial administrative complex, began in 1970, by which time the Ministry of Works and Supplies' design and planning teams and part of the CCDC was housed in temporary headquarters constructed in 'Old Lilongwe'. In 1972 this Ministry was the first to move to Capital Hill and by 1978 the relocation of all government ministries from Zomba and Blantyre was complete. The army and police headquarters were also relocated successfully. Kamuzu Barracks, located near to the State House site, was in fact one of the earliest complexes completed, at a cost of K2.5 million (Malawi Government, 1976), and was opened in 1974. The police headquarters were estimated to have cost K1.6 million, and are located between the large traditional housing area west of the airport road, and Capital Hill (see Map 6.2). It is arguable that the prioritization of these police and army developments and their siting indicates the President's influence, and a somewhat suspicious attitude towards the low-income urban population. The rapid transfer of government administration was marked by the official designation of Lilongwe as Malawi's new capital in 1975. All foreign diplomatic missions have also relocated to Lilongwe.

The city is now established as the focus of national administration, but since in 1986 Parliament remains in Zomba, and the President's main residence is still in Blantyre the locus of decision-making power remains diffuse. Some other important institutions have also yet to be relocated. Whilst the pace of construction in the early stages was rapid, this did not continue into the later 1970s and 1980s, due to financial stringencies. For example during the latest planning period into the

1980s, planned expenditure on government buildings was severely cut back. Thus although the site for the new High Court had been earmarked for years, at present (1986) it still remains in Blantyre, as does the Post Office Headquarters. Planning for the new Parliament had not passed the design stage in 1982. Some development of State House occurred during the early years, but then construction was halted for some time; by the mid 1980s it had begun again despite its massive cost and the fact that it is possible that Banda will never occupy it, since he has not visited it for years and seems content to remain in Blantyre (Metcalf, personal communication, 1986).

7.2 Commercial and Industrial Development

Other major elements of the master plan completed by 1982 include the new Capital City Centre, close to Capital Hill. This provides a fairly narrow range of services, but several government and diplomatic missions are located here, as was the CCDC administration. Other major institutions located here include the headquarters of the National and Commercial Banks, the Building Society, the Reserve Bank, and the National Library Service. The new five-star Capital Hotel is also situated nearby. This area of the 'New Capital' represents the most visually appealing and visible element of its development, although even here the density of construction is low.

The main industrial areas are Biwi Triangle south of the old town, Area 7 (2) also adjacent to old Lilongwe, and Areas 27, 28 and 29 (see Map 6.1). Kanengo (Areas 28 and 29) is the new heavy industrial area for Lilongwe and is serviced by the railway. The land was developed by the CCDC for lease to industrialists who pay a development charge as well as rent. The degree and nature of private investment in these areas is varied, and the private sector's contribution to Lilongwe's growth centre role and its attitude to location in the New Capital is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

7.2.1 Commerce and Industry in Old Lilongwe

The physical appearance of the old town has been little affected by the new capital project. It retains the characteristics of a small African colonial provincial town. Historically it was divided into an "Asian quarter" on the east bank of the river, with the European town on the west bank and to some extent this division is still evident.

The range of service functions in the old town is extensive, and it is naturally more popular as a shopping area than the new Capital City Centre, which compares very unfavourably. The city's bus station is in the old town also and the original city market is adjacent to it; again the volume of trade at the ill-sited new market is a tiny fraction of that at the thriving old market.

A number of small industrial concerns are found within the old town, ^{those} apart from ^{at} the Area 7 estate. Thus in some ways the old town is essentially self-contained and any fears that it might suffer from competition with the new capital appear unfounded. In fact the reverse has occurred and it has benefited from an increase in demand as the population has grown, and several new retail outlets have opened and the old Lilongwe hotel has been extended.

7.3 Housing

Residential land has the largest single allocation of space in the city (see Table 6.1 in previous chapter). This land is sub-divided according to income and density into high income-low density, middle income-medium density, and low income-high density zones. The last category is further sub-divided into 'permanent' and 'traditional' housing.

Permanent low income housing is generally formally built by the Malawi Housing Corporation. The traditional housing areas (THAs) accommodate the vast majority of the low income population and operate on the site-and-service principle. They are sub-divided into plots, and are

supplied with water mains, estate roads, landscaping and neighbourhood centres (Richards, 1974). The THAs were the responsibility of the CCDC during its existence, and after 1984 the MHC reluctantly took them on. People allocated these plots build their own 'traditional' housing, and there is therefore some flexibility in their choice of construction materials and the general standard of housing according to income levels. The THAs thus have a wide variety of housing types, and whilst some are of a relatively low standard, some people have privately built high quality permanent structures on site-and-service plots (TPD, 1978a). However the houses are meant to comply with fairly strict regulations laid down by both the Public Health Act and the LUSP, which cover a range of variables including plot coverage, spacing, minimum size of dwelling, air and sunlight specification and building lines. This ensures a certain degree of standardization in the THAs. There are also a number of regulations designed to prevent the sub-letting of separate dwellings on each plot. In theory only one principal building is allowed per plot, and all outbuildings are subject to detailed specifications which should ensure only plot-owner's employees can actually sleep there. However these regulations are widely disregarded.

The basic housing type for all income levels is detached, single-storey dwellings. A small number of low-rise middle income flats were planned and some high density maisonette-style accommodation is provided in the high income area east of Capital Hill. The original plans for the allocation of land for different housing types, and the assumed nature of occupancy is shown in Table 7.1. These estimates were later revised by the TPD to produce more accurate estimates of potential plot numbers, and to allow for flats and permanent high density housing in THAs (see Table 7.2). Nevertheless, adherence to original land use allocations will lead to shortages of residential land well before 2000, the period covered by the plan. Although the total residential allocation is

TABLE 7.1
Housing in Lilongwe: Population Capacity to Year 2000 (original estimates)

RESIDENTIAL AREA	Occupancy factors		Net Residential Area	Maxm. no. of plots	Maxm. popn.	% total popn.	% popn. estd. demand	Year land exhausted
	Occupants/ plot ¹	Average plot size (acres)						
Low Density	10	0.75	3,810	5,080	50,800	10.1	13	1997/98
Medium Density	7	0.5	2,934	5,868	41,076	8.2	13	1994
High Density: a) Permanent b) Traditional	6	0.103	775	7,525	45,150	9.0	15	1993/94
	6	0.103	6,245	60,631	363,786	72.7	59	post 2000
TOTAL	-	-	13,764 ²	79,104	500,812	100	100	-

source: TPD, 1978: LUSP, Section 1, Background Information, adapted from Table 1E

- Notes: 1. Including allowance for staff and families in low and medium density areas.
2. Net residential area is considerably less than the gross acreage of 25,280 for residential purposes due to allocation for roads, dambos, gullies, primary schools, local centres etc., estimated at 40% in old and medium density categories, and 50% in the high density category.

TABLE 7.2

Revised Town Planning Estimates of Housing Capacity
According to Original Plot Density Specifications

RESIDENTIAL AREA	Net Residential Area (acres)	Maxm. no. of plots	Maxm. popn.	% total popn.	Projected 2000 Popn.	Year land exhausted
Low Density	3,810	5,067	50,670	9.5	58,253	c. 1997
Medium Density:						
a) Houses	2,827	1,654	39,578	7.9	53,772	
b) Flats	107	716	5,012	1.0	4,481	
Total Medium	2,934	2,370	44,590	8.9	58,253	1995/96
High Density:						
a) Permanent	775	7,525	45,150			
b) Permanent in THAs (1)	500	4,849	29,094			
Total Permanent	1,275	12,374	74,244	14.8	67,125	After 2000
c) Traditional	5,745	55,571	333,426	66.8	264,380	After 2000

Source : as for Table 7.1,
adapted from Table 1

Notes: 1. On assumption that 8% of THA plots used for permanent low income housing, as recommended by TPD.

sufficient given an estimated population of 450,000 in that year (TPD, 1978a), there are structural deficiencies in land allocation, and the TPD has suggested that the average area for low density houses should be decreased to allow the construction of maisonettes etc., and that more land should be allocated to medium density areas or that plot size should be decreased to 0.4 acres (ibid).

The physical development of the residential areas shown on Maps 6.1 and 6.2 in Chapter 6 has been gradual. The old town already had some low density housing in Area 3, whilst Area 2 was an existing Indian housing area. There was also some low income permanent housing in parts of Area 1 (the Falls Estate), as well as some pre-existing traditional housing in the south of this area as well as in parts of Areas 4-9, 21, 22, 33, 37, 46 and 47. Most of this was at least partly outside 'old Lilongwe's' municipal boundaries (Pennant, 1982) and consequently came under conditions of traditional tenure.

By 1982 extensive development had taken place of the new low density areas (10 and 43) north and east of Capital Hill. Development of medium and high density permanent housing has been provided in parts of the appropriate zones by the MHC, including some high density permanent housing in Area 25 (near Kanengo and adjacent to a THA), and Area 18 (see plates). The MHC had provided over 2000 houses in these two categories by 1978, utilizing loans from the government and abroad, totalling over K3 million (CCDC, 1978). Most of this housing is for government employees, and rents are heavily subsidized. Massive new development of MHC housing also began at Lumbadzi in the 1980s to house staff associated with the airport.

Housing in these categories has more or less kept pace with demand, especially when compared with the situation in the THAs. The TPD stated in 1978 that "housing shortages are already apparent in Lilongwe, ^[and] this is felt most acutely in the low-income groups. All site-and-service plots

are occupied or allocated, and the waiting list for plots is large, there being up to 9,000 applications on the register....the main problem is the lack of finance available....money borrowed externally is subject to high rates of interest" (TPD, 1978a, ps. I-37, I-38).

Site-and-service plot provision has not begun to keep pace with demand and since it is estimated that between two-thirds to three-quarters of Lilongwe's population will need to be housed in these areas (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2) it is clear that the CCDC has not fulfilled its major residential responsibility and this must be seen as one of Lilongwe's greatest problems. Table 7.3 shows the TPD's demand projections for low income housing to 2000. Over 10,000 plots were needed as early as 1977, at which time only 1400 had been laid out (CCDC, 1977).

At the beginning of the new capital project the CCDC took over a site-and-service area in Area 4 of 'old Lilongwe' which had been begun in the 1960s. Their largest new development is in Area 25, and there has also been expansion and new site-and-service development in Areas 4, 8, 21 and 22 near the old town. The siting of new THAs has been in line with efforts to maintain Lilongwe's image as a modern and visually attractive city. They are therefore some distance off the road from which they are screened by trees. However despite increases in annual plot provision (e.g. the CCDC allocated 1500 plots in 1980 with immediate plans for a further 1700 (CCDC, 1980)), the housing problem is increasing. It also appears that the TPD's projections were underestimates since although about 10,000 plots had been allocated by 1981, there were 10,568 applications on the waiting list in April that year (Pennant, op cit). Furthermore it is very probable that the demand is even higher than these figures imply as, in the circumstances, it is inevitable that many people will not bother to register.

The CCDC had strong anti-squatter sentiments in line with the government. As land in Lilongwe was almost entirely owned by the CCDC, it

TABLE 7.3

Plot/Housing Demand Projection - Low Income Housing in Lilongwe 1977-2000


Year	PLOTS - TRADITIONAL		PLOTS - PERMANENT	
	Cumulative no. of plots reqd.	Additional no. of plots reqd. per year	Cumulative no. of plots reqd.	Additional no. of plots reqd. per year
1977	10,121	-	2,573	-
1980	12,749	944	3,241	240
1985	18,386	1,041	4,675	265
1990	24,605	1,393	6,256	355
1995	32,927	1,864	8,371	474
2000	44,043	2,494	11,203	634


Source: Malawi Government, Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan, Section 1, Background Information, Table 1D (adapted).


Note: the additional number of plots required did not include the current backlog of about 9000 registered applications in 1978, plus an unknown number of low income people who may not have bothered to register.

was able to prevent squatting fairly successfully. Apart from the CCDC's control of land, specific legal provision is made in the LUSP to prevent the development of 'unsightly sites' (TPD, 1978c, paras 3.10.10, 3.10.11). Squatters who are evicted are usually compensated, but such compensation would probably not be paid if they built illegally again within the city boundaries (TCPD, interview, August 1982). Consequently squatting is not a major problem within the city, and Richards (1974, p.38) states that "density control and planned siting of the houses [has] resulted in suburbs vastly superior to the generally ragged housing areas that border so many cities in Africa" (3).


A survey of the THAs in Lilongwe by the Centre for Social Research of the University of Malawi showed that the unsatisfied demand for such housing, combined with restrictions on illegal alternatives, has pushed the problem into existing THAs and resulted in severe overcrowding. The areas surveyed are shown in Map 7.1: (this survey was carried out in August and September 1980, and involved a systematic sample of every eleventh plot in Areas 4, 8, 21, 22 and 25). There is therefore extensive sub-letting of parts of plots and many plots are multiple-tenanted. Table 7.4 illustrates the extent of overcrowding, showing the estimated housing areas per person in 1980. Many renters and their families are accommodated in single rooms erected in series behind the main dwelling as illustrated in Figure 7.1. The whole situation in the THAs is in flagrant defiance of the legislation already discussed, but the CCDC admitted that they dare not enforce the law because they could not provide any realistic alternative (CCDD, interview, August 1982), and the LCC will now be facing exactly the same problem. The CCDC estimated in 1982 that 40% of THA plots had sub-tenants (ibid), but the aforementioned survey found the problem to be much greater, and that the occupation of a plot by the legal plotholder's household alone was a rarity.

 Squatter areas

 T.H.A.s surveyed



**T.H.A.'s AND SQUATTER AREAS SURVEYED BY C.S.R.
IN LILONGWE**



**T.H.A.'s AND SQUATTER AREAS SURVEYED BY C.S.R.
IN LILONGWE**





TABLE 7.4

Housing Area Per Person: Lilongwe 1967, Lilongwe THAs 1972 and 1980(1)

Area/person (square feet)	1967 Lilongwe Municipality		1972 Areas 4,8,21	1980 Areas 4,8,21,22,25	
	Housing Units %	People %	Plots %	Plots %	People %
0-19.9	5	8	2.1	2.6	2.8
20-39.9	22	28	14.6	9.4	12.6
40-59.9	21	25	22.0	22.2	25.5
60-79.9	19	19	23.7	21.6	23.0
80-99.9	10	7	12.9	11.6	13.7
100-119.9			6.9	10.8	8.5
120-139.9			4.3	6.9	5.6
140-159.9	21	11	2.6	4.9	2.7
160-179.9			2.6	3.1	1.8
180-199.9			1.7	0.6	0.2
200+			6.4	6.0	2.5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100
Total popn(2)	4,280	16,390	2,320	5,324	66,341

Source: Pennant, 1982, adapted from Table A12

- Notes: 1. 1967 area per person of housing unit, from 1967 Housing and Income Survey; 1972 are per person on plot of main house on plot from 1972 Lilongwe Social Survey THAs; 1980 area per person on plot of one or both houses on plot from 1980 CSR survey.
2. Estimated total population of sample areas obtained by $n \times$ sampling factor.



SOURCE : CROOKE, 1983 FIG. 8.1

Fig . 7.1
MALAWI: TRADITIONAL HOUSING AREA PLOT (12×13m)
SHOWING PLOT HOLDERS' AND TENANTS' ACCOMMODATION

Table 7.5 shows the tenure status of household heads interviewed in this survey, as well as their initial status when they first lived in Lilongwe. The survey indicated that about 12% of THA household heads were resident in Lilongwe before 1966, and 23% before 1970 (when initial construction of the new city was beginning). It has become increasingly difficult to obtain a plot over the years, and as the table implies there has been relatively little mobility from other categories to becoming a plotholder, apart from those who had traditional tenure, who were given priority in plot allocation when resettled. Plotholders as compared with tenants were found to be typically long-term residents, relatively old, with large families and households, and were more often economically inactive or self-employed than other groups. Self-employment for plotholders was stated to involve 'business' rather than 'subsistence' activities, which implies higher income levels, although this is probably a fairly arbitrary categorization and elements of both could probably be categorized as 'informal sector' employment (4). Furthermore the survey indicates that for many the additional rental income makes 'subsistence' self-employment a viable long-term way of life.

However plotholders made up only about one-fifth of the surveyed THA residents. Nearly three-quarters of household heads were renting, although the average household size of renters was only 3.7 compared to 6.6 for plotholders (see Table 7.6). The situation is further complicated by the fact that either through mismanagement or corruption, only about half of all plots are actually resided on by plotholders who only have one plot. The survey estimated that 25-30% of all plots are owned by multiple plotholders who live on one plot and let others. This is most common in the older THAs, the Kawale area of Area 1 being particularly notorious and rarer in the new ones. A further 20% appear to be owned and rented out by people not living in the THAs who are "frequently in salaried positions and employer-provided housing" (Pennant, 1982, p.9).

TABLE 7.5

Tenure Status in First Residence in Lilongwe by Present Tenure Status
Heads of Households, THAs 4,8,21,22,25

PRESENT RESIDENCE	F I R S T R E S I D E N C E						Row Total	% present HHs.
	Plot- holder	Plot- renter	Tenant	Staying with friends, relatives	Trad. tenure	Other		
Plotholder	85.6	26.0	12.0	11.5	76.6	25.8	289	21.8
Renter	2.9	54.2	1.4	4.8	4.7	4.8	46	3.4
Tenant	9.6	18.7	86.0	74.2	15.6	58.1	964	72.0
Staying with Friends, Relatives	1.9	4.2	0.4	8.7	3.1	3.2	32	2.4
Traditional	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0
Other	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.8	0.0	8.1	9	neg.
TOTAL %	100	100	100	100	100	100		99.6
Total sampled household heads (column totals)	104	24	834	252	64	62	1340	

Source: Pennant, 1982 Table A10

TABLE 7.6

Percentage Distribution of Household Size
Lilongwe Urban 1967 and 1968; and Lilongwe THAs 1980

Household Size	1967	1968 A*	1968 B*	1968 C*	1980 THA PH(1)	1980 THA tenants
1	14	11	2	6	3	9
2	23	24	7	4	5	22
3	20	26	12	10	7	22
4	12	13	24	9	8	18
5	10	10	13	9	14	12
6	7	7	12	21	15	9
7	4	4	14	13	13	4
8	4	2	7	9	11	2
9	1	1	2	9	8	1
10	1	1	4	9	7	1
11	1	1	-	1	3	-
12+	0	0	1	0	5.6	0.1
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total no. #	4,280	1,487	1,049	933	3,267	12,089
Average HH Size	3.7	3.5	5.3	5.8	6.6	3.7

Source: Pennant, 1982, Table A16

Notes: 1. Plotholder.

* Household Annual Cash Receipts Group: A £0-200, B £200-300, D £300-1000.

#

estimated no. in category obtained by n x sample size

TABLE 7.7

Number of Households per Occupied Plot, Lilongwe THAs 1980

Households/Plot	No. Plots	% plots	% households
1	147	30	10.4
2	93	19	13.2
3	104	21.2	22.1
4	69	14.1	19.6
5	34	6.9	12.1
6	18	3.7	7.7
7	12	2.4	6.0
8	6	1.2	3.4
9	3	0.6	1.9
10+	4	0.8	3.7
TOTAL	490	100	100

Source: Pennant, 1982, Table A15

This explains why Table 7.6 only shows 3267 plotholders in the areas surveyed, although there were obviously at least double this number of plots in all THAs in 1980. This also means that there is a difference between plot-tenants where the plotholder is non-resident, and tenants sharing a plot with the plotholder or main tenant. If CCDC employees were involved in this lucrative practice, of course, this would have created an extra disincentive for the Corporation to prioritize THA housing, since the greater the supply shortage, the higher the rents would be.

About two-thirds of householders, allocated only one plot, sub-let. The result of these various elements of illegal renting and leasing in the THAs is that only 30% of plots accommodate only one household, and only 10% of THA households (containing 16% of THA residents) live on a one-household plot, whilst 30% of plots have more than three households on them involving over 50% of all households (see Table 7.7).

7.3.1 Spontaneous Housing in Lilongwe

In 1982 there was only one true squatter settlement within the city's boundaries (Pennant, op cit). This is south of the old town, invisible from the main road, and fairly well established and has not been removed. A major task of the CCDC was to resettle thousands of people who had been living under traditional tenure in rural housing who suddenly found themselves within the new capital's boundaries. Payment of compensation to these people was yet another major drain on the CCDC's resources (Moore, personal communication, 1984). This is discussed in greater detail later in relation to population growth rates, but is not appropriate here since this housing could neither be described as spontaneous nor squatter.

There are a number of spontaneous settlements however just outside the controlled or designated boundaries (see Map 7.1). The controlled area extends beyond the designated boundaries proper but is subject to

ministerial control of land-use (TPD, 1978b). These peri-urban settlements emerged particularly from 1977 onwards, due to the lack of available plots within the city, and have been termed "squatter areas" in the CSR surveys. Although strictly speaking they do not constitute squatter settlements, since the residents have obtained permission from village headman or farmers to settle, the situation is complicated by the Lilongwe Land Development Programme (LLDP) which borders on the city boundaries to the west and south. This land has been converted to freehold and registered to the small farmers involved in the scheme. All but one of the external "squatter settlements" shown on the map fall in this area, and when approached by residents' representatives, the control of permitting settlement and allocating land has been shared by village headmen and the freeholders. The other area falls outside the LLDP and therefore is on communal land controlled by village headmen. In comparison to THA residents the inhabitants of these areas may be judged as having greater security of tenure once having paid a fee to settle, since the former technically have a lease with a one month notice period, and the majority are in breach of contract anyway. On the other hand the LLDP administration was in conflict with the CCDC over this situation as they maintain that their land cannot officially be used for urban settlement, and that the farmers should not be allowed to let or lease land to "squatters" (LLDP, interview, August 1982).

The legal situation is possibly confused; however the CCDC was not entirely complacent about these spontaneous boundary settlements. In fact settling in this way has previously been the main way to obtain compensation and a plot in a THA. According to the CSR survey in 1980 nearly all the so-called squatters were employed, many of them in the construction and service sectors, and less than 10% were self-employed. The majority were working for large private firms in the city, although nearly a third worked for government authorities or parastatals. Even

though construction employment is not very stable, it is evident that despite its peri-urban location, this population could not be described as 'marginalized', or characterised as part of the informal sector. Instead the evidence suggests that this population can to some extent be viewed as low income consolidators, in terms of Turner's (1968) model of patterns of urban residence. The 'squatters' interviewed in 1980 were often people who had moved from a rented or shared room in a THA on getting married or having children, in order to obtain more space at a lower cost and be eligible for resettlement in a THA (Pennant, op cit). Combined with the employment data this clearly implies a relatively stable population which is adjusting itself according to local circumstances and changing life-style aspirations, as the model suggests, although as Pennant (ibid) points out it is unlikely that they will reach the further stage of middle income status-seekers.

The estimated population in all these spontaneous settlements in 1980 was 7-12,000, of which between 6-10,000 were on LLDP land, and less than 1000 were within the city boundaries (the true squatters). The CCDC's position on housing at the time indicated that this population was likely to grow, leading to further encroachment on agricultural land (when large areas of urban land are unused) and more conflict with the LLDP. A further small squatter settlement had emerged within the city boundaries by 1986, although on the whole the determination to prevent internal illegal dwelling had preserved the city's relative freedom from this aspect of urban development. However one can speculate that the city authorities will find it convenient to allow peripheral and therefore largely 'invisible' spontaneous settlements.

7.4 Transport

Lilongwe's role as a national transport focus is assured by its new railway connection and the improvement of its road links to Kasungu and the north, to Mchinji, and to Dedza and thence to the Southern Region.

The railway means that it now enjoys the same advantages as Blantyre in this sphere, with the caveat that being further from the sea, costs will in theory be higher. However Lilongwe is currently very important in Malawi's external transport affairs due to the continuous disruption of the country's traditional rail links to the Mozambique coast by the activities of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Road transport from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia is now vital, and Lilongwe is a natural internal node for this redirected traffic. Improvement of road transport north to Tanzania is also now a national priority; again this will certainly benefit Lilongwe's transport role in comparison to Blantyre's (Metcalf, personal communication, 1986). This situation is however disastrous for Malawi's economy as a whole, and the hopefully short-term advantages gained by the city in this respect, must be to some extent offset by factors which are depressing all economic development (including urban) throughout the country.

The new airport is well suited to serving the whole of Central Southern Africa and would have benefited enormously if it had been chosen to function as the main internal link in the air network for the SADCC grouping. However this function has gone to Harare and the facilities at the new airport are under-used, although British Airways is again operating a route to Malawi, which had been stopped because of the expense of flying smaller jets to Blantyre's Chileka airport which could not accommodate wide-bodied jets.

Lilongwe's internal transport network and system is less satisfactory. Not all the roads planned, shown on Map 6.2, have been built, due to lack of funds and this decreases the efficiency of internal urban communications. A worse problem is the lack of cheap and efficient public transport which is crucial given the lay-out of the city, and particularly the siting of the newer THAs.

There is no overall public transport policy for Lilongwe. The LUSP

emphasized the problems of public transport, which in 1978 was reliant on one bus operator (United Transport (Malawi)). UTM had only about 10 buses on 5 routes at that time. which was totally inadequate for the growing population. In addition it is very expensive relative to the income of the majority of the population (TPD, 1978a). The level of charges was theoretically 2 tambalas/km (5) but this increases to 50t/km between the old and new town (TPD, interview, 1982), and by 1986 the situation had not improved, since the cost of commuting in from the newer THAs along the airport road was 50t each way. However more buses have become available (Metcalf, personal communication, February 1986). Public transport serving upper and middle income residential areas is virtually non-existent since the bus company finds it too expensive given the relatively low level of demand (CCDC, interview, 1982).

The problem led to the Ministry of Trade allowing private mini-buses to operate within the city boundaries in 1982 (ibid). However these are too expensive to satisfy the needs of most of the population, and by 1986 several of these new enterprises had folded (Metcalf, op cit). One of the major criticisms contained in the 1978 LUSP pertained to the inadequacies of Lilongwe's transport system, particularly the expense and inflexibility of the bus network (TPD, 1978a, Section 1.7).

7.5 Population Growth in Lilongwe

The development of Lilongwe as Malawi's capital city has been accompanied by very high population growth rates (see Chapter 3). Apart from the initial transfer of government employees from Zomba and Blantyre, and of associated institutional employees such as the diplomatic missions, there has been an influx of people to take advantage of new employment opportunities.

It is difficult to assess exactly how fast the population has been growing in terms of a strict definition of natural increase of the

existing urban population, combined with ^{net} in-migration of people not previously associated with the city. The issue is not only complicated by massive boundary changes since the 1966 census, but also by the resettlement of thousands of "rural" people from within the new boundaries to outside locations (see 7.3 above). This has led to widely differing estimates of intercensal population growth, which not only affect the order of future projections for the city, but also overall estimates of national urban growth.

Preliminary 1977 census data gave Lilongwe's population as 103,000, implying an intercensal AAGR of 16.2% (Malawi, N.S.O., 1978), but the final report recorded a population of 98,718. On the basis of varying estimates of the population living inside the 1977 boundaries in 1966, the 1966-77 AAGR has been calculated at between 7.3% and 15.8% as shown in Table 7.8. The lower estimates depend on calculations regarding the population outside the 1966 municipal boundaries which have been assumed to represent more accurate pictures of the true 'urban' population of Lilongwe at that time. The more conservative approach to this issue (see note a in Table 7.8) only adds to the 1966 urban population those people who lived sufficiently close to the city's edge to have reasonable access to its services.

In order to gain a picture of the rate of migration to Lilongwe for future planning purposes, it is very important to have an idea of the size of the pre-existing population within the new boundaries, whether this was urban or essentially rural in character. It is assumed here that the figure of 21,000 is a fair estimate of the truly 'urban' population of Lilongwe in 1966, taking into account the restricted nature of the original boundaries, and this figure is accepted in official documents (e.g. TPD, 1978a; TCPD, 1980b). The estimate of 45,380 includes large numbers of rural households who happened to be occupying farms within the designated area.

TABLE 7.8

Estimates of Population Growth in Lilongwe 1966-77

1966 population		1977 census popn.	% AAGR 1966-77
Census data	Adjusted data		
19,425		98,718	15.8
	21,000(1)	98,718	15.0
	45,380(2)	98,718	7.3


- Notes: 1. Estimate of the 1966 population, living within 1977 boundaries, who had direct access to Lilongwe's urban services (TPD, 1980b, Table 3-2).
2. Estimate of the 1966 population resident within 1977 boundaries (TPD, 1978a).

A 15% AAGR from 1966-77 is generally viewed as being much too high (TPD, interview, August 1982; CCDC, interview, August 1982), since many people living in the area chose to remain as the city developed. However the lower figure of 7.3% is also misleading. It would imply that Lilongwe's AAGR in that period had been only slightly higher than Blantyre's, which is untenable considering the initial transfer of government institutions, combined with the evidence of massive increases in THA populations involving people who moved to Lilongwe after 1966 (see 7.5.1 below).

The main problem lies in estimating the number of households living outside the 1966 boundaries, but within the 1977 boundaries, in 1966, who were subsequently resettled outside the city. The CCDC operated a massive resettlement and compensation programme as people were moved to make way for new developments and areas were re-zoned. Their freehold title of all land negated any legal claim to land under traditional tenure and 10,515 families were resettled between 1966-81. About 30% of these were resettled from within the 1966 municipal boundaries. However it has not been possible to ascertain what proportion of resettled households chose to be resettled outside the new city area. In 1974 it was stated that "over 6000 families had to be moved to make way for the construction of the new capital. Some were resettled in rural areas but accommodation had to be found for those who wished to remain in the city. To house these people; to cope with the rapid growth of population....and to prevent slums developing it was decided to set aside areas where people could build their own houses [THAs]" (Richards, 1974, p.38). As previously mentioned the allocation of most plots in the THAs has been to people compulsorily resettled from other areas in the city and therefore new in-migrants have found it very difficult to obtain plots. Data from the CSR survey suggest, that less than 20% of resident ploholders in 1980 obtained this tenure status immediately if they moved into Lilongwe after

1966. On the other hand the CCDC estimated the average size of resettled households as 6, implying a total resettled population of over 60,000 which is greater than the maximum estimate of the 1966 population. Therefore a large proportion of those resettled must have moved into Lilongwe after 1966. The right to a THA plot has involved the establishment of a claim to some length of previous residence and it appears that whilst many people must have become tenants in the THAs when resettled, some went to the 'squatter' areas outside the boundaries, thus making them eligible for eventual relocation to a THA plot (Pennant, 1982), and others have been relocated outside the city altogether.

Data on original tenure status for 1980 THA residents who lived in the new Lilongwe area before 1966 allow a rough estimate to be made of those who were living under traditional tenure before 1966. These would correspond to people outside the 1966 municipal boundaries who chose to be relocated within new Lilongwe, as virtually all the land surrounding the old municipality was customary land (ibid). The CSR survey data suggests that in 1980 about 770 households, or 5% of all households in the THAs were in this category. This implies that the majority of the households living outside Lilongwe in 1966 under conditions of traditional tenure, who were included in the 'urban' population estimate of 45,380 (perhaps 4000 households), were resettled elsewhere and therefore that a more realistic base figure for the 1966 population is around 24,000 (see Figure 7.2). It is also likely that some of the 1980 THA population who were recorded as tenants, or staying with family or relatives before 1966, may also have been renting or staying with people living under traditional tenure, although many of these would have been living in existing low income settlements, and would have been included along with original plottolders and plot renters as part of Lilongwe's 1966 census population. A maximum estimate of the 1966 base population assuming all these people were outside the 1966 boundaries is about 28,000. Although this analysis



- a. population resettled from tenancies, or from staying with friends and relatives (many of these were probably really included in the census figure).
- b. population resettled from traditional tenure and 'other' tenure within Lilongwe.
- c. census figure.

Fig. 7.2
URBAN POPULATION & AAGR's FOR LILONGWE 1966-77
ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT BASE POPULATION ASSUMPTIONS

can only be a guide to the true growth rate, it suggests that Lilongwe's true AAGR from 1966 to 1977 was in the range of 12-13% as shown in Figure 7.1.

This evidence clearly indicates that Lilongwe did indeed experience very rapid in-migration during the intercensal period. Further support for this high growth rate is given by data on Lilongwe's THA population, according to the year of initial residence in Lilongwe. This suggests a fairly steady AAGR of the THA population between 1965-80 of 14-15% (calculated from Table B3 in Pennant, op cit), and it seems fair to assume that this sector of the population is growing faster than the medium and high income population.

Lilongwe's growth rate was therefore very high from 1966-77 and mostly due to in-migration. Even allowing for the initial element of 'transferred' population it appears that the low income population as represented by those living in the THAs was still increasing rapidly up to 1980 at least. It should also be noted that these estimates do not include the 7-11,000 (depending on varying estimates of family size) living in the bordering spontaneous settlements. If these are included the number of people directly involved in the city is larger than official estimates. Some evidence suggests that this element may be very significant indeed: over 128,000 people reported themselves as having been resident in Lilongwe a year before the 1977 census, which is over 30% more than those recorded within the city in 1977. Employment statistics gathered by the National Statistical Office also indicate discrepancies: the average number of employees recorded in Lilongwe for the three years 1976, 1977 and 1978 was 31,764, compared to only 24,861 recorded there by the 1977 census. Since employment statistics from the NSO in Malawi are usually suspected of being underestimates (Pennant, op cit) these figures are even more significant. The only feasible explanation, as suggested by Pennant (ibid), is that thousands of people dependent upon employment in

Lilongwe are living outside the city, but are being registered as urban employees by their employers, and report themselves as resident in Lilongwe when asked, although the census enumerated them as rural residents.

Population projections used by the LUSP estimated Lilongwe would grow at 8% per year until 1984, and at 6% per year to 2000, giving a population of about 450,000 at the end of the century. Given past trends it appears that these must be regarded as underestimates, especially for the short-term. A CCDC survey estimated the THAS's population in 1982 as 135,000. Even assuming that the THAs house nearly three-quarters of the population (the highest estimate assumed in housing projections), this implies a total population of over 185,000 in 1982 compared to the projected number of about 150,000 and an AAGR from 1977-82 of about 13%.

The TPD however emphasizes the need to limit Lilongwe's population growth to the projected rates, as even this would create an enormous strain on urban services. In 1978 it was stated that "the problems of too rapid urban growth cannot be overemphasized. The reduction of Lilongwe's annual growth rate from 8% at present to 6% by 1984 is a vital move towards avoiding the plethora of problems which beset many large cities in other developing countries" (TPD, 1978a, p. I-28). Yet it was also recognized that population densities in the Central Region were reaching critical levels, and, in combination with the reorganization of areas within the LLDP, this was likely to cause rural-urban migration. This latter factor was likely to become particularly evident after 1983 when the LLDP's population was projected to reach about 600,000 at which point land shortages would have a significant "push" effect. According to the original master plan "unless density is increased by a reduction of the size of allotment there will be approximately 8000 persons displaced from the [LLDP] area annually....and about 2,000 more from other areas of high population, many of whom will attempt to find work in the nearest urban

areas. As a result, squatting could become a major problem" (Gerke and Viljoen, 1968, quoted in TPD, 1978a, p. I-29). Whilst large-scale rural-urban drift from the LLDP was not evident in 1978 when the LUSP was published, this factor is likely to be adding significantly to Lilongwe's growth by now.

Overall therefore Lilongwe's growth has been very rapid. Furthermore it appears that this situation is likely to continue, with growth rates exceeding official projections; this is bound to exacerbate existing problems, and create new ones. By 1986 the housing crisis had grown steadily worse for example (and the very low income levels of the THA population was reflected in a massive default rate on payment of development charges and rents) (Metcalf, personal communication, February 1986).

7.5.1 In-Migration to Lilongwe: area of origin

Whilst detailed information on area of origin is not given in the 1977 census, the available data indicate that the population of Lilongwe district grew faster than natural increase in the year 1976-77, and therefore that net in-migration had occurred. However the 3.2% growth rate registered was not exceptional in Malawi; seven out of the country's 24 districts (including Blantyre district) grew faster than Lilongwe district. Mchinji, Kasungu and Mwanza in particular attracted large numbers, because of their new tobacco estates, and Lilongwe district's growth rate was actually lower than the Central Region average of 3.4%.

There are doubts about Malawi's exact rate of natural increase which makes it difficult to estimate the net in-migration balance to Lilongwe district, which would help to indicate what proportion of the city's migrant population is 'local', and how much comes from other districts. This is important as it relates to Lilongwe's geographical impact on the population, as well as to the distribution of income from the capital's

new employment opportunities if migrants make remittances to their areas of origin. These factors are significant in terms of the spread effects generated by the city and will therefore affect any analysis of the spatial distribution of the costs and benefits of the capital project.

A natural growth rate of 2.6% was recorded in the 1970-72 population sample survey, but the 1977 census data indicated a 2.3% rate, and an overall growth rate of 2.9%. This latter rate includes the effect of net return migration by Malawian workers from abroad, which the census report assumes to have been quite extensive. However the 1977 census report also states that the 2.3% natural increase rate must be an underestimate, and that 2.6% is probably more correct, for although return migration is reflected in an improvement of national and many district sex ratios, the degree of return migration is not thought to be sufficient to explain the discrepancy between the natural increase and overall growth rate recorded in the 1977 census. One attempt to estimate the impact of migrant return suggested that 2.7% was a reasonable adjusted intercensal natural increase rate (TCPD, 1980a)(6).

Return migration is unlikely to have been a major factor in Lilongwe district's growth as it had the lowest proportion (4%) of its de jure population abroad in 1966 of any district (Hill, 1982). The 1977 census data also show that the proportion of district's enumerated population resident abroad 12 months previously was negligible (Malawi, N.S.O., 1978, Vol. 1, Table 5.3).

On the assumption that Lilongwe district's natural growth rate was between 2.6% and 2.7% per year therefore, a rough migration balance can be calculated, as shown in Table 7.9. It is realistic to believe that most of the net in-migration to the district was directed towards Lilongwe city, as the density of rural population was one of the highest in Malawi (comparable to that of Blantyre district) which would discourage migrants to the rural areas of the district. Also the LLDP effectively controls

TABLE 7.9

In-Migration to Lilongwe District 1966-77

AAGR assumptions	Population 1966	Population 1977	In-Migration Balance	
			no.	%(1)
3.2% (NI + in-migration)(2)	495,524	704,117	-	-
2.6% (NI)	495,524	662,860	41,527	6.2
2.7% (NI)	495,524	670,067	34,050	4.8

Notes: 1. In-migrants as % of total 1977 population.
 2. AAGR taken from 1977 census data.

land-use in part of the district and land registration prevents migrants obtaining land there.

Table 7.9 suggests that a substantial number of people have come from other parts of Malawi, and that therefore the city has exerted a considerable level of attraction outside its immediate district. It is also evident that a proportion of Lilongwe's population increase was fuelled by local intra-district migration, as its population increased by well over 60,000 from 1966-77 (excluding natural increase of the estimated 1966 population). Past analyses of the local element of migration in Lilongwe's growth have asserted that it is the most important component of total in-migration, and therefore that the city's growth has primarily been fed by its immediate rural hinterland (TCPD, 1980b; Hill, 1982). However it is clear that these analyses have overestimated the significance of local migration: in the case of the TPD estimate this was due to the use of inaccurate preliminary census data on Lilongwe district, as well as a 2.95% assumption for increase before internal in-migration. Given that there will have been natural increase amongst the migrant population, Table 7.9 suggests that the majority of Lilongwe's growth from migration has been caused by migration from other districts, and only perhaps 20% of migrant households are from Lilongwe district.

The CSR survey in the THAs also found long-distance migration to be very significant. Table 7.10 shows the district of origin and time of migration to the city of surveyed THA household heads: only 9% reported that they had come from the district of Lilongwe itself. This survey does not show the true distribution of Lilongwe's population according to original residence as it only pertains to a sample survey. However given that the majority of Lilongwe's population lives in these low income settlements, the results of the survey are considered to be significant. Most importantly the table shows that after 1970 the development of the new capital has attracted migrants from every district in the country,

TABLE 7.10

Date of Moving to Lilongwe by Residence Immediately Before Migration
Heads of Household, Areas 4,8,21,22,25

DISTRICT OF PREVIOUS RESIDENCE	DATE OF MIGRATION									
	Before 1966		1966-70		1971-75		1976-80		All years	
	% Rural	% Urban	% Rural	% Urban	% Rural	% Urban	% Rural	% Urban	% Rural	% Urban
Chitipa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.9	0.0
Karonga	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.0	2.2	0.0	1.5	0.0	1.5	0.0
Nkhata Bay	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.0	1.9	0.3	2.1	0.1	1.8	0.1
Rumphi	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.6	0.1	1.4	0.1
Mzimba	4.2	1.2	4.9	2.1	5.3	1.1	4.3	2.7	4.6	2.0
Total N. Region	4.8	1.2	11.2	2.1	11.3	1.4	10.8	2.9	10.1	2.2
Kasungu	1.8	0.0	3.5	1.4	1.4	1.6	2.4	0.0	2.0	0.6
Nkhota Kota	1.8	0.6	1.4	0.0	1.7	0.5	2.4	0.0	1.7	0.5
Ntchisi	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.7	0.2
Dowa	3.6	0.0	2.1	0.7	1.4	0.5	1.3	0.7	1.7	0.6
Salima	1.8	0.0	4.9	0.0	4.2	0.8	2.1	1.3	2.8	0.9
Lilongwe	8.4	(13.9)	13.3	-	7.6	-	7.3	-	9.0	3.5
Mchinji	1.2	0.0	2.1	0.0	1.4	0.3	2.3	0.6	1.8	0.4
Dedza	10.8	1.8	7.3	0.7	8.1	1.1	6.7	0.3	7.2	0.7
Ntcheu	7.8	0.0	5.6	0.0	7.6	0.3	7.5	0.3	7.1	0.2
Total C. Region	37.	(16.3)	40.9	3.5	34.2	5.4	32.6	3.3	34.0	7.6
Mangochi	10.8	0.0	5.6	2.1	5.3	0.0	5.8	0.6	6.2	0.5
Machinga	4.8	0.6	4.9	0.0	3.9	0.6	5.7	0.3	5.5	0.4
Zomba	3.6	1.2	5.6	1.4	3.9	2.2	3.9	1.2	3.9	1.5
Chiradzulu	1.8	0.0	2.1	0.0	1.4	0.0	1.8	0.0	1.7	0.0
Blantyre	0.6	5.4	1.4	6.3	2.8	19.9	2.1	18.7	2.7	15.7
Mwanza	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0
Thyolo	1.2	0.0	1.4	0.0	1.7	0.3	1.6	0.1	1.5	0.1
Mulanje	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.9	0.1
Chikwawa	0.0	1.4	1.4	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.6	0.0	1.2	0.0
Nsanje	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total S. Region	22.8	7.2	23.8	10.5	20.7	23.0	24.7	21.0	24.1	18.4
Zambia	1.8		2.1		2.5		1.5		1.8	
Other countries	2.4		2.8		2.7		2.9		2.3	
Total % sample n =	100 166		100 142		100 361		100 665		100 1334	

Source: adapted from Pennant, 1982, Table B2


which indicates that its impact has been national. It is clear that Lilongwe's attraction for migrants before 1966 was less widespread, as no surviving migrants were recorded from seven districts before this date.

It is also evident that a distance decay effect operates with respect to the origin of migrants, with more coming from those districts closer to the capital (see Map 7.2). Migration from Blantyre district does not fall into this pattern however, and urban-urban migration from Blantyre to Lilongwe was the most significant single component of migration after 1970. The relative significance of Mzimba's rural and urban areas may be explained by the low level of opportunities in rural areas there (which are not covered by a specific agricultural project), and the location of the Northern regional capital Mzuzu in the district which has clearly experienced emigration to Lilongwe in the same way as Blantyre and Zomba. However from 1966-70 when the new capital project was only just beginning, migration from the rural areas of Lilongwe district formed the largest single component of growth in the THA population. This may indicate the importance of proximity in the process of the diffusion of information about employment opportunities in Lilongwe. The local population would obviously have been more easily able to take advantage of the initial demand for construction labour for instance, although as knowledge of the demand spread this advantage would lessen as competition from other migrants increased.


This factor may suggest that the proportion of the city's total population from Lilongwe district is higher than the THA survey alone indicates, in line with the prior interpretation of census data. This is because many government employees are housed in subsidized low and medium density housing and would not be included in the CSR survey. Many would have been simply transferred from Zomba or Blantyre, and thus an even larger proportion of the total population than indicated by Table 7.10 will have come from there. Yet the relocation of government and natural

Map 7.2 FLOWS OF SAMPLED MIGRANT HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD TO LILONGWE BY DISTRICT

a) RURAL



b) URBAN



expansion in government administrative employment created many new jobs. In addition accompanying institutional establishments like the CCDC, the bank headquarters and various government services would also have provided new job opportunities which included subsidized medium-density housing. Depending on the skill level demanded, it may be that the local population again was able to take advantage of its greater accessibility to these new opportunities in the early stages of the new capital's development. However no statistics on the origins of households in other residential areas exist to test this hypothesis.

There is relatively little change in the pattern of migrants by district and by rural or urban origins in the three time periods 1966-70, 1971-75 and 1976-80, apart from the fall in the proportion coming from Lilongwe district and the rise in the proportion from Blantyre City. During the 1970s it appears that about a fifth of new households moving into the THAs came from Blantyre and this is clear evidence that Lilongwe has had some success in providing a counter-attraction to Blantyre in terms of the opportunities provided for the low income population.

The regional pattern of in-migration to the THAs after 1966 shows in fact that the Southern Region provided just over 40% of sampled migrants, with a further 40% from the Central Region and 13% from the North. As Table 7.11 shows the number of migrant household heads from Blantyre alone out-numbered all those from the Northern Region. However when the distribution of the economically active population is taken into account, the impact of the new capital, in terms of the propensity to migrate to it, has been fairly evenly spread across the country as there is a certain degree of correspondence between the pattern of economically active people, and the proportion of migrants by origin. At a regional level the Southern Region shows the largest discrepancy, with 50% of the nation's economically active population but only 40% of in-migrants to Lilongwe.

The division between rural and urban origins by region however shows

TABLE 7.11

Economically Active Population by Region and Rural and Urban Areas 1977
and In-Migrants to Lilongwe's THAs 1966-80 by Area of Origin.

REGION	% total econ. active pop.	% THA in- migrants by origin	% of rural econ. active	% all rural in- migrants	% urban econ.. active in region	% all urban in- migrants
NORTHERN:	11.7	13.2				
Rural	10.9	11.1	12	15.8		
Urban	0.8	2.1			9	8.6
CENTRAL:	38.6	40.0				
Rural	36.0	35.9	39	51.2		
Urban	(2.6) 1.8 ¹	4.1			(29) 8 ¹	17.0
SOUTHERN:	49.9	41.2				
Rural	44.4	23.0	49	33.0		
Urban:	5.4	18.2			62	75.0
Blantyre	4.1	14.0			47	57.0
Other urban	1.3	4.2			15	18.0
ABROAD	-	4.5				

Notes: 1. Excluding Lilongwe.

Source: 1. data from Table 7.10.
 2. Malawi Govt, 1977 Population
 Census, Vol 2. Table 4.1

that here the impact has been more uneven, except in the Northern Region. The proportion of rural and urban in-migrants to Lilongwe from the Central Region are both significantly higher than that region's respective proportions of the national economically active rural or urban population. On the other hand there has been a much lower than average propensity to migrate by rural inhabitants of the Southern Region, but a higher propensity amongst its urban inhabitants, although as can be seen this is largely due to migration from Blantyre. Overall it is clear that the impact of Lilongwe has been most felt in the urban system and that this has been experienced in all three regions, since the proportion of all migrants from urban areas in each region (and Blantyre) is about three times the proportion of the total economically active population found in those urban areas.

In 1966 the sex structure of Lilongwe's population was skewed in favour of males (127 males: 100 females). There was a slight improvement to 120:100 by 1977 due to a slightly higher rate of female in-migration than male. The LUSP asserts that the provision of subsidized housing for the significant number of government employees has helped to improve the balance, as wives can then join their husbands, but it is also felt that this is to some extent offset by the shortage of housing for low income groups which discourages household heads from bringing all their family (TPD, 1978a). Less than 10% of THA household heads surveyed were female, but the overall sex ratio in the THAs was estimated to be about 118:100, similar to the city average. This indicates that the imbalance is not confined to the THAs but occurs in other income/residential groups.

There has not yet been any survey in Lilongwe on the migrant population's length of stay within the urban area, nor on the crucial factor of the level of remittances to area of origin (7). In 1982 the CCDC was of the opinion that most of those even on short-term construction jobs are choosing to remain at the end of their formal employment. The

CCDC felt that this was a problem, particularly as at the time the construction of the airport had just been completed throwing many more construction workers out of a job (CCDC, personal communication, August 1982). The issue of the permanency of migration is a crucial factor affecting a city's development as it has ramifications in terms of housing and welfare provision, and long-term growth. This issue has received little attention and is an area where further research is needed.

7.6 Conclusion

Although the CCDC managed to achieve a notable rate of growth in the early stages of Lilongwe's development, it is clear that financial stringency became more and more of a problem during the Corporation's lifetime. It recorded a total loss of K2,556,000 in 1978-80 (Economic Planning Division, 1982), and all expansionary development activities in the 1980s were cut back. The 1982 Economic Report stated that prospects for Lilongwe's further development were not improving and that the CCDC was unlikely to be able to meet future demand for housing and commercial premises. The transfer of control over Lilongwe to the City Council in 1984 would not have changed the situation in essence, and the completion of the remaining elements of the capital are still being delayed, and the necessary provision for continued population growth in housing, transport and other infrastructure continues to lag far behind demand.

The rapidity of population growth in Lilongwe since the initiation of the project has caused many problems in the low income housing sector. The government has chosen to adopt a site-and-service approach to housing. Although this type of approach has won a considerable amount of support from some Third World governments and their advisers (e.g. see Martin, 1975; Muwonge, 1980; Lloyd, 1981) it has also been criticized for off-loading government responsibilities on to those least able to afford the cost of building their own houses (Ward, 1984). Given the financial

circumstances of the Malawian government it is arguable that, whilst such criticism is undoubtedly valid, there was very little choice in real terms. Nevertheless it is apparent that the responsibility for low income housing has been neglected, even if allowance is made for financial problems. As discussed in Chapter 6, the CCDC could be seen as an inappropriate body to fulfil this responsibility as its commercial outlook and its need to rely on high interest commercial loans made it difficult for it to prioritize THAs when allocating funds. In addition the lack of allocable plots in the THAs has partly been caused by mismanagement which has allowed plot leases to be given to unqualified people, who thereby profit from the housing shortage. Thus although in practice the solution to the low income housing problem was to some extent inevitable, the magnitude of the problems faced by the poor in Lilongwe is unjustifiable.

The welfare of Lilongwe's low income population has apparently been a low priority since it is evident that it generally loses out where it is in conflict with planning guidelines. This has led to the establishment of the external "squatter settlements" which illustrate that the city authorities are prepared to foist their responsibilities on ^{to} others as long as the city's internal image can be maintained.

The rate of in-migration to Lilongwe has been high. As expected the distance from Lilongwe has played a part in the process of migration, but overall the impact by region has been fairly equally spread according to the distribution of the nation's economically active population. Migration to Lilongwe from Malawi's other urban centres has however been higher than their relative share of the economically active, and many of them have come from Blantyre since it has a large proportion of the national urban population. Altogether about a quarter of sampled migrants to the THAs from 1966-80 came from other urban centres, of which three-fifths came from Blantyre. This may imply a greater willingness to migrate amongst urban residents in general, although previous urban

residents may also be more qualified to take advantage of job opportunities in Lilongwe. On the other hand the rate of urban-urban migration might also be interpreted as evidence of unemployment and under-employment in the urban system.

Lilongwe's spatial impact will also be affected by processes of innovation diffusion. As the North is the poorest region it might have been expected that the rate of out-migration to Lilongwe would have been relatively high. Yet since the influence of Lilongwe appears to have been higher in urban centres, therefore in absolute terms its impact on the Southern Region has been much higher than that on the North, because the former has a higher share of the country's urban centres and people.

This last point relates to the general role of Lilongwe as a regional growth centre, which is the central theme of the next chapter.

Notes for Chapter 7

1. The main research on Lilongwe was conducted during visits to Malawi in 1980 and 1982. Some of the information presented in this chapter relates to the situation in 1982, but wherever possible more recent information is presented.
2. This area pre-dates the new capital project having been set aside for light industrial and commercial concerns in the mid 1950s (Pennant, 1982).
3. It is notable that Richards also describes the location of low income housing as being "sited within easy reach of industrial and commercial areas, to make travel easier for workers in industry and commerce" (1974, p.40). As discussed above, this is not the case and it is apparent that Lilongwe's publicity material has, not surprisingly, attempted to present a picture of the new capital's development that is not always accurate.
4. This term in itself is open to differing interpretations of course (see Bromley and Gerry, 1979), but is generally used here in terms of the ILO (1972) definition.
5. 100 tambala = 1 Kwacha.
6. The 1966 census reported about 250,000 Malawians working abroad (primarily in Rhodesia, South Africa and Zambia), plus a similar number of dependents. However it is thought that some of the migrants had become virtually permanent emigrants (Clarke, 1974) and most of the dependents have also been considered to have become citizens of other countries (Hill, 1982). A World Bank report on the Malawian economy (cited in TCPD, 1980b, Section 3.1.1) estimated that there were still about 250,000 Malawian labour migrants in the early 1970s, but by the end of 1976 about 155,000 were estimated to have returned. This was largely due to the effects of a ban on recruitment to South Africa after a plane carrying returning migrants crashed in

Francistown in 1974, and changing policies towards foreign migrant labourers in South Africa. However recruitment rose again after about 1976, and it is estimated that therefore the net return of migrants was about 150,000, implying a national natural increase rate of around 2.7% (TPD, op cit).

7. It was not possible to conduct my own survey since permission could not be obtained.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Lilongwe's Growth Centre Role: Government Policy and Private Investment

8.1 Growth Centre Theory and Malawi: contextual problems

Lilongwe's potential role as a growth centre is one of the major elements and justifications of the new capital project, as discussed in Section 5.2. This has been a feature of new capital programmes in several countries. Kaluwa (1982, p.67) compares Malawi with Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tanzania in this respect and states that "whatever the exact form of the strategy, and whatever the immediate detailed objectives, this policy is based on the growth pole (or centre) idea which relies on urban concentrations to generate economic spillovers in the hinterland and beyond". However such a view ignores the specific aspects of growth centres which theoretically enable them to act in this way (as reviewed in Chapter 1) as urban concentrations cannot be seen as synonymous with growth centres. The problem is summed up by Mlia (1975b, p.394):

"A capital is obviously not a propulsive industry with strong forward and backward linkages and relocating a capital may not be the most effective and efficient way of reducing perceived regional imbalances in development in any given country."

Although the concept of a growth centre has tended to become more diffuse in the literature (see Moseley, 1973) the statement by Mlia reflects the original formulation in which the idea of propulsive industries is important. When analysing a growth centre's performance in terms of this aspect, one problem lies in defining what is a propulsive industry. In global terms it is obvious that this will vary over time as economic and technological circumstances vary - for instance in the current recession the classic industrial complex of coal/iron and steel may no longer fit the propulsive industry category, whilst highly sophisticated industries related to the information technology boom may. In the context of Malawi of course, neither of these examples is relevant, and the problem has to be related to the local resource base, the nature of demand and the current low level of the industrial base. However it

remains necessary that to have a real growth centre impact, an industry would have to be relatively large in order to have a significant effect on sectors dealing with its inputs (including labour) and outputs, which implies that it must be in some way integrated into local supply and demand structures. Demand for its products would have to be sufficient to allow it to expand, thus maintaining growth in associated sectors. It is unlikely that any one industry in Malawi would have sufficient potential to affect the urban economy of Lilongwe significantly, so a number of such concerns would probably be necessary. Furthermore their growth rate in terms of both output and employment would need to be higher than that experienced by enterprises in Blantyre, since it is part of the stated policy line to counter its 'inequitable' development and strive for a reduction in regional imbalances (Mlia, 1975b).

It is possible to split the types of industries which might have strong potential for growth into three categories depending on their demand characteristics. One type could be industries geared to export products which are in high demand outside the country. Another would be industries which serve the whole country with products which have a rapidly growing national demand. A third category is industries whose demand comes from the city or local regional population only, where the level of demand is again high and expanding.

In relation to these above categories it is important to reiterate some of the basic factors affecting Malawian economic development. Malawi is land-locked, and transport to the sea is expensive and insecure due to constant disruption by anti-government forces in Mozambique. Apart from the processing of cash crops, there are few local resources which could form the basis of a competitive industry which had a large overseas demand. This latter point was central to the failure of the ambitious Viphya Wood and Pulp Project, which was planned as an important element of Malawi's early development programme to generate huge employment and

overseas earning opportunities with the export of wood, pulp and possibly ethanol products. Huge timber plantations were planted on Vipha Plateau in the Northern Region (1) but during the 1970s it was gradually dropped from development policy publications as it was realized that the export of these products could not have a competitive edge in the world market. Malawi's labour force, although cheap, is mainly unskilled and this, combined with its landlockedness, means it is unlikely to attract the multinational industrial investment which has occurred in some parts of the less-developed world (although hardly at all in Tropical Africa). Its potential for more basic industrialization for export within the Southern African regional sub-system is also very limited, because of the competitive advantages of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Overall therefore Malawi, and thus Lilongwe, is in a very weak position to develop new export based industries.

There are also major barriers to industrial development for internal demand on a national basis. The population of Malawi is very small and income per head is one of the lowest in the world. Consequently effective demand for all but the most basic manufactured consumer goods is very low. There is little indication that this is likely to rise rapidly in the future, as smallholder prices paid by ADMARC tend to be well below market prices (Kydd, 1982; Ghai and Radwan, 1983; Kliet, 1980) (although there has been some improvement recently), and the government is maintaining its rigid rural and urban wage restraint policies. Although income distribution is quite skewed (Humphreys, 1973), there are too few people in the upper brackets to allow any large-scale industrial development aimed at this section of the market. As a corollary to these problems the demand from the industrial sector for inputs is usually too small to allow the emergence of non-consumer based industries (intermediate and capital goods) which need economies of scale to be economically viable. This in itself is a major hindrance to the development of propulsive industries

which have forward and backward linkages.

All these arguments are also relevant to development of industries based on demand from the city and its hinterland. However the very rapid growth of a concentrated, urban and largely wage-earning population is likely to induce many types of industrial development to satisfy the sudden increase in local demand. Whether any such developments have the potential for long-term growth and can help to spread and generate other activities is another question - and if industrial output only kept pace with local population growth this would only maintain Lilongwe's position with respect to Blantyre (assuming the same happened there and their future population growth rates were according to policy predictions) rather than help to close the gap.

This preceding analysis does not intend to deny the possibility of any sort of industrial development in Malawi. During the 1960s and 1970s in fact high rates of growth were experienced in manufacturing. However from 1975 the manufacturing sector in Malawi has been far less buoyant, and in some areas there has been stagnation or actual decline (see Appendix 8.1 for a more detailed analysis of Malawi's post-independence industrial performance). What it is intended to suggest is that perhaps one of the most important flaws in the application of growth centre policies in countries such as Malawi (Tanzania is in many ways a similar example) is that the nature of the entire economy makes it extremely difficult to identify or establish 'propulsive' industries. Furthermore it might be argued that, these being so rare, the government is in a weak position to influence their location for regional equity principles since this might reduce their growth potential.

Lilongwe's regional development role involves not only its impact on its surrounding region, but also acting as a counterbalance to Blantyre, whose predominance in commercial and industrial development is presented as inequitable in government documents. The following sections of this

chapter therefore consider government industrial policies in relation to these points, and present an analysis of the two cities' economic development since the capital project began. Since Malawi is very much committed to the ideals of free enterprise in the spheres of commercial and industrial development, private enterprise is a very important economic force. Decision-making by private investors is therefore the most important 'unknown' variable in deciding the overall question of the development of Lilongwe versus Blantyre, and the attitudes of private entrepreneurial decision-makers to the new capital, whether they are resident in Malawi or abroad, are crucial to its future. This issue was therefore one of the main research topics of this study, and the results are presented in the latter sections of this chapter.

8.2 Government Industrial Policy and Future Industrial Prospects

Industrial policy in Malawi has tended to be of a general nature, with relatively few specific directives aimed at influencing the nature or location of industry. This partly reflects the government commitment to 'free enterprise' and the emphasis on private investment as the engine of growth in this sector, which precluded too much government interference. To some extent pragmatic consideration of the constraints on industrialization has also coloured policy formulation and implementation. Malawi's national development strategy is based firmly on the agricultural sector and the 1971-80 Statement of Development Policies clearly places industrialization in a relatively minor role.

The basic objectives of the government's industrial development policies are to complement its programme in the natural resources sector by expanding the range of economic activities, providing additional income

and employment opportunities and relieving pressure on the balance of payments. This expansion is being brought about by creating additional value added in exports of primary products and by replacing imports with domestic manufactures. In the words of the government this is not an "industrialize at all cost policy" (Economic Planning Division, 1971, p.74).

The government does generally encourage private investment in this sector with liberal tax and tariff arrangements (see Appendix 8.1). There is also some effort to increase local participation, although there is no question of stipulating any minimum level of Malawian participation in joint ventures. The main strategies here have been the entry of parastatals such as the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC), which was specifically created for this purpose. The MDC and ADMARC both have wholly owned subsidiaries as well as holdings in private firms. In some ways Press (Holdings) Ltd. also plays this role of improving local control or investment in strategic industrial areas. This is arguably a private Presidential holding (see Chapter 5), although Njolwa (1982) has termed it a quasi-public enterprise.

Another strand of Malawianization has been the imposition of restrictions on Asians. This has taken the form of legally restricting them first to a selection of larger towns, and then to only Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zomba (although recently it has been mooted that Mzuzu should be added to this list) (Metcalfe, personal communication, February 1986). The most significant impact has been on trading establishments, but it has also affected the few industrial concerns run by Asians outside the three main towns.

Malawi's emphasis on an export-oriented, agro-based strategy has led to determined efforts to keep wages low. This is hoped to restrain inflation, maintain an international competitive edge, help employment generation and restrict rural-urban migration. This may be attractive to industry (minimum wages in 1982 being only 35 tambala per day in Lilongwe,

and 40 tambala in Blantyre) but the strategy necessarily includes price control as well. Only 8 essential items are controlled by legislation, but a large part of locally produced goods are controlled by convention and ministerial decree (2) which may well have an unfavourable impact on industrial development (Kydd, 1985).

8.2.1 Policies Affecting Industrial Location in Malawi

Government provision of serviced industrial plots forms part of its package of incentives for industrialists. At independence these were only provided on any scale in Blantyre, but they are also now established at Liwonde and Lilongwe. It is obvious that the location of these plots involves a conscious government decision on the spatial impact of the manufacturing industry, and this has been used to encourage the regional spread of industrialization to Liwonde and Lilongwe. The provision of sites in Lilongwe has clearly been beneficial to its industrial development in line with government policy, but, as will be seen, expansion of Blantyre's provision has prevented Lilongwe achieving any long-term advantage in this respect. Liwonde's development was also specifically related to the need to spread investment, but was largely a failure due to its uneconomic location (see Chapter 4), which is specifically criticized by Njolwa (op cit), the principal economist in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism.

The principal direct means of influencing the location of industry, particularly between Blantyre and Lilongwe, has been industrial licencing. All manufacturing enterprises over a certain size have to apply to the Ministry of Trade for permission to establish or expand (3) a concern. These submissions relate to a specific plot, and in 1970 it was decided to use industrial licencing to promote Lilongwe's growth pole role. This departure from the government's previously laissez-faire approach to private industrial investment was reiterated in the 1971-80 development plan:

"the Malawi government is now more conscious of the need to ensure that private sector operations are consistent with national development strategy, as evidenced by the decision taken in 1970 to promote industrial development in Lilongwe" (Economic Planning Division, 1971, p.77, emphasis added).

With specific reference to the need to counteract the "primate" city of Blantyre this plan also stated that "the new industrial location policy....requires all new "footloose" industries to be sited in Lilongwe" (ibid, p.121, emphasis added). The following reference is also made to this policy in the 1978 Lilongwe Urban Structure Plan:

"through the granting of industrial licences, large and medium-scale industries are encouraged to locate in Lilongwe, rather than elsewhere" (TPD, 1978b, Section 2, p.216, emphasis added).

Before discussing the implementation of this policy it is worth noting that the strategy appears never to have been very clear-cut. There are for instance distinctions to be drawn between being "required", "promoted" or "encouraged" to locate in Lilongwe, and between "footloose" and "large and medium-scale" industries. It is thus difficult to know exactly how to measure the success or failure of the policy, although generally it obviously implied the manipulation of industrial licencing to favour Lilongwe, and disadvantage Blantyre. The policy was central to enabling Lilongwe to attract sufficient industrial investment in the face of Blantyre's competitive edge, to act as a growth pole and counteract Blantyre's industrial dominance.

Throughout the 1970s however the policy was never implemented with any vigour, and even the weak government commitment that existed appeared to dissipate. It is generally accepted that the Ministry of Trade did not often exercise its right to refuse licences on any grounds (Njolwa op cit, p.15) (4) and thus even more rarely on locational criteria (Kaluwa, 1981, p.7). Nevertheless some firms did have pressure put on them through the licencing procedure to locate in Lilongwe, rather than their initial choice of Blantyre. The Town Planning Office in Blantyre said in 1982 that theoretically industrial concerns had had to prove that they had to

be in Blantyre to gain permission to establish there. It was felt that one unfortunate result of this, in terms of national manufacturing growth, was that because most applicants preferred a Blantyre location, some entrepreneurs had decided not to invest at all as they would not go to Lilongwe. The number involved was probably small, but there are no exact data on this or the employment and capital investment lost (Blantyre Town Planning Office, interview, 1982).

By the early 1980s the policy had been further relaxed, perhaps completely. The most significant evidence of this is seen to be the government's decision to develop a major new industrial estate in Blantyre (ibid; Kaluwa, op cit, p.9). One advantage Lilongwe had had was the greater availability of industrial plots, whilst Blantyre's provision was coming under pressure to some extent. Yet in 1981 a large new estate with rail access was started in Blantyre, at Chirimba out towards the airport (5). The fact that this project had been approved by the government in 1970, at about the time it was beginning to promote its pro-Lilongwe industrial policy, might be taken as further evidence that commitment to the latter was always more rhetorical than real. On the other hand it is possible that the delay in implementation of Chirimba was an indirect part of this policy. However, unfettered private decision-making has been the main determinant of the distribution of manufacturing investment between Blantyre and Lilongwe. This view is shared by Kaluwa (op cit, p.9) who states that:

"considering that the government still anticipates growth of the manufacturing sector in Blantyre- since a new industrial estate is being developed at Chirimba to be occupied - it cannot be said that there is an all out effort to coerce industries to locate in Lilongwe" (emphasis in original).

The government's attitudes to this policy are in conflict with the recommendations of the LUSP which made it clear that it was regarded as a very important aspect of Lilongwe's development. The first recommendation made in respect of employment and industry was "to continue the policy of

discriminating in favour of Lilongwe when granting industrial licences" (TPD, 1978a, Section 2, p. 2.17). The planners added that this should be in the short-term only, but clearly supported a strong line on the policy, and did not anticipate the relaxation, if not reversal, which occurred with the establishment of the Chirimba estate.

It appears that despite a stated commitment to regional equity, the government is still strongly influenced by considerations of economic efficiency which entails continued support for Blantyre. Further evidence of this is the location of the industrial estate for the new Small-Scale Enterprise Development Organization of Malawi (SEDOM), financed by the EEC. Although there was a debate about whether it should be located in Blantyre or Lilongwe, it was eventually decided to locate it in the former because there were more potential small entrepreneurs there (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism, interview, 1982). As stated by Oksal (1982, p.8):

"the choice of Blantyre for its [SEDOM's] first industrial estate shows that the agglomeration effect on location choice is still a dominant factor in Malawi".

Although the scheme may be extended to Lilongwe in the future, Blantyre has obviously gained yet another competitive edge, and it is probable that most SEDOM participants will be predisposed to locate in Blantyre after their period of training.

8.2.2 The Industrial Development Programme (IDP)

By the second half of the period covered by the 1971-80 development plan the Ministry of Trade felt that a more comprehensive and planned approach towards the problems of industrialisation in Malawi was necessary. The government requested assistance from UN agencies in preparing such a plan, which resulted in the preparation of a set of guidelines by a UNDP/UNIDO team in May 1980. This was followed by the publication of sector programmes for the Industrial Development Programme

(IDP) by the Ministry in February 1982. A document on locational analysis was also submitted by one of the IDP advisers in June of that year. The terms of reference for the team were generally not far removed from the basic approach in the 1971-80 development plan (see Appendix 8.2), with directives aimed mainly at the encouragement of national industrial development and no mention of the special needs of Lilongwe. The most specific directive was to provide flexible guidelines for future manufacturing development, and a logical order of priorities. This represented quite a significant departure for the government (if the guidelines are ever implemented) as previously there had been little attention to the type of industry established in Malawi.

One of the main problems the team had to tackle was that the government still expects private enterprise to remain the strategic sector for industrial investments, but the Ministry of Trade has few means of involving them in industrial planning. Even the MDC which is the most important parastatal involved in the industrial sector, does not come under the control of this Ministry. This caused problems in terms of Lilongwe's industrial development, as the government has not been able, or not been prepared, to direct the type and share of industrial investment there. Some of the general policy recommendations made in the IDP are relevant to this issue of government control. It is suggested that the government must become more directly involved in the industrial sector and participate equally in the IDP programme along with the private sector. It was also recommended that the institutional structures through which the manufacturing sector can be encouraged and directed should be strengthened, and that the government should assist local entrepreneurs more by providing finance on reasonable terms. One of the strongest proposals is that industrial licencing should be used more strongly, and that licencing policy should be based entirely on the IDP guidelines. It is also stated however that economic viability must be the most important

criterion for determining applications.

Another problem facing those preparing these proposals was that Malawi's economic prospects at the beginning of the 1980s, and therefore those of the manufacturing sector too, were "not bright" (Oksal and Edwards, 1980, p.9). Two years later when the sector programmes were published it was stated that the manufacturing sector had been virtually static from 1980-82, and that there had been almost no investment by new companies since 1975 (Economic Planning Div, 1982). Furthermore Malawi's general circumstances (e.g. landlockedness, low internal demand, few resources) were admitted to be severe restrictions on any industrial growth, and manufacturing growth was expected to remain based on export-oriented agro-industry. Much of this is of course location-bound, and its activities were not felt to be amenable to planning as they depended entirely on the outside world and the climate (ibid).

These factors alone did not bode well for Lilongwe's industrial development in the 1980s, but the nature of the IDP has further implications for Lilongwe's growth centre role. The IDP is meant to be consistent with the national development objectives outlined in the 1971-80 development plan, and IDP advisers have stated that regional development should therefore be an objective of the programme (Oksal and Edwards, op cit). Yet this issue does not emerge in the list of overall objectives given in the guidelines, where emphasis is placed on the need for economic efficiency. Nor is it addressed in the 1982 sector programmes. Table 8.1 shows the major projects assessed by the IDP as being the most feasible during 1981-85. None of these was specifically earmarked for Lilongwe, although some could be located there, and the only mention of Lilongwe in the sector programme is with respect to the possibility of a new brewery (see Appendix 8.3). The largest project by far is for fertilizer production, which was planned to be based on the electrolysis of water. This would rule out Lilongwe which suffers from

TABLE 8.1

Potential Industrial Projects 1981-85
(at 1980 prices)

Potential Products	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (K'000,000)	Net Output per year (K'000,000)	Employ- ment	ICOR ¹	GFCF /emp (K'000)
Fertilizer Manufacturing	56.2	10.0	192	5.6	293
Ethanol Production (Dwangwa)	3.0	1.0	26	3.0	115
Polypropylene bag-making	2.4	0.8	120	3.0	20
Zomba Sawmill Expansion	2.2	0.4	150	5.5	15
Tannery	1.6	1.0	40	1.6	40
Solvent Extraction of Vegetable Oils	2.4	0.6	40	4.0	60
Used Oil Refinery	1.3	0.7	22	1.9	59
Total	69.1	14.5	590	4.8	117

Notes: 1. ICOR: incremental capital to output ratio

Source: Oksal and Edwards, 1982, Annex 5.2.3

water shortages. No location is mentioned in official documents for this project, which is so dominant in this assessment that the other projects would hardly affect the overall figures, except in employment. However one source gives Lirangwe (in the Southern Region south of Blantyre) as a potential site (Blantyre Town Planning Office, interview, 1982).

By 1982 only two of the suggested proposals had been initiated: the Ethanol Company Ltd. began producing fuel alcohol from sugar for mixture with petrol at Dwangwa on the lakeshore, and a feasibility study had also been completed for a large-scale glass industry project for which potential investors were available but no specific site had been chosen (Economic Planning Div, 1982, p.45). Presumably however if the other projects become operational some may be sited in Lilongwe.

The paper on locational analysis submitted to the Ministry of Trade also did not give any particular emphasis to Lilongwe. Whilst it was mainly a theoretical paper it also appeared to assume that current government policies will effect decentralization without further assistance. Thus it is stated:

"So far the forces of agglomeration have been effective in attracting the industries into Blantyre metropolitan area. But the Government policies of deconcentration intend to change this pattern and create new growth poles, such as Lilongwe, Kasungu, Mzuzu, etc." (Oksal, 1982, p.1, emphasis added).

This reference to other growth poles beside Lilongwe is mysterious, as it is not evident in other government documents (6). Development plans for the post 1981 period cannot be assessed (7) and therefore one can only speculate whether this statement reflects a real policy change by the government by nominating other centres as 'growth poles', or whether it is a personal interpretation of the country's efforts at regional development (8). Either way, since Oksal is one of the main contributors to the IDP, it is possible that Lilongwe's position will be further weakened if it has to compete with other centres besides Blantyre for industrial investment. Oksal makes no specific recommendations but he does say that

care needs to be exercised when granting licences for medium-scale industries (large-scale industries being regarded as resource-oriented) as "they tend to concentrate in or around the urban areas with sizeable markets, such as Blantyre and, to a certain extent, Lilongwe" (ibid, p.8). Again it is arguable that this implies that there should be some diversion of resources from Lilongwe.

Overall whilst the implementation of the IDP should increase the government's ability to direct the process of industrialization in Malawi, it also suggests that government policies in the near future are going to be even less committed to the promotion of Lilongwe as a manufacturing centre.

8.3 Aspects of Development in Blantyre and Lilongwe 1964-82

One of the major aspects of Lilongwe's regional development role is supposed to be the provision of a counterattraction to Blantyre, since it is the dominance of this city which is stated to be the major regional inequality in the country. Analysis of this aspect of Lilongwe's development therefore must relate its performance to that of Blantyre, in order to assess its effectiveness in this role. This section will therefore examine their experiences in certain economic spheres for which comparative data are available: building and construction, employment, and applications for industrial licences. However even for this limited range of economic indices data problems exist, as will be discussed in the following sub-sections.

In order to set the context for comparison of the two towns since independence, two sets of economic data are presented in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 which illustrate the initial massive economic gap between them. Table 8.2 shows the results of a survey conducted by the Blantyre Planning Team of all Blantyre's commercial, trading and industrial establishments in 1972. Gerke and Viljoen (the authors of the original Lilongwe master plan)

TABLE 8.2

Commercial, Trading and Industrial Establishments in Blantyre 1972
Number and Percentage of Total Employment by Location

Type of Establishment	Blantyre CBD	Limbe CBD	Other Locations	Total	% Total Employment
Retail	193	122	372	687	8.1
Wholesale	68	38	51	157	1.5
Offices and Banks	168	87	161	416	21.3
Other Commercial ¹	19	10	18	47	0.8
Markets	1	1	1	3	-
Total Commercial and Trading	449	258	603	1310	31.7
Large-Scale Industry				130	23.6
Small-Scale Industry				574	2.5
Total Industry				704	26.1

Notes: 1. Includes commercial travellers, travel and forwarding agents, auctioneers.

Source: Blantyre Planning Team, 1973

TABLE 8.3

Commercial and Trading Establishments in Lilongwe CBD 1968

Type of Establishment	Number
General Dealers	28
General Dealer and Restaurant	3
Tea Room/Restaurant	3
Hardware, furniture etc.	10
Clothing and Materials	8
Other	6
Total Retail	58
Wholesale and Warehouses	6
Banks and Offices	1
Market	18
Total Commercial and Trading	83

Source: data from Gerke and Viljoen, 1968


conducted a similar survey of commercial and trading establishments in the CBD of 'old Lilongwe' in 1968 (Table 8.3). The two surveys are roughly comparable since there were very few commercial and trading enterprises outside the CBD in Lilongwe at that time, and although Gerke and Viljoen did not quantify Lilongwe's industrial sector they reported that it was very limited: with one or two exceptions the industrial area contained no manufacturing industries and consisted mainly of truck terminals, storage depots for farm produce, and some service industries (e.g. motor and engineering repair shops) (Gerke and Viljoen, 1968). Even allowing for the 4 year gap between the surveys, the evidence for Blantyre's economic superiority is overwhelming and it is in this context that the towns' relative performance in subsequent years should be viewed.

8.3.1 Building and Construction

This sector has been one area in which Lilongwe has successfully competed with Blantyre since it was designated the new capital. However as will be seen this success has fluctuated, and there are significant differences between investment by the private and public sectors.

Figure 8.1 shows that from 1972 on the value of building plans passed in Lilongwe has been considerably higher than those for Blantyre (see Appendix 8.2 for a discussion of data sources and problems of data discontinuities). It will be seen later that this does not accurately reflect the number of buildings actually completed but it is obvious that Lilongwe's new status did cause a massive upswing in this sector. However the private sector data for 1968/69 to 1976/77 show that Blantyre tended to predominate in this sphere over that period, and that the overall increase for Lilongwe was due to government, rather than private investment.


The differences between Blantyre and Lilongwe in planned public sector investment from 1969-77 are shown in Figure 8.2. This is disaggregated into government plans (from the Ministry of Works) and



SOURCES: NSO Statistical Yearbooks 1977 & 1978
Monthly Statistical Bulletins Sept. 1979 June 1980 June 1984

Notes: a) data for Lilongwe available from 1969 only.
b) building plans passed disaggregated by sector only available for 1968-77 for Blantyre and 1969-76 for Lilongwe.

Fig. 8.1
VALUE OF PUBLIC & PRIVATE BUILDING PLANS PASSED
IN BLANTYRE & LILONGWE 1968-83



SOURCES: NSO: Statistical Yearbooks 1977 & 1978
Monthly Statistical Bulletin Sept 1979 June 1980 June 1984

Notes: as for Figure 8.1.

Fig. 8.2
VALUE OF PUBLIC SECTOR (GOVERNMENT & STATUTORY BODIES)
BUILDING PLANS PASSED IN BLANTYRE & LILONGWE 1968-77

statutory bodies' plans (e.g. MHC, MDC, CCDC). Whilst yearly values have fluctuated considerably, the share of planned statutory body investment in Lilongwe was generally much higher than in Blantyre from 1973. Also relatively little government building investment was planned for Blantyre during this period, and that planned for Lilongwe was significantly higher from 1970. This again illustrates government commitment to Lilongwe rather than Blantyre over this time.

Actual performance in the building sector up until 1977/78 however shows a different picture. The data illustrated in Figures 8.3-8.6 are admittedly incomplete but some inferences can be drawn from them. First, although one would expect a time lag between plans being passed and completed, it is evident that apart from private buildings in Blantyre, there are significant disparities between actual performance and planned activity. Thus up until 1977 around half of Lilongwe's total, and half of Blantyre's public, planned expenditure was not completed. It seems fair to say that the public sector's building plans tended to be over-optimistic in relation to its capabilities therefore (in terms of finance and/or technical factors). The fact that the CCDC's planned investment in Lilongwe fell sharply in the mid 1970s (as shown in Figure 8.2) is also indicative of these problems. The explanation of the gap between the private sector's planned and completed building in Lilongwe may also be that decision-makers were over-confident about the new capital, although alternatively much of the planned expenditure may have been related to public sector contracts which had to be shelved or modified (9). Secondly actual private sector investment in Blantyre was much higher than in Lilongwe, although government investment in Blantyre was relatively much smaller.

After 1977 the published data for planned buildings are not disaggregated, but from 1977-83 the pattern of a disparity between the value of total planned and actual building in both cities continued.

Fig. 8.3

BLANTYRE: VALUE OF PRIVATE BUILDING PLANS PASSED AND COMPLETED 1968-77




Fig. 8.4

BLANTYRE: VALUE OF PUBLIC SECTOR BUILDING PLANS PASSED AND COMPLETED 1968-77




Fig. 8.5

LILONGWE: VALUE OF PRIVATE BUILDING PLANS PASSED AND COMPLETED 1969-77





Fig. 8.6


LILONGWE: VALUE OF PUBLIC SECTOR BUILDING PLANS PASSED AND COMPLETED 1969-77



However it cannot be discerned whether one or both sectors was responsible (see Figures 8.7 and 8.8). There also appears to have been a surge of private investment in Lilongwe after this date, overtaking the government^M share which decreased in relative and absolute terms. It is assumed that this reflects completed projects by the CCDC's subsidiary property companies which, (as discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7.3) attracted finance for a short-lived building boom (10). Although this 'boom' had ended by 1983, and Blantyre again overtook Lilongwe in this sector, it brought the total value of private buildings completed in Lilongwe from 1971-83 to K47.8 million, compared to K40.7 million for Blantyre.


Data on the types of buildings planned in the two cities are available only for the period 1968-1976/77, but during that time there were significant differences (see Figure 8.9). The proportion of industrial plans in Blantyre, for example, was about two and a half times that in Lilongwe. Also the share of government plans in all building categories in Blantyre was much smaller than in Lilongwe, where the government accounted for 50% or more in each case. On the other hand the types of buildings completed in each city up until 1978 were not very different (Figure 8.10).

Whilst most official data on this sector are confined to buildings only, Figure 8.11 presents available data on all construction (including engineering, repairs and maintenance work) in the two cities from 1974-82. It is evident that Blantyre attracted nearly as much overall construction investment as Lilongwe over this period. In combination with the above evidence it appears that whilst on the one hand Lilongwe has experienced very significant growth and development in its building and construction sector, it has not entirely dominated the urban scene in this respect, since Blantyre has continued to receive significant investment which, in certain sub-sectors has exceeded Lilongwe's.



SOURCES: NSO Statistical Year Books, 1977 & 1978
 Monthly Statistical Bulletins, Sept. 1979 June 1980 June 1984

Fig. 8.7
VALUE OF TOTAL BUILDING PLANS PASSED & PRIVATE & PUBLIC BUILDINGS COMPLETED LILONGWE 1969-83




SOURCES: NSO Statistical Yearbooks 1977 & 1978
Monthly Statistical Bulletins Sept 1979 June 1980 June 1984

Fig. 8.8


VALUE OF TOTAL BUILDING PLANS PASSED & PRIVATE & PUBLIC BUILDINGS COMPLETED BLANTYRE 1968-83

**Fig. 8.9 VALUE OF BUILDING PLANS PASSED IN BLANTYRE 1968-77
AND LILONGWE 1969-76 BY CATEGORY**

BLANTYRE 1968-77
TOTAL 52,363.1 K'000




LILONGWE 1969-76
TOTAL 57,472.4 K'000



GOVERNMENT PROPORTION
OF SECTOR

BLANTYRE 1971-78
TOTAL 18,994.7 K'000



LILONGWE 1969-78
TOTAL 12,515.4 K'000




Fig 8.10
VALUE OF PRIVATE BUILDINGS COMPLETED: BLANTYRE 1971-78,
LILONGWE 1969-78




Fig. 8.11 VALUE OF ALL CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT IN BLANTYRE AND LILONGWE 1974-82 : PRIVATE & STATUTORY BODIES


8.3.2 Employment

By 1980 employment in Lilongwe was dominated by the tertiary sector, as shown in Figure 8.12 which gives a sectoral breakdown of employment in Blantyre and Lilongwe for that year. For a capital city this is not unusual: this sector has experienced rapid growth from the transfer of civil servants from Zomba and natural expansion of the administration. On the other hand growth in tertiary sector commercial employment has been much less significant, and available data suggest that community, social and personal services (most of this being government employment) accounts for about a half of Lilongwe's total employment, and around 80% of its tertiary sector employment.


The tertiary sector is also an important component of Blantyre's employment, but here secondary sector employment, of which the majority is in manufacturing, is roughly of the same magnitude. By comparison manufacturing is a very small component of Lilongwe's employment, where the secondary sector is dominated by building and construction. Generation of jobs in this latter category in Lilongwe throughout the 1970s was second only to that in community, social and personal services.

It is, unfortunately, impossible to analyse and compare Blantyre and Lilongwe's employment structure and growth from the beginning of the new capital project, because disaggregated data were only published from 1974. Much of Lilongwe's new employment in building and construction and government services must have already occurred by that year, and it is assumed that there must have been a sharp rise in overall employment during the early 1970s. The importance of these two sectors was certainly already established by 1974, as can be seen from Table 8.4. Detailed breakdowns of tertiary sector employment can only be shown for 1975 and 1976 (11), but this suggests that the structure of Blantyre's tertiary sector employment is very different from Lilongwe's, with much greater relative and absolute employment in commercial rather than administrative

BLANTYRE
TOTAL=68,919




LILONGWE
TOTAL = 44,508





M MANUAL
B&C BUILDING, CONSTRUCTION
E&W ELECTRICITY, WATER

Fig. 8.12
1980 EMPLOYMENT IN BLANTYRE & LILONGWE BY SECTOR

BLANTYRE
TOTAL = 22,127



LILONGWE
TOTAL = 21,167



GOVERNMENT PROPORTION
OF SECTOR

Fig. 8.13
TERTIARY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: BLANTYRE & LILONGWE 1976

TABLE 8.4

Employment by Sector: Blantyre and Lilongwe 1974-80 ('000s)

SECTOR OR INDUSTRY	Town	Y E A R							
		old series			new series				
		1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	
PRIMARY	Blantyre	1.5	0.9	1.7	2.9	3.5	3.2	2.7	
	Lilongwe	0.4	0.6	0.3	5.0	5.4	6.5	6.1	
Manufacturing	Blantyre	14.6	18.6	21.7	13.9	15.2	21.9	22.0	
	Lilongwe	1.6	2.0	2.3	1.8	2.3	2.5	2.7	
Electricity and Water	Blantyre	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.9	
	Lilongwe	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.3	
Building and Construction	Blantyre	6.6	8.0	6.1	6.1	7.7	8.7	7.0	
	Lilongwe	9.5	7.7	8.9	6.4	8.9	9.9	11.1	
TOTAL SECONDARY	Blantyre	22.4	27.9	29.2	21.3	24.2	32.4	31.0	
	Lilongwe	11.9	10.6	12.3	9.0	12.1	13.3	15.1	
Wholesale, Retail, Hotels and Restaurants	Blantyre		7.4	6.4					
	Lilongwe		2.1	1.9					
Transport, Storage and Communications	Blantyre		6.8	6.6					
	Lilongwe		1.3	1.7					
Finance, Insurance and Business Services	Blantyre		2.1	2.6					
	Lilongwe		0.4	0.5					
Community, Social and Personal Services	Blantyre		8.5	6.6					
	Lilongwe		16.4	17.1					
TOTAL TERTIARY	Blantyre	23.8	24.9	22.1	24.8	25.8	30.6	35.2	
	Lilongwe	15.0	20.2	21.2	14.7	15.4	19.5	23.3	
TOTAL ALL SECTORS	Blantyre	47.7	53.8	53.0	49.1	53.5	66.3	68.9	
	Lilongwe	27.2	31.4	33.7	28.7	32.8	39.2	44.5	

Notes: a) Official employment data only disaggregated by location from 1974.
b) Disaggregated tertiary sector data only available for 1975, 1976.

Sources: Kaluwa, 1981, Table 2.
NSO, Employment and Earnings Annual Reports 1975, 1976.
NSO, 1983, personal communication.

or welfare services. This is illustrated in Figure 8.13 which also shows that government employment in Lilongwe's tertiary sector is more important than in Blantyre.

A change in employment coverage (see footnote to Appendix Table 8.7) between 1976 and 1977 makes it impossible to calculate real growth rates for 1974-80. Growth obviously occurred in all employment sectors for both cities during this period. However downward fluctuations also occurred and most significantly there was a large recorded fall in nearly all sectors between 1976 and 1977. Some of this may be accounted for by re-allocation between sectors. Lilongwe, for instance, saw a massive increase in recorded primary sector employment in 1977 and a fall in recorded tertiary sector employment. Most of the former is accounted for by landscape gardening which employs thousands to maintain the garden city image, and it is assumed that this element was re-allocated from services to the primary sector in 1977. Another factor may be that the re-organization of coverage caused a general dislocation in the rate of returns from employers in the first year or two, or some other organizational factor caused underestimations (12). It is difficult to assess how much of the recorded fall in Blantyre and Lilongwe's employment was genuine, and how much was caused by the reorganization of coverage, but it may be that both played a part.

Recessionary conditions in Malawi in the early 1980s also saw a fall in secondary sector employment (Figure 8.14). The implication is that employment in this sector is quite fluid and responds rapidly to general economic conditions, and it is probable that this will have been reflected in secondary sector employment in both cities during the 1980s.

Table 8.5 gives the 1974-76 and 1977-80 employment growth rates in both cities. Bearing in mind suspicions about the new series data, one can only make general comments on the basis of these data. It appears




Fig. 8.14 SECONDARY & TERTIARY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT

Source: As Tables Appendix 8.7, 8.4

that employment growth has been rapid in both cities, and higher in Lilongwe than Blantyre. Secondary sector growth in Blantyre has been high and fuelled mainly by increasing manufacturing employment. Impressive growth rates in manufacturing, and building and construction employment have also been experienced in Lilongwe. However the high growth rate of manufacturing employment there reflects a very low initial base, and absolute increases were less than 1000 in both periods (Table 8.4). Lilongwe's tertiary sector employment has also grown rapidly, but although Blantyre recorded negative growth rates in the earlier period, it has also experienced expansion in this sector overall, and the absolute increase there from 1974-80 was greater than that in Lilongwe.

Overall there has been little change in the share of national employment held by each city (Table 8.6). The most significant change has been a large rise in the share of tertiary sector employment in both Blantyre and Lilongwe. Blantyre's dominance in terms of national manufacturing employment is clear, whilst Lilongwe's share is only 6-7%. Blantyre's overall share of national employment fell to just under a fifth by 1980, but this was not due to competition from Lilongwe but from the growth of employment in the agricultural estate sector, as Lilongwe's share remained static at 12%.

A more sophisticated analysis of Blantyre and Lilongwe's employment growth by shift-share techniques has been made by Kaluwa (1982) for the period 1974-79. For both cities he concluded that total tertiary and secondary sector employment shifts were negative in relation to national growth in these sectors. The implication that employment growth is more dynamic outside the country's major urban centres is a positive factor in terms of regional and rural development, yet it is surprising that the massive investment in Lilongwe did not boost employment generation there to a rate beyond the national average. For the secondary sector the results of Table 8.6 support this conclusion: Kaluwa proposed that this

TABLE 8.5

Average Annual Growth Rates in Employment in the Secondary and Tertiary Sectors
Blantyre and Lilongwe: 1974-76 and 1977-80

SECTOR	1974 - 1976		1977 - 1980	
	Blantyre	Lilongwe	Blantyre	Lilongwe
	p	e	r	c
SECONDARY:	14.2	1.7	13.3	18.8
of which: Manufacturing	22.2	19.9	16.5	14.4
Building and				
Construction	-3.2	-3.2	4.7	20.1
TERTIARY	-3.6	18.9	12.4	16.6
TOTAL ALL SECTORS	5.4	11.3	12.0	15.7

Source: calculated from data in Table 8.4

TABLE 8.6

Percentage of Malawian Secondary, Tertiary and Manufacturing Employment
in Blantyre and Lilongwe 1974 and 1980

SECTOR	1974		1980	
	Blantyre	Lilongwe	Blantyre	Lilongwe
SECONDARY	43	23	41	20
Manufacturing	55	6	56	7
TERTIARY	25	16	32	21
TOTAL ALL SECTORS (including primary)	21	12	19	12

Source: calculated from data in Table 8.4

had occurred because the performance of agro-based industry had been good, and because there had been investment in major construction projects outside the cities. Thus even the construction boom in Lilongwe generated jobs at a slower rate than the national average (ibid, p.73). However Kaluwa's conclusion about the growth of tertiary sector employment in the two cities appears to be in error, given the rising share of this sector in total employment between 1974-80.

Future employment in Blantyre is going to depend largely on the private sector's performance. So far there is no evidence that employment in any sector in Lilongwe has been at Blantyre's expense; instead national economic factors such as lay-offs in the manufacturing industry during critical periods are most significant. The importance of private manufacturing and commercial services in Blantyre's employment suggests that the recession will depress employment growth here during the 1980s however.

In Lilongwe these factors will also have an effect. However it has become evident during the early 1980s that Lilongwe's large building and construction sector is decreasing in importance, as the new capital is completed or plans are postponed. Kaluwa (op cit, p.81) found that "a number of major building and construction companies representing thousands of employees had or were in the process of winding up". He assumes that these may be replaced by some smaller companies, and that employment will at best remain static in this sector, but more realistically this process would probably cause an absolute reduction. According to the Town Planning Department in Lilongwe (interview, 1982) redundant construction workers are unwilling to leave Lilongwe, if they were initially in-migrants, because they do not wish to appear to have failed to establish themselves, or ^{because they} want to save more money. They are likely therefore to be absorbed into the informal sector for the most

part.

There are also constraints on future public sector employment, particularly in the important area of community, social and personal services. According to Kaluwa (1982, p. 82) "given current budgetary constraints and that most of central government employment that is supposed to be in the capital is already there, total government employment is not likely to be a growth sector in any way." Some expansion is bound to occur in central administration of course, but the high growth rates of the 1970s are unlikely to be maintained.

There appears to be a feeling in both official and academic circles in Malawi that employment prospects in Lilongwe now largely depend upon growth in the secondary sector (TPD, 1978a, Kaluwa, 1981, 1982). Tertiary sector employment is regarded as being dependent on expansion of 'autonomous' jobs: these are defined by Kaluwa as being manufacturing, electricity and water, building and construction, and also the non-local (e.g. central administrative) element of community, social and personal services. On this basis Lilongwe's future employment prospects do not appear bright. The predictions for government employment and building and construction are poor, electricity and water employ few people, and "the manufacturing industry category is....still too small in Lilongwe to make a major contribution to total employment growth for at least a few years" (Kaluwa, 1982, p.84). However autonomous growth of the tertiary sector appears to be a feature of 'Third World' urbanization, and the predictions may be too gloomy. A possible factor in Kaluwa's approach may be a misinterpretation of growth in community, social and personal services during the 1974-79 period. He states that "in relative terms, Lilongwe has not had the expected edge in performance over Blantyre precisely because this dominant public employment has not shown any persistent upwards trend". Yet Table 8.4 and Figure 8.14 show that the tertiary sector as a whole (of which community, social and personal services are

the dominant element) has shown an upward trend, and failure to account for the differences between the old and new series of employment data must have affected Kaluwa's analysis.

Despite this, the combination of a decrease in the building and construction sector, and probably some restrictions on public employment suggest that informal sector employment is likely to become more important in Lilongwe. Lilongwe's population was still growing rapidly in the early 1980s, and formal employment opportunities are unlikely to keep pace. No specific surveys have been conducted on the informal sector, but it was estimated that in 1977 it accounted for around 10% of the economically active in Lilongwe (and also in Blantyre) (Kaluwa, 1981, 1982) (13). This is a low proportion compared to many 'Third World' cities and it is not clear why this should be. It is possible that this is an underestimate and without more reliable data there is little point in speculating about the cause. The general prospects for employment in Lilongwe, and to some extent in Blantyre, from 1980 on do however suggest that the informal sector is likely to have expanded in both cities.

The unreliability and restricted coverage of the data base makes it difficult to draw any certain conclusions about Lilongwe's employment performance with respect to Blantyre. Undoubtedly there has been an expansion of employment opportunities and it seems that overall employment in Lilongwe has grown slightly faster than in Blantyre, although the absolute gap between the two has increased. The improvement in Lilongwe's relative position from 1974-80 was primarily due to a large expansion of primary employment (mainly in landscape gardening), a slightly higher increase in the tertiary sector, and a temporary expansion of building and construction employment. The nature of Lilongwe's employment growth has done little to challenge Blantyre's position as the country's 'economic capital'.

8.3.3 Industrial Licences

The last economic index for which there is reliable comparative data for Blantyre and Lilongwe is their share of industrial licences. The number issued for Lilongwe and Malawi from 1967-82 is shown in Table 8.7. For 1967-74 the data available for Lilongwe only show those licences which were still operational in 1979, and therefore do not cover enterprises which were never established or had folded by this date. The later data are taken direct from the Ministry of Trade's files, and licences for Blantyre are also shown for comparison. The pattern of licences issued over time is very varied. 1970 saw a particularly high number, and there is some suggestion of an upward trend in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. Also Lilongwe was getting more licences than previously during this period, and although Blantyre received more licences than Lilongwe, it was closely rivalled in some years. A more detailed analysis of the implications of the shares of industrial licences accounted for by each city is made in the following sections, in relation to a survey of the manufacturing sector.

8.4 The Private Sector and Lilongwe's Growth Centre Role

The designation of Lilongwe as both the new capital and the most significant element of the government's strategy for regional development has given the city a dual role. By becoming the administrative capital Lilongwe has experienced several advantages in terms of its potential as a growth centre. It has received much public investment associated with its administrative role which would not have occurred if it had merely been designated a growth centre. For instance Lilongwe's general infrastructure (e.g. roads, water supply, power supply) have been greatly improved. Regional transport developments which, as previously argued, largely accompanied Lilongwe's capital city status, are also of great economic advantage for a growth centre. The population increase experienced since Lilongwe became capital has mainly been fuelled by its

TABLE 8.7

Industrial Licences Issued by Location 1967-82

LOCATION	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
All Malawi	9	10	20	33	13	11	16	18
(Operational in 1979)	-	(6)	(16)	(32)	(8)	(11)	(13)	12
(Lilongwe: operational 1979)	-	(1)	(3)	(7)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
All Malawi	8	14	12	21	16	18	18	25
Lilongwe	2	5	3	9	4	6	3	12
Blantyre	1	5	4	11	10	9	12	10
	All Malawi		Lilongwe		Blantyre			
Total Licences 1968-74	121		n.a.		n.a.			
Operational in 1979	98		13		n.a.			
% operational in 1979	100%		13%		n.a.			
Total licences 1975-82	132		44		62			
% total licences	100%		33%		47%			
number of new enterprises	122		36		60			
% new enterprises	100%		30%		49%			

Notes: 1. Several of the licences issued were for expansion etc., rather than for new enterprises.

- unreliable data

n.a. not available

Sources: Oksal and Edwards, 1980 (for 1967-74 Malawian licences); Kaluwa, 1982, (for other 1967-74 data); Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism's Industrial Licence files 1975-82.

new status also, as the major areas of employment which have generated this increase are in government administration and services, construction, and the primary sector employment associated with maintaining Lilongwe's garden city image. This has increased the size of the local market, and again because Lilongwe is the capital, the population includes many relatively well-paid government employees which could attract businesses geared to exploiting this small, but important, section of the national market.

Access to the government should also theoretically encourage the location of new businesses in the capital. Yet a further positive factor for the city's prospects is the publicity associated with the capital project. Logical analysis of monetary costs and benefits are by no means the only criteria for private sector investment location: previously in Malawi the blatantly obvious choice of Blantyre for urban-based development may have led to the neglect of alternative, and possibly equally profitable, sites. Private investors may also consider the availability of social facilities for higher-paid employees. As a growth centre alone, Lilongwe would not have received the degree of publicity it has done, nor the prestigious type of development associated with its new CBD, hotels and restaurants, and this should have enhanced the private sector's perception of the city as a location for investment.

The advantages accrued by Lilongwe becoming the capital city are however a one-off boost to its development. The initiative of the private sector still remains of primary importance to its economic role, unless the government becomes much more involved in the industrial and commercial sectors. As yet the government has not specifically invested in any industries or businesses to promote Lilongwe's economic development and clearly sees this as the private sector's role. If Lilongwe is to fulfil both aspects of its dual role therefore, a major factor is the investment decisions made by private decision-makers.

A major part of this research was directed towards an empirical examination of private business in Lilongwe, in order to evaluate this sector and its decision-making in relation to Lilongwe's growth centre role. However this analysis of Lilongwe within a growth centre framework should not appear to imply full acceptance of the value and efficacy of growth centre strategies as a whole, or more particularly within the context of Malawian economic circumstances. Furthermore it is not accepted that Lilongwe's growth centre role is a central aspect of the new capital programme: there is much evidence to suggest that this is a largely justificatory and rhetorical argument. Thus the surveys in Lilongwe could be seen as a largely qualitative approach to testing certain hypotheses related to Lilongwe's development. In these terms the two major research hypotheses could be briefly detailed as:

1. The growth and nature of private investment in Lilongwe, since its designation as a growth centre, has allowed and actively enhanced the city's potential to act as a growth centre as postulated by growth centre theory.
2. A growth centre role for Lilongwe is actively and deliberately promoted by government policy relating to private investment.

The null hypotheses would therefore be that private investment in Lilongwe has not developed as predicted by growth centre theory; and that the government has not actively promoted Lilongwe's growth centre role.

Two surveys of private investment were carried out. The first, conducted in 1980, was a postal questionnaire to a sample of Lilongwe businesses. The second, conducted in 1982, involved interviews with industrial enterprises in Lilongwe and Blantyre which had been established since 1975.

8.5 Postal Questionnaire of Private Sector Businesses in Lilongwe

The Lilongwe postal questionnaire covered a stratified sample of all

types of businesses, using the August 1980 business register file which listed 576 private sector businesses in Lilongwe. A total of 201 questionnaires were sent out from which 61 responses were received, representing just over 10% of the city's total private sector enterprises (see Appendix 8.4 for a more detailed description of the methodology used). The register showed that there were far more small than large enterprises in Lilongwe, but it was significant that the larger firms in all sectors tended to be better respondents, and this factor should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.

The format of the questionnaire used is reproduced as Appendix 8.5. Topics covered included the nature of the enterprise and the type of product(s) or service involved, the date of establishment, initial and subsequent capital investment and labour usage. The original motivation for choosing Lilongwe was addressed with particular reference to its designation as capital (14). Specific attention was paid to the sources of inputs and destination of outputs in order to examine the spatial extent of Lilongwe's economic impact, the degree of internal linkage between businesses, and links with Blantyre. Several questions related to general attitudes to Lilongwe as a site for investment, including for instance the likely impact of the airport (which was not operational in 1980), and assessments of profitability.

8.5.1 Sectoral Analysis of Private Sector Businesses in Lilongwe

All firms were asked to detail what type of activities they engaged in. Several of the large enterprises were involved in more than one sector - for instance wholesale businesses sometimes also operated retail outlets, as did some manufacturers. Multiple answers were categorized under each separate heading, so Table 8.8 shows a greater total of activities than sampled firms.

From these results it appears that in 1980 there were more private sector enterprises in the tertiary sector in Lilongwe than in the

TABLE 8.8

Surveyed Firms by Sector: Lilongwe 1980

SECTOR	Number	%
Manufacturing	18	22
Construction	5(1)	7.5
Construction Services	6	7.5
Electricity and Water	3	4
		15
TOTAL SECONDARY	33	41
Transport	5(2)	9
Petrol Stations	2	2.5
Garage Repairs	3	4
Other Repairs	1	1
Wholesale	12	15
Retail	13	16
Restaurant/Bar	4	5
Hotel	1	1
Finance Services	2	2.5
Community, Social and Personal Services	3	4
		31
TOTAL	81	100

- Notes: a) Total number of replies was 61 including 3 firms no longer active, here shown in brackets.
b) Construction services includes quantity surveyors, consultant engineers, etc.

secondary sector. Retail and wholesale enterprises together were numerically most represented, after which came manufacturing firms. The significance of manufacturing enterprises within the private sector shows that this sector has grown rapidly since Gerke and Viljoen's survey in 1968 (cf. Table 8.3), and is undoubtedly a positive indication in relation to Lilongwe's development. However it should be noted that there was a particularly high response rate from this sector (which was almost entirely made up of medium or large-scale firms).

Construction companies accounted for 15% of the sample, as did transport and related services. Lilongwe's central position and improved transport infrastructure should have enhanced its role as a distributive centre, and this seems to be reflected by the proportion of transport and wholesale companies found in the private sector.

Private business and financial services were poorly represented in the sample, which suggests that the focus of such activity remains in Blantyre. However, the headquarters of some large public financial institutions have been established in Lilongwe as part of the capital project (e.g. Reserve Bank of Malawi, National Building Society).

The majority of businesses were locally owned, about 10% were foreign or multi-national companies, and around 25% were forms of joint Malawian/foreign partnership. The latter two types of ownership tended to be concentrated in the manufacturing and construction sectors, accounting for around 50% of all such enterprises (14 firms). Five other non-local firms were in financial services and wholesale. The degree of foreign investment in Lilongwe's key economic sectors has many implications for its growth centre role, such as the leakage effect from repatriation of profits.

8.5.2 Labour Usage

One of the most important aspects of Lilongwe's regional development

role is its impact on employment. Agriculture is of course the main activity of the vast majority of the economically active in Malawi, and urban development is unlikely to have much impact on its spatial spread, which is affected mainly by policies specifically directed at the rural sector. Urban centres do however form concentrations of wage-earning opportunities and higher incomes, and these were highly polarized spatially in Blantyre at independence.

Analysis of national employment statistics has shown that Lilongwe has had a qualified success in providing an alternative focus for urban wage employment, and thereby has also provided an enlarged local market. The questionnaire provided further information on employment in Lilongwe in the private sector. It appeared relevant to enquire into the sources of Lilongwe's labour, as this is an aspect of the regional impact of the city. It was expected that inevitably most employees would be recruited fairly locally, but evidence of labour being drawn from further afield than Lilongwe district would support the government's assertion that the city's spatial impact would be more widespread (15). Thus some of the advantages of new employment would be displaced from Lilongwe itself.

The majority of sampled private sector businesses were small-scale employers, with under 20 employees. 85% of respondents who reported their initial numbers of employees fell into this category, though the proportion had fallen to 64% by 1980. Nearly every firm in all size categories had expanded its employment since the date of initial establishment, as shown in Table 8.9. Although the small-scale sector remains so predominant (nearly a quarter of those surveyed still had less than 6 employees) the evidence that the development of the new capital has been associated with employment expansion throughout the private sector is clearly encouraging.

Even in the Malawian context however, only five of the sampled firms could be categorized in 1980 as large-scale employers (more than 60 employees). Despite the small number of such firms, their employment does

TABLE 8.9

Labour Usage in Lilongwe

Number of Employees	Initial and Subsequent Numbers Employed				
	initial no. of firms	% firms	nos. with subsequent increase	subsequent no. of firms	% firms
1 - 5	26	58	21	12	24
6 - 10	8	18	8	11	22
11 - 20	4	9	3	9	18
21 - 40	3	7	3	9	18
41 - 60	2	4	2	3	6
61 - 100	0	0	0	1	2
101 - 200	2	4	2	1	2
> 201	0	0	0	3	6
No. usable replies	45		39	49	
Average no. employees	17			48	
Total employees reported	745	100		2365	100

	Employees by Origin			
	locally recruited (Lilongwe city and district)	elsewhere Malawi	transferred	Expats.
Frequency (no. firms reporting)	42	37(11) ²	11	13
Average no. employees ¹	57	9(10) ²	16	2.5
% enumerated employees	80%	12%	7%	1%

- Notes: 1. Not all firms indicating origin of employees gave figures. Averages; are based on those that did.
2. Figures in brackets indicate number of firms which indicated recruitment was exclusively non-local.

have a very significant effect on the average employment figures shown in Table 8.9. As two of them did not estimate their initial number of employees, this adds a further distortion to the averages although controlling for this factor still gives an average of 45 employees by 1980. The other three had experienced significant expansion with at least a doubling of employment. Yet excluding the five large-scale employees altogether, the average size of the rest was found to have increased from 8 to only 15. Although still a high proportional increase, obviously the bulk of absolute employment expansion is occurring amongst a small number of large firms.

It is significant, given the future prospects of the construction sector, that the two largest firms by far were both construction companies (employing 790 and 424 people respectively). Such firms may, within the Lilongwe context, have partially fulfilled the role of "propulsive industries", and both assessed the return on their investment in a positive light. Yet ideally the impetus of a growth centre should be maintained by a propulsive sector with long-term growth prospects, and the Lilongwe economy cannot rely on the construction sector for future sustainable growth impulses. If the survey can be regarded as representative of Lilongwe's private sector therefore, the great significance of construction companies implies that apparent successes in its growth centre role in the employment realm must be qualified by the fact that much of it has been caused by a component which must decline in the future.

Two of the other large-scale firms cannot be regarded as particularly suited to a "propulsive" role. They are both long-established companies (dating from 1938 and 1947) and thus employment expansion has occurred over a very long period. One is the local branch of Malawi's major transport company, providing both public passenger and freight transport. The other is a branch of a metal products manufacturing and processing company which, since 1975, has only opened a new spares outlet in Lilongwe

and regards its prospects there as poor. In both cases the headquarters remain in Blantyre and neither indicated that the focus was likely to change.

The last of the five large companies is involved in assembly and sale of machinery largely related to the construction sector, and had established in Lilongwe in 1976. This company had transferred its headquarters from Blantyre to Lilongwe in 1980, and indicated that Lilongwe's status had been an important element in that decision, not only because of the local construction boom but also because of the importance of "direct contact with policy-makers". Its operations were not only linked to Lilongwe's construction, as it had major dealings with several government departments and projects (e.g. National Rural Development Programme, Public Vehicle Hire Organization) and supplied a national market with 25% of its sales in Lilongwe, 25% in Blantyre, 48% elsewhere in Malawi, and 2% in Mozambique and Zambia. It appears that out of the sampled large-scale employers this firm displayed the most significant potential for future growth. However its local employment impact has been restricted because most of its employees were transferred from Blantyre when the headquarters were moved.

Table 8.9 also shows that most employees, as expected, came from Lilongwe and Lilongwe district. The majority of sampled firms (37) also indicated that a proportion of their employees had come from further afield. In most cases the number was very small, but surprisingly 11 small-scale firms stated that all their employees fell into this category. Transfers (mainly from Blantyre) had occurred in about 20% of sampled firms, but apart from the company discussed above the numbers were generally small and only accounted for 7% of total employment in the sample. Yet in terms of the spread of income opportunities this factor may be more significant than this initially suggests as transferred people are likely to be in more skilled and better-paid jobs. This hypothesis is to some extent supported by general comments made about location in

Lilongwe. Although recruitment of non-skilled employees was easy, two respondents made specific reference to problems with the quality/skill-level of locally recruited staff. One felt that its entire operation was jeopardized because as fast as it trained local staff they were 'poached' by other companies, due to severe shortage of skilled or semi-skilled labour in the area.

8.5.3 Decision-Making by Lilongwe Enterprises

The parliamentary statement of 1966 referring to the choice of Lilongwe for the new capital was expected to have had an impact on investment decisions after that date. Part of the questionnaire was designed to test the government's apparent assumption that the redesignation of Lilongwe's status would encourage investment there.

Of the 58 surveyed firms the vast majority (over 80%) were established after 1966 (see Table 8.10). 1976 was the peak year for new firm establishments. For those businesses in existence before 1966 capital status could not have affected their decision although one enterprise stated that there had been a suspicion that this might occur. The others were asked whether they would have invested in Lilongwe if it had not become the capital. Table 8.11 shows that 50% of responding firms would probably or definitely have invested in Lilongwe anyway. A further 20% were uncertain whether Lilongwe's status had affected their decision. Thus about 30% of investors felt that the fact that Lilongwe was the capital was an essential attraction. This is a fairly significant proportion and suggest that capital status does confer some advantage to a city in the competition for investment. Even amongst those who might or would have invested anyway, six respondents stated that Lilongwe becoming capital had been an extra attraction, and one of those pointed out that they would not have located their firm's headquarters there otherwise.

These replies however give no information on the qualitative factors which had motivated investors. Therefore a more general question on motives was included, which was left fairly open in order not to restrict

TABLE 8.10

Date of Establishment of Sampled Businesses

DATE	Number	DATE	Number
Before 1966	0	1974	2
1967	2	1975	4
1968	3	1976	8
1969	3	1977	2
1970	3	1978	6
1971	4	1979	5
1972	2	1980	1
1973	2	TOTAL	56

Notes: 1. Two not available.

TABLE 8.11

Impact of Capital Status on Decision-Making

If Lilongwe was <u>not</u> capital	Definitely	Probably	Total
Would have invested	16	9	25
Would not have invested	10	6	16
Don't know/Uncertain		9	9
TOTAL			50

TABLE 8.12

Factors Affecting Decisions to Locate in Lilongwe

FACTOR	no. reporting
Demand	7
Supply	1
Communications/Access	3
Construction Development	10
Regional Agricultural Development	9
Administrative Factors	6
Capital Status	5

Note: some respondents gave more than one factor influencing their decision (number of individual respondents = 33).

respondents to a specific range of factors presupposed to be significant. 33 enterprises established after 1966 responded to this question, some of which gave more than one major reason for choosing Lilongwe. The replies fell into fairly clear categories as shown in Table 8.12. It was evident from these replies that Lilongwe's status per se had been a much less important factor than the general economic development associated with the town's growth. However the most significant specific factor cited was the construction boom caused by Lilongwe becoming capital. Many establishments which had located in Lilongwe after 1966 were construction firms or consultants, and these all stated that their primary motivation was that there was a large demand for their services for the construction of the new capital.

The huge increase in Lilongwe's population was another major factor cited, and this was encouraged by the expansion of public sector and construction job opportunities, most of which occurred because Lilongwe became the capital. Similarly the new capital programme was the direct cause of many of the transport development which have improved Lilongwe's accessibility.

This survey in Lilongwe gives some support to the proposition that private investors find it advantageous to locate close to the government. Six respondents made reference to the importance of proximity to the seat of government. This included not only ease of access to public decision-makers but also the need to maintain a close link when the government was the most important client. Whilst five specific references to Lilongwe as the national capital were made, this was generally because it was assumed that if this had not happened, an associated factor which also influenced the location decision would not have occurred.

It is significant that the second most important motive cited for location in Lilongwe was agricultural development in the Central Region. This was obviously important for firms involved in trading and processing tobacco, although it was made plain that the government decision to open

new tobacco auction floors in Lilongwe was highly significant. This may of course have been partly due to the government's desire to promote economic development in Lilongwe, rather than a chance factor, although it is not mentioned in policy documents as being part of the new capital/growth centre strategy. However there were also general references to Lilongwe's advantages because it was at the centre of an agriculturally developing area. Most respondents in this category had a specific link with agricultural production (e.g. transport, processing), although two had no direct link but felt that agricultural development in the surrounding region would inevitably encourage the growth and development of the city itself.

It is apparent from the survey that the capital city project, as a whole, (including associated infrastructural development) has influenced some of those who decided to locate in Lilongwe after 1966. Much of this was due to Lilongwe becoming a focus of government investment and population growth, rather than because it attained the status of capital. It is also apparent that there was some potential for development in Lilongwe already, based on the expansion of agricultural production in its hinterland.

8.5.4 Alternative Investments

This survey also tried to establish whether investment in Lilongwe had been at the expense of investment elsewhere. If Lilongwe had attracted investment which otherwise would not have occurred at all, this was an overall advantage but if there would have been alternative similar investment in Blantyre, then the main advantage is in terms of regional equity. On the other hand if the alternative investment would have been elsewhere in Malawi, there has been no real gain for either regional or overall national development.

About a third of all respondents felt that their choice of Lilongwe had definitely or possibly been at the expense of alternative investment

elsewhere, as shown in Table 8.13. Most of this alternative investment would have been in Blantyre. Seven respondents were definite that this would have occurred: thus Lilongwe has had some success in attracting investment from Blantyre, although this has been fairly limited. There is also some indication that Lilongwe has attracted a few investors away from other location (sites specified were Mzuzu, Salima and Mangochi), although two of these responses pointed out that their answer was based on the hypothesis that a new capital might have been constructed elsewhere.

On balance investment in Lilongwe has therefore represented a net gain to the national economy, and its impact on the regional spread of investment has been largely positive, since its main alternative rival was Blantyre.

43 of the sampled firms indicated the magnitude of their initial investment in Lilongwe. 50% were fairly small-scale enterprises with less than K25,000 initial capital investment (Table 8.14). Only seven of the firms answering this question had established in Lilongwe before 1966; the majority (77%) had made their initial investment after 1970, including all but one of the firms which had made an initial investment of over K100,000. This suggests that Lilongwe is now attracting more major investors. However two of the three firms investing over K250,000 are related to the agricultural sector and their investment was not motivated by Lilongwe's growth and development per se. By far the largest investor was a tobacco processing firm. There is a clearer link between the development and growth of the city and some of the firms which made subsequent major investments of over K100,000 after 1966. These include two construction firms, the bus company, a firm of accountants, and a company producing and repairing machinery and vehicles.

8.5.5 Location of Decision-Making and Branch Operations

Blantyre has always tended to house the headquarters of local multiple branch firms, and the local headquarters of multinational

TABLE 8.13

Alternative Investment Locations

AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT	L O C A T I O N				
	Blantyre		Elsewhere		None
	Definite	Possible	Definite	Possible	
Same	4		3	1	29
Less	2	1	1		
Enlargement of Existing Premises	1	2	1		

Notes: number of answers = 45.

TABLE 8.14

Initial and Subsequent Investment (Kwacha '0000)

	0-0.99	1-5	5-25	25-100	100-250	>250	Average Investment K'000	no. usable answers
	n u m b e r			o f	f i r m s			
Initial Investment	3	5	14	10	8	3	94.3	43
Subsequent Investment	1	3	8	4	2	4	87.3	22

companies. Many of the new enterprises which have opened in Lilongwe since 1966 are branches of an existing enterprise (Kaluwa, 1981). In this sample survey 25 businesses (43% of the total) fell into this category. Of these 10 had only one other branch which, with one exception, was in Blantyre. Another 10 had between two to five other branches, and six larger firms had over 19 branches (16). Investment decisions are primarily made at the firms' head offices. It was hypothesized that Lilongwe would benefit if there was evidence that multiple branch firms were choosing to locate or relocate their headquarters there, since this would herald a shift in the locus of private decision-making power away from Blantyre. Also head offices are usually larger than branches, and relocation may also lead to heightened perception by key personnel of investment opportunities in Lilongwe. A possible factor encouraging the location of headquarters in Lilongwe would be accessibility to the government but this has to overcome the general inertia against relocation from existing head offices in Blantyre, and the advantages of being in the largest commercial and industrial centre.

The results of the enquiry into these issues showed that Blantyre remains the focus of private decision-making. Altogether 23 of the 58 firms stated that their decision to locate in Lilongwe had been made in Blantyre (including some non-branch operations). In 22 cases the decision was made in Lilongwe, six were made elsewhere in Malawi, and five abroad. 17 multiple branch firms had their head offices in Blantyre and with one exception the decision to open a branch in Lilongwe had been made there. The Malawian Development Corporation had been involved in this exceptional case, and it was reported that the Lilongwe branch had resulted from a decision made by the government in Parliament in Zomba.

Seven establishments had their head offices in Lilongwe and in every case this was due to transfer from another location after 1966. It is assumed therefore that Lilongwe's capital status had some impact, although

it is still in a weak position compared to Blantyre. Of the six largest companies, five still have their headquarters in Blantyre and only one is in Lilongwe (transferred from Kasungu). However five of the establishments with Lilongwe head offices had transferred from Blantyre. One of these was the national library service (categorized as private in the business register) which felt that it had to be in the capital, two were local private firms, and one was a multinational with its main headquarters in Nairobi. All of these retained a branch in Blantyre, but one construction firm had closed down its operation there. The two other multinational companies in the survey had kept their local head offices in Blantyre.

The survey also attempted to discover whether the establishment of a branch in Lilongwe represented an overall gain to the national economy, or whether it was due to the transfer of investment and business from a less advantageous location which was closed down. In general there was no evidence that Lilongwe's gain had been at another's expense (17).

8.5.6 Linkages and Integration

The establishment and growth of new commercial and industrial premises are crucial aspects of a growth centre's role. Theoretically these developments should be mutually reinforcing in order to enhance a local multiplier effect. In other words the establishment of enterprises which require locally produced inputs and stimulate the development of other local concerns which will deal with their outputs should encourage self-sustaining growth in the local economy. The concept of backward and forward linkages is, in theory, central to the successful development of a growth centre. If inputs are largely derived from outside the local/regional economy, and outputs do not require local processing or services, or their end use is not directly productive then it is possible that the multiplier effect of new investment will be dissipated, because its benefits are being accrued in locations outside the region that the

growth centre is supposed to stimulate.

The sampled firms were asked to indicate the sources of their inputs and destination of their outputs, as well as the types of local firms they felt were directly related to the operation of their enterprise. The response to this section of the questionnaire was rather variable, and the accuracy of answers was in some case suspect. However this was not unexpected as the questions had to be fairly complex; this obviously discouraged some respondents but altogether 35 (65%) of those sampled did fill in this section, including most of the larger firms which are the most important in this regard.

The general results showing origins of inputs and use of outputs are shown in Table 8.15. The proportion of inputs derived from the categorized locations gives some picture of the spatial impact of the multiplier effect of these firms.

Overall it appears that this is very varied with inputs being derived both locally from Lilongwe itself, and the surrounding district; from Blantyre; from elsewhere in Malawi, and also from abroad. The multiplier has not been confined therefore to the city itself or its immediate hinterland. Yet for all types of inputs it is significant that few enterprises were using inputs which came from 'elsewhere in Malawi', and that where this was reported the proportions were low. This suggests that the wide-ranging regional impact on production which government policy statements envisaged has not occurred. For instance the government suggested that Lilongwe's development would stimulate development as far away as the Northern Region, the country's least developed area. Such an expectation was suspect even in theory however, as there is no basis for expecting a relatively small growth centre to generate economic spread effects over such a distance. It is more important that Lilongwe's commercial and industrial development has few supply links with the economy of the Central Region as a whole, which is also included in the

TABLE 8.15

Reported Input Sources and Sales Destinations of Firms Operating in Lilongwe

SOURCE	% Inputs from Each Source						Total no. firms reporting	Category Input
	0%	1-2%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	81-100%		
	no.	of	firms	reporting				
Lilongwe	3	1				2	6	Constr- uction
Lilongwe District	2	3		1				
Blantyre	4	1		1				
Elsewhere Malawi	4	1	1					
Abroad	3	1				2		
Lilongwe	8	1					9	Machinery and Equipment
Lilongwe District	6	2		1				
Blantyre	6	2		1				
Elsewhere Malawi	8	1						
Abroad	2				1	6		
Lilongwe	4			2			7	Vehicles
Lilongwe District	4			1	1(1)			
Blantyre	1		3	3				
Elsewhere Malawi	7				1			
Abroad	5					1		
Lilongwe	5			1			7	Component Parts
Lilongwe District	3	1		1	(1)	1		
Blantyre	6			1				
Elsewhere Malawi	5	1	1					
Abroad	4					3		
Lilongwe	12		1	1		2	17	Raw Materials
Lilongwe District	12	1		1	(1)	2		
Blantyre	14		2			1		
Elsewhere Malawi	13	1	3			5		
Abroad	8		1		3	5		
Lilongwe	7	1			1	2	12	Manufac- tured Goods
Lilongwe District	10				(1)	1		
Blantyre	5	1	4	1		1		
Elsewhere Malawi	12							
Abroad	5	1	1	1	2	2		
Lilongwe	5	2	3	2	2	7	26	SALES
Lilongwe District	9	4	2(2)	2	(2)	(1)		
Blantyre	10	5	4	3	3			
Elsewhere Malawi	13	6	3	3	(1)			
Abroad	23	1				2		

Notes: some respondents combined source locations (e.g. Lilongwe city plus district, or 'elsewhere Malawi including Blantyre). These are shown in brackets.

category 'elsewhere in Malawi'. Instead local links are mainly within Lilongwe district. Blantyre and external sources of supply are as important, and in some cases more important. In relation to its growth centre role therefore, the spatial impact of Lilongwe's demand has been restricted and in terms of promoting regional equity some of it has been counter-productive because it has been directed to Blantyre or abroad.

Lilongwe itself figures as an important supply source for some inputs. Two construction companies estimated that they derived 90% of their inputs from within the city. This is a positive result given the importance of the construction sector, although it is somewhat offset by the fact that two other respondents obtained 90% of their inputs from abroad, and one received 50% from Blantyre.

Foreign supply sources were also significant for machinery, equipment and component parts. Even raw material inputs were often being obtained from abroad. Almost half of all firms responding reported that the vast majority of these inputs were foreign and nearly a third received all their raw materials from abroad. This highlights the problems of applying growth centre strategies in less-developed countries, where local circumstances hinder production of significant inputs, and thus the multiplier effect of new investment is to some extent dissipated. However four out of seven establishments reported that over 50% of their supplies of component parts came from Lilongwe district, including the city. Local suppliers also supplied all the raw materials for four of the sampled firms. This largely involved food inputs bought within the city (e.g. for hotels); whilst tobacco formed an important element of raw material supplies from Lilongwe district (18).

Whilst Blantyre was only cited by one firm as a supplier of component parts, it was the source of 50% of vehicles used by three other businesses. Local sources supplied the other 50% and 75% of another respondent's vehicles however. Blantyre was also an important source of

manufactured inputs. Inevitably these were also often obtained from abroad as well, whilst just under half were supplied with the majority of their manufactured inputs by local sources.

Whilst many inputs were received from foreign sources, hardly any of the sample had export sales (the major exception being the tobacco firms). The local market was very or quite significant for most firms (with about a quarter of respondents supplying the Lilongwe city market only), but well over half were also supplying a much wider market. Blantyre figured most significantly again in this pattern of demand, appearing to be a more important market for Lilongwe than the whole of the rest of Malawi (excluding Lilongwe and Lilongwe district). However half of all firms were selling some of their products to 'elsewhere in Malawi'. Thus to some extent Lilongwe has become a centre for national and regional distribution, and it was often the larger, more important firms which were involved in this national and regional market.

The patterns of supply and demand for Lilongwe according to the sample survey were rather varied, but they are at variance with its proposed growth centre role. The main linkage with the Central Region beyond the immediate Lilongwe district is as a supplier of tobacco, and as a market for Lilongwe's goods. Lilongwe has also some role as a national centre of supply. Its central position gives it an advantage over Blantyre in this respect and the improved access of the Central and Northern regions to urban goods and services, with lower transport costs, should represent some benefit to regional development.

Apart from these spatial linkages, the questionnaire also sought to establish the nature and degree of integration that existed within Lilongwe city. The sampled firms were asked to specify what types of other establishments in Lilongwe dealt with their inputs or outputs, or supplied them with services. The frequency with which specified categories of linkages were mentioned is shown in Table 8.16. It is

TABLE 8.16

Linkages between Firms in Lilongwe

TYPE OF ENTERPRISE	Deal with inputs	Deal with outputs	Opened	Extended
	no.	of	firms	reporting
Industry	8	8	2(2)	1
Transport	7	11	2	1(1)
Wholesale/Retail	11	11	5	
Other Services	12	10	2(3)	
Agricultural	5	7		
TOTAL	43	47		

Notes: a) Total number of responses = 49.

b) Figures in brackets are possible rather than certain.

evident that some backward and forward linkages do operate within Lilongwe's commercial and industrial sectors, but the degree of integration which emerged from the survey was rather low, although there is no theoretical quantified expectation to compare it with. Many respondents only specified one category of activity which they felt was directly complementary to their concern; in other words there was only one local forward or backward linkage mentioned. Only a small minority indicated that their operations were fully integrated into the local economy by specifying a range of linkages, covering a variety of secondary and tertiary activities. Overall each broad category of complementary sectors was mentioned by 15-20% of respondents, and the frequency was generally below 20%.

It was also possible to identify some patterns within the categories specified. For instance in the industrial sector the main type of activity providing both forward and backward linkages was construction. One criticism of the new capital city was that the associated construction development would have no spread effects in the local economy. Williams (1978, p.293) cites one local politician who hoped that foreign businesses would leave brick-making to local people because "that is the only way in which they benefit from the construction of the capital, by making bricks". The survey responses suggest that this analysis was too pessimistic. Although some of these linkages were between non-local companies, many were links to Malawian companies, some of which were quite small. However as the construction sector declines, these links may well be weakened.

On the other hand linkages between manufacturing firms were limited. Most of those specified by manufacturing companies related to other sectors such as transport of their inputs and outputs, repair of vehicles, and the use of financial services such as banks and accountants. Banks were the most frequently identified link in the 'other services' category,

but a range of other commercial services dealt with respondents' inputs and outputs, including for instance architects, government licencing departments and customs offices, and insurance. The government per se was specifically mentioned as a 'complementary activity' in this category.

Although several respondents claimed links with agricultural activities, few specified the exact nature, although food and tobacco were mentioned as inputs. There was only one specific mention of a forward link to agricultural production which was the provision of wagons to local farmers.

Theoretically the development and expansion of Lilongwe's economy should encourage the establishment of new enterprises as agglomeration economies emerge, and levels of demand for goods and services increase. Although the survey suggested that this is occurring, as yet it appears to be fairly limited. Sampled firms were asked whether the existence of complementary enterprises in Lilongwe had encouraged their establishment, and whilst just under a half of the 44 respondents felt that this was true, the others were negative or uncertain. Several of the sampled firms also stated that their activity had encouraged the establishment or expansion of other enterprises (see Table 8.16), but again these were in a minority, representing only about a third of respondents.

8.5.7 Control of Exports and Imports

One specific aspect of Lilongwe's commercial sector where Blantyre retained complete dominance was in the field of external trade. Almost every firm that used foreign material inputs primarily obtained them from Blantyre: 20 respondents indicated that Blantyre was their main source. The materials were either bought from Blantyre firms, obtained from headquarters or a branch office there, or through Blantyre import agents, or a combination of these. Only three respondents obtained imported materials from sources in Lilongwe, although a further seven imported

foreign materials directly for their own use.

Economy activity in Lilongwe is not generally directed to an export market, but the three respondents involved all made their exports through Blantyre headquarters. Two were involved in the tobacco industry, and both made clear statements to the effect that their presence in Lilongwe was entirely dictated by the opening of the tobacco auction floors, but that purchased tobacco continued to be processed in and exported from Limbe in Blantyre.

8.5.8 Private Sector Attitudes to Investment in Lilongwe

Towards the end of the questionnaire questions were included which aimed to assess the sampled firms' attitudes to, and confidence in, Lilongwe. Such information is essentially subjective in character and therefore difficult to quantify and analyse, but it offers more insights into Lilongwe's future prospects and problems in terms of private sector investment than the more factual questions about firms' existing status.

Two-thirds of respondents stated that they had not encountered any problem due specifically to location in Lilongwe. However the remaining third had, and their answers were probably made in the context of comparison with Blantyre, the most viable alternative site and one in which several branch operations already had experience. The most common and identifiable complaints related to material availability and price, transport, and trained staff. In several cases unfavourable comparisons with Blantyre were made directly. For instance one third of complaints related to material availability in Lilongwe, and it was clear that delays in receiving spares and components were a real problem. These are often imported, and since imports generally came through Blantyre, it is obvious that the 'commercial capital' retained a clear locational advantage for companies reliant on imported parts.

The opening of the new international airport at Lilongwe in 1982 will have helped to reduce this problem as some imported goods are

airfreighted. This factor should also have improved Lilongwe's competitiveness in terms of other transport problems, as there was some indication that another disadvantage of Lilongwe was the necessity of meeting foreign visitors in Blantyre.

A further identifiable aspect was dissatisfaction with housing, recreation and consumer goods provision for staff in Lilongwe, in comparison with Blantyre. The continued location of head offices in Blantyre also emerged as a problem, in relation to obtaining consultancy work in one case and to co-ordination of offices and staff in another.

Unless Lilongwe can offer specific alternative advantages, Blantyre is likely to continue to receive a higher share of future private investment. In this context, it is significant that very few respondents indicated that there were particular advantages in locating in Lilongwe when asked to assess the return on their investment. On the whole the answers to this question did not indicate any marked enthusiasm in the private sector for Lilongwe. The most common remark was that returns had been 'adequate' or 'fair'. Only 10% felt that they had been good or worthwhile, whilst a similar proportion expressed real dissatisfaction. Of the latter it is worthy of note that the most extreme response came from a company in the construction sector, which was operating at a loss and felt that once construction stopped in Lilongwe the city would "only be occupied by civil servants and tobacco people in season". Such a view conveniently discounts the majority low income population of the city of course (and was probably made by an expatriate), but it is in line with the argument that Lilongwe's industrial and commercial progress has largely been fuelled by a single 'propulsive' sector, and cannot be maintained.

The most positive factor emerging from these answers related to Lilongwe's agro-industrial potential, but was referred to by only three firms. The expansion of regional agricultural surpluses, and the

establishment of the new auction floors were mentioned as factors enhancing Lilongwe's future growth potential by these respondents.

Another positive factor for the future was the airport. The majority of firms felt that once Lilongwe had become the major focus for international air flights (which it now has), this would improve their prospects as shown in Table 8.17. Also just over a quarter of those replying were sure that the airport's impact would encourage further investment in their enterprises. Five branch enterprises also anticipated the transfer of company headquarters to Lilongwe once the airport became operational. The advantage of the airport however did not altogether outweigh the perceived benefits of head office location in Blantyre, as 13 firms felt sure that there would be no transfer, whilst a further six were uncertain.

8.6 Results of 1982 Manufacturing Survey in Blantyre and Lilongwe

A survey of new manufacturing enterprises in Blantyre and Lilongwe, conducted in 1982, provided further insights into industrial location decision-making in Malawi. This survey was conducted by personal interview, and the method provided much more detailed and exacting information about how firms made their decisions. Several factors influencing these were thus identified which had not emerged from the earlier postal questionnaire.

In particular it was possible to tackle the sensitive issue of government pressure to locate in Lilongwe. The government's ability and stated intention to use industrial licencing as a means of promoting Lilongwe's development is the only direct policy measure published in government plans, aimed at the private sector. As there were no studies on how this policy had been implemented apart from general statements that it had been little used (Njolwa, 1982; Kaluwa, 1981), it was felt that research into this issue was important as it related to both the

TABLE 8.17

Impact of Lilongwe's New Airport

ANSWER	Improve Firm's Prospects		Encourage Further Investment	
	no.	%	no.	%
Yes	27	54	14	28
No	10	20	14	28
Uncertain	13	26	22	44
TOTAL	50	100	50	100

government's commitment to Lilongwe's growth centre role and the effectiveness of such policies.

The research was confined to industries which had received licences after 1975, the year when Lilongwe was designated capital. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism (MTIT) gave access to files containing all industrial licences issued from 1975 to August 1982. Applicants for licences have to provide detailed information on a range of issues including the nature of their product, the location and number of the plot they wish to occupy, their proposed sources of investment, the nature and sources of employees, and the exact origin and type of inputs including import requirements. The application form is reproduced as Appendix 8.6. Question 18 on this form pertains specifically to the policy of enforcing the location of footloose industries in Lilongwe, as it demands an estimate of additional costs incurred by location in Lilongwe if the application was for a location other than Lilongwe. Granted licence forms, for which research access was given however, only detail the firm's products and plot site.

Over the period under study 132 industrial licences were granted, of which 62 were in Blantyre and 44 in Lilongwe. Thus Blantyre accounted for almost half of all licences, and Lilongwe for a third. Blantyre has obviously remained the most favoured location for new manufacturing investment, but it appears that Lilongwe has become a major focus. On the other hand several of Lilongwe's licences related to the same enterprises applying to produce different products on the same plot, and its relative position in terms of the number of different enterprises licenced over the same period is somewhat weaker with only 36 compared to 60 in Blantyre. With three exceptions, the firms in each city were different.

Blantyre and Lilongwe's domination of the urban system in terms of manufacturing is almost total. Mzuzu and Liwonde each received just four industrial licences in this period, and Zomba only one. Nearly all the

others applied to agricultural estates.

The range of manufacturing products licenced in both Blantyre and Lilongwe was very similar (Table 8.18). The most important type of new manufacturing in each was metal fabrication and light engineering. In some cases this was directly related to providing inputs for the agricultural sector. Despite the seeming importance of Lilongwe's agricultural hinterland, this was most common in Blantyre where a half of licences for general metal products (excluding light engineering) related to this sector, compared to just under a third in Lilongwe.

Textiles and food and agricultural processing were the next most important types of new manufacturing in both cities. In Lilongwe three of these industries were related to the tobacco industry.

The firms' licences showed the industrial area and plot number on which they had permission to build or expand. These were located from plans kept in the town planning offices in Blantyre and Lilongwe. In Lilongwe there are three main industrial areas: a light industrial site on the north-western edge of the old town, and Areas 28 and 29 on either side of the road to the airport to the north-west of the new CBD. The latter is a heavy industrial area with railway access. There are also some industrial plots in the old town, as well as Biwi Triangle south of the old town (although none of the licences in this period were for Biwi Triangle).

In Blantyre there is a more complex pattern. There are essentially two CBDs here because of the old split between Blantyre and Limbe. Between them there are industrial areas including Ginnery Corner, Chichiri and a heavy industrial area, Nyambadwe. There is also a major industrial area in Limbe which has rail access.

One of the major problems encountered in this exercise proved to be tracing firms. First many which had been granted a licence had not proceeded and the plot was undeveloped. This was particularly significant

TABLE 8.18

New Manufacturing Production in Blantyre and Lilongwe 1975-82

TYPE OF MANUFACTURE	Blantyre		Lilongwe	
	no.	%	no.	%
General metal fabrication, assembly and light engineering	15	24	14 ¹	32
Chemicals	7	11	2	4
Plastics	4	6	3	7
Electrical	4	6	2	4
Furniture	1	2	1	2
Textiles, clothing and leather	12	19	10	23
Food and agricultural processing	11	18	8	18
Printing and paper	1	2	2	4
Construction	1	2	1	2
Miscellaneous	6	10	1	2
TOTAL	62	100	44	98 ²

- Notes: 1. Includes 5 separate licences for same firm on same plot.
 2. Less than 100% due to rounding.

in Blantyre where 15 firms (25% of all licences) which were visited were not established, compared to 7 in Lilongwe. Secondly several of the Blantyre firms either had box numbers instead of plot numbers on their licences, or had plot numbers which did not correspond to the plans. Furthermore sometimes there was no-one available to interview, and return visits were not always fruitful. Altogether over 60 plots were visited including all those in Lilongwe. In the time available visits in Blantyre were concentrated in Chichiri, Nyambadwe and Ginnery Corner, and Limbe was excluded. 30 successful interviews were conducted, of which 21 were in Lilongwe and 9 in Blantyre.

8.6.1 Competition for Plots

One of the most significant results of the survey emerged not from the interviews but from the absence of so many industrialists from their plots. This led to inquiries at the land evaluation offices in Blantyre and Lilongwe. It was found that there are significant differences in the nature and cost of industrial plots both within and between the two towns, and that this was clearly having a significant effect on industrialists' behaviour.

Much of land in Blantyre is freehold, the exception being land developed relatively recently. All land in Limbe is freehold for instance, including industrial areas. In Lilongwe however all land belonged to the CCDC, which leased it out. Although the annual ground rent is fairly low, the initial development charges made in Lilongwe are quite high (see Appendix 8.7). In 1982 the CCDC expected to make an initial profit of about K14,000/ha on industrial land, at the time it was first leased (Department of Land Evaluation, interview 1982). The attraction of acquiring an asset in the form of freehold land is clearly an advantage for Blantyre. Furthermore there is evidence that some of the freehold land there often changes hands at very cheap rates. One land evaluation officer in Blantyre estimated that rates of K5000/acre were

common.. Although some plots in Limbe, which often belong to Asians, were being sold for about K15-20,000/acre, even this is clearly competitive with Lilongwe's heavy industrial areas given the fixed asset acquired.

It became clear from the interviews that Asian industrialists in particular had preferences for certain industrial areas and that economic considerations alone were not paramount. Limbe is the main centre for the Asian community and freehold plots here appear to be preferred. The importance of residential and community ties emerged several times in the interviews in both towns. In Lilongwe the light industrial areas near the old town (Area 7) is greatly preferred to the more distant Areas 28 and 29, as it is more accessible. The competition by Asians for land in this area which is nearer their homes in the old town, and is cheaper than land in the heavy industrial area further north, had become intense, and most had been taken up. This had led to the CCDC departing from its normal practice of charging fixed rates, and a few plots of land in Area 7 had been put out to tender. According to the land evaluation department this was presented as sensible commercial practice given the shortage of land for Asian entrepreneurs in Area 7. However it was clear that some Asian industrialists felt discriminated against, and it is evident that this view is supported by the general antagonism often displayed towards the Asian community in Malawi. As a significant proportion of medium and small-scale industrial licences went to Asian businesses, psychological and political considerations may discourage their expansion to Lilongwe.

Another important factor which emerged in relation to land costs in Blantyre and Lilongwe is that in Blantyre the land market was operating in an unorthodox fashion during the 1960s and 1970s. For instance industrial land at Ginnery Corner and other areas is held on leasehold from the government (and by 1982 there were virtually no plots left). Ground lease charges are extremely low, and bear little relation to the value of the land, and in some cases it appears that no development costs

are charged (Blantyre Land Evaluation Department, interview, 1982). Moreover there are curious anomalies in the levels of rent charged on developed plots. According to a report of the Land Evaluation Department (OPC, (Valuation), 1978, p.8):

"The first point that strikes an enquirer into the level of transactions [in Blantyre] is that there seems little in the way of a precise pattern, thus one finds a factory at Ginnery Corner rented at K400 per month and another a mile along the same road being three times the size rented for K300 per month on the same basis".

Although the report does not speculate on the cause, it does point out that some transactions examined were between connected persons and disclosed an element of gift, and secondly that there was evidence that the government had sold plots freehold, during the currency of a lease, for prices well below their true value. Three examples given in Ginnery Corner had all been sold for about 10% of the estimated market value (ibid). There is therefore a strong implication that corruption and patronage have an important influence on the Blantyre industrial land market. Since this is generally operating to depress costs there this is clearly a disadvantage for Lilongwe in terms of competition as land there was entirely controlled by the CCDC (and now by the LCC), and less open to such practices.

These factors must be borne in mind when a straight comparison is made between theoretical (ie. officially posted) industrial land costs in both areas. It became clear from these enquiries that during the 1970s a shortage of industrial plots had occurred in Blantyre. How real this shortage was is difficult to ascertain but it appears that this was used by the government, more than persuasion under the aegis of the footloose industries' section of the licencing act, to encourage industrial development in Lilongwe. Thus by making it more difficult to find a plot in Blantyre, the government hoped that entrepreneurs would take the alternative of Lilongwe. However none of the firms interviewed in Lilongwe which had originally preferred Blantyre, said that they could

not find a plot in Blantyre. It is arguable therefore that this (unstated) aspect of government policy had not been successful in achieving its aims. On the other hand it is possible that it had had a negative effect on development by discouraging investment in Blantyre, which was not compensated for by alternative investment in Lilongwe. Furthermore it had led to a significant degree of land speculation. Although some of the non-developed plots visited were only recently licenced and may have been awaiting development, it seemed a fair assumption that others had never been intended for development as they had had licences for some years. Such activity may have depressed industrial development in Blantyre, but is also indicative of a general preference for Blantyre since it would not be worth doing if industrialists were willing to go to Lilongwe where there were more plots available. Town planners are apparently unable to force licencees to develop their plots (Town Planning Office, Blantyre, interview, 1982).

The development of the new industrial estate at Chirimba in Blantyre which has been aided by EEC funds has been seen as a relaxation of this aspect of government policy. However industrial plots in Chirimba will be more expensive than in Lilongwe because the EEC loan has determined that costs must be recouped over a 20 year period, and the anomalies present in other industrial areas should therefore be avoided. At the time of the survey it was too soon to know how this will affect industry's attitudes to Lilongwe. On the one hand the Land Evaluation Department felt that this would be a boost to Kanengo's (Area 29 in Lilongwe) development, especially when the airport became fully operational. Several freight licences had been applied for in Lilongwe in anticipation of this. On the other hand there was a strong feeling amongst those interviewed in Blantyre, and among some in Lilongwe, that land in Lilongwe was more expensive than in Blantyre. Residential land in Lilongwe is anyway more costly, being possibly 20-30% higher than in Blantyre (ibid). Housing

costs were frequently cited as a major aspect of choosing not to locate in Lilongwe, and this was sometimes combined with the point that there was also insufficient low income housing for employees there. The combination of factors such as general economic preference for the more developed Blantyre, freehold land, the (admittedly unquantifiable) effects of the anomalies in the Blantyre land market, housing, and discrimination against Asians may easily outweigh the theoretical cost advantages of Kanengo's industrial land against Chirimba's.

This issue of industrial land and its availability appears therefore to have formed part of the government's overall strategy towards Lilongwe. However not only is this an indirect influence which appears to have achieved little except undesirable side effects, but also it has now been relaxed.

8.6.2 Firms Affected by Government Policy

Only five businesses interviewed in Lilongwe had been affected by government influence to locate there. One of these was a Press Holding subsidiary and therefore could not have located elsewhere. In another the managing director had previously been employed by Press, and although then resident in Blantyre he stated that he had to start up in Lilongwe. The others however had all applied for existing plots in Blantyre and had been refused licences unless they went to Lilongwe. These three were the only ones for which direct evidence was found of the government using their powers under the Industrial Development Act (19).

The reaction and attitudes of the three firms involved varied considerably. They also represented three distinct types of ownership and were producing very different products, suggesting that implementation of this policy had not been directed at any specific areas of the manufacturing sector. One was a relatively important metal products firm producing railway trucks and hydraulic appliances which was a Malawian

registered company. Another was a subsidiary of a Monaco registered company, which was producing plastic products. This firm was partly controlled (30%) by the MDC. The third was a textile company owned by Asians.

The first firm had battled with the Ministry of Trade and Industry for two years for permission to establish in Blantyre. This had been refused, and no licence was available unless they set up in Lilongwe. Eventually the firm capitulated and received two licences in 1976: one for Lilongwe but the other for Blantyre. The manager clearly felt that the market could not support two branches, and expected the Blantyre development to be the mainstay whilst the Lilongwe branch was an unfortunate necessity. It became clear that one of the reasons why this firm had been singled out was that there was indirect government interest in the firm, as Press Steel Industries (part of Press Holdings) had planned to buy into the firm by initially taking a 50% interest by 1982, and eventually taking it over by 1984. However Press pulled out of negotiations in 1981, leaving the firms with an initially unwanted Lilongwe plant. It seems safe to assume that Press's interest was part of the reason for insisting on a Lilongwe location, not only because of Banda's influence but also because ^S Press Steel Industries was already established in Kanengo. The recession in Malawi had made the operation of two plants totally uneconomic by 1982 and significantly, the decision had been made to close the Blantyre plant and increase production in Lilongwe. Despite this, the manager expressed a personal preference for Blantyre, the implication being that he believed consolidation in Blantyre would not be politic and might be refused. Overall however this example had benefited Lilongwe in the long run, at Blantyre's expense, particularly as the Blantyre plant's production also involved agricultural sector inputs such as maize mills.

The second firm had also been refused a Blantyre licence. However

here the manager felt that in retrospect, location in Lilongwe was a better choice. This could be seen as an example of how Blantyre's obvious economic dominance affects foreign decision-makers, who lack detailed knowledge of the Malawian economy and do not perceive that an alternative may exist. In addition to this Blantyre had also lost its competitive edge in two areas since the firm was established in 1976. Previously raw material imports had come in via the Tete road from Zimbabwe to Blantyre but the activities of the MNR in Mozambique had led to these being re-routed through Zambia. In the mid 1980s the importance of this factor has undoubtedly remained. Secondly Blantyre had been the company's main market but the firm had become increasingly involved in supplying sanitation and water development schemes throughout the country. Accessibility to the government (which accounted for 50% of its business) and a central position had become important advantages, and overall the manager was very positive about location in Lilongwe. This firm also provided an example of something which emerged from interviews with other firms which had been successful in Lilongwe. They often expressed a far more positive attitude towards Lilongwe as a whole, and sometimes this took the form of specific support for the government's stated strategies of regional development. Thus once perception of Lilongwe had been enhanced by personal economic success, to some extent this led to the assumption that this proved that Lilongwe was economically viable for other investors. This attitude was even expressed by firms which admitted that Blantyre had been considered for investment, and it was interesting to note how perceptions had been created which appeared to override any considerations that many firms' needs could still be better suited in Blantyre.

The Asian textile firm on the other hand was strongly opposed to Lilongwe. The manager's original business interests and residence was still in Limbe in Blantyre, and a factory for the textile concern had even

been completed on one of his plots there. However when the licence application was made the Ministry of Trade and Industry had issued it for a plot in Area 7 in Lilongwe. Although a building had been erected on this plot, the manager had not started any form of production. He stated that the strength of his ties to Limbe, and the fact that his main market was in Blantyre made it impossible for him to continue in Lilongwe and the shed had been leased to another company whilst he endeavoured to persuade the Ministry to change its mind.

The implementation of the government's policy in these three cases had obviously had markedly different effects. It is also apparent that the government has chosen to use its powers in very few cases, as the interviews in Lilongwe covered the majority of new industrial establishments since 1976 and none of the others had been affected. Nor had any of those seen in Blantyre encountered any opposition. In two cases the government decision appears to have been made because of their involvement through a parastatal or quasi-parastatal (MDC and Press).

8.6.3 Residential and Family Ties

The most frequently mentioned motive for location in either Blantyre or Lilongwe in this survey did not relate to general economic issues at all. In all 14 firms emphasized that their choice of location was basically determined by where the licence applicant already lived. In several cases this was combined with the fact that the licence either represented expansion of an existing production line (e.g. pasta production on a plot with existing flour mills) or was a new line for an entrepreneur who had several other different business interests in one town. Some interviewees felt that this factor so determined location that other variables such as market, supply and political pressure were largely irrelevant in industrial decision-making in Malawi. However this issue was generally confined to small and medium-scale industrial operations,

where the manager was also the owner, and could clearly not afford to divide time between two locations. The importance of family labour to Asian-owned enterprises reinforced this effect. Residential and family ties to one location sometimes dated back for decades. It was interesting to note however that those in Lilongwe who advanced this argument did not tend to express negative views about Blantyre, but simply felt that since they were already there and had a house it was a logical choice, whilst those in Blantyre often expressed very negative opinions about Lilongwe, particularly in terms of how expensive land and housing were, and how dull the social life in comparison to Blantyre.

The significance of these factors has obvious implications for a government attempting to decentralize industry and commerce for the purposes of regional equality. In these circumstances it is conceivable that no matter how economically competitive a new growth centre may become, the continued development of the core is a foregone conclusion because^s of its social hold on large numbers of potential and existing entrepreneurs. It is arguable that in Malawi there are very few footloose industries if the effects of this 'social inertia' are taken into account. Domestic industrial investment originating outside Blantyre and Lilongwe is largely confined to agricultural estates and although foreign investment may avoid this problem, there has been very little new foreign investment in the industrial sector in Malawi since 1975 which was not expansion of existing premises.

8.6.4 Economic Factors

Although social reasons were the single most significant locational factor emerging from the surveys many interviewees also had distinct economic preferences for either Blantyre or Lilongwe (often in combination with their residential ties). In Blantyre five firms mentioned the importance of economic factors such as the greater size of the Blantyre market, and in particular they perceived Lilongwe as being more expensive

for both industrial and residential land. One of these firms had tried a feeler shop in Lilongwe for its repair services, but had closed it after lack of response.

It also appeared that the activities of important large-scale firms in Malawi were used as an indicator of Lilongwe's viability. This picture did not emerge from this survey alone but also from general observation. For instance the fact that Press had eventually decided not to transfer its headquarters to Lilongwe was deemed as highly significant. Also the lack of significant investment by David Whitehead (a long established and important textile firm) was also held against Lilongwe. The National Bank of Malawi had also kept its head office in Blantyre and the scenario behind this decision is worthy of comment. The bank is 80% Malawian owned (47% Press and 33% ADMARC) but Standard Bank has a 10% share, as does Barclays which also holds the management contract. When the Malawi Congress Party headquarters were transferred to Lilongwe apparently significant pressure was put on the bank to follow suit. Yet despite the indirect government involvement in the bank, the management held out against the move on the basis that the majority of bank business was in Blantyre (76% in 1980), and that the auditors who prepared an independent survey of the economic arguments were strongly opposed to it.

Where the size of the local market was an important factor Blantyre naturally dominated as a favoured location. However two interviewees (one in each city) were of the opinion that most industrial concerns in Malawi (even quite small ones) catered for the national market, and that therefore the issue of the local urban market was largely irrelevant. Other firms did not necessarily make the point in this way, but many did emphasize that their market was Malawi-wide and that therefore distribution was an important factor. In this context Lilongwe had a clear advantage over Blantyre (although sometimes this had meant that an industrial plot had been taken in Lilongwe to act merely as a distributing

point for goods manufactured in Blantyre). Four firms felt that this had been an advantage of location in Lilongwe, but in two cases this had only been realized after location in Lilongwe due to the refusal of Blantyre licences. Again this implies that lack of perception of Lilongwe's advantages may be hindering its development.

The growing Lilongwe market had also encouraged the development of branches of existing Blantyre firms. In one production in Lilongwe had been restricted to vehicle assembly and other types of general metal production directly aimed at the local urban market, when its original licence had included production of agriculturally-related products as well. This decision had been made apparently because the latter were insufficiently profitable. However tobacco production in Lilongwe's hinterland and the auction floors were factors which had determined the location of three industries in the heavy industrial zone of Area 29.

Only 5 of the firms interviewed in Lilongwe made any allusion to the impact of Lilongwe becoming the capital, and this was never the primary motive for their choice. The factors mentioned in this context were that the massive population increase had heightened demand and therefore profitability, that government contracts and offices were more accessible, and that the airport would be helpful.

At the time of the survey there had been a number of policy measures implemented aimed at redressing the severe problems facing the Malawian economy. Some of these had caused problems to industrialists in general and frequent reference was made to import controls, exchange controls and high import duties (which had led to one firm temporarily ceasing operations). In addition the constant disruption of transport from the ports of Nacala and Beira in Mozambique, or from Zimbabwe to Tete, was also affecting some firms' production. Too much competition in the textile sector was also mentioned by one firm, and an Asian firm complained of a lack of family labour for management positions.

Apart from these general problems, the only others mentioned were directed at Lilongwe. As in the postal questionnaire complaints were made about the lack of high density and medium density housing for employees, and also of the difficulty of obtaining skilled labour. The issue of the CCDC putting Area 7 plots out to tender was also regarded as a disadvantage in Lilongwe.

The issue of Malawian policy to Asians had determined location of one firm in Lilongwe. This belonged to an Asian who had previously had numerous trading concerns in several small trading centres. As these were 'Malawianized' he ended up operating in Salima, and then in 1978 had to make a choice between Blantyre, Lilongwe or Zomba. This was obviously the case of a 'footloose' entrepreneur, and the choice of Lilongwe had been made because he feared that eventually Asians might be restricted to the capital city alone.

8.7 Conclusion

The introduction to this chapter analysed the general conditions and constraints within which Lilongwe's development as a growth centre has occurred. The national context was shown to impose constraints on the implementation of a classical growth centre strategy based on industrial development. Furthermore Malawi has experienced stagnation or decline in national manufacturing production and employment at times in recent years. Another problematic factor, highlighted in the IDP guidelines, is the government's unwillingness and weak institutional capability to direct the process of industrial development.

The government's commitment to Lilongwe as the new capital city has been strong however and this has been reflected by growth in building and construction, and employment. The construction boom in Lilongwe has been a central aspect of its development. It has entailed huge capital investments (in Malawian terms) which have led to associated growth in

employment, and also to the establishment of construction-related companies, including some with limited backward linkages to firms producing construction inputs. Although there is a very large gap between planned and completed buildings, Lilongwe has outstripped Blantyre in this sphere. Public sector investment in particular was dominated by Lilongwe until 1978, although after this date Blantyre's share of completed public sector buildings has been roughly equivalent to Lilongwe's. The private construction sector has continued to invest more in Blantyre than Lilongwe in most years however. The 1979-82 surge in private construction development in Lilongwe is related to the establishment of the CCDC's subsidiary property companies, and this success has to be qualified by the financial problems these companies created for the city's planning and investment institutions.

Lilongwe's successes in the sphere of employment are also mainly related to its role as the capital, and to the importance of the construction sector, rather than to any transformation which would allow it to challenge Blantyre's economic role. Tertiary sector employment in government rather than commerce, has registered by far the greatest absolute increase, and also the highest relative increase over the years for which data are available. High employment in construction completely dominates Lilongwe's secondary sector - this was already established by 1974, when relevant data first became available, and was maintained at a high level until 1980. However although data are unavailable for later years, other evidence suggests that this very important area of employment has been falling during the 1980s. Manufacturing employment growth has been small in absolute terms, although the very low initial base has meant that growth rates have been high. Blantyre on the other hand has also experienced very high growth rates in manufacturing employment, despite the periods of stagnation and decline already noted, and the absolute gap between Blantyre and Lilongwe has greatly increased, whilst

there has been little change in their relative positions. Commercial employment in Lilongwe has also remained relatively insignificant compared to Blantyre where total tertiary employment growth, although slower than Lilongwe's, has still been significant. Government employment in the tertiary and primary sector, and construction employment have undoubtedly given a huge boost to Lilongwe which means it now represents a significant urban market. However although the initial 'one-off' boost occasioned by the transfer of government employees and the onset of construction must have greatly improved Lilongwe's employment position relative to Blantyre between 1966 and 1974, overall Blantyre has more or less kept pace since then, and thus its attraction for demand-based investment has not received any further serious challenge.

As a growth centre, part of Lilongwe's role is to improve regional equality. In order to do this it must not only equal Blantyre's rate of development, but also outpace it. There is no doubt that the spectrum of government investment and involvement in transforming Lilongwe from a regional to the national capital has led to a position where there is another major urban focus in the country now, whilst before Blantyre's dominance was overwhelming. There has been a spatial spread of urban-based development therefore, and development associated with its capital status *per se* has enhanced Lilongwe's ability to act as a growth centre in certain respects. This conclusion is supported by the evidence from the business survey in Lilongwe, where developments associated with Lilongwe's capital status, which would not necessarily have accompanied its designation as a growth centre, were found to have had a strong impact on the decision to locate in Lilongwe (e.g. the railway, the air port, the construction boom, and population growth). In other words, the fact that Lilongwe had become the national capital did cause a spread in regional development, and in some ways got the city's growth centre role "off the ground".

On the other hand some of the ways in which this initial boost occurred do not comply with the needs of a growth centre. For instance the nature of employment growth means that some of it is unsustainable. As the construction sector decreases in importance, it is possible that Lilongwe will fall behind Blantyre, and thus that the regional gap will widen again. Thus private business development in Lilongwe is crucial for both its employment prospects and its economic role.

The evidence collected in the two surveys shows that there are no simple answers to the two hypotheses formulated about Lilongwe's development as a growth centre. Certain aspects of the development of its commercial and industrial sectors do correspond with theoretical expectations, but at best the evidence is weak or qualified. For instance the construction sector has been active enough to fulfil the role of a propulsive sector as indicated by frequent reference in the surveys to the importance of this sector in attracting private investment, and to some extent in encouraging the establishment of related activities. Yet this role cannot be sustained and is already in decline. Also whilst there is some evidence of backward linkages in the internal economy for inputs this is fairly limited.

Given the small commercial and negligible industrial base Lilongwe initially had, growth in these sectors represents a large and encouraging increase. Most of this has occurred in small or medium-scale enterprises. Although a few larger-scale firms have also located in Lilongwe, no evidence emerged from the surveys of the development of any industry or group of industries which might take over the role of a propulsive sector. Thus the nature of Lilongwe's economic development has not encompassed any particular element which can be identified as being likely to maintain the impetus of its growth. The evidence of the development of intra-urban linkages between firms, whilst perhaps a positive indication for some sustained economic growth, is insufficiently strong to produce a major

stimulus to the economy. In this context the continuing strong involvement of Blantyre firms in several areas of Lilongwe's economy is directly contrary to the need to spread development away from Blantyre.

The spatial spread of Lilongwe's external links also appears rather limited, mainly being concentrated within Lilongwe district, or upon Blantyre. The evidence for urban-rural links, in terms of the impact of the city on its hinterland's economy, is to some extent conflicting. There appears to be a positive perception of the potential of Lilongwe's rural hinterland and this undoubtedly encouraged the establishment of several firms. Apparently even if Lilongwe had not become the capital, this factor would have fostered growth there. Yet the nature of manufacturing development had involved very few links with the wider agricultural economy of the Central Region, and one of the few firms issued a licence for such activity had chosen to confine itself to production directed at the urban market alone. Apart from offering a market for rural produce and acting as a service centre, Lilongwe could presumably have benefited the regional economy by producing inputs which were cheaper (because of lower transport costs) and more accessible than alternative sources. However an interview at the LLDP offices made clear that any question of such links ignored a practical reality of the institutional set-up of Malawian agricultural development. Whilst the LLDP project managers made it clear that the hugely increased market demand for food products in the city was a major benefit to the project's producers, who could obtain higher prices than by selling to ADMARC, the question of inputs linkages was met with some amazement. It was pointed out that farmers' inputs all over the country (e.g. seed, fertilizer, wagons etc.) were nearly all provided by ADMARC from its subsidiary AGRIMAL in Blantyre (LLDP, interview, 1980). It is assumed that this monopoly is more effective amongst project farmers than others, yet there are several important projects relatively close to Lilongwe (a fact emphasized in

government statements) which are likely to be the source of most effective demand for urban-produced inputs. In this context it becomes easier to explain the lack of such development in Lilongwe, but at the same time damages the notion that Lilongwe can have a productive input role to the regional agricultural economy.

In terms of Lilongwe's ability to counteract Blantyre, perhaps the most damaging evidence is the private sector's perceptions of the two cities. This is not to say that the evidence is overwhelmingly in Blantyre's favour - the airport, and access to the government for example, have clearly enhanced Lilongwe's position. In general however it seems that the private sector actively favours Blantyre, even though such perceptions can be altered once a firm has established in Lilongwe. The importance of non-economic considerations in decision-making also tends to operate in Blantyre's favour.

In terms of the second hypothesis relating to government policy, it is notable that the impact of the stated government policy to promote Lilongwe (the use of the Industrial Licencing Act) has been less strongly implemented than the policy of restricting available industrial land in Blantyre which does not appear in published planning documents. In the case of the former policy the evidence is conflicting in terms of the impact on the individual investor: however even though it has obviously been implemented only rarely, given the small number of licences issued each year, it must have had at least a small impact in Lilongwe's favour. On the other hand given the strength of Blantyre's industrial dominance this has been insufficient to promote significantly Lilongwe's competitive position, and in addition has not been applied in any coherent fashion to specific types of industry. Instead it appears that indirect government influence (e.g. through the MDC) is an important factor in deciding which firms should be pushed to Lilongwe. Whilst this type of government influence is by definition limited in the private sector, an important

area of governmental promotion of Lilongwe has been the location of certain other investments which government decision-makers influence. Two clear examples are Press Steel Holdings and the tobacco auction floors. There is no way of knowing whether these decisions occurred because it was felt that, as a matter of public policy, Lilongwe as capital should have these functions, or whether it was a deliberate and considered promotion of its growth centre role. The auction floors have had a very important role in attracting tobacco-related investment and form one of the clearest urban-rural links for Lilongwe (although private investors appear to be unconvinced that the duplication of tobacco floors was a good idea). However the decision not to move Press headquarters to Lilongwe is an indication that, whatever the motive, continued government promotion of this type has weakened.

Restrictions on industrial land availability in Blantyre are more easily categorized as deliberate (if indirect) promotion of Lilongwe. The impact of the policy has been shown to have largely misfired for a variety of reasons. The continued perception of Lilongwe as a high-cost location by private investors, and the development of Chirimba show that any potential this strategy may have had is anyway now dissipated. Lilongwe's future prospects in the industrial sphere are also not encouraged by the formulation of the IDP guidelines, where no attention is paid to its special needs.

In terms of the two hypotheses formulated, it is considered that overall, if one takes a long-term perspective, the null hypotheses must be accepted. This is because there appears to be no evidence that in the future Lilongwe will be able to maintain the economic growth experienced so far, and also because there is much evidence that Blantyre will maintain the existing gap between them, and possibly even widen it. In addition the varied elements of government promotion of Lilongwe's economic role during the 1970s, ad hoc and unconvincing as they were, now

appear to have ended. Yet acceptance of these conclusions must be qualified by acknowledging that Lilongwe has been transformed economically between 1966 and today. Its impact on its regional economy may be limited, but it has provided another significant urban focus besides Blantyre. Notably many of its successes have occurred partly because it became the capital city. The investments which have occurred due to consideration of status and prestige have played a major part in Lilongwe's commercial and industrial development. Furthermore the massive population growth associated with a surge in the dominant area of tertiary sector employment and in construction, which again relate to its capital city status, has undeniably attracted private investment. Capital city status per se has not been the cause (as clearly shown by Zomba's experience), but the creation of a new capital city has led to development, although not necessarily that expected of a growth centre.

Notes for Chapter 8

1. In its initial stages it was proposed that the establishment of the new capital and the growth of new industries would have beneficial effects on this development as illustrated by the following statement: "This [Lilongwe and its new industries] will affect more especially future development on the Viphya Plateau where several thousand workers will be employed in the production of wood pulp and related products" (Malawi Government, 1965, p.10).
2. The eight controlled items are sugar, meat, matches, petrol, medicines, hoes, milk and infant foods, and Carlsberg beer. Commodities which have no control or recommended price are limited largely to fashion goods, certain restaurant meals, custom-made goods and those products for which the manufacturers have avoided requesting price increases (Njolwa, 1982, p.21).
3. This includes expansion of premises on an existing plot or on a new site, and development of new products. More details about the operation of industrial licencing in Malawi are given in Appendix 8.1.
4. Njolwa's analysis, although not directed at the locational aspects of licencing per se, is critical of the government's laxity as he feels that permission has often been granted to economically non-viable projects.
5. It is of interest to note that this was associated with a large traditional Housing Area development at nearby South Lunzu. This was established during the 1970s, but as with the Kanengo industrial estate in Lilongwe, the time-lag between the development of this residential area and the associated planned industrial employment has been too long, causing considerable inconvenience for South Lunzu residents who are far away from any alternative employment.
6. Njolwa (1982) the Ministry of Trade's principal economist, also makes reference to these centres as 'growth poles'. However his paper was

presented a month after Oksal's was submitted, and the section on locational analysis merely paraphrases Oksal's paper.

7. One problem is that the government produced two plans for the 1981-85 period: one reflecting the economic crisis, and another which depended on obtaining substantial aid, if this turned out to be forthcoming during the period. I have not been able to assess either of these documents.
8. Kasungu for instance has received some investment in a large new THA, and the nearby elitist secondary school (see Chapter 4), whilst Mzuzu has a large new hotel.
9. A large proportion of private construction work in Malawi is for the government. From 1974-77 the share was 70% by value of work done, and from 1970 to 1982 (when a new system of coverage was introduced) it was 40%. However this included engineering, repairs and maintenance as well as building, and no locational break-down is available.
10. These companies are regarded as part of the private sector, despite considerable CCDC involvement (CCDC, Annual Report 1980). No CCDC buildings per se were built after 1979 (NSO, 1984).
11. Employment and Earnings Annual Reports are not published regularly in Malawi. In 1984 the latest available report was 1976 which gives detailed structural breakdowns, including the tertiary sector. Kaluwa (1981) gives some figures for 1977 and 1978, and 1979 and 1980 data were the most recent available from the Commissioner of Statistics (personal communication, 1984).
12. Personal enquiries about the anomalies at the Ministry of Labour, and to Kaluwa (who has written on employment in Lilongwe) did not yield any satisfactory solution. The National Statistical Office just stated that the two series were not compatible.
13. This view is opposed to that of employment planners who felt that the informal sector in Lilongwe was unlikely to exceed 10% of total

employment (Kaluwa, 1981, p.17).

14. This topic was addressed in several ways and by more than one question as a cross-check, because it was suspected that, although unavoidable, the mention of Lilongwe's capital status as a possible motive might induce respondents to some form of 'post-hoc rationalization', leading them to cite it as a motive when originally it was not.
15. Such evidence of course could depict the spatial extent of both spread and backwash effects. The economic effect of out-migration of potentially productive labour on the area of origin would depend on a number of variables, including the marginal productivity of labour there, and the value of cash remittances.
16. Another firm which answered this question was an Asian business which had once had branches in five other small centres, which had been closed due to the restrictions on Asian trading.
17. A possible exception was Malawi's main food supermarket chain which had reduced its operations in Zomba whilst expanding them in Lilongwe. Zomba's stagnation in demand was caused by its loss of capital status.
18. The original source of tobacco sold on the Lilongwe auction floors would not of course be confined to Lilongwe district alone, but it is at this point that processing firms enter into the trade.
19. Others affected in this way but who simply chose not to invest at all were obviously not available for interview. The intimation that this had occurred sometimes has already been made (Section 8.2.1) and is clearly a negative aspect of the policy.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This study of Malawian urbanization contains two major elements. First it has provided a geographical analysis of the growth and development of urban centres in the country from the beginning of the colonial period to the 1980s. The study of urbanization in Malawi has to some extent been neglected due to the overwhelming predominance and importance of the rural sector, and the interest generated by aspects of its political life. The provision of a detailed study of the urban sector was therefore an important objective. This largely empirical element of the study has provided the basis for critical, theoretical discussion of the nature of the urban process in Malawi. The second element of this study utilizes a variety of approaches to provide comparative and critical analyses of specific aspects of Malawian urbanization. Many of the theoretical considerations discussed in the introduction have moulded the direction of this second element which in particular presents explanatory insights into two major issues of Malawian urbanization: its underdeveloped nature at independence, and the creation of a new capital city as the most important government urban policy after independence.

9.2 Urban Processes During the Colonial Period

It has been shown that only a very low level of urbanization occurred during the colonial period, and that the urban hierarchy which had evolved was characterized by a low level of differentiation even when compared to other colonial territories. At a macro-level these factors are most comprehensively explained by adoption of a structuralist approach to the analysis of Nyasaland's economic development. Within the context of British colonial transformation of its Southern African possessions, involving changes in the mode of production, the accumulation of surpluses and the redirection of colonial economies to becoming primary commodity

exporters involved in an international economic system, Nyasaland was relatively neglected. Without a major mineral resource base Nyasaland was not the profitable proposition that Northern and Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were for British and other investment capital. The development of white settler agriculture in Nyasaland experienced many problems in the early decades of colonial rule and never generated large surpluses. The number of white settlers in Nyasaland was too small to cause the partial conflict between the interests of external and internal capital which had transformed the South African economy and to some extent the Southern Rhodesian economy by the 1960s. These underlying structural factors meant that Nyasaland experienced very little economic development which would generate or demand major urban-based industrial and commercial development. Nearly all that did occur was inevitably and easily accommodated in the urban centre originally associated with the emergence of estate agriculture in Southern Nyasaland, i.e. Blantyre.

Nyasaland was essentially an economic backwater. The colonial authorities had little incentive to expend more than a basic minimum to maintain administrative control and this formed the major force for the emergence of central places, few of which merited the term 'urban'. Consolidation of these settlements into functioning urban centres was hampered not only by lack of economic stimulus but also by the considerable fluidity of administrative foci in the first colonial decades as the location of district administrative centres changed regularly. Nyasaland's dire economic circumstances have been highlighted in several historical studies and its status is characterized by the descriptive titles it has been given: the Cinderella of Central Africa, and imperial slum (Vail, 1974), and 'everybody's hinterland' (Fetter, 1982; 1983).

However Nyasaland's unattractiveness for investment did not mean that it was unaffected by wider structural changes. The imposition of colonial taxation and the introduction of new consumer needs, combined with a lack

of cash earning opportunities in the domestic economy, forced hundreds of thousands of Nyasas into the Southern African migrant labour system. It has been argued in this thesis that this contributed a further depressive effect on urbanization in Nyasaland by a process of displacing those with the highest propensity to urbanize. Throughout the colonial period Nyasaland's involvement in the migrant labour system was both cause and effect of its continued economic underdevelopment. Once firmly established, migrant labour flows on this scale have been shown to have markedly deleterious effects on the development of peasant agricultures, and simultaneously prevent the transformation of economic and political structures which would have been necessary if the migrants were to participate productively within their own society (1).

It has been shown that Nyasaland's level of urbanization was low even when compared to countries with more similar economic bases to its own (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). The difference may partly be explained by the lower level of colonial economic development in Nyasaland, as well as its involvement in the migrant labour system. However, Nyasaland also experienced the imposition of a formalized political and economic bond with neighbouring territories in the form of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 1953-63, which has here been argued to have had significant effects on its economic and urban development. The Federation placed Nyasaland in a subordinate relationship to stronger economies which in turn were still satellites of the colonial metropole. Despite the fact that there were some economic benefits in this arrangement for Nyasaland, analysis of the strengthening of dependent links centred in particular on Salisbury, the Federation's capital, has demonstrated that Nyasaland had been further relegated to the status of the periphery of a periphery. The main urban centres, Blantyre and Zomba, through which Nyasaland's surpluses were channeled to the metropole and colonial decisions were exercised, were also weakened in this process. To a large extent they

merely became intermediaries in the structures through which international wealth and power transfers flowed, with Salisbury exercising many of their former functions. In addition there is evidence that whilst Salisbury experienced a major boost as a centre for commercial and industrial investment, Nyasaland's urban centres (which in this context largely means Blantyre alone) were greatly disadvantaged by the weakening of the territory's separate political and economic identity which, it is argued, had offered a degree of protection from Salisbury's competitiveness.

These macro-level aspects of Nyasaland's colonial urban development therefore need to be related to the regional and global economic and political forces which largely determined its status in, and relationships with, the capitalist metropolises. However at a more particularistic level analysis of the spatial patterns and nature of urban centres requires the adoption of approaches which embrace the effect of local geographic factors and the perceptions of key decision-makers.

The development of the Shire highlands as the major centre of European estate agriculture was determined partly by its environmental acceptability to the settlers and its relative accessibility to the major export route, the River Shire. It was inevitable that the major colonial administrative and commercial centres should locate in this area. However the unusual fact that the capital city was spatially separate from the largest urban centre can only be understood in terms of the subjective perceptions of early colonial decision-makers, in particular Hawes and Johnston. Thus the choice of Zomba as capital has been shown to have involved considerations of its scenic location and a certain animosity between colonial administrators and the settler farmers. Although this meant that the polarization of urban development was less complete than in some other countries, it probably depressed Blantyre's potential growth and development by removing the extra fillip that an administrative focus would have added. The administrative function alone, on the other hand,

never proved to be sufficient to attract significant economic functions to Zomba.

At the level of the district centres administrative considerations largely determined their location. The non-nucleation of these centres, which tended to have their administrative, service and economic functions spatially separated, may have been one factor preventing the development in some centres of more specific and complex central place functions. The missionary centres, many of which located in remote areas partly due to denominational rivalry, further served to splinter the spatial occurrence of central place functions, as several of these developed into service centres in their own right. The generally very low level of monetary demand from the rural hinterlands of most centres, due to the early neglect of and low level of development of peasant cash-crop agriculture in most areas, must however have also depressed the development of economic service functions in the administrative centres.

At independence in 1964 Malawi inherited an urban system which exhibited two major characteristics: the split between Zomba and Blantyre at the top of the urban hierarchy, and a very low level of functional differentiation among the centres which formed the rest of it. Lilongwe and Mzuzu had some functional distinction as regional capitals, and Lilongwe had also benefited from the growth of peasant tobacco cropping in the Central Region.

9.3 The Post-Colonial Urban Experience

In terms of Malawi's post-colonial urban experience this study has concentrated in particular on the transfer of the capital city from Zomba to Lilongwe. This has been the major element of urban policy in Malawi since independence, but a secondary aspect has been the development of a specific programme directed towards the smaller centres at the lower end of the urban hierarchy. A further major consideration involves the

question of how fast the process of urbanization has been proceeding in Malawi since 1964.

By the end of the 1970s when Malawi's 1977 census data became available it was usually suggested that Malawi was experiencing extremely rapid urbanization, and it appeared that this was true of all levels of the urban hierarchy. Whilst other African countries also experienced very high rates of urbanization at this time, it appeared that Malawi's was even faster at 8.4% per year from 1966-77. Yet it has been shown that most of the smaller urban centres in the country did not experience rapid growth over this period. Whilst Lilongwe's growth has been spectacular for special reasons, and Blantyre and Mzuzu have also experienced significant rural-urban migration it is suggested that a false impression of Malawi's urbanization has been accepted by many. In fact the Malawian government's policies to discourage urbanization may have been to some extent successful.

Analysis of income data for rural and urban households in Malawi, largely based on the works of Ghai and Radwan (1983) and Christiansen and Kydd (1982; 1983), has shown that the income incentive for rural-urban migration in Malawi appears to be very small for the bulk of migrants who would be unable to get skilled jobs (although it should be noted that income inequality as a whole is very marked, as there are few controls on higher income levels (Humphrey, 1973; Ghai and Radwan, *op cit*)). The analysis of census figures taking into account boundary changes etc., has indicated that urbanization has been occurring at a much lower pace than many thought (especially if Lilongwe's impact is excluded as a special case). Yet the large overestimate of the problem caused by the impression given by census data certainly affected the government's perception as evidenced by its quoted statement (see Chapter 4) about the perils of continued rapid rural-urban migration and its maintenance of the rigid wages policy. Government policies to encourage the development of

district centres to divert migration from larger centres were thus to some extent based on false assumptions, although of course this is no reason not to maintain the programme (although as shown in Chapter 4 it is suffering from a number of problems, not least of which is lack of funds).

Overall therefore the impression that Malawi has been experiencing some of the fastest urbanization in Africa since independence is not sustainable. More recently the government itself has recognized this as shown in the following statement:

"In total, the poor and scattered provision of social and economic services in the rural areas increases the migration of rural populations to the urban centres. But one should say that compared to other developing countries, this migration pressure is still on a low level.

All the more it is now urgent to take action to influence this process in such a way to reduce the migration from the rural areas, though it will not be possible to stop it completely". (Malawi Government, 1983, cited in Christiansen, 1984, p.148 (emphasis added)).

However it is inherent in the last sentence that the government still retains the view that migration needs to be stopped. Christiansen (ibid) argues that such a view is not entirely justified. The government's negative stance on urbanization appears somewhat unwarranted, given the still low level of urbanization in the country. The need to develop the small district centres in order to achieve a more balanced hierarchy and spread of urban services, and the fact that population pressure on land may eventually lead to much more rapid migration and greater demand for urban employment should be recognized. Maintaining poverty income levels in both the rural and urban sectors in order to contain urbanization (and allow high profit levels in estate agriculture) may have had some success, but clearly can be criticized as a policy which is hardly conducive to "development" in terms of the raising of living standards for the majority of the Malawian people.

9.4 Lilongwe: Comparisons and Conclusions

The transformation of Lilongwe effected by its development as Malawi's capital city has led to major changes in its population size, employment structure and administrative and transport roles. Whilst several factors can be suggested to have influenced this decision, including Lilongwe's central position and theoretical potential as a growth centre and problems associated with Zomba's location, it has been argued that the initial stimulus for the move came from President Banda, whose personal motives cannot be ignored. Therefore analysis of Lilongwe within an essentially positivist framework which links it to theoretical considerations concerning its geographical location, transport role, relation to other urban centres and the nature and extent of the market in its agricultural hinterland can only give a partial explanation of its choice. These factors do however give the context within which the final decision was made, and furthermore are important influences on its economic development role. It is proposed to draw the final conclusions about the decision to develop Lilongwe as a new capital city within the context of a comparison with other new African capitals, which helps to focus discussion on some of the opinions expressed here about the factors involved in this decision, by drawing attention to certain elements of similarity and contrast in the experience of other African countries.

Since independence several African countries have relocated their capital cities. Some of the factors that lay behind these decisions are relevant to Malawi, although there are exceptions. One problem faced by most African countries is that their capital cities are essentially located according to colonial economic and administrative imperatives. In many cases this led to the creation of peripheral capitals, often on the coast, which were suited to the outward-looking, export-oriented administration. Another problem, as suggested by Hamdan (1964), is that capitals often acquired a "regional" rather than national character, as

they were so located that they tended to be identified with particular sections of the population (for instance the Yoruba in Nigeria, or the Kikuyu in Kenya). Also as centres of investment colonial capitals sometimes formed the nodes of regions which benefited from the infrastructure and 'development' associated with concentrations of European settlement (for instance the 'White Highlands' in Kenya, and the Shire Highlands in Malawi). Furthermore these cities are "the most evident fingerprints of Europe on African life" (ibid, p. 239), which may tend to detract from their perceptual appeal as symbols of independent national pride.

Whilst these issues were not problematic for colonial governments, new national governments could less afford to appear obviously remote from their populations, or to ignore possible regional jealousies caused by imbalances in resource allocation in favour of the core area centred on the old capital. Although most countries have retained their old capitals, which represent major centres of fixed capital, Mauritania, Botswana, Tanzania and Nigeria, apart from Malawi, have transferred their capital cities, and recently the Ivory Coast has followed suit.

As in Malawi centrality has been one factor influencing the location of the new capitals in Nigeria, Tanzania and possibly the Ivory Coast. Zomba's location is not really peripheral in the sense that Lagos or Dar es Salaam are, but Lilongwe, Abuja and Dodoma all have a clear advantage over the old capitals in terms of their central locations. Even Gaborone is located fairly centrally in relation to the distribution of Botswana's population, although not in terms of national territory. For Tanzania ideological considerations related to the ujamaa policy emphasized the centrality factor. The Capital Development Authority in Tanzania states that Dodoma is "at the heart of Tanzania's ujamaa effort....and a government amongst the people is able to share their problems and progress, and thus serve them better" (CDA, 1974, p. 6, quoted in Hoyle,

1979).

On the other hand Mauritania chose a coastal location for its new capital. Mauritania's new capital programme was dictated by the fact that it had previously been administered from an external centre: St. Louis in Senegal. Botswana had suffered the same problem as its colonial capital was Mafeking in South Africa. Mauritania's choice however still reflected the country's geographical and political needs. Alternative sites such as Rosso, Port-Etienne (now Nouadhibou), and the more central Tijigja and Afar were either too inaccessible, in such a large and sparsely populated country, or too close to either the old colonial associations of Senegal, or to the threat of Moroccan interference. Nouakchott was at least on a main road and offered the advantage of being in the nomadic zone but relatively close to the sedentary southern population, and thus not antagonistic to either of the major sections of the population (Pitte, 1977).

In Nigeria where ethnic rivalry is a severe problem, the location of the new capital was clearly influenced by the need to choose a neutral location. Thus Abuja is in an area not inhabited by any of the major ethnic groups. To some extent ethnicity also played a part in the choice of Gaborone in Botswana, as it was accessible to six of the eight major tribes (Best, 1970), without being too closely associated with a particular tribal territory, as for example Serowe would have been (Gardner, personal communication, 1986). However in Malawi the capital transfer has shifted the administrative focus in favour of the country's strongest ethnic faction, and the President's strongest support base. This may reflect Banda's political motives or even subjective attachment to his 'home' area. Such factors appear to have operated in the Ivory Coast too, where Yamassoukro, near Houphouet-Boigny's birthplace has been chosen as the site of their new capital (West Africa, 1983).

The planning and finance of new capitals also provides some

interesting comparisons with Malawi. Apart from Nigeria all the countries involved are poor even by African standards (2). Mauritania and Botswana had little choice in incurring the cost of their new capitals, but both Nouakchott and Gaborone were planned on a smaller scale than Lilongwe. The cost of Dodoma in Tanzania however has led to internal criticism about expense (CDA, 1975) which has been far greater than originally expected. Dodoma's completion was planned for 1980 but building has been severely curtailed by lack of finance, and although it is now the official capital, Dar es Salaam remains the seat of government. As in Malawi, Dodoma's cost can only have served to exacerbate the repayment and foreign exchange problems faced by Tanzania, and here up until the middle of 1986 ideological commitment discouraged the government from accepting IMF or World Bank terms to alleviate its financial position, as Malawi did in the early 1980s.

In Nigeria Abuja's planned environment carries strong connotations of a massive prestige project, where considerations of expense, or indeed the opportunity to develop a new form of 'African' city in harmony with indigenous income levels and aesthetic preference have been spurned in favour of the most modern 'Western' construction and planning influences on all aspects of Abuja's development, from transport, to office buildings, to the nature of the drainage system (Moore, 1982). However whilst Abuja was planned in a time of considerable financial optimism in Nigeria, more recent years have seen a considerable change due to the oil price falls, and it appears that this is delaying Abuja's progress.

Abuja's planning was done by foreign consultants, and this dependence on outside planning forms a common element in new capital construction, and was also true for Malawi. Although Lilongwe's Master Plan was partly changed by local planners, it has been argued that the South African influence on the plan remained strong leading to zoning and transport problems which need not have arisen. The dependence on outside planners,

which also occurred in Tanzania, is an obvious paradox when it is considered that these new capitals are all meant to be symbols of independence and national pride. Doherty (1976) has been heavily critical of the implications of this factor for Dodoma. He feels that "the privileged position and newly acquired wealth and power of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie would be threatened by the implementation of a thorough-going social revolution....In the context of town planning, the type of planning which perpetuates social distinctions and inequalities is recognized and accepted; the ideological orientation of the capitalist based consultant planners and that of the indigenous bureaucratic stratum thus coincide and are mutually supporting" (ibid, p.11). On the other hand Dodoma has been planned to include mixed neighbourhoods of 'urban villages' which at least in theory should help to promote the community values associated with Tanzania's brand of African socialism. Dodoma should also have extensive busways and a greater degree of integration between the old town site and new capital centre than in Lilongwe, thus allowing pedestrians easy access to the functions of both (CDA, 1976). Tanzania's proposals for Dodoma therefore appear to be more appropriate to its circumstances than is the case in Malawi, although a continued anti-squatter sentiment is common to both new capitals.

Gaborone's development included strict zoning of even residential lands as in Lilongwe. Both Botswana and Malawi had a history of residential segregation on a racial basis, and this is obviously a reflection of that Southern African legacy. Both countries had the opportunity to achieve more balanced, mixed residential neighbourhoods as planned in Dodoma, and whilst segregation on income criteria may not be as contentious as racial segregation, it is indicative of an elitist approach not wholly appropriate to any supposedly democratic and popular government.

Nouakchott on the other hand has been called "modest by the standards

of other former West African colonies". The majority of the housing consists of simple one-storeyed traditional dwellings, and Mauritania's nomadic cultures are represented by tents stretching right up to the city limits with many people commuting between urban jobs and true encampments 40-60 miles away (Wolfers, 1975). Much of Nouakchott's early growth was due to the effect of the 1968-73 drought which led to the influx and increased sedentarization of previously nomadic people (Pitte, 1977). In 1975 Wolfers (op cit) commented that there is a closer affinity between Nouakchott and the rest of Mauritania than between most African capitals and their largely rural hinterlands. Whilst Tanzania in particular, and perhaps Malawi given the rhetoric devoted to Lilongwe's supposed impact on its rural hinterland, may have cause to feel envious of this affinity which is being specifically planned for in Dodoma, the now forced nature of this 'affinity' in the 1980s, accelerated further by the more recent drought can only be viewed with sadness because of its cause.

The issue of Lilongwe's growth centre role can also be compared to the strength and nature of the regional development role governments have expected of their new capitals in other countries. Neither Mauritania or Botswana considered directly the regional planning implications of their new capital sites, and although Gaborone and Nouakchott have grown rapidly and provided new centres of urban employment and investment which might not have otherwise developed, there is little evidence that a wider role was envisaged. On the other hand the planning of Dodoma and Abuja coincided with the upturn in interest given to regional planning issues, and like Lilongwe, this forms a component of Tanzania's and Nigeria's capital projects, although the emphasis differs.

Dar es Salaam and Lagos both represented a similar problem to that of Blantyre in Malawi, in terms of their overwhelming attractiveness for urban investment to the detriment of other urban centres. In their case the problem was further exacerbated by also being the national capital.

Dodoma's development is clearly hoped to counterbalance Dar es Salaam, and a general aim of Tanzania's urban policies is to divert urban growth from Dar to a series of urban growth centres (Hoyle, 1979). The Capital Development Authority in Tanzania also emphasizes Dodoma's ability to stimulate development in its surrounding region and states that "one of the principal reasons for the decision to transfer the national capital to Dodoma was to stimulate economic and agricultural progress in Tanzania's central, underdeveloped but potentially productive heartland (CDA, 1976, p.19). The CDA also conducted a major regional study of the 2500 square mile Capital City District in order to assist the implementation of the regional development programme, and suggested a number of projects which would be necessary if the capital was to become part of a truly developing region. Although there is no specific outline of an overall industrial policy directly related to 'growth centre' theory, there has been an effort to pinpoint regional resources which could be utilised as industrial raw materials. It is apparent that Tanzania had a considerable commitment to achieving Dodoma's potential as a growth centre, but there is as yet little evidence to show that it has succeeded. As that country's balance of payment problems deepened during the 1980s, its ability to fund the Dodoma programme has been limited, and Dar continues to grow rapidly and is still the most favoured location for urban investment.

In Nigeria the original White Paper on the new capital emphasized centrality as the main criterion for Abuja's choice (Nigeria, Government Committee, 1976), as the most fundamental objective of the new capital is to accelerate unity and integration of the nation (Africa, 1983). However it also made the point that Abuja's development would be accompanied by an enormous number of new job opportunities and that it would form a growth point for the surrounding region. Yet there was no attempt to go beyond this general statement to identify regional resources which might form

inputs for the capital's economy, nor of the specific forward linkages an urban industrial base might have with its hinterland, as there was in Tanzania. Furthermore whilst the Minister for the Federal Capital Development Authority stated in 1983 that Abuja would be not only a political capital but also a commercial and industrial centre, this was on the grounds that "as it is the capital it will attract investment from several quarters" (Africa, op cit, p.63), rather than any implication that its economic development would be guided or planned to fulfil a more specific regional role. It appears that, to an even greater degree than has been suggested for Lilongwe, the point made about Abuja's growth point role in the White Paper was made without any real commitment or consideration of the theoretical elements of growth centres. Indeed it has even been suggested in Nigeria that industrialization in Abuja should not be an important element of that city's development (Moore, 1982). Also as in Malawi where there is evidence of continued commitment to maintain Blantyre's economic development, Nigeria also expects Lagos to remain paramount as a metropolitan centre, and has designated it as "special area" so that it is assured of continued Federal investment.

The decision-making and planning for Lilongwe thus has certain comparable aspects to other new capitals in Africa. The theme of centrality or at least the need to be accessible to major sections of the population is common to all for example. However each of the new capitals have specific characteristics which are unique and reflect the political and cultural values of their nations, and the historical background to their inception. Political motivations involved must differ according to local ideologies and governments: in Tanzania therefore the ideology behind ujamaa has played a part in Dodoma's planning. In Nigeria Moore (ibid) has strongly argued that political motivations for General Gowon were paramount to the initial decision to create Abuja, and that later Shagari's perceptions of Nigeria's political tension further promoted its

development. However for Malawi the link between the national leader and the capital city programme has been even more clearly defined than elsewhere (for a more detailed comparison between Lilongwe and other new African capitals see Potts, 1985b).

In conclusion there are clearly two elements to Lilongwe's development since independence. These are its development as a new national administrative focus and secondly, growth and changes that have occurred in its urban economy. The focus in this study in terms of the latter element has particularly been on whether these are compatible with Lilongwe's expected growth centre functions and its ability to compete with Blantyre for urban investment.

Lilongwe has undoubtedly succeeded in becoming Malawi's capital city, replacing Zomba in both physical and perceptual terms. The nation now has a new central focus, which has considerable symbolic appeal as a national achievement and as concrete evidence of a shift away from colonial development patterns which had for so long favoured the Southern Region. In the Malawian context Lilongwe has now become a major city although its very rapid growth has not been unaccompanied by problems. The CCDC's role in Lilongwe's development was central but it has been shown that this body faced a number of institutional and financial difficulties. However it has to be remembered that the CCDC was faced with implementing a plan which had a strong South African influence, even after some redesign by local planners. As South Africa also maintained its influence through personnel in the CCDC itself, and was the source of the original loan, it has been directly and indirectly influential on Lilongwe's development from inception on. This has been combined with the fact that Banda's close association with the project determined that its visual appeal was linked to his personal prestige. Lilongwe is thus characterized by artificial segregation of residential zones, and a new CBD and national administrative zone which is not integrated with the old town, and

separated from low income residential areas. The peripheral location of the newer low income areas is an obvious parallel with the morphology of the apartheid city (Davies, 1981). Apart from the contentious implications of such zoning in an independent African country, the practical ramifications for the majority low income population are very difficult when the state has neither the funds nor the commitment to provide sufficient public transport capacity and subsidies necessary to make such a system efficient. Ignoring local realities in this way for whatever reason (political or aesthetic) is quite unjustifiable.

The provision of low income housing has also been shown to be a major shortfall of the new capital programme. Criticism on this point should however be tempered by recognition that the choice of site and service schemes was the most appropriate for Malawi's circumstances. Despite the arguments that such programmes shift the cost of construction onto the shoulders of those least able to bear it, and also recognizing that the simultaneous subsidization of medium income housing for government employees misallocates scarce resources, it has to be accepted that the CCDC's financial situation would have rendered any other option largely inviable and thus further heightened the housing problem. Nevertheless the CCDC, faced with massive competing claims on its finances and guided by essentially commercial considerations to favour potentially profitable investments could be regarded as institutionally incapable of fulfilling a commitment to low income housing schemes which do not bear a profit. The possibility of corruption, as suggested by the evidence on unorthodox and illegal plot allocation in the low income housing areas, is thereby heightened and this presumably has allowed some sort of monetary return (ie. the housing shortage could be both cause and effect of corrupt practices) - although it is impossible to determine how far the CCDC was directly involved.

Thus whilst the establishment of capital development authorities for

new capital programmes yields some benefits, low income housing may be neglected unless the authority either has a real commitment (perhaps ideological or politically imposed) to this issue, or government funds are specifically assigned to it either under the auspices of the authority, or an alternative body. The latter option may also yield advantages if its nature is likely to attract aid funds specifically for low income housing. The CCDC in Lilongwe, as a profit-seeking parastatal, had not attracted aid funds which might have been available for some of its responsibilities - and furthermore found it difficult to raise loans on external markets at soft rates. As has been shown this caused the CCDC to incur large debt repayment problems, as well as unorthodox commercial practices to raise funds through property companies, which have involved a financial burden being placed on both the government (because of rescheduling of government loans owed by the CCDC) and the national banking sector which guaranteed property company dividends.

It has also been demonstrated that the cost of the Lilongwe programme has far exceeded the original estimates - a further common element amongst new African capitals. Some of the projects which have been argued to be directly associated with Lilongwe's new status such as the airport and railway, have attracted overseas aid in the form of soft loans, but the analysis of the proportion of development expenditure Lilongwe has commanded must lead to the conclusion that it has contributed in no small part to the foreign exchange and balance of payments problems faced by Malawi by the late 1970s, which led to the imposition of an austerity budget during the 1980s and the intervention of the IMF and World Bank.

Analysis of the fulfilment of Lilongwe's growth centre function, as examined by the testing of hypotheses regarding its economic development in Chapter 8, to some extent sets aside the question of whether growth centres have any theoretical validity. Growth centres clearly fall within the context of the trickle-down diffusionist model of neo-classical

development theory, but throughout the less developed world such an idealized concept of the development process has become increasingly questionable as regional and income inequality increase. Although growth centres lend themselves particularly well to the implementation of regional planning policy, there are now many instances of growth centres which have not worked, and their continuing popularity must in part be due to the absence of any alternative policy-oriented theory. A major problem, despite the obvious appeal of the theory, is the very imperfect understanding of how the processes of the industrial multiplier effect and trickle-down work (Thomas, 1972; Appalraju and Safier, 1976; Mackie, 1982). It is therefore perhaps not very surprising that countries like Malawi have seized upon the model, but have paid little attention to the creation of the specific conditions that might promote such multiplier and trickle-down effects.

Dependency theorists have opposed the concepts of diffusionist development theory. Their model of underdevelopment in which surplus is extracted from less developed countries through a chain of urban centres to their sub-metropolises and thence to the industrialized metropolises of the capitalist world, essentially see urban centres as exploitative in nature, in direct opposition to the tenets of growth centre theory. The impossibility of full development of capitalist industrialization in the Third World is also central to their theories. However Malawi cannot be expected to have paid much attention to these ideas given the ideological nature of the state, which is essentially capitalist and does not pretend to pay even lip service to the popular concept of African socialism.

Warren's (1973) arguments that capitalist industrial development is possible in the Third World were also developed within a Marxist framework. Whilst these might be viewed as giving credence to the concept of the industrial development effect in growth centres, they do not however support their regional development role given that this theory

emphasizes the exploitative and painful nature of the capitalist process.

The description of Lilongwe as a growth centre therefore was no guarantee that the regional development envisaged by policy makers would take place, even had local conditions been conducive to theoretical success and had the government been more committed to the policy. However as discussed in Chapter 8 Malawian economic circumstances in many ways call the application of such a theory into question. Attention has been drawn to the small size of the economy as a whole, the paucity of the domestic market which places a severe demand constraint on the industrial sector, and the lack of local industrial and capital resources which make it virtually impossible to identify a "key propulsive industry" which could serve as an industrial 'inductor' in Lilongwe. These factors are by no means unique to Malawi, and it is suggested that many African countries (including Tanzania for example) should recognize that even if they accept the validity of growth centre theory, this does not in itself mean that it is an appropriate regional planning tool for all countries.

The drastic falls in industrial production and employment in the second half of the 1970s in Malawi also did not bode well for Lilongwe's industrial development. A further problem, beyond Malawi's control but very relevant to an industrial process which must largely depend on imported components, is the general instability of the Southern African region as a whole, which has caused continuous disruption of its vital transport routes.

Apart from these general considerations however it is also evident that the government itself has taken an ambiguous stance on Lilongwe's growth centre, as opposed to its national administrative, role. Policies to induce industrial development in Lilongwe, and in particular to reduce Blantyre's competitiveness, have taken the form of the control of industrial licences and the limitation of industrial land availability in Blantyre, but it has been shown that neither of these policies have been

effectively used, and both have now been relaxed. There has also been no apparent attempt to ensure that the industrial licences granted in Lilongwe would lead to the establishment of industrial concerns with regional links, such as production of agricultural inputs. Even the Industrial Development Guidelines of the 1980s pay no special attention to Lilongwe's industrial development, and make no mention of its growth centre role. The fact that ADMARC essentially controls agricultural inputs from AGRIMAL in Blantyre obviously decreases the potential for such development anyway, and further highlights the problems of the small market which makes such a monopoly possible and potentially more efficient in allowing for economies of scale. On the other hand Kydd (1985, p. 34) has stated that inputs supplies to the agricultural sector have become less efficient and that there is a case for reducing ADMARC's dominant position in this respect, by either permitting or promoting competition. If this should occur, perhaps due to World Bank pressure which in particular has paid attention to reorganization of Malawi's parastatals, this could greatly improve the prospects for real links between Lilongwe's industrial sector and its rural hinterland.

This study has also illuminated certain factors relevant to private decision-makers in the industrial sector which it is clear the government had not taken into account. Long-standing residential ties, and the perception of land costs in Blantyre and Lilongwe were clearly important to such decisions. The behaviour of key industrial concerns, particularly Press, were also viewed as influential factors in determining Lilongwe's competitive position. Unorthodox land transactions in Blantyre also distorted the theoretical advantage that Lilongwe might have had in this sphere. The perceptions of discrimination in the Asian community were also important in decision-making, although essentially unquantifiable. Such factors may well operate in other countries, although being largely behavioural, local ethnic and residential patterns would make their

effects very variable.

However whilst Lilongwe has clearly not succeeded as a growth centre in the classical sense, it is here proposed that its economic role within the urban hierarchy in Malawi has been greatly enhanced since its development as the capital. As has been shown there is evidence that in some spheres, Lil^ongwe's record has equalled or exceeded Blantyre's. The massive construction has been a major factor - as indicated by the analysis of building plans passed and completed in both cities. Despite Blantyre's competitiveness in the private sector for building, unsurprisingly Lilongwe's public building and statutory body construction programme has attracted far more resources, although construction has often been delayed. Rapid growth rates of employment have been recorded in all sectors, although these have varied over the years. The boom in construction employment, combined with huge increases in the number of tertiary sector employees, many related to Lilongwe's administrative role, have greatly boosted internal demand for the service sector, and internal industrial production for local demand. Lilongwe has also provided a market for local agricultural producers for food. Although clearly the geographical extent of this impact is limited, it was one factor identified by LLDP officials as a benefit to their programme. Furthermore analysis of the nature of the industrial sector does indicate the existence of internal backward and forward linkages on a small-scale, and the operation of an industrial multiplier effect, of which local industrialists are aware. Also whilst the evidence of linkages to Lilongwe's agricultural hinterland are largely disappointing, an important element of Lilongwe's industrial sector has been the establishment of the tobacco auction floors in competition with Limbe, as a direct result of government policy. This at least does provide an important backward link to the rapidly growing tobacco production sector.

Although Lilongwe's industrial sector does remain small in comparison

to Blantyre, and all the evidence suggests that the latter's competitiveness has re-asserted itself and will be maintained, Lilongwe does now have an established industrial base which has reduced the polarization of such development in Blantyre. Kydd (1985) states that there was a surprising degree of buoyancy in Malawi's import-substituting consumer goods industry in 1984, which he links to the raised real incomes of the upper third or so of peasant farmers resulting from the maize price increases in particular. Relaxation of price controls on many basic industrial products such as clothing, soap, furniture, stock feeds, and mattresses in September 1983 (ibid) may have also played a part, and therefore Lilongwe's newly established industrial base may be improving, as the key constraints of profitability and demand have eased slightly.

The surveys undertaken have also established that Lilongwe's transport development has played a part in attracting industry. The railway has allowed the development of a heavy industrial zone for example, although its construction has been argued to be largely a result of the new capital aspect of Lilongwe's development, rather than its growth centre role, and its extension to the Zambian border can only yield real benefits for Lilongwe if it is eventually connected with the Zambian network. Interestingly the new international airport, which might be seen as less directly influential on industrial development, which has been criticized as a prestige project and which is undoubtedly underutilized, does however seem to be perceived within Lilongwe as a major benefit. Several industrialists felt that their operations could be expanded when it became operational (as it now is). Perhaps more significantly in terms of Lilongwe's economic role in the urban hierarchy as a whole is the fact that, although Blantyre has clearly retained its position as the centre for industrial decision-making as the locus of most multi-branch firms' headquarters, there was a clear indication that several firms felt that the airport (rather than Lilongwe's capital status) was sufficient cause

for transfer of their headquarters to Lilongwe.

There is therefore a relationship between the two elements of Lilongwe's development outlined above. Its development as the national capital has involved major infrastructural investments which have fed directly and indirectly into the creation of a stronger and more varied economic base. Thus although it is proposed that a new capital programme per se cannot be used as a surrogate for a regional development policy, in Lilongwe's case associated projects have boosted its economic development. The relocation of the administration has drawn with it an allocation of transport and construction resources which have allowed a degree of deconcentration within the urban system. Zomba's failure in this respect therefore was not a definite indication that administrative development could not entail economic spin-offs. Lilongwe has not succeeded in the strict terms of a growth centre, but within Malawi the dominance of the agricultural sector must dictate that essentially rural development programmes and policies, and attention to the smaller service centres, should be the prime focus of attempts to promote greater regional equality. It is probable that Blantyre will remain the most economically efficient place for much urban-based investment, but Lilongwe can now provide a degree of competition, and has succeeded in providing a new national focus more likely to create a feeling of national pride and identity than the entirely colonial creations of Blantyre and Zomba.

Notes for Chapter Nine

1. In South Africa and Southern Rhodesia it was necessary deliberately to underdevelop peasant agriculture in order to force labour into the market in sufficient quantities (Arrighi, 1970; Bundy, 1979). However in many parts of Nyasaland conditions for migrant labour were already in force. Even where settler agriculture demanded local labour the colonial government sometimes had to intervene to prevent migration out of the country in order to maintain local supplies, although massive Alomwe immigration from Mozambique greatly eased the settlers' labour problems.
2. The Ivory Coast of course has greater financial capabilities but its new capital programme is not yet clearly defined.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 2.1

Estimates of Migrant Labour from Nyasaland

Methods of estimating the total available male labour force for Nyasaland varied and this effects the calculation of the proportion of the labour force abroad at any one time. For the earlier years in Table 2.2 the criteria used was merely the adult male labour force and it is difficult to tell whether any age limits were set or allowance made for those unable to work through illness etc. It seems likely that no upper age limit was set as for the year 1945 (a census year) a total of 390,000 adult males was estimated to be living in Nyasaland (the de facto adult male population) and the estimated male labour force is given as 513,000. The missing 123,000 is the number given as working abroad (including some in this particular year still on military service because of World War II). It is possible that some underestimation of the proportion of the true male work force abroad occurred then, because the estimated total male labour force probably included a section who were too old or unfit to work and who would remain in Nyasaland. Only able-bodied men would be likely to obtain jobs abroad. From 1948 on the estimates made were for "able-bodied manpower" and so the calculated percentages are likely to be more accurate representations of the proportion of the male labour force absent in each year.

The estimation that over a third of the male labour force was absent in the years after the war was made on the basis of data taken directly from the Colonial Report records. A 1958 estimate by the 'Jack' Report, the federal economic survey of Nyasaland, was rather less: 20-25%. However this calculation was made on the basis of an estimate of adult male taxpayers as a surrogate for the Nyasaland male labour force, which would include some unable to work. Also this estimate of 615,000 included an unknown number of the 153,000 absent in Northern and Southern Rhodesia at that time, and a 'guesstimate' of 75,000 is used in order to arrive at a percentage absent figure (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1959). This is regarded as less accurate than using the contemporary colonial records.

APPENDIX 2.2

The Recruitment of Migrant Labour from Nyasaland

The conditions under which migration occurred from Nyasaland varied according to the destination. Southern Rhodesia was always the most important destination, followed by the Union of South Africa, and then Northern Rhodesia. The main destination for the few workers going to 'other territories' was Tanganyika.

A certain proportion of those who went to Southern Rhodesia went under contract but the majority simply left Nyasaland and found a job there when they arrived. In 1938 it was estimated that only 3,000 of the 72-75,000 Nyasa male workers in Southern Rhodesia were contract labourers. The proportion of contracted workers did gradually increase although very few organizations were permitted to recruit in Nyasaland, and those that did usually operated under a quota system. WENELA was one such, and in 1946 the Southern Rhodesia Agricultural Native Labour Ltd. was allowed to recruit up to 5,000 workers. Later the main Southern Rhodesian recruiting body was the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission which, for instance, had a quota of 8,000 workers in 1954 which had increased to 14,000 by 1958. A few selected Rhodesian companies could also recruit workers, and in 1956 a special allowance was made to permit the recruitment of up to 8,500 labourers for the Kariba dam, although only 2,843 and 2,203 were obtained in 1956 and 1957 respectively. It is probable that the Nyasa worker preferred in fact to work uncontracted, as a contract implied the imposition of various restrictions on his freedom to come and go, and use of his wages. Often it proved impossible to fill the quotas permitted as in the example of the Kariba recruitment drive. In 1947 a Tripartite Migrant Labour Agreement between Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established and enforced from 1949 until its termination in 1960. This governed the conditions of work of uncontracted labourers and was geared more to the protection of economic and social life in the migrant's country of origin than to his own individual interests. It provided for deferred pay and regular family remittances and repatriation after two years of all single or unaccompanied men. Despite encouragement of family migration by the Nyasaland authorities, the general rule even for uncontracted workers in Southern Rhodesia was for men to migrate alone leaving their family in Nyasaland. Support of their dependents was enforced by this agreement, and backed up by the system of identity certificates which had to be obtained before any departure. This allowed the issuing officer to identify those with family obligations and to ensure that some provision was made for dependents; for instance, by the preparation and planting of 'gardens' as Malawian agricultural plots are usually termed (Nyasaland, 1959).

All migrant workers to the Union of South Africa were contract labourers, and WENELA was the only body allowed to conduct recruitment in Nyasaland for the Union. Recruitment to South Africa fell over the period in question: in 1960 14% of the male migrants from Nyasaland were in South Africa, compared to 33% in 1947 (the respective proportions in Southern Rhodesia being 71% and 56%). Absolute numbers also displayed a downward trend from 1947-53. However in 1961 more identity certificates were issued to migrants going to South Africa than to those going to Southern Rhodesia (Table 2.4). This reflects the downward trend of applications for certificates to Southern Rhodesia from 1956 on, which may partly have been due to the relatively more permanent nature of migration to Southern Rhodesia as some workers did take their families (a situation obviously impossible in South Africa). Official reports also attributed the fall to "unsettled conditions in Rhodesia and the increasing difficulty

experienced by Nyasaland Africans in obtaining secure employment" (Nyasaland, 1960, p.32). This latter factor can be related to the underdevelopment of the Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia, which by the 1950s had made it much easier for employers to obtain local labour in that country (Clarke, 1974).

The WENELA quota was increased from only 4,000 in the late 1930s to 12,750 in 1946. The quota fell thereafter, presumably reflecting labour needs in Nyasaland, but then rose steadily and was finally abolished in 1960 to relieve the unemployment which occurred in Nyasaland in that year. This unemployment possibly occurred as a result of the drop in employment opportunities in Southern Rhodesia as mentioned above. It was also about the same time that new migration to Southern Rhodesia peaked that WENELA began to fill its quota allowance; up until 1955 WENELA had never succeeded in doing this which may have indicated a reluctance to migrate to South Africa if alternative, and especially non-contract, opportunities were available, despite the higher wages offered. One can only speculate as to why earlier quotas were not filled. Possible factors at work were a dislike of apartheid (a factor which definitely caused African Nyasas to resent the Federation which they felt might allow the spread of this system); the greater distance and less familiar climate which had to be contended with; and the non-availability of casual employment without a contract. Nyasas only represented a small proportion of South Africa's foreign labourers, and by 1962 the mines had reached temporary saturation point and recruitment dropped (Nyasaland, 1962). The number of foreign-born male Africans in South Africa (who would mostly be employees) in 1946 and 1960 has been estimated at 435,000 and 483,960 (Clarke, 1978, p.56). If this is compared to the numbers of Nyasas estimated as being in the Union for those years they represented only 8% and 6% of these foreign males. Mozambique and Lesotho were far more important sources at that time: at least 173,000 Mozambiquans being in South Africa in 1954 (Wastberg, 1963). Nyasaland was, however, an important source of labour amongst those who came from further north. In 1952 23% of the 31,000 'tropicals' (foreign Africans recruited from north of latitude 22° S) employed in the South African mines were from Nyasaland, compared to 16% from Tanganyika, 10% from South West Africa and 6% from Barotseland (Wilson, 1972). By comparison, Nyasas formed approximately 30 % of the foreign able-bodied male Africans in Southern Rhodesia in 1951, and this had increased to about 40% by 1958 (Report of the Advisory Commission, 1960, Appendix VI).

APPENDIX 3.1

Components of Population Growth in Blantyre

The 1977 census provides information on the under one population still alive, born in Blantyre. A total of 8,243 were reported, of which 7292 remained in the city whilst the remainder were resident elsewhere. To estimate the total number of births it is necessary to adjust for infant mortality, estimated in the World Bank demographic survey which is the most reliable source, at 136 per thousand in urban areas (Hill, 1982). The adjusted figures are 9364 and 8283. As a cross-check the number of births expected from reported fertility rates for urban areas in the Southern Region (of which Blantyre accounts for three-quarters of the population) was calculated on the basis of the estimated mid-year female population in the appropriate age groups: this gave a figure of 9156 which is in reasonable agreement with reported births. The average of the two figures (9364 and 9156) was used as an acceptable approximation. The death rate for Blantyre was taken as that calculated from reported urban deaths in the Southern Region which was 11.1 per thousand.

The mid-year population had to be calculated as it is the most applicable figure on which to estimate crude birth rates. This was done on the basis of the 1977 census figure for the city (219,011) and the population which reported that it lived in Blantyre a year prior to the census (192,666). There is reason to believe that the latter was an underestimate as urban-rural migration has been undercounted (see Section 3.2.4). However using the average of the two years would help to smooth out this imperfection to some extent.

The crude birth rate calculated by this method (total births per mid-year population) was 45 per thousand, almost identical to the national urban rate. When related to the crude death rate this gives a natural increase rate of 3.49% per year.

The AAGR for Blantyre from 1966-77 was 6.4%. This growth rate appears to have been very steady throughout the intercensal period. Using data from the 1972 Blantyre City Population Sample Census, it is possible to calculate the 1966-72 and 1972-77 AAGRs as well. These were 6.5% and 6.4% respectively. Relating the 3.5% natural increase rate to the total growth rates implies that net in-migration must therefore have accounted for around 55% of Blantyre's intercensal growth.

Sources: 1. Malawi, National Statistical Office, Malawi Population Census, 1977, Final Report, Volume 1; Zomba, 1980.
2. Malawi, National Statistical Office, Blantyre City Population Sample Census, September 11-October 11, 1972; Zomba, 1974.

APPENDIX 4.1Categories of Urban Functions

Three categories of urban functions were defined for the analysis of central places. The first category included a number of facilities which were assumed to be the most important factors in determining the level and potential of the 'private' urban economy or commercial and industrial development. The centres were ranked according to their appointed values for the following services: retail and wholesale services, petrol and vehicle repairs, public transport, water and electricity, postal facilities, banking facilities, and hotel/rest-house availability.

The second category relates to services which are part of the administrative and welfare structure of the centres. Their administrative functions depend largely upon their historical status in the colonial administrative structure, and most urban centres are the seats of the district administration. Yet relatively few have been designated as 'towns' and have the advantage of being administered by a specifically designed urban institution: the Town Council. Other services included were protection, justice, health, education and community facilities. These are mainly provided by government, although religious missions also provide some facilities in the last three categories.

Urban centres also act as focal points for the rural economy and the provision of these services is one of their most crucial roles in an agriculturally orientated economy. Thus a variety of services were considered: for example the location of agricultural project administrative offices and higher order veterinary services, of forestry and fishery stations, and of the produce depots and market of the government's agricultural marketing concern, ADMARC. The values assigned for the various functions are shown in Appendix Tables 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d. These functions and values are as used by the Town and Country Planning Department (1979).

SECTOR	FIRST ORDER (4 POINTS)	SECOND ORDER (3 POINTS)	THIRD ORDER(2 POINTS)	FOURTH ORDER(1 POINT)
1. Agriculture	NRDP HQ or District Field Officer	Training Centre or Area supervisor or NRDP Offices	Extension Worker	Extension worker within 3 miles or Demonstration plot
2. Veterinary & Forestry	Veterinary District office forestry office & Dip Tank	Veterinary Area Office or Dip tank and cattle market	Veterinary Assistant and Dip Tank	Dip tank within 3 miles
3. Admarc	Main or Parent Depot	Permanent market	Temporary	Market within 3 miles
4. Wholesale & Retail	30+ points (see table II)	20-29 points	10-19 points	less than 10 points
5. Petrol & Vehicle repairs	Several petrol companies & repair facilities	One petrol company and repair facilities	One petrol company	Facilities existing but out of use
6. Public Transport	Any three of: All year round bus, rail, harbour airstrip	All year bus service & air field/rail/harbour	All year bus service	Dry season bus service only
7. Rest houses hotels	Tourist class hotel or resthouse	Government rest house	D.C. rest house	Other rest house
8. Postal service	Post office & telephone exchange	P.O.	or postal agency	Within 3 miles of Postal agency or postal agency class "B"

(continued)

Table 4.a
Values for Central Place Functions

SECTOR	FIRST ORDER(4 POINTS)	SECOND ORDER(3 POINTS)	THIRD ORDER (2 POINTS)	FOURTH ORDER (1 POINT)
9. Banking	2 or more permahent banks	One permanent bank	static bank part time or mobile bank	Post office savings bank or within 3 miles of other
10. Administration	District Commissioner and District & Town Councils	District Commissioner's Office and District Council Office i.e. (Sub-boma)	District Council Sub-Office	Traditional Authority HQ.
11. Protection	Police station	Police sub-station	Police post or rural pllice unit	Within 3 miles of police post
12. Justice	Senior resident magistrate or Commissioner for Justice	Magistrate (any Level)	Traditional Court	Within 3 miles of Traditional court
13. Health	Government Hospital (District or special)	Primary health centre or mission hospital	Health sub centre or Mission dispensary	Health post or D.C. Maternity unit or under 5's clinc
14. Education	Primary, Secondary and further education	Primary and Secondary education	Full Primary school	Junior Primary School
15. Community Facilities	At least football ground churches and 3 other facilities	At least football ground churches and two other facilities	At least football ground, churches and one other facility	At least football ground and 1 or 2 churches
16. Others	4 of..... see table IV	3 of	2 of	1 of

Table 4a (continued)

TABLE 4b

POINTS RETAIL AND WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION & CRAFTS

D.C. Food market with permanent buildings	3
Roadside market with no permanent buildings	2
Groceries - small	1
Canteens - small	1
Bars	1
Maize mill	1
Saw mill	2
Carpenter	2
Other Craftsmen	2
Specialist shops	3
General stores - large	2
Supermarkets	3
Wholesale	3

FIRST ORDER	SECOND ORDER	THIRD ORDER	FOURTH ORDER
30 + Retail Points	20-29 Retail points	10-19 Retail points	Less than 10 retail points
4 C.P. Point Points	3 C.P. points	2 C.P. Points	1 C.P point

TABLE 4c

Football Ground
Children's playground
Homecraft worker
Social Centre
Community Development Facility/Library
Hall
CCAP Church
R.C. Church
Mosque
Anglican Church
Public telephone

TABLE 4d

OTHERS INCLUDE:-

Piped Water Supply
Electricity Supply (Escom = 3rd order i.e. counts at 2 points)
Training Establishments (not T.T.or University)
Research Establishments
NYP "
MCP "
Brick works
Customs Post

APPENDIX 4.2

Transaction flow analysis

Transaction flow analysis interprets data on exchanges of information between areal units. It allows all important or salient interactions to be identified, instead of only nodal flows. Salient flows are those of greater than expected strength, given the magnitude of total interaction with the whole system of both the origin and destination. The expected interaction is based on the assumption of origin-destination independence and ignores the effect of distance. It is related to the proportion of all interactions received at each point i.e. if a centre received 10% of the total number of interactions made in the system, then it is expected to receive 10% of the interactions made from each individual centre. If this value is exceeded by what is regarded to be a significant proportion then the interaction is considered salient. In terms of an analysis of telephone calls this means that the proportion of calls from origin to destination is expected to be equal to the total proportion of all calls received at that destination. Both direct and indirect associations can be identified. Mutually salient centres would both have made more than the expected number calls to one another. An indirect association would indicate that the salience was only one-way i.e. a centre would be indirectly associated with another if it only received more than the expected number of calls, but did not send more.

The measure of salience used is called the relative acceptance index, which is calculated from the following equation:

$$RA = \frac{A - E}{E}$$

where A is the actual number of transactions from one centre to another, and E is the expected strength of transactions between them:

$$E = \frac{\text{calls received} \times \text{calls sent}}{\text{all calls in system}}$$

For this study an $RA > 2$ was regarded as salient.

The method was developed by Savage and Deutsch (1960) and has been identified as being a useful indicator "of the mutual relevance of political units to one another and of their potential cohesion" (Deutsch, 1964).

APPENDIX 4.3

Regression Analysis of Telephone Data

The general supposition behind gravity model analysis is that interactions between centres, whether in the form of flows of goods, services, people or information, will be strongly influenced by their relative 'mass' and the distance between them. The form of the regression equation generally used for this sort of analysis is:

$$\log(\text{flow}_{ij}) = A + b\log(\text{mass}_i) + c\log(\text{mass}_j) + d\log(\text{dist}_{ij})$$

The independent 'mass' variable used in the Malawian analysis is the population of each centre taken from the 1977 census. Hirst (1975, p.277) felt that population would be of limited predictive power as a measure of mass in Tropical Africa as it is often found that population size is not a "very discriminating variable in terms of the socio-cultural patterns, political power and economic activity of an urban system in the early stages of development". However attempts to improve upon the crude population mass variable, using numbers of telephone subscribers or central place mass in terms of functional importance, were generally found to decrease the explanatory power of the mass variable in Malawi. Hirst used a measure of industrial structure as his mass variable, extracted from a principle components analysis of the features of Tanzanian towns. A similar surrogate was not possible in the Malawian case as statistics are not produced for industrial employment in any but the largest towns.

It was also found that the general practice of logarithmically transforming all the variables in the equation was not a satisfactory manipulation for the Malawian data. This manipulation is usual in such regressions as it tends to 'smooth' the difference between values when there is a large gap between the maximum and minimum and thus tends to improve the total explanatory value yielded (i.e. the r^2 value). However the range of population size for Malawian towns was too small to merit this treatment as it was found that this slightly decreased the variance explained. Instead the size values were divided by 100 in order to make the co-efficients more comparable to those for other values. The other variables were logarithmically transformed, the dependent variable being taken as the logarithm of calls between each urban dyad, thus yielding 1024 dyads. As this formulation led to a significant number of dyads being ignored, since no calls were registered, checks were done to ensure that the relative degree of importance of the dependent variable was not affected by this manipulation. This was done by giving all 0 recorded interactions the value of 1 which could be logarithmically transformed. Comparison of the two sets of regressions showed that in fact the number of 0 interactions did not affect the results in any significant way. The distance variable was taken as the simple straight-line distance between centres. This was assumed to be a fair measure, rather than the more complex road distance, for telephone interactions. Hirst (op cit) for instance found that further manipulation of the distance variable in Tanzania only yielded very slight improvements in his regression model.

Development Potential and Rural-Urban Linkages
Indices for the District Centres Development
Programme

District	(1) Smallholder Development Index 1)	(2) Agric. Estate Development Index 1)	(3) Secondary Sector Devt. Index	(4) Tertiary Sector Development Index 1)	(5) Public Sector Development Index 1)	(6) Road Development Index 1)	(7) Road Deficit Index 1)	(8) Population Potential Index 2)	(9) Aggregated Unweighted Total Index	(10) Unweighted Total Indicator (Rank)	(11) Aggregated Agric. biased Total Index	(12) Agric. biased Total Indicator (Rank)
Chitipa	100	0	10	21	92	78	- 162	103	247	48(17)	347	43(19)
Karonga	228	0	8	60	207	100	- 186	5	422	83(9)	655	92(9)
Rumphi	44	49	0	37	170	105	- 66	87	426	83(9)	606	84(10)
Mzimba	75	20	10	111	272	100	- 252	219	555	109(7)	869	120(5)
Nkhata Bay	89	58	15	38	77	110	+ 0	5 5	392	77(12)	544	75(12)
Kasungu	119	594	7	24	38	65	- 83	152	916	179(2)	1,781	247(2)
Nkhosakota	169	0	7	10	66	103	+ 0	17	372	73(13)	558	77(11)
Mchinji	128	124	0	19	26	129	- 52	72	446	87(8)	770	107(8)
Ntchisi	142	0	0	24	45	59	- 183	69	156	31(22)	367	51(18)
Dowa	178	1	0	13	36	110	- 107	4	235	46(19)	418	58(16)
Lilongwe	161	34	162	113	195	89	- 117	- 9	628	123(5)	814	113(6)
Salima	105	41	23	140	76	190	+ 0	37	612	120(6)	795	110(7)
Dedza	44	8	2	8	55	121	- 97	- 20	121	24(23)	153	21(23)
Ntcheu	91	9	0	21	38	138	- 52	- 17	228	45(20)	311	43(21)
Mangochi	44	150	5	51	40	75	- 45	21	341	67(14)	472	65(14)
Machinga	86	6	5	68	27	94	- 69	33	250	49(16)	275	52(17)
Mwanza	125	45	0	57	33	24	- 134	15	165	32(21)	350	48(20)
Zomba	44	62	60	40	182	125	- 66	- 40	407	80(11)	473	66(13)
Blantyre	100	53	723	614	167	216	- 55	- 46	1,772	347(1)	1,879	260(1)
Chiradzulu	61	37	15	5	45	154	+ 0	- 56	261	51(15)	303	42(22)
Mulanje	39	202	55	8	37	94	- 141	- 52	243	45(17)	432	60(15)
Thyolo	39	399	119	70	33	121	+ 0	- 74	710	139(3)	1,074	149(4)
Chikwawa	239	194	75	46	123	56	- 34	- 4	695	136(4)	1,124	156(3)
Nsanje	92	1	14	33	27	54	- 214	- 4	43	9(24)	137	19(24)
All Malawi	100	100	100	100	100	100	- 100	+ 11	511	100	722	100

1) Percent of national average

2) Percent of rural district population in 1977

3) Double weight for indices 1,2 and 8

Table 4.6: Potential and Resources Utilization Indicator by District

Source: TCPD, 1980a, Tables 5-1 and 5-11

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Name of Centre	(1) Population Index	(2) Population Growth Index	(3) Agricultural Services Index	(4) Market Services Index	(5) Public Services Index	(6) Private Services Index	(7) Infrastruc- ture Deve- lopment Index	(8) Urban Economy Index	(9) Development- Constraint Index	(10) Aggregated Total Index	(11) Total Comparative Advantages Indicator	(12) Rank
Chittipa	72	99	36	110	107	123	35	48	115	745	63	28
Varanasi	276	99	144	147	137	137	35	96	29	1,100	122	5
Chikamba	70	99	36	147	55	115	71	144	86	823	91	23
Zwargu	33	99	144	147	122	108	106	48	115	982	109	13
Mabeta Bay	94	99	144	147	126	115	141	144	86	1,096	122	5
Lubani	47	148	36	37	55	87	35	144	115	704	78	31
Mzimba	115	99	144	147	126	115	35	96	115	992	110	12
Debuque	47	197	72	110	56	51	141	192	58	924	101	14
Mbata-Nata	240	49	72	147	110	87	141	48	115	924	101	14
Kasimaga	151	197	72	110	122	130	71	144	115	1,009	112	11
Kacalel	43	49	108	110	68	72	35	48	115	1,112	123	4
Kova	48	49	108	110	107	58	71	48	115	668	74	34
Ngomale	65	99	108	110	101	87	71	96	115	677	75	33
Kasiya	35	99	72	110	95	72	35	96	115	658	95	20
Kchimaji	46	99	144	110	122	94	141	144	115	729	81	30
Salima	108	148	144	147	129	123	141	144	115	1,064	118	8
Chipoka	65	99	72	0	49	65	141	144	86	1,170	130	2
Dacia	129	48	108	73	126	130	106	48	115	883	98	22
Kachau	72	48	144	73	129	115	141	48	115	885	98	17
Belaka	178	99	108	147	103	130	141	96	115	1,117	124	3
Mungochi	78	99	72	37	118	123	106	96	115	844	94	21
Morley Bay	76	99	72	73	80	103	106	96	86	204	89	24
Mzimba	23	99	144	110	71	87	106	48	115	802	89	24
Livanda	63	197	36	147	60	101	141	192	115	1,097	122	5
Zomba	48	49	144	147	127	164	141	144	86	1,481	165	1
Licarage	47	99	108	0	26	87	141	48	115	744	83	28
Chiradzulu	16	49	108	0	95	43	141	0	115	567	63	26
Mtanga	53	99	108	147	110	87	35	48	115	802	89	24
Tlopolo	97	99	108	147	122	123	141	96	115	844	94	21
Isichenze	79	148	36	167	80	115	141	192	115	1,053	117	9
Mulazje	70	99	144	0	129	87	35	48	58	670	74	34
Chikwawa	66	49	144	110	122	87	106	48	58	790	85	27
Mchato	136	148	36	37	62	87	106	192	115	919	102	15
Mgandu	132	49	144	110	99	115	106	96	115	917	102	15
Gangula	53	148	72	147	49	101	141	192	115	1,018	113	10
Mzimba	132	49	106	110	118	123	71	48	115	654	98	17
All Centres (Average)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	900	100	

Table 4f: Comparative Advantages Indicator and Rankings for Small and Medium Sized Urban Centres


APPENDIX 4.5

The Relationship between the District Centres Development Programme and other projects

There is an attempt to tie in the district centres plan with the operations of two rural development programmes which have ramifications for the centres' development: the National Rural Development Programme (NRDP) and the Rural Growth Centres Project (RGCP). The first is a national programme formulated and administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources to improve production opportunities for the entire rural smallholder population, 80% of which was not covered by existing major projects. This is administered through 8-10 Agricultural Development Divisions (ADDs), with their headquarters at Karonga, Mzuzu, Kasungu, Lilongwe, Salima, Liwonde, Blantyre, Ngabu with possible plans to include Mzimba and Ntcheu. In addition the country is sub-divided into 180 Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) with a corresponding number of local small centres for administration (Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources, 1978). These centres obviously provide a very useful foundation on which to base the "rural centres" of the DCDP's proposals, as well as indicating which higher-order centres should be favoured, and should automatically ensure that these have special ties with ongoing rural developments. The development of these centres and the 40 planned rural projects which will cover on average 4-5 EPAs, is to be completed in phases over ten years, starting in the early 1980s, and can therefore be linked with the phasing of the district centres programme. However there is some evidence that despite the compatibility of the two projects there has been a lack of attention to the need to ensure that they do not conflict. For instance the consultants for the DCDP indicate that instead of the district capitals of Mzimba, Nkhotakota and Ngabu, the nearby non-urban centres of Euthini, Dwangwa and Bangula should become sub-regional centres. The reasons given are that Euthini, although very low on most indices, falls within an area of high agricultural potential because of tobacco estate development, whilst Dwangwa has a similar advantage over Nkhotakota because it is the centre of the latest sugar development in Malawi. Ngabu falls just within Blantyre's sphere of influence and was therefore rejected in favour of the railway centre of Bangula. However both Ngabu and Mzimba have special status under the NRDP, the former as an ADD headquarters, and the latter as an ADD sub-centre which may be promoted to headquarter status (*ibid*). Euthini only has EPA centre status, whilst Bangula has not been selected under the NRDP. Similarly Dwangwa has not been selected as an EPA probably because it has little association with smallholders, whilst Nkhotakota has. Considering the emphasis put on the necessity of linkages between rural and urban centres by the consultants as a way of providing growth in both primary and secondary sectors, it is surprising that at the level of sub-regional centres, three centres may be neglected despite the existence of institutional facilities which definitely give them an advantage in this respect.

The Rural Growth Centres Project is co-ordinated by the Development Division of the Office of the President and Cabinet, and financed by the German government (OPC, Development Division, 1980a). The project has three main objectives: to create focal points of development in remote or underdeveloped areas by providing social and economic services to the rural population; to give rural people an opportunity to participate better in local development activities and thus contribute to administrative decentralization; and to contribute to the integration of development activities of the various Ministries in rural areas (OPC, 1978). The stress is particularly on improving service provision in

remote areas, on average not less than 40 miles from District Centres, as can be seen from the location of the 10 pilot centres in Appendix Map 4.1. There may therefore be a political motivation behind the project as most of these centres are very near international borders. However this does mean that areas that might otherwise have been neglected by the proposals of the DCDP in terms of national coverage are provided with centres which generally fulfil the role of 'rural centres'. In addition, 15 more centres were proposed for development from 1983/84, over a period of 5 years, to be located in areas so far not covered by the pilot centres, and efforts have been made to co-ordinate the choice of centres with the NRDP (OPC, DD, 1980b). The centres will be provided with health and community centres, market and workshop areas, post offices, rest-houses and staff houses; and roads and water supply will be improved with the aim of making "the centres so attractive that residents do not leave the area to settle elsewhere where these services are provided - especially in the urban areas" (OPC, Development Division, 1980a, Section 1).



Appendix Map 4.1
LOCATION OF RURAL GROWTH CENTRES

APPENDIX 5.1

Blantyre's Role in the Malawian Economy

The estimates made by the Blantyre Planning Team for 1972 suggest an extraordinary degree of economic concentration in Blantyre. The estimate made for the share of monetary GDP accounted for by Blantyre alone was 66%. If the 24% contribution of agriculture to monetary GDP is excluded, this suggests that other activities outside Blantyre generated a mere 10%. This is obviously a very extreme situation. The method of calculating Blantyre's share could not be examined and therefore any analysis of the accuracy of this particular figure can only be speculative. There are for instance conceptual problems involved in allocating some elements of GDP to a specific location (e.g. rail transport, the army).

However in 1972 public services accounted for only 12% of monetary GDP, whilst industry, 'other services', and net indirect taxes contributed 63%. It is feasible that Blantyre could have generated a very large proportion of the last three categories of production. 70% of the industrial and 'other services' categories was made up from manufacturing, building and construction, distribution and banking and finance, and the vast majority of these by value would have been concentrated in Blantyre. For instance, in 1972, the value of buildings completed in Lilongwe was only 15% of that in Blantyre (NSO, 1978, Tables 10.9, 10.11). In addition transport, which would have been less concentrated in Blantyre accounted for only 3.5% of monetary GDP. Considering that Blantyre would have also produced some proportion of public services as its share of government administration had not yet been affected by the move to Lilongwe, it may be that this estimate of its share of monetary GDP is not unreasonable, and certainly it can be assumed to indicate the rough magnitude of Blantyre's dominance of the economy at that time.

APPENDIX 6.1CCDC Loans 1980

LONG-TERM BORROWINGS		1980 K	1979 K
1.	Government of the Republic of South Africa to Malawi Govt. and on-lent. Bears interest at 4% per annum and is repayable in a further 35 equal bi-annual instalments of capital and interest.	10,539,247	10,539,906
2.	Malawi Government:		
	- Bears interest at 4% per annum and is repayable in a further 39 bi-annual instalments of capital and interest	8,119,889	8,097,547
	- Bears interest at 9.5% per annum and is repayable in twenty equal annual instalments of capital and interest commencing July, 1981.	1,445,939	1,327,762
	- Bears interest at 9.5% per annum and is repayable in twenty equal annual instalments of capital and interest commencing November, 1982.	2,661,293	2,437,230
	- Bears interest at 9.5% per annum and is repayable in twenty equal instalments of capital and interest commencing September, 1983.	581,243	573,137
3.	Citibank N.A.		
	- Bears interest at 2.25% over the three month London inter-bank offered rate for Eurodollars and is repayable in a further eight equal bi-annual instalments of capital.	974,807	1,186,172
	- Bears interest at 2.25% over the three month London inter-bank offered rate for Eurodollars and is repayable in a further nine equal bi-annual instalments of capital. The loan is guaranteed by the Malawi Government.	1,668,182	1,997,550
	- Bears interest at 1.875% over the three month London inter-bank offered rate for Eurodollars and is repayable in twelve equal bi-annual instalments of capital commencing April, 1980. The loan is guaranteed by the Malawi Government.	10,523,903	10,195,329
4.	Edesa		
	- Bears interest at 10% per annum and is repayable in full in December, 1985. Edesa has the option at any time to require CCDC to transfer to Edesa 5,000,000 10% preference shares in Capital Hotels Ltd. in settlement of the loan.	523,372	510,680
5.	Airport Development Ltd.		
	- Bears interest at 8% and has no fixed terms of repayment.	848,087	2,828,556
6.	Old Mutual		
	- Bears interest at 11.5% per annum and is repayable in thirty equal bi-annual instalments of capital and interest commencing March, 1981.	309,615	-
TOTAL BORROWING (LONG-TERM)		38,195,577	39,673,869

source: CCDC, 1980, Annual Report.

APPENDIX 8.1

Malawian Industrial Development Since Independence

In 1964 Malawi's industrial base was very limited, with the manufacturing sector restricted to tobacco and tea processing on agricultural estates and a range of small, very basic manufacturing firms. The industrial sector as a whole (1) accounted for 13% of GDP, but the monetary manufacturing sector for only 4% (Njolwa, 1982).

Over the next ten years or so the industrial sector experienced very rapid growth rates, averaging 13% per year from 1964-73. This was partly due to the rapid expansion of estate agriculture which has occurred after independence (see Table A8.1), engendering a corresponding expansion in what may be termed agro-industries for export (AIE) (Oksal and Edwards, 1980). The low initial national industrial base, and the construction boom for the new capital are other factors which contributed to the rapid growth.

The rest of the manufacturing sector is largely accounted for by industries producing for domestic demand. Like many other less developed countries Malawi accorded priority to an import-substitution strategy in early development policies. The government's general industrial development policy as set out in both the Industrial Development Act of 1966 and the Statement of Development Policies 1971-80 is mainly aimed at encouraging and enhancing the growth of the manufacturing sector by private local and foreign investors and/or joint ventures with Malawian corporations. An extremely liberal approach has been adopted in terms of taxation and control on industrialization, and free repatriation of all profits is allowed after a 50% corporation tax (2). There was still plenty of scope for fairly basic manufacturing based on local demand and sometimes indigenous resources, and government incentives certainly encouraged the establishment of a number of manufacturing enterprises in the early years of independence which remain very important within the local industrial framework (3).

Table A8.2 shows the structure of manufacturing output in 1973 when a national survey was taken, and this illustrates the importance of basic processing and import-substitution activities. However import-substitution strategies in the less developed world face many problems, and as elsewhere "proved to be of a limited scope in Malawi" (Njolwa, op cit, p. 4). By the end of the 1960s most of the opportunities for large new ventures in demand-based industries had been taken up (Malawi Government, 1971, p.77). From 1968-75 it is estimated that only 20-25% of new gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing went to new projects, the rest being expansion of existing industries (Oksal and Edwards, 1980). Analysis of these problems by Njolwa (ibid), the Ministry of Trade and Industry's principal economist, emphasizes the restrictions imposed by the small size of the domestic market resulting in the perpetual protection of inefficient industries. Also the government's approach has been mainly beneficial to foreign companies, and often costly to the local economy due to the heavy, and often government-subsidized, importation of capital and intermediate goods by foreign and local firms, and because the tendency to overvalue the local currency, in order to facilitate these imports, made primary product exports less competitive in the world market.

As the weaknesses of the import-substitution strategy became apparent, industrialization became only a secondary objective as Malawi opted for an outward-looking, export-oriented development strategy based

upon agriculture. Up until the mid 1970s the industrial contribution to Malawi's economic growth was impressive. It accounted for 18% of GDP increase from 1964 to 1976, when its share of GDP had grown to 17%, and the manufacturing sector's share alone had increased to 13%. Total industrial employment had grown from 34,500 in 1968 (4) to 61,300 in 1976 (23% of domestic wage employment), of which the private industrial sector accounted for 54,500. These official figures only included private enterprises with more than 20 employees, and industrial employment in smaller enterprises was estimated at a further 35,000 (Njolwa, 1982, p.10), bringing total industrial employment to about 96,000. On the other hand this was only about 5% of the 1976 estimated economically active population of 1.7 million.

From 1973-76 however industrial growth slowed, averaging 5% per year, and the manufacturing sector in Malawi has been much less buoyant since about 1975. The index of gross manufacturing output in several categories actually fell in 1976 as shown in Table A8.3. From this table it can be seen that steady growth occurred in all manufacturing categories to 1975, but after this there is much less evidence of a strong upward trend, and downward fluctuations occur in all categories over the following seven years. In particular, 1982 saw falls in all but two categories (footwear, clothing and textiles; export industries), neither of which appeared to expand much, if at all, in the following ten months of 1983. The strongest sector appears to have been the food, beverages and tobacco category - however it is worth noting that official statistics included sugar production (much of it now for export) in this category, and that the production of a huge new sugar project (begun at Dwangwa in 1977) was first included in 1981. Reclassification of this element would improve the performance of the export industries, and depress that of the food, beverages and tobacco category.

This is to some extent reflected in Table A8.4 which uses a limited body of data produced by Oksal and Edwards (1980) which divides Malawian manufacturing into agro-industries for export (AIE, including sugar), and manufacturing for domestic demand (MDD). This shows that from 1969-75 the net output growth of AIE was more buoyant than MDD, and according to Oksal and Edwards (ibid) this trend probably continued. Net output for both sectors has been growing slower than gross output, possibly due to the faster rate of price increases of imported inputs and a possible understatement of costs, and therefore overstatement of net output, in years prior to 1973. This might increase the net growth of MDD from 1969 to 1975, but from 1975 to 1979 it could have been even lower than the 3.4% gross rate shown (see footnote to table). It is therefore estimated that the share of monetary GDP accounted for by MDD has remained static, or decreased slightly from the 17% share in 1972.

Lack of detailed and reliable data on the growth of the manufacturing is a problem (ibid). However one fairly good data base is industrial licences. These are the principal government control mechanism on new manufacturing investment in Malawi. The licencing is governed by the 1966 Industrial Development Act and was originally designed primarily to regulate sectoral investments, avoid investments in saturated domestic markets, prevent the establishment of uneconomic firms, and restrict firms with large import:value-added ratios. All industries engaging more than 10 persons, or using more than 25 horse-power machinery have to apply for licences before they set up, or before expanding an existing enterprise. Table A8.5 and A8.6 show the industrial mix of granted licences between 1967 and 1981, as well as their estimated capital cost and number of employees. The numbers of licences granted per year shows no upward trend after 1970, averaging out at about 14-15 per year, nor is any significant

trend displayed in investment or employment. Specific large-scale projects associated with the AIE sector (two of which are related to Dwangwa) account for the figures for 1977, 1978 and 1981. The pattern therefore parallels that of the indices of manufacturing output, since there is a time lag between establishment and output.

In terms of the sectoral mix of new production, the food and beverages sector, and clothing and textiles are important. However agricultural implements and engineering had the largest number of new or expanding enterprises over the period, although average capital investment here was quite low. The investment and employment impact of the above-mentioned projects is again evident. Overall employment generation has been unimpressive, and productivity per employee is also estimated to have stagnated in all categories, except in tea processing which has experienced a marked improvement (ibid). Employment in manufacturing, and also in building and construction registered a marked decline in the early 1980s as shown in Table A8.7. This parallels the general picture of declining output: the sharp fall in manufacturing employment in 1977 may be linked to the 1976 manufacturing slump.

A slowdown in the growth rate of the manufacturing sector was probably inevitable, given the constraints on import-substitution in Malawi already discussed. However other factors have contributed to the unfavourable performance since 1975/76. One problem is that the AIE sector may be facing supply-side constraints. Expansion of estate acreage has fuelled its development and the current land shortage implies restrictions on this growth and not break-through in productivity appears imminent (ibid). In the short-term there is also no expectation that any alternative cash crops are likely to challenge or even supplement tobacco, sugar and tea.

The slow growth, which in some areas has amounted to stagnation or decline, in manufacturing in Malawi during the later 1970s and early 1980s means that the climate for industrial decentralization, let alone the development of a growth pole, has not been good. Without the provision of massive financial incentives to encourage new enterprises in specific areas (which is beyond Malawi's means) such projects need to operate within an expanding industrial sector, because the alternative is the forced relocation of existing enterprises. This would not only be very expensive but also impossible within the context of Malawi's commitment to free private enterprise. The general economic climate in Malawi during this period, which led to the intervention of the IMF has not encouraged substantial new private investment. A significant constraint has been the recessionary policies implemented by the government to control credit expansion and redress imbalances in the trade accounts. Deposit requirements on import orders, and cut-backs in the availability of bank overdrafts have squeezed business cash balances. Also the shortage of government funds and continued high imported inflation, especially (during the period examined) in fuel, has affected demand.

TABLE AB.1

Estate Production Growth 1960-81

PRODUCT	v o l u m e		v a l u e	
	AAGR% 1960-69	AAGR% 1970-81	AAGR% 1960-69	AAGR% 1970-81
Tea	3.7	5.6	2.1	11.7
Tobacco	11.2	16.3	20.5	37.6
Sugar	-	23.5	-	18.0

Source: Christiansen and Kydd, 1983, adapted from Tables 1 and 2.

TABLE AB.2

Sources of Manufacturing Output 1973

SOURCE	% of manufacturing output
Tobacco Processing	13
Tea Processing	7
Food Processing	16
Textiles, clothing and footwear	17
Beverages	10
Metal works and vehicle assembly	8
Drugs and cosmetics	8
Sawmilling and wood furniture	7
Paper and printing	6
Non-metallic minerals	6

Notes: 1. e.g. sugar, meat, grain, milling, bakeries, canning.
2. Including cotton fibres for export.

Source: data from Njolwa, 1982.

TABLE AB.3

Index of Manufacturing Output

1970 = 100

PERIOD	Manufactures produced mainly for the Domestic Market						Export Inds.	Total
	Consumer Goods mainly for the Domestic Market				Intermediate Goods Mainly for Building and Construction	Total		
	Food Beverages & Tobacco	Footwear Clothing & Textiles	Other Goods	Total				
Weight	(33)	(14)	(15)	(62)	(18)	(80)	(20)	(100)
1970	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1971	112.3	118.1	110.8	113.2	103.1	111.0	108.7	110.6
1972	127.6	118.8	108.0	120.9	122.9	121.3	125.4	122.0
1973	169.4	115.2	142.4	150.4	147.6	149.9	137.7	147.4
1974	192.1	120.1	175.1	171.7	129.0	162.1	131.6	156.0
1975	225.7	130.2	187.3	194.8	157.6	186.5	154.0	180.0
1976	238.6	109.9	176.8	194.6	128.6	179.8	172.3	178.3
1977	259.8	126.2	190.2	212.8	142.9	197.1	207.3	199.1
1978	274.4	148.3	234.3	236.2	166.8	220.6	217.3	219.9
1979	273.9	169.2	205.2	234.7	172.4	220.8	220.2	220.7
1980	292.9	149.4	259.7	252.5	150.4	229.5	201.6	223.9
1981	374.5	170.6	273.0	303.9	124.3	263.5	180.6	246.9
1982	370.1	181.4	180.8	281.7	98.4	240.5	199.8	232.3
1983								
January	232.3	190.5	213.2	218.2	70.6	185.0	190.2	186.1
February	196.7	188.1	182.4	191.3	85.7	167.5	170.4	168.1
March	209.0	190.5	168.4	195.0	103.0	174.3	179.6	175.3
April	330.9	158.5	263.0	275.6	119.1	240.4	137.4	219.8
May	431.9	169.1	330.3	348.0	90.8	290.1	163.0	264.7
June	515.8	194.4	306.0	392.5	120.0	331.2	185.8	302.1
July	528.9	181.5	365.2	410.9	146.6	351.4	184.6	318.0
August	493.8	196.9	379.6	399.1	222.8	359.4	235.3	334.6
September	672.0	250.7	352.3	501.0	141.6	420.1	250.3	386.1
October	304.6	177.4	311.5	427.5	113.6	356.9	199.7	325.4

Notes: 1. High production of sugar, edible oils and fats caused the index to rise.

Source: NSO, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 1984, adapted from Table 9.

TABLE AB.4

Selected Statistics on Performance of Manufacturing Sector
(AIE and MDD)¹

	Agro-Industries for Export (AIE)	Manufacturing for Domestic Demand (MDD)
AAGR in net output in constant prices 1969-75	10%	6%
AAGR in gross output 1975-79	n.a.	3.4% ²
AAGR in employment 1969-75	8.3%	7.7% ³
% <u>monetary</u> GDP:		
1964	n.a.	11%
1972	n.a.	17%
average 1972-80	n.a.	15-17%

- Notes: 1. The ratio of net output of AIE:MDD was estimated in 1980 at 55:45.
2. Net output growth has been estimated at 6.3% for 1969-75. However the UNDP/UNIDO project team felt this was in error, given that the gross output figure is lower.
3. MDD was estimated to account for about 35,000 jobs in 1980, about 10% of domestic wage employment.

Source: Oksal and Edwards, 1980.

TABLE A8.5

Industrial Licences Issued 1967-81

YEAR OF ISSUE	Number.	Capital ¹ (K'000)	Employment ²
1967	9	626	440
1968	10	1550	402
1969	20	2700	950
1970	33	8487	7488
1971	13	1595	426
1972	11	861	387
1973	16	2862	810
1974	18	3966	770
1975	11	2041	200
1976	12	2281	226
1977	15	61464 ³	5398
1978	24	15571 ⁴	2875
1979	16	1999	800
1980	13	1430	n.a.
1981	17	e.9600 ⁵	449

- Notes: 1. Estimated capital cost of projects.
 2. Estimated number of jobs created.
 3. Includes large Dwangwa sugar project costed at K59 million.
 4. Includes large Limbe Leaf Co. Ltd. enterprise of K5.63 million.
 5. Includes ethanol project at Dwangwa costed at K6.84 million.

TABLE A8.6

Industrial Licences Granted by Sector 1967-79

SECTOR	Number	Capital (K'000)	Employed
Chemicals	16	3539	592
Clothing and textiles	28	2894	1274
Motor assembly and parts	8	3453	138
Plastics	8	2048	198
Timber and furniture	25	2961	906
Electrical	7	436	98
Agricultural implements and engineering	35	5748	1606
Paper products	4	598	66
Food products and beverages	32	63337 ¹	5391
Tobacco processing	11	16142 ²	9516
Tea processing	4	681	151
Miscellaneous	30	3008	217

- Notes: 1. See footnote 3, Table A8.5.
 2. See footnote 4, Table A8.5.

Source: Oksal and Edwards, 1980.

TABLE AB.7

Employment by Sector in Industry 1968-82

YEAR	Mining & Quarrying	Manuf-acturing	Electricity & Water	Building & Construction
old series				
1968	319	17429	1499	15472
1969	826	17691	1530	17362
1970	492	19463	1737	18539
1971	600	21760	2168	17771
1972	764	23158	2457	18209
1973	763	25640	2884	21127
1974	865	26792	2529	22827
1975	891	31361	2664	21065
1976	1098	36025	3027	21128
1977	509	31417	2751	22283
new series				
1977	588	33749	2751	23250
1978	564	35629	2922	31529
1979	562	38437	3481	33570
1980	605	39652	4030	32749
1981	572	35366	4124	24481
1982*	609	31397	4272	24725

Notes: * estimates

In 1977 there was a change in the coverage of employment. The old series (1968-77) covered all government employees, and companies with 20 or more employees in the private sector (which included statutory bodies and commissions). From 1977 onwards the private sector coverage was broadened to include all businesses regardless of size. There was also reclassification of some enterprises between sectors, although there is no specific information on this. The effect on the industrial sector can be estimated by comparing the 1977 old series data with the 1977 new series data, but this does make it difficult, if not impossible, to compare pre- and post-1977 employment statistics.

Sources: NSO, Reported Employment and Earnings Annual Reports, 1970, 1976
 NSO, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, September 1979, Quarterly Supplement
 Malawi Government, Economic Report 1982, Table 9.1
 NSO Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 1983, Quarterly Supplement.

Notes to Appendix 8.1

1. The industrial sector includes manufacturing, building and construction, mining and quarrying, and electricity and water. The latter two categories however form only a small proportion of industrial production (respectively 0.5% and 5.5% in 1964, and 0.6% and 6.7% in 1973). From 1974 onwards mining and quarrying production is included in the official category of manufacturing, but this has little impact on comparison of manufacturing output before and after this date.
2. In 1979/80 Lever Brothers (Malawi) Ltd. thus repatriated 94% of post tax profits to the London head office (Njolwa, 1982, p.3).
3. These are mainly represented by Lever Brothers (Malawi) Ltd., David Whitehead and Sons (Malawi) Ltd., Portland Cement Ltd., Agrimal (Malawi) Ltd., Carlsberg Brewery (Malawi) Ltd., and Southern Bottlers Ltd. Their main products are respectively food, clothing, building materials, agricultural implements, and beer and beverages.
4. This was the first year in which employment statistics were published for both the government and private sectors. Although employment statistics from 1968-76 are strictly comparable, from 1977 the coverage was changed and therefore caution must be exercised in comparing time-series data.

APPENDIX 8.2

Terms of Reference for the Industrial Development Programme

1. To encourage the development of manufacturing industry by private investors and/or joint ventures with Malawian companies and statutory corporations.
2. To ensure industry develops to the maximum extent possible consistent with optimum allocation of scarce resources and on the basis of long-term comparative advantage.
3. To provide administrative, legal and physical frameworks conducive to manufacturing development.
4. To provide flexible guidelines for future manufacturing development and a logical order of priorities.
5. To ensure that foreign investors are aware of manufacturing opportunities in Malawi.

APPENDIX 8.3

Other Significant Potential Industrial Projects in Sector Programme

1. Expansion of natural rubber output.
2. Dairy expansion in Blantyre.
3. Expansion in plastic products output.
4. Ceramics and glass production.
5. Cement production expansion.
6. New foundry: K1.25 million.
7. Rolled steel products.
8. Particle-board or fibreboard plant.
9. Textile expansion in polyester.
10. Lilongwe brewery, 1987.
11. Pulp/paper/wood and panel mill at Chintechi (uncertain) for local demand.

APPENDIX 8.4

Sample Survey of Lilongwe Business Enterprises 1980: Methodology

This postal questionnaire survey covered a stratified sample of all types of businesses operating in Lilongwe in 1980. The data base for the sample was the business register of Malawi, which covered all registered businesses operating in the country, with their addresses, and includes virtually all formal private and public sector operations (including for instance agricultural estates). Private sector operations are distinguished from the public sector by a numerical code, and include quasi parastatals (e.g. Press). The register is arranged by type of business, rather than location. For instance, all manufacturing enterprises are listed together and sub-divided into textile industries, agricultural industries, chemical industries, metal products, etc. Similarly construction concerns form another category, as do wholesale and retail outlets, petrol stations and general garages, and so on.

This formulation meant that a systematic sample of enterprises in Lilongwe from the register would cover every type of business, and each category would be represented in the sample in proportion to its real numerical significance in the city. It also covers a complete size range of firms in terms of employment and capital invested. Whilst accepting that large-scale business must be the most significant element in a growth centre's internal economy, smaller-scale enterprise is also important. This is the level at which local entrepreneurs will dominate and is also theoretically very susceptible to local spread (or backwash) effects initiated by other larger enterprises.

The August 1980 business register file listed 576 private sector businesses in Lilongwe. As the rate of return from postal questionnaires is notoriously low, it is best to have as large an initial sample coverage as possible. Combining this point with the practicalities of available time and cost, an initial sample of a third was chosen, by selecting every third Lilongwe private business on the file.

Although it would have been preferable to use a pilot survey to design the final questionnaire the time involved would have been prohibitive. Local help was solicited in formulating the questionnaire, and in particular the accompanying letter. Questions about motivation and attitudes are highly sensitive issues. There is understandably, some controversy over the desirability of the Lilongwe project in the private sector, particularly in Blantyre. It was therefore necessary to emphasize in the accompanying letter that the questionnaire was for private research, and no company would be mentioned by name in the final presentation.

201 questionnaires were sent out. Those who had not replied after a certain period were sent a reminder letter. Altogether 61 replies were received - thus the response rate was 30%, reasonable for a postal questionnaire. Thus the survey covered just over 10% of all business concerns in Lilongwe. The spread of non-respondents through the categories of businesses obviously affected the overall representativeness of the sample. Although they were fairly scattered throughout the various types of businesses represented, it was significant that larger enterprises in all sectors were much better respondents than small concerns (e.g. tailors or grocers), perhaps because the latter had less time and labour to devote to such a non-productive activity, or because they were more suspicious of its motive. As there were far more small-scale businesses than medium or large-scale on the register, this

does not matter too much although this factor should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.

The questionnaire covered a very wide range of variables. Some respondents did not answer some relevant questions or their answers were inadequate. Thus the results for various questions refer to varying numbers of respondents, and cover only those answers which were felt to be accurate. The maximum possible number of answers to each question was 58, since three responding businesses were non-operative. One of these businesses had closed, and another had never opened due to lack of capital but was still on the register. The third was a construction company which had just been liquidated. These indicate some inaccuracies in the national business register and many more non-operational firms are likely to have been amongst the non-respondents of course. The case of the construction company is noteworthy because of the decline in Lilongwe's construction sector generally.

7. Have any branches of the enterprise elsewhere in Malawi been closed or reduced in size since the establishment of the Lilongwe enterprise?

Closed

Reduced

Branch.....
.....
.....

8. Where is the headquarters of the enterprise now? (tick)

a) in Lilongwe at this enterprise []

b) in Blantyre. []

c) elsewhere in Malawi (location.....) []

d) HQ outside Malawi (state town & country
 []
 []

State original location of headquarters before establishment of enterprise in Lilongwe, if different from above:

Blantyre []

Other (specify)..... []

Impact of Lilongwe's capital status.

9. Was the enterprise in Lilongwe established before or after the Government's decision to move the national capital to Lilongwe in 1965? (tick)

Before [] After []

Where was the decision to invest in Lilongwe made (tick)

a) In Lilongwe, by head of this enterprise []

b) At another branch/Headquarters in Malawi located in:

Blantyre []

Zomba []

Other..... []

c) At HQ outside Malawi

Location and name:..... []

d) Other (specify)..... []

10. If the enterprise was established before the official decision to make Lilongwe the national capital, was it ever suspected by this enterprise, before 1965, that Lilongwe would become Malawi's capital city?

Yes [] No []

11. If it was suspected that Lilongwe might become the capital city, did this affect the decision to invest in Lilongwe?

Yes [] No [] Uncertain []

12. If the enterprise was established after 1965, would it have begun in Lilongwe if Lilongwe had not become the national capital? (tick)

- Definitely.....	Yes []	No []
- Probably.....	[]	[]
- Uncertain.....	[]	[]

13. If Lilongwe's status did affect the decision to locate there, in what ways was it expected that location in the national capital would be advantageous to the enterprise?

.....

.....

14. If this Lilongwe enterprise would not have been established if Lilongwe had not become the national capital, would an alternative investment elsewhere in Malawi have been made?

yes [] no [] uncertain [] (tick)

alternative location.....

Would the value of this alternative investment have been the same, less or more than amount invested in Lilongwe?

same [] more [] less [] (tick)

Would alternative investment have been an entirely new enterprise or enlargement of existing enterprise?

new [] enlargement []

15. State value of initial fixed capital invested in Lilongwe enterprise:

value in Kwachas.....

Has there been any subsequent fixed capital investment?

yes [] no [] - value subsequent investment Kwachas.....

16. State number of employees employed when first established

At present time

17. How is labour obtained (tick) Please give no. in each category. Number

- a) locally recruited (from within Lilongwe district)[.]
- b) from elsewhere in Malawi. []
- c) transferred from other branches []
- branch.....
- d) from outside Malawi. []

Integration.

18. What sort of enterprises exist in Lilongwe which are complementary to the product or service your enterprise provides (i.e. that produce inputs for your operation, or process, sell, transport outputs; other than services such as electricity, water, roads etc.,)

	Type of firm	Deal with outputs	Provide inputs
- Industries	[]	[]
- Craft enterprises	[]	[]
- Trade companies (e.g. export cos.)	[]	[]
- Transport firms	[]	[]
-	[]	[]
-	[]	[]
question No.18, cont'd.....			

QUESTIONNAIRE - cont'd - page 4

Question No. 18 contin'd:-

18.	<u>Type of firm</u>	<u>Deal with outputs</u>	<u>Provide inpute</u>
Wholesale / retail outlets	[]	[]
Other services (e.g. Govt. licensing offices, customs, banks)	[]	[]
Agric., livestock, forestry (e.g. ADMARC., private outlets for food, timber)	[]	[]

19. Did existence of complementary enterprises encourage your location in Lilongwe? (tick)

yes [] no [] uncertain []

20. Have other enterprises in Lilongwe been opened or extended due to the location of your enterprise in Lilongwe? (tick)

yes [] no [] uncertain []

	<u>Type of firm</u>	<u>Opened</u>	<u>Extended</u>
-Industries	[]	[]
-Craft enterprises	[]	[]
-Trade companies	[]	[]
-Transport firms	[]	[]
-Wholesale / retail outlets	[]	[]
-Other services	[]	[]
-Agric. Livestock forestry	[]	[]

21. Where are original sources of inputs needed for the activities of your enterprise (please estimate % of each input from each area)

	LILONGWE	LILONGWE DISTRICT	BLANTYRE	ELSEWHERE MALAWI (SPECIFY)	ABROAD (SPECIFY)
-Construction inputs	%	%	%	%	%
-Machinery & equipment	%	%	%	%	%
-Vehicles	%	%	%	%	%
-Component parts	%	%	%	%	%
-Auxiliary materials.	%	%	%	%	%
-Raw materials	%	%	%	%	%
-Manufactured goods (i.e. shop goods)	%	%	%	%	%

22. What percentage of products or services are sold by the enterprise to customers / enterprises in:-

LILONGWE	LILONGWE	BLANTYRE	ELSEWHERE	ABROAD
	DISTRICT		IN MALAWI	

Estimated
percentage per
year

23. How are foreign materials obtained, and foreign exports made?

		Imports	Exports
a) Through Blantyre firms (tick)		[]	[]
b) Through <u>your</u> Blantyre operations.		[]	[]
c) direct through a Blantyre agent		[]	[]
d) direct		[]	[]
e) other (specify).....		[]	[]

f) no foreign raw materials [] []

24. Are enterprise buildings: (tick)

a) owned and built by enterprise	[]	[]
b) owned by enterprise and built by construction firm.	[]	[]
c) rented from Government	[]	[]
d) other specify.....	[]	[]

Is land on which buildings are located (tick)

a) Owned by enterprise	[]
b) rented from Government	[]
c) rented from other body (specify)	[]

25. Have you encountered any particular problems due to your location in Lilongwe rather than elsewhere in Malawi?

(tick) yes [] No []

Nature of problem.....

26. Will the location of an international airport at Lilongwe improve the commercial prospects of your enterprise?

(tick). yes [] no [] uncertain []

Is it possible that further investment in the enterprise will occur when the airport is built?

(tick) yes [] no [] uncertain []

If the enterprise's headquarters are elsewhere, might they be moved to Lilongwe when the airport is built?

(tick) yes [] no [] uncertain []

27 How do you assess the return made on your investment made in Lilongwe?

28. Any other comments?.....

APPENDIX 8.6

Industrial Licence Application Form : Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ACT

(CAP. 51 : 01)

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT RULES

PART 1

APPLICATION FOR INDUSTRIAL LICENCE UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE ACT

1. Name of applicant:
2. Name under which applicant proposes to operate in Malawi
.....
3. Postal Address:
.....
4. Proposed location of manufacturing establishment (s):
Plot Number: Town:
District:
5. List of products it is proposed to manufacture:
.....
.....
.....
6. Estimated number of persons to be employed:
7. Estimated horse-power of machinery and equipment to be
used in manufacturing:
.....

.....

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

.....

DATE

.....

Status of signatory

(owner, director, manager, etc)

PART 11

INFORMATION REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION

(Note: Please consult the explanatory notes on the last page of this form before answering the following questions)

1. What steps have been taken to acquire land and/or buildings?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

2. Estimated date of commencement of manufacturing operation:

.....
.....

3. Estimated number of persons to be employed:

	Malawians	Others	Total
Managerial			
Other skilled			
Unskilled			

4. Estimated total cost of salaries and wages, both in cash and kind (per month):

Paid to Malawians K Paid to others K.....
Total salaries and wages (per month): K.....

5. Give details of the type and timing of training for Malawians and the number to be trained by category:

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Estimated annual consumption of raw materials:

	Unit	Quantity	Produced in Malawi	Imported Materials	Total value
(a)	Agricultural (specify)				
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

TOTAL
AGRICULTURAL
MATERIALS

	Unit	Quantity	Produced in Malawi	Imported Materials	Total Value
(b)	Mineral (specify)				
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

TOTAL
MINERAL
MATERIALS

(c)	Other raw materials (specify)				
1.
2.
3.
4.
TOTAL OTHER RAW MATERIALS					

Estimated annual consumption of bought in components and semi-
Manufactured goods:

Type of Component	Unit	Quantity	Produced in Malawi	Imported	Total Value
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

8. Estimated annual transport costs
.....

9. Estimated annual consumption of other industrial materials
and services:

	Unit	Quantity	Produced in Malawi	Imported	Total Value
1. Electricity	00KWH
2. Water	000 gls
3. Fuel	tons
(specify type)	gals
4. Others	
(specify)	

10. Estimated annual costs of administration:
.....
.....
.....

11. Estimated sales for the first year of production:

	Product: (specify)	Selling Price Per Unit	Quantity	Sold in Malawi	Export	Total Sales Value
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

12. Estimated annual sales if plant and equipment were working at maximum output:

	Product (specify)	Selling Price Per Unit	Quantity	Sold in Malawi	Exported	Total Sales Value
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

13. What annual percentage growth in sales do you expect?
(e.g. 2%, 4%, 7%, 10% etc):
Applicant Remarks (if any)
.....
.....

14. Present prices of products similar to those applicant proposes to manufacture:

Product (Specify)	Selling Price Per Unit	
	For Similar goods already produced in Malawi	For similar goods presently being imported
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

15. Estimated value of capital to be employed:

Value	
(A) <u>Fixed Capital:</u>	
i) Building
ii) Land
iii) Machinery
iv) Vehicles
v) Tools, Fixtures, Furniture
vi) Other
Total Fixed Capital (sum of i to vi)	
(B) <u>Working Capital:</u>	
vii) Stocks of material and work in progress
viii) Stocks of finished goods
ix) Amount owing from debtors
x) Cash in hand and at bank
Total Gross Working Capital (sum of vii to x)	
Deduct amount owing to creditors	
Total Net Working Capital	
(C) Total Capital Employed: Fixed capital + Net Working Capital	

16. Sources of funds to cover total capital employed

Nature of Funds (Specify rate of interest on loan funds)	VALUE (K)		
	Malawi Sources	External Sources	Total Value
(A) <u>Loan Finance Name & Country of lender</u>			
a) Long term loans (over 5 years)
.....
.....
b) Medium term loans (1 to 5 years)
.....
c) Short term loans and credits
(less than 1 year
(B) <u>Equity Finance Source</u>			
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

17. Protection and rebates:

State whether applicant proposes to apply for:

- (a) Tariff Protection Yes/No.
- (b) Rebates of duty on imported materials Yes/No.

18. If your chosen location for manufacturing is other than Lilongwe, state the additional costs you would expect to incur by sitting at Lilongwe (specify the nature and amount of cost increases):

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

19. What arrangements will you make to acquire necessary skilled technical or managerial manpower?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

20. Names and nationalities of directors, partners, etc.

Full Name	Status	Nationality
-----------	--------	-------------

21. Qualifications and/or experience of persons listed in 20:

.....
.....
Date

.....
.....
Signature of applicant

.....
.....
Status of signatory
(owner, director, manager, etc)

APPENDIX 8.7

Capital City Development Corporation
Schedule of Land Charges - 1st October 1981

Type of Development	Area	Annual Ground Rent		Development Charge	
		Per Acre K	Per Hectare K	Per Acre K	Per Hectare K
<u>Residential</u>					
Low and Medium	2 3 9 10 12 43/2 47/3	60	148	6,000	14,826
Medium Density Multi Occupation	11	100	247	8,000	19,768
<u>Commercial</u>					
City Centre	10				
City Centre Surround	13,16,40	1,000	2,471	60,000	148,260
Local Centres		400	988	10,000	24,710
<u>Industrial</u>					
Light Industrial	7,28,29	300	741	8,000	19,768
Heavy Industrial	29	500	1,236	10,000	24,710
<u>Churches, Clinics, Community Centres</u>		80	198	One third of Normal Charge	
<u>Agricultural Land</u>					
0-10 acres		50	124	-	-
10-100 acres		25	62	-	-
100-1000 acres		7.5	19	-	-
Over 1000 acres		5	12	-	-

NOTES

1. Ground rent is reviewable every 7 years.
2. Development charges are per acre pro rate.
3. Ground rent is based on a minimum of 1 acres.

Source: Capital City Development Corporation.

PLATES

PLATE 1



A view from the new Lilongwe CBD looking towards the Reserve Bank



The new National Building Society headquarters in the new CBD (note the intervening open land).



The road to the new airport passes some of the newer THAs but these are screened from sight by trees.



A site and service house in Area 25, a new THA in 'new' Lilongwe.



Formally built housing for Africans in 'old' Lilongwe:
the Falls Estate.



Area 18 in 'new' Lilongwe: permanent high density housing.



Women pounding maize outside site and service houses in Area 25 - a new THA.

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